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Irena Borowik, Dinka Marinović Jerolimov, Siniša Zrinščak 
RELIGION AND PATTERNS OF SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION – OR: HOW TO INTERPRET 
RELIGIOUS CHANGES IN POST-COMMUNISM? 
Sociologists of religion agree there is a characteristic compatibility 
between religious institutions and social structures at any stage of social 
development. Changes in society are related to religious changes. These kinds 
of changes were a core interest of classical sociologists. Emil Durkheim (1902) 
discussed how changes of labour division accompanying the process of 
transformation from traditional to modern society affect the social status of 
religion. In discussing these relationships, he identified the moment of religious 
individualisation. 
Weber (1920-22) devoted his research to the identification of social groups 
who carry religious traditions; he showed the relationships between the social 
structures of India, China, and Israel, and the development of Hinduism and 
Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism, and Judaism. In this, he also 
demonstrated the relationship between religious and economic processes, and 
found the evidence for the rationalisation of religion, in keeping with his view 
of the rationalising tendency of Western Culture. Robert Bellah (1964) 
summarised the development of religion as a process showing at each stage the 
relation between the form of religion and the features of a society. Niklas 
Luhmann (1982) admitted that modernity models religion and in consequence 
causes the development of dogmatics. These examples illustrate that there are 
many themes and motifs in sociological thought, but that their common feature 
is an acknowledged relation and relevance between religious and social 
forms. Having reflected upon these relations, the cited sociologists identified 
characteristic features of religions in certain periods, looking at them in longer 
or shorter temporal perspectives. It is also a good context to question the 
transforming society and the place of religion in it. 
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The decline of communism had its own symbols – terms like “glasnost” 
and “perestroika” – that narrated the politics of opening the Eastern Block to 
the world. They were easy to find on the international front pages in the late 
1980s. The photos of the collapse of the Berlin Wall illustrated the ending of 
the ‘sphere of Soviet influence’. Terms like “round table” and “Velvet 
Revolution” epitomise the bloodless character of the transformations which 
resulted in the changes in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Having in mind classical concepts of mutual relevance of religious and 
social processes, what could be treated as a good starting point to reflect on the 
“nature” of society being in the process of transformation, leaving the 
Communist past and joining capitalistic and democratic world of Europe? 
One of the possible views is considering of the transformational changes 
from two different perspectives: systemic and subjective. In the first case, 
political change seems to be the most distinctive – the replacement of a one-
party system with a multiparty democratic system. As a result, societies of 
Central-Eastern Europe became subjectively politicised. The last decade can be 
characterised as a great differentiation of the political scene into left-wing, 
Post-Communist parties, many right-wing parties, and a consequent variety in 
the composition of governments. Parliamentary and presidential elections 
expressed the mobilisation as well as the political attitudes of society. The 
possibility of having an influence on political reality was a real change in 
comparison to the past. 
The other novelty could be observed in economics. After the collapse of 
communism a Communist, a centrally-managed, planned economy was 
replaced by a free-market economy and the system of capitalistic production. 
Its consequences increased unemployment and variation in salaries. For the first 
time these societies experienced social stratification based on strongly 
differentiated incomes. On the personal level, society divided into layers, 
moving from the shared poverty of communism to a society with a very 
prosperous elite and growing poverty. In the succeeding years, transformation 
affected other areas: the educational system, health service, and public 
insurance system. These changes are ongoing. 
From a subjective perspective, the view of a normal ‘man on the street’ 
(or a component of social awareness of changing reality), the process is 
perceived mainly in the context of the problems it brings. Nostalgia is 
common, at least in those areas where the transformation process is perceived 
as having worsened the situation. Socially and economically underprivileged 
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groups experience fear of changes, fear of the entrance to the European Union 
and fear of an uncertain future. 
Lest this analysis be considered one-sided, we must remember to mention 
the other side of transformation: the positive opportunities brought by change, 
and those who have benefited from them, those who have been the carriers – to 
use Weber’s terms – of transformation and democratisation. The new economic 
possibilities presented by the free market have been utilised by those social 
groups predisposed to gain from them: the former political elite, who have 
made use of their knowledge of economics; the young, dynamic and qualified, 
who have introduced to the employment market such professions as manager, 
insurance agent, stock broker, advertising copywriter, and moreover the 
members of trades and guilds, those professions which during communism 
formed the exceptional enclave of ‘private business’. Freedom therefore, 
pregnant with possibilities for all, has been exploited effectively by a few. 
The change in the style of living has meant a change in values. Also 
significant is the growth of print media and the effect of that growth on public 
opinion. Journalists have exposed the corruption, penetrated the organised 
crime, critiqued and debated many aspects of the societal world-view: even 
such a sensitive issue as child abuse within the family, until recently the taboo 
in societies of the region. 
In these transformations is religion present and if so – how? Does it relate 
to the objects that the clasics of the sociology of religion dealt with? Are 
religions and churches involved in transformation of economy, politics, styles 
of life, values? Is religion the source of integration or desintegration in 
transforming society? Does it involve itself, own structures and modes of acting 
in the processes of adaptation or rather form expectations, directions and 
influence changes of other sectors of society in order to adapt them to its own 
aims? What are the social attitudes towards religions and churches and what are 
the differences in comparison to the Communist times? In these rolling 
transformations, this democratic life and all that it brings – pluralism, freedom, 
the rule of law, existing civil society and the formation of political society – are 
religion and its accompanying institutions appropriate to these changes? 
These methodological dilemmas are strongly present in this book, but also 
in other studies that do not focus on Central and Eastern Europe but other areas, 
mainly on the Western societies. Two recently published books, written by 
James Beckford and Karel Dobbelaere, are here of a particular interest. 
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Elaborating already discussed question why during the second half of the 
twentieth century social science has marginalized religion (Beckford, 1989), in 
his latest book the author explains social-constructionist approach aimed at 
better understanding of the way how people understand, experience and use 
religion in their everyday life. Respectively: ‘Without denying the existence of 
anything other than text and discourse – and building on well-established 
insights into the constructive and destructive possibilities of social interaction – 
I seek to analyze the processes whereby the meaning of the category of religion 
is, in various situations, intuited, asserted, doubted, challenged, rejected, 
substituted, re-cast, and so on’ (Beckford, 2003:3). 
Our intention is not to discuss the presumptions and consequences of using 
the social-constructionist approach towards sociology of religion, but to point at 
an attempt of the new approach to a contradictory and paradoxical reality, a 
reality in which religion plays various and often hardly comprehensible roles. 
This variance has been highlighted several times in the analyses of the Post-
Communist reality where in many cases religion becomes the object of 
ideological and social struggles, what often hides its other, not less important, 
social roles. Therefore, it is not only the issue in which way religion (mainly 
dominant churches) is adapting to the new pluralistic social circumstances 
scientifically relevant, but in which way it builds (by means of various answers 
offering to various people at various levels) the new social reality, regardless 
how much this construction of the new reality is encumbered by social 
conflicts. 
In order to understand the past, contemporary and future social roles of 
religion in Central and Eastern Europe, scientists often use the secularisation 
theory. If there has already been some skepticism regarding the features of 
Communist modernisation (and consequently about secularisation as an 
apparent manifestation of the process of the functional differentiation of 
society), the connection modernisation – secularisation in its entirety is on the 
agenda of the recent modernisation development (at least in the majority of 
Post-Communist countries). This is the reason why it is interesting a re-
publishing of the fundamental study on secularisation by Karel Dobbelaere 
(1981, 2002), which is as having been impregnated by the notion of a necessity 
of returning to the original idea of complexity of secularisation, articulated in 
differentiating the three dimensions – societal, organisational and individual: 
‘The concept of secularisation should be only used if one referred to all three 
levels at the same time. However, this proposal did not produce the expected 
results’ (Dobbelaere, 2002:13). Indeed, it is really a matter of a complex task 
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and a sensitive concept and the study itself indicates again how it is often 
difficult to associate the influence of one level to the second and third and vice 
versa. We can even say that an attempt of understanding the connection 
between the dimensions diverges a necessary attention from the processes 
within one dimension, for example, the processes that occur on the individual 
level where there is an evident tendency of not only individualistic-pluralistic 
relationship towards religious traditions (bricolage, religion à la carte, 
patchwork etc.), but also of recomposition that stresses the new human needs as 
well as the new religious answers. Another fact is pointed out in this new 
edition of the study that is specifically relevant for Post-Communist countries: 
bringing the actors back in! Consciously or unconsciously, the protagonists 
constantly re-shape and change social processes and relations and this 
dynamics has a considerable impact on the difference of the role of religion and 
the Church in different societies. 
The very thing that associates not only these two studies but also a lot of 
others from this book that are emphatically focused on West-European 
societies, is the matter of validity of scientific reinterpretation of the social 
reality. Evident discontent with the existing theories within sociology of 
religion whose immanent reductionism can not explain without increasing 
difficulties the difference of the social roles of religion what is more evident in 
the analyses of Post-Communist societies as well. 
The first issue that strikes and provokes researchers is the existence of an 
extreme variance in Post-Communist countries, from a very high rate of non-
religious to those with an outstandingly low percentage of non-religious. As an 
addition to this, there are also differences within a particular country. The level 
of religious identification (answer on the question: “I am religious person”) 
vary from 94.4% in Poland, 84.8% in Romania, 84.5% in Lithuania and 83.7% 
in Croatia to 43.2% in the Czech Republic, 41.7% in Estonia and 27.5% in 
Belarus (Halman, 2001). In this respect Poland is the most religious and 
Belarus the least religious country taking into account the whole Europe. 
Religiosity is higher in Italy, Austria or Portugal than in Slovenia, Hungary or 
Bulgaria. With some slight differences, the same image is produced by 
measuring religiosity through Church attendance. Malta is with Poland the most 
religious country (87.2% and 78.2% respectively of those who attend Church at 
least once a month) and the Czech Republic (11.7%), Estonia (11.2) and Russia 
(9.2%) are the least religious together with Sweden (9.3%), France (11.9%) or 
Denmark (11.9%). But, can we just conclude that Russians or Czechs are 
simply irreligious or secular? Or, can we say that Poles, Romanians and Croats 
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are not so religious that researches indicate because religion in these countries 
has different social roles, such as those connected with particular cultural and 
national identities? Are the indicators of religiosity, which are obviously an 
outcome of various social relationships – and for that very reason – of lesser 
importance? May we question the religious image of some country by doubting 
the motives of such religiosity? Ideological intricacy of religion and ideological 
interpretative matrix are linked with many threads and it is for sure a field of 
the future interest of the sociologists of religion in Central and Eastern Europe. 
We believe that the studies published in this book, especially in the first 
chapter, represent a solid base for this field. What comes under scrutiny now is 
a comparison of the Eastern European countries with Italy and Finland – the 
two countries where secularisation is at full work, but it can not entirely 
describe all religious tendencies, especially those more noticeable in these 
countries by the end of 20th century. 
The next very intriguing issue, and which is also treated in various ways in 
the texts of this book (specifically the chapter: Challenges of Post-Communist 
Societies), is the matter of a consequential reach of an increased or revived 
religiosity in many Post-Communist countries. For example, approval of abor-
tion for single women is not so consistent with the image of religiosity, in some 
countries almost completely unattached to religious views. Slovenia, Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Romania, Croatia, Belarus and Russia are the countries in which such 
approval is greater than 50%, in many cases higher than in Germany or Great 
Britain (Halman, 2001). Religiosity is also not able to shape socially acceptable 
behavior. Cheating on tax is according to opinions of respondents generally 
higher in Post-Communist Europe than in Western Europe. 
In any case, theologically-normative image of a social role of religion 
does not correspond to the real role and functions of religion. Do the Post-
Communist countries, however, share some specific features in this area, as 
the recent research of R. Stark (2001) suggests? Firstly, he contended that it 
is the image of God, and not attendance at church services, which helps 
religion maintain moral order. Secondly, he suggested that the link between 
religiosity and some moral norms is the weakest in the Post-Communist 
Europe, what is a consequence, as he explains, to a great extent, of the 
position of religion in communism. Stark’s research was focused on only 
some of Post-Communist countries that took part in the World Value Study 
1990-1991, but his findings and theses are very intriguing which will for sure 
incite a new research-work interest. 
Religion and Patterns of Social Transformation… 
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As in many other fields, the issue of the European integrations gains an 
increasing legitimacy. Namely, it becomes clearer that, in spite of many doubts 
and obstacles, New Europe affects many social relationships, even those that by 
the rule of subsidisation (what is, among other things, the topic of religious 
tradition and Church-State relations) are not in jurisdiction of the European 
supranational level. Europeisation, as a process of constructing the new 
supranational mechanisms and institutions, has a double effect: from the 
European level towards the national states (an example of the influence of the 
European Court of Human Rights), and then in reverse order (when the EU 
issue becomes an issue of social debates, even serious conflicts). 
Many of mentioned problems are discussed in the studies published in this 
book. It is based (after discussions and suggestions have been made) on collection 
of elaborated and developed presentations from the International Conference, 
‘Religion and Patterns of Social Transformation’ that was organized by the 
International Study of Religion in Eastern and Central Europe Association 
(ISORECEA) and the Institute for Social Research in Zagreb, Croatia in 2001. 
The book consists of four topical units. The first chapter ‘Religion and 
Social Transformation: East and West’ consists of six papers which deal with 
religion, religiosity and spirituality in the countries of Central and Eastern, but 
also Western Europe. The first study is written by Eileen Barker in which the 
author, provoked by the issues resulting from the secularisation debate, 
discusses a plethora of different meanings of spirituality. She examines 
spirituality through three approaches: two ideal-type models of relations of 
spirituality towards conservative religiosity and secularism; by selection of 
some meanings people ascribe to spirituality and basis the results of Pan-
European Study on Religious and Moral Pluralism (RAMP) conducted in 1998, 
which indicate some of the characteristics that were associated with the 
respondents’ understanding of spirituality, thereby suggesting some directions 
for further investigation. Miklós Tomka analyzes religious changes in some 
Post-Communist countries and brings up a crucial matter before regarding the 
relations of religion and modernisation. Namely, the main controversy of 
modern sociology arises out of secularisation consequences of modernisation 
development. Tomka demonstrates that the connection between secularisation 
and modernisation is discernible in Post-Communist Europe as well, but he also 
takes into consideration some alternative hypotheses while interpreting 
religious revival. For example, he points to a substantial increase of religiosity 
of those born after 1960, as well as to the strong link of religion and culture in 
certain countries. 
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The complementary texts to the study of Miklós Tomka are those of Olaf 
Müller and Detlef Pollack who mostly examine data of comparative research 
‘Political Culture and Central and Eastern Europe’ conducted in eleven 
countries in 2000. While Müller analyzes the three hypotheses on religious 
changes in Central and Eastern Europe (secularisation, privatisation and 
revitalisation), Pollack is focused on the relations of the institutional 
(traditional) and individual (subjective) religiosity. His conclusion is that 
individualisation is present but still marginal, especially in societies with strong 
traditional churches. 
The next two texts examine the situation in two West European countries – 
Italy and Finland. They also raise an issue of unambiguousness of relation 
modernisation – secularisation. By wondering how come that Italian society, 
although highly modernized and individualized according values, continues to 
be in many aspects a traditional Catholic society, Enzo Pace introduces a term 
of ‘soft secularisation’. It can be assumed that this concept, similar to the well 
known Grace Davie’s concept on ‘believing without belonging’, which 
describes contradictory tendencies of religious changes on the European 
Continent, will draw the attention of the scientific community. Kati Niemelä 
examines the Finnish experience that is different from the Italian, but provokes 
similar questions: In comparison to many other European nations, the Finns are 
less religious but they identify themselves at an above- average level with the 
Lutheran Church. On the other hand, in the 90s, many indicators show an 
increase of privatized religiosity that the author observes in the context of the 
slump in social security (recession and rising unemployment). 
Five papers of the second chapter ‘Challenges of Post-Communist 
Societies’ discuss the answers of religion to the new social issues within the 
frame of the process of Post-Communist transformation. Irena Borowik 
challenges the connection of religion, development of civil society and 
democratic transformation in general. The Catholic Church in Poland has been 
the prime social moving force of democratic changes. Now the Church can 
hardly respond to the challenges of those changes. The crucial query is how to 
act and have influence in pluralistic society, what means to use pluralistic-
modern means of social power. Małgorzata Zawila analyzes the viewpoints of 
the Catholic Church in Poland on euthanasia and abortion, the old social issues 
that now appear in the new social framework. The results showing that there is 
no necessary a contradiction between the respondents’ religiosity and their 
positive attitude towards abortion and euthanasia, which the author presents in 
order to illustrate this fact as supportive of the thesis on the presence of a 
Religion and Patterns of Social Transformation… 
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general process of secularisation and privatisation of religion. Barbara Theriault 
analyzes the attitude of different churches (in this case, the Catholic and 
Evangelistic) towards the social situation in former East Germany and which 
principles, strategies and arguments they used at the time. Marjan Smrke lays 
down an intriguing thesis saying that a part of religious changes in post-
communism (firstly revitalisation of religion and strengthening of its social 
role) can be explained by the idea of proliferated social, respectively, religious 
mimicry. Ankica Marinović Bobinac, basis the results of an empirical research, 
analyzes a dimension of religious knowledge of the adult population in Croatia. 
She connects different socio-demographic indicators with an ascertained level 
of comprehension of religious facts and events in the Catholic Church. In the 
last text of this chapter, Keishin Inaba analyzes comparative data of the 
European Value Study on the relation of the altruism and religion, on the 
altruistic motives standing behind a certain religious action. 
The third chapter ‘Religion in New Europe’ consists of the texts in which 
the role of religion from the perspective of Euro-integration processes is being 
studied. James Richardson and Alan Garay show in which way the European 
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg reinterprets Article 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and fundamental freedoms, and a possible influ-
ence of such reinterpretation on the Church-State relation in Post-Communist 
countries. Namely, some countries (as defending parties) have already appeared 
before this Court. A similar problem is a topic of the study of Aleš Črnič who 
takes Slovenia as an example of how different definitions of religion and dif-
ferent positions of certain social protagonists have very concrete consequences 
on the activity possibilities of some, mostly smaller religious communities. 
Katarzyna Leszczyńska, basis the results of an empirical research, analyzes the 
attitudes of the Catholic Church in Poland and the Czech Republic towards the 
European Union and the integration processes, all this from the perspective of 
characteristic social processes that are in progress – pluralism, liberalism, 
postmodernism and modernisation. This analysis may also be a starting point 
for a debate in other countries. Lucian Leustean examines a real process of 
building New Europe and the role of religious communities. 
The last chapter presents the three studies in which the subject of research are 
New Religious Movements and ecclesiastical movements. Basis an analysis of 
several comparative empirical investigations, Tadeusz Doktór is testing the 
theories that focus on the consequences of modernisation, market models and the 
theory of invisible religion, especially having regard to the new trends which can 
be applied in the three fundamental forms of religiosity: traditional church 
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religiosity, sectarian religiosity and New Age religiosity. Stipe Tadić and Vine 
Mihaljević, basis the results of an empirical research, analyze an up to now 
uninvestigated theme of ecclesiastical movements within the Catholic Church in 
Croatia. The study of Péter Török is of methodological nature in which he 
discusses the problems of collecting data on New Religious Movements, what, as 
at the time when Gordon Melton started to collect such data, appeared to be the 
problem in former Communist countries. Researchers may use an example of the 
interview attached to this study. 
A few final remarks. 
ISORECEA is an international scientific association that as of 1991 gathers 
all those scientists interested in the study of religious situation in former 
Communist parts of Europe. The following books based on the International 
Conferences have been published so far: The Future of Religion East and West 
(1995, eds. Irena Borowik & Przemysłav Jabłoński), New Religious 
Phenomena in Central and Eastern Europe (1997, eds. Irena Borowik & 
Grzegorz Babiński), Church-State Relations in Central and Eastern Europe 
(1999, eds. Irena Borowik), Religion and Social Change in Post-Communist 
Europe (2001, eds. Irena Borowik & Miklós Tomka). This book is the fifth in a 
row of published books. An increasing attendance of the ISORECEA’s 
Conferences, especially by the scientists coming from former Communist 
societies, speaks not only of the position and importance of religion in Post-
Communist societies, but it also justifies the basic intention of this association – 
to allow the experts and scientists who live in these regions to speak about 
religious situation in their countries. The Conference Religion and Patterns of 
Social Transformation that took place in Zagreb in 2001, what was the basis of 
this book, showed all the heterogeneousness of theoretic approaches and the 
efforts to comprehend and explain a complex and multidimensional 
phenomenon of religion and its presence in different socio-cultural and political 
contexts. 
The papers in this book witness the above said. 
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Eileen Barker 
THE CHURCH WITHOUT AND THE GOD WITHIN: 
RELIGIOSITY AND/OR SPIRITUALITY?1 
1. Introduction 
At the most general level, the questions pursued in this chapter arise out of 
the secularisation debate. They do not, however, deal with many of the issues 
associated with that debate. They are not, for example, concerned with the 
extent to which religion is involved with the state or with secularisation as a 
‘process whereby religious thinking, practice and institutions lose social 
significance’ (Wilson, 1966:4). Nor are they particularly interested in the 
changing rates of church attendance. They are, for the most part, concerned 
with the possibility that those of us who are students of religion are ignoring, or 
at least not fully recognising, something important that is going on. The 
underlying proposition is that conventional methods of investigation have not 
yet developed the tools to explore this ‘something’ as fully as they ought – but 
that if we were to access it (the ‘something’), we would be likely to consider it 
an integral part of the study of religion. 
Such a claim risks raising the age-old question: ‘What do you mean by 
religion?’ I have discussed this question elsewhere (Barker, 1994) and do not 
want to debate definitions here, but I do want to suggest that, if we were to ask 
the right questions, we would reveal sets of beliefs and practices and/or an 
orientation towards the world that, at a commonsense level, few religious 
scholars would want to label secular. The ‘something’ I have been talking 
about is, for want of a better word, spirituality. But now, of course, we have 
shifted to another problem: What is meant by spirituality? The simple answer is 
                                                          
1 I would like to thanks Sally Stares for her invaluable help with the statistics and, in particular, the 
calculations resulting in Table 12. I would also like to express my gratitude to the Economic and 
Social Research Council for funding the British part of the RAMP research. 
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that we do not know – or, at least, that the concept gives rise to a plethora of 
different meanings. And that, in a way, is just what this chapter is all about. 
Three approaches will be pursued in the search of possible meanings of 
spirituality. The first involves proposing two ideal-typical models that indicate 
what could be meant by spirituality in opposition both to conservative religiosity 
and to secularism. Being ideal types in the Weberian (1949) sense of the word, 
these models do not claim to describe what goes on ‘out there’; they are 
analytical tools intended to be used to facilitate comparing ways of being 
religious – or being non-religious. Actual groups and individuals will not fit 
neatly into any one type; they will, rather, exhibit a cluster of characteristics 
which, comparatively speaking, are closer to one type than to another. In other 
words, the abstract models are more or less useful, not more or less true, in 
helping us to chart and understand relative locations with reference to the 
particular characteristics we might observe in the messy miscellany of reality. 
Secondly, there is a very brief selection of some of the meanings people have 
attached to spirituality. Finally, some findings are drawn from a pan-European 
study of religious and moral pluralism (RAMP) that was conducted in 1998. 
These indicate some of the characteristics that were associated with the 
respondents’ understanding of ‘spirituality’, thereby suggesting some directions 
for further investigation. 
2. Spirituality: an Initial Orientation 
2.1. Religion and patterns of social transformation 
Just as processes such as industrialisation, urbanisation, modernisation, 
rationalisation, bureaucratisation and, to the east of the iron curtain, 
sovietisation led in their different ways to secularisation as defined by Bryan 
Wilson (1966) at the societal level throughout most of Europe, so have 
processes such as social and geographical mobility, globalisation, the growth of 
mass media, the collapse of state atheism and (most recently) the introduction 
of the Internet led to increasing multi-culturalism and religious diversity. Figure 
1 represents, ideal-typically, something of the range and complex interplay 
between different manifestations of a (loosely defined) religious nature that 
have emerged and/or separated themselves from traditional, institutionalised 
religions – which, it must be stressed, are still responsible for the great majority 
of religious practices throughout Europe. The arrows indicate that there can be 
developments in many different directions, rather than there being a single 
direction in which religion is moving; but, in the absence of some kind of 
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political or military coercion, the overall trend in Europe (and, indeed, 
elsewhere) would appear to be towards increased diversity. 
 
Figure 1: Religious Diversity 
 
 (b) Apathetic
Secularism 
 
   
(c) Soft Secularism  (a) Hard Secularism 
   
 Traditional 
Religions 
 
   
(f) Spirituality  (d) Fundamentalism 
   
 (e) NRMs  
 
The top half of the diagram extends from (a) hard secularism (manifest as 
atheism), through (b) an apathetic secularism that is due more to disinterest in 
religious matters than to any strong antagonism, to (c) a soft, part-time 
secularism which might, when pressed, encompass a belief in some sort of god 
or special force and is quite likely to call on the traditional religions at times of 
crises and for rites de passages. The lower part of Figure 1 represents (d) the 
appearance of strong conservative revivals and fundamentalist innovations (not 
necessarily an oxymoron), and (f) at the other extreme, the emergence of 
beliefs and practices of a more spiritual orientation. Between the two poles are 
(e) numerous new religions that are more or less conservative or spiritual in 
nature. Spirituality is thus placed in opposition to conservatism on the one hand 
and secularism on the other. 
2.2. Conservative religiosity and contemporary spirituality 
The model depicted in Table 1 delineates two ideal-typical caricatures 
consisting of clusters of theological and social beliefs or orientations that allow us 
to locate, on a comparative basis, a particular movement or group of individuals 
nearer or further from one or other of the ideal-typical poles which are labelled 
respectively spirituality and religiosity. The underlying hypothesis is that groups 
or individuals who exhibit one or more of the characteristics belonging to the 
spirituality cluster are more likely to exhibit other spiritual characteristics than 
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characteristics associated in the model with the traditional religion cluster. If, for 
example, an unchurched individual, X, believes that the source of the Divine is 
within himself and that when he dies his soul will be reincarnated, then the model 
invites us to predict that he would be less likely to believe in Satan and original 
sin than another individual, Y, if she attends church and believes in a personal 
God who revealed Himself through the Old Testament. The possibility of 
falsifying such a prediction through empirical testing is, of course, part and parcel 
of the scientific enterprise (Popper, 1963:ch.1). 
 
Table 1: An ideal-typical distinction between Scriptural religiosity and 
spirituality, indicating hypothesised oppositions in theological and social 
orientations 
 Religiosity (of The Book) Spirituality 
The Divine Transcendent & Particular Immanent & cosmic 
Source Without Within 
Origins Creation Creating 
Source of Knowledge Scripture/revelation Experience/mysticism 
Authority Dogma/Priesthood/Tradition Personal experience 
Theodicy Evil/sin/Satan  Lack of attunement, balance &/or awareness 
Life after death Salvation/resurrection/damnation Reincarnation/transmigration/Mokşa 
Time Temporal/historical Eternal/a-historical 
Change Lineal: past/present/future Cyclical: then/now/then 
Perspective Analytical Holistic/syncretistic 
Anthropology Man in God’s image Humans as part of Nature 
Distinctions Dichotomous: Them/us Complementarity: Us (them=them/us) 
Sex/gender Male/(female) Feminine~(masculine) 
Relations Controlling Relating (‘sharing’) 
Social Identity Group (membership of tradition) The inner ‘me’/the ‘true self’ 
Control External authority Internal responsibility 
Organisational unit Institution/family Individual 
Place of worship Synagogue; church; mosque Informal building; temple; shrine; open air 
Communication Vertical hierarchy Horizontal networking 
 
For a movement or individual near the religiosity pole, the Divine is seen 
as a transcendent, personal God, separate from the believer, although possibly 
also dwelling within. There is belief in a creation myth and an eschatological 
faith in an eventual end time. The world is likely to be divided into dichoto-
mous distinctions (them and us; before and after; good and bad; male and 
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female; godly and satanic). Truth and morality tend to be absolute and are 
known through God’s revelation in the Bible or through some specially chosen 
prophets. Human beings are considered inherently sinful and in need of God’s 
grace to receive salvation. Following death, the body is resurrected into heaven 
(or damned to hell, possibly after a period in purgatory). 
For the spiritually oriented type, ‘the god within’ is an integral part of the 
human individual, who may, in turn, be conceptualised as an integral part of 
nature and/or of the cosmos. Time tends to be perceived as basically cyclical, 
tied to the seasons and the natural cycle of birth, growth, death and rebirth. 
Truth and morality are likely to be seen as relative to the situation rather than 
absolute, universal laws or commandments. Concepts such as sin and guilt are 
alien; yin and yang complementarity and balance are stressed with, perhaps, a 
greater (rebalancing) emphasis on the feminine and on an awareness of 
environmental issues. A fundamental value is placed on personal experience 
and personal responsibility. 
But, to repeat, these are methodological caricatures. The two clusters of 
characteristics are unlikely to be found unambiguously together in reality. It is 
perfectly possible that actual groups and/or individuals could be closer to one 
pole on one characteristic and to the other pole on another characteristic. 
3. Uses of the concept of spirituality 
3.1. Different meanings of spirituality 
The concept of spirituality is, of course, by no means new; it has long been 
in common usage and is familiar to any English speaker. The most cursory 
survey of the literature immediately reveals a vast array of different meanings 
being promoted or assumed. Logically, there are five different kinds of 
relationships that could exist between the concepts of religiosity and 
spirituality. These are represented in Figure 2, with the two concepts being 
interchangeable in the first diagram (a). In diagram (b), spirituality is 
represented as one or more (possibly very different) sub-divisions of religiosity, 
examples could be the Spiritual Baptists (Shouters); religions involving spirit 
possession (Lewis, 1988); or Spiritualism, be it conjuring up pictures of elderly 
ladies summoning mediums to bring forth messages from Uncle Fred, now 
residing in the hereafter (frequently with a chronic cough), or more 
sophisticated beliefs in the spirit world (Nelson, 1969). A variant of this would 
be when spirituality is seen as the very core of religiosity, lying, perhaps, in the 
mysticism experienced by the ‘truly religious’, such as Meister Eckhardt, 
Hildegard of Bingen, or Julian of Norwich – or, more recently, persons such as 
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Thomas Merton, Bede Griffith, Mother Theresa or the Dalai Lama. Spirituality 
in this sense may be pursued by a variety of means such as the exercises of 
Ignatius of Loyola, the practices of Sufism, the devotions of the Indian siddha, 
or diverse forms of meditation, chanting or yoga, including practices associated 
with contemporary New Age and/or Human Potential groups. 
Conversely, as in (c), religiosity may be seen as a subsection of spirituality, 
the latter being the all-encompassing concept. This is the position taken by 
some New Agers or Human Potential practitioners who see spirituality as 
embracing all aspects of life. There are, however, other New Agers who want 
to distance themselves from religion, which is seen as institutionalised and 
(therefore) dead. They (like some conservative religionists who are highly 
suspicious of New Age ideas and associate them with the idea of spirituality) 
would prefer to define the two concepts as entirely discrete phenomena, as 
represented in diagram (e). In diagram (d) the two concepts overlap, sharing 
some characteristics but not others. The overlap may be almost complete as in 
diagram (a), or it may be almost non-existent as in diagram (e) – as, for 
example, when the President of the Shri Ram Chandra Mission, Shri 
Parthasarathi Rajagopalachari (1992:104), declares ‘… spirituality represents 
everything that religion is not. The only thing we can say they have in common 
is the idea of God’. 
 
Figure 2: Some potential relationships between religiosity and spirituality 
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Sometimes the distinction between spirituality and religiosity is used to fill 
an apparent overlap between the religious and the secular, particularly those 
segments of the population that are labelled ‘the unchurched’ (Fuller, 2001; 
Hay, 2000) or ‘believers not belongers’ (Davie, 1994). The modern (or, perhaps 
more cogently, the post-modern) understanding of spirituality in the kind of 
new-age manifestation outlined in Table 1 is widely associated with the USA – 
and California in particular; but although it is frequently assumed that the 
emergence of unchurched spirituality is a comparatively new phenomenon, it 
has a long history in different societies throughout the world. Turning the clock 
back two millennia, for example, we learn that the Gnostic Gospels were 
‘spiritual’ in a number of ways not unlike those of some contemporary move-
ments: they embraced mystical experiences, promoted the importance of the 
feminine and distinguished the false from the true church not in its relationship 
to the clergy but through the quality of personal relationships and ‘spiritual 
fellowship with those united in communion’ (Apocalypse of Peter, quoted in 
Pagels, 1982:118). Not altogether surprisingly, this account of Jesus’ teachings 
was suppressed by some of the early Christian leaders because it lacked the 
dogmatic boundaries and hierarchical structures that were deemed necessary to 
hold the Church together. 
Jumping to North America, Robert Fuller (2001:13) argues that, although 
the early colonists might have been very religious according to some criteria, 
this was not in the commonly accepted sense of the word. He provides a fasci-
nating account of the history of alternative spiritual practices throughout 
American history, charting the interplay of such phenomena as the occult, 
witchcraft, divination, astrology, intermingled with alchemy, Hermeticism, 
Rosicrucianism, Swedenborgianism, Metaphysical religion, a variety of alter-
native medicines and world views, and psychological spirituality, ending up 
with what he terms the new eclecticism. 
3.2. Some findings from the USA 
Today there are numerous books, particularly those on the New Age and 
modern Paganism, that provide descriptions of how individuals and small groups 
use the concept of spirituality (see, for example, Anthony et al, 1987; Bowman, 
1999; Cox, 1994; Crowley, 1998; Dillon & Wink, 2003; Ellwood, 1994; Fontana, 
2003; Fox, 1991; Griffin, 1999; Hanegraaff, 1999; Heelas, 2000; Pennick, 1997; 
Wuthnow, 2001), but few studies have tried to test how a random sample of an 
entire population might understand the concept. There have, however, been some. 
In a telephone survey conducted in 1999 with a randomly selected national 
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sample of 100 adults aged 18 and over, respondents were asked what the word 
spirituality meant to them. The replies are summarised in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Selected responses ranked in order of frequency of mention to the 
question: ‘What does the word spirituality mean to you?’ 
1. Belief in God/seeking to grow closer to God 
2. Belief in a higher power, something beyond oneself/sense of awe and mystery in
the universe 
3. Inner peace/state of mind 
4. Seeking to be a good person/lead a good life 
5. Seeking the inner self/the being within your body/the essence of your personal
being/evolving into a whole spirit/experiencing spiritual side of the natural order 
6. Reach human potential/to affirm sense of personal worth 
7. What has been learned from upbringing, school, church, the Bible 
8. A mystical bond with other people 
9. Sense of right and wrong/to know who you are and what you are doing is right 
10. Calmness to my life 
11. Going to church and being a good person 
(Gallup & Jones, 2000:184/5) 
 
Almost a third defined spirituality with no reference to God or a higher 
authority (Gallup & Jones, 2000:49). When asked whether they thought of 
‘spirituality’ more in a personal and individual sense, or more in terms of 
organised religion and church doctrine, 72 per cent of the respondents said the 
former, and 21 per cent the latter (Gallup & Jones, 2000:185). It should, of 
course, be remembered that belief in God is higher in the United States than in 
most of Europe: 79 per cent of Gallup’s respondents said they had no doubt about 
God’s existence; but 12 per cent said that while they did not believe in a personal 
God they did believe in a higher power of some kind (Gallup & Jones, 2000:187). 
Returning to the earlier discussion about the logical possibilities of the 
relationship between religiosity and spirituality as depicted in Figure 2, a study 
by Zinnbauer and Pargament (1997:555) found religiosity was perceived as, 
respectively, (a) the same as (3 per cent); (b) encompassing (10 per cent); (c) 
encompassed by (39 per cent); (d) overlapping with (42 per cent); and (e) 
separate from (7 per cent) spirituality. Three quarters (74 per cent) of their 
respondents (who were largely, though not entirely, selected from Christian 
churches) identified themselves as both-religious-and-spiritual, 4 per cent as 
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religious-but-not-spiritual, 3 per cent as neither-religious-nor-spiritual and 19 
per cent as spiritual-but-not-religious. In other words, a total of 93 per cent 
identified themselves as spiritual, compared to 78 per cent identifying them-
selves as religious. When they compared the spiritual-and-religious with the 
spiritual-not-religious, the former were more likely to attend church, to follow 
some sort of religious orthodoxy, and to exhibit right-wing authoritarian 
tendencies, while the latter were more likely be involved with New Age beliefs 
and practices; (Zinnbauer & Pargament, 1997:559).2 
Those who identified themselves as spiritual-not-religious in Zinnbauer and 
Pargament’s study were similar in many ways to the ‘highly active seekers’ 
identified by Wade Clark Roof (1993) from among America’s baby-boomers. In 
the conclusion of a book Roof and others edited on the post-war generation in the 
West, late- or post-modern spirituality was summarised as exhibiting five main 
characteristics: (a) having an emphasis on individual choice; (b) mixing codes; (c) 
drawing on both New Age and Eastern religions and conservative, evangelical 
(often charismatic or Pentecostal) religions; (d) placing a high premium on 
religious experience and growth; and (e) displaying an anti-institutional and anti-
hierarchical stance (Roof et al, 1995:247-52). 
Perhaps at this point I could anticipate the discussion that follows in the 
rest of this chapter by mentioning that when Marler & Hadaway (2002:292) 
compared five American studies that asked about religiosity and spirituality, all 
of these had a higher percentage of respondents claiming to be spiritual but not 
religious than the percentage that emerged from the RAMP (Religious and 
Moral Pluralism) survey. This could be because: (a) the respondents were 
American rather than European; (b) not all the American samples were 
randomly selected from the population as a whole; (c) slightly different 
questions were asked; and/or (d) slightly different answers were open to the 
respondents, RAMP having offered a neutral option. 
However, none of these American studies was available at the time I was 
invited to join the RAMP team. This consisted mainly of social scientists 
interested in exploring European religious and moral pluralism in greater depth 
than had been possible with the European Values Surveys (with which several 
of them were connected). Having become familiar with unchurched seekers and 
New Age practitioners in my qualitative research, I was eager to include 
                                                          
2 It has been estimated that in the late 1600s less than one third of all adult Americans belonged to a 
church; then, by the start of the Revolutionary War, only about 17 per cent of Americans were 
churched. By 1980, however, church adherence was about 62 per cent (Finke & Stark, 1992:15). 
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questions that would enable us to explore the distribution and content of 
spirituality. My suggestions were, however, met with scepticism. We were 
Europeans, not Americans, and almost all my colleagues were scholars who 
focused primarily on large-scale surveys rather than in-depth interviews or 
observation. They said they did not really understand what I was getting at, and 
that not only would our respondents have no idea what we meant if we were to 
ask them about spirituality, but we would have no idea what they meant if they 
responded to such questions. It was gently suggested that perhaps I had spent 
too much time talking to ‘weirdoes’ in California. I, on my part, wondered 
whether perhaps they had spent too much time sitting in front of their VDUs. 
Eventually, however, they agreed to include one question on spirituality, and I 
had to content myself with adding some of the other questions in which I was 
interested to the end of the British questionnaire. 
The English version of the question (number 39) that was included was 
formulated as: ‘Whether or not you think of yourself as a religious person, 
would you say that you have a spiritual life – something that goes beyond just 
an intellectual or emotional life?’ It was situated in a section where there were a 
number of questions about subjects such as belief in God, salvation, what 
happens after death, membership of a faith community, and attendance at a 
place of worship. The question immediately preceding Question 39 was about 
the extent to which the respondents’ religious beliefs influenced (a) their daily 
life and (b) how they made important decisions. Before that, question 37 had 
asked: ‘Whether or not you go to church or a place of worship, to what extent 
would you say that you are a religious person?’ 
4. The RAMP results3 
As it turned out, both my colleagues and I had been right. They had been 
right in saying that the concept of spirituality had not been satisfactorily opera-
tionalised and we did not really know what it had meant to the respondents. 
Indeed, the question on spirituality had been translated in a slightly different way 
into the different languages, and even within any particular country it was clear 
that it had meant something different to different respondents. But I had been 
right in suspecting there was something out there that we needed to investigate. 
                                                          
3 Although five more countries were involved in the creation of the questionnaire, only 11 were 
successful in gaining funds. The British survey, which lasted just over an hour, involved a 
representative sample of 1466 respondents aged 18 or over and was conducted by the British 
Market Research Bureau in 1998. 
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The respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they considered 
themselves to be religious and to have a spiritual life on a Likert scale ranging 
from 7 if they definitely thought of themselves as religious/spiritual to 1 if they 
definitely did not. In Table 3, responses 1-3 appear as ‘not religious/spiritual’ 
and 5-7 as ‘am religious/spiritual’. If respondents entered the neutral value of 4 
in one or both of their answers, they were removed from the calculation. Of the 
remaining respondents, just over half (52 per cent) considered themselves 
religious, and exactly half (50 per cent) considered they had some sort of 
spiritual life. A quarter (26 per cent) of the non-religious and 71 per cent of the 
religious considered themselves spiritual. Had the question about spirituality 
not been asked, more than one in ten (12 per cent) of all these respondents – a 
quarter (26 per cent) of those who denied being religious – might have been 
classified as secular when in fact they considered themselves spiritual. Of 
course, we may not know what they meant by ‘spiritual’, but it is doubtful that 
many of them would have taken it to mean secular. 
 
Table 3: Cross tabulation of self-assessments of religiosity and spirituality (%) 
Q39 Do you have a spiritual life? Q37 Do you consider yourself a 
religious person? No  Yes  
Total 
 74 26 100 
 70 25  Not religious  
Total 35 12 48 
 29 71 100 
 30 75  Am religious  
Total 15 37 52 
 50 50 100 
 100 100  Total 
Total 50 50 100 
N=7,393. Due to rounding, numbers do not always add up. 
 
Furthermore, it transpired that question 39 had not met with the mass 
rejection which had been predicted by some of the RAMP team. Overall, 92 per 
cent of the respondents were willing to answer. Respondents in Roman Catho-
lic countries (which included the two central European countries) tended to be 
most confused by the term – Hungary (18 per cent), Poland (16 per cent) and 
Portugal (13 per cent) being most likely to say that they did not know what was 
meant by leading a spiritual life; Finns (10 per cent); Belgians (9 per cent); 
Norwegians (9 per cent); and Swedes (8 per cent) had some difficulty, but 
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Danes (5 per cent); Italians (4 per cent); Britons and the Dutch (both 3 per cent) 
apparently had few problems with the concept.4 
As already intimated, a problem with Table 3 is that a third of the respon-
dents were eliminated because they gave the neutral response of 4 to questions 
37 and/or 39. The full spread of answers can be seen in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Religiosity and spirituality with neutral responses (%) 
 Definitely not spiritual 2 3 4 5 6 
Definitely 
spiritual Total 
Not at all religious 8 2 1 2 1 1 1 16 
2 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 10 
3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 10 
4 4 2 3 6 3 1 2 22 
5 2 2 2 4 5 3 2 20 
6 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 12 
Definitely religious 1 0 0 1 1 1 4 9 
Total 21 11 10 19 15 11 12 100 
N=11,359. Totals do not always add up due to rounding. 
 
One way of including the neutral responses (4) was to make a comparison 
between each individual’s answers to see whether s/he claimed to be equally, 
more or less spiritual than religious. 
Table 5 indicates that although over a third (38 per cent) considered they 
were more religious than spiritual, nearly a third (32 per cent) considered 
themselves equally spiritual and religious and only slightly less (30 per cent) saw 
themselves as being more spiritual than religious. 
Another point of interest, however, is that (a) of those who were both-
religious-and-spiritual, over half were both equally; with just over a quarter 
being more spiritual, and the remaining fifth more religious; and (b) again, 
just over half those who were neither-religious-nor-spiritual were equally so, 
with 17 per cent being more spiritual, and 28 per cent more religious. 
 
                                                          
4 For some reason the Catholic countries were the only ones to offer the option of saying that the 
respondent did not know what the term meant, while the other countries merely coded ‘missing’. 
This suggests that the translation and/or administration could have had a role to play in the 
outcome. We might, nevertheless, want to investigate the availability of religious (widely defined) 
concepts as a cultural resource in post-communist countries, compared with the situation in 
Western Europe, which, in turn, could be compared with that in the USA. 
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Table 5: Relative religiosity and spirituality for individual respondents 
 Frequency % Valid % 
Spirituality greater than religiosity 3,378 27 30 
Spirituality same as religiosity 3,614 29 32 
Religiosity greater than spirituality 4,347 35 38 
Total valid responses 11,339 92 100 
Missing (no response to one or both questions) 1,003 8 – 
N. (Total number of respondents) 12,342 100 – 
 
Of those who assessed themselves as more spiritual than religious, 43 per 
cent were likely to say they were not religious, compared to 36 per cent 
calling themselves both, the remaining scoring low on both, though obviously 
lower on religiosity. Of those who saw themselves more religious than 
spiritual, nearly half were positively religious and negatively spiritual, while 
nearly a third were low on both, compared to less than a quarter being high 
on both. Those who assessed themselves equally religious and spiritual were 
just about as likely to score high on both as to score low on both. In other 
words, if spirituality is greater, then it is likely that both are high; but if 
religiosity is greater, then it is more likely that both score low. Frequencies 
indicate that spirituality received a slightly more emphatic yes or no, while 
religion received more moderate affirmations and denials. 
For the purposes of brevity and clarity, despite the fact that it means 
eliminating around a third of the respondents, most of the discussion in this 
section will focus on the four groups of respondents (presented in Table 3) 
who fell clearly into one of the following four categories: (1) neither-
religious-nor-spiritual (‘neither’); (2) religious-but-not-spiritual (‘only-
religious’); (3) spiritual-but-not-religious (‘only-spiritual’); and (4) both-
spiritual-and-religious (‘both’). 
4.1. Spirituality by Country 
Table 6 shows that roughly the same proportion of Belgians, Danes, Finns, 
Britons, Hungarians, and Dutch (but a far larger proportion of Swedes and 
Norwegians, a considerably lower proportion of Italians and Portuguese, and 
almost no Poles) fell in the ‘only-spiritual’ category. But the total proportion who 
agreed to being spiritual (‘both’ and ‘only-spiritual’) was remarkably consistent 
between the countries – in other words, it was the extent to which they called 
themselves religious (with or without spirituality) that varied more dramatically 
(by 62 percentage points compared to 27 points for spirituality). 
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Table 6: Religiosity compared to spirituality by country (%) 
Country N. 
Neither 
religious 
nor 
spiritual 
Religious 
but not 
spiritual 
Spiritual 
but not 
religious
Both 
spiritual 
& 
religious
Total All religious 
All 
spiritual 
Belgium 940 45 14 12 28 100 42 40 
Denmark 388 42 18 13 27 100 45 40 
Finland 470 33 10 13 44 100 54 57 
Great Britain 970 44 11 13 32 100 43 45 
Hungary 526 40 13 15 33 100 46 48 
Italy 1.374 18 16 8 59 100 75 67 
Netherlands 694 41 19 12 28 100 47 40 
Norway 310 50 8 22 20 100 28 42 
Poland 548 13 34 2 51 100 85 53 
Portugal 523 25 20 8 47 100 67 55 
Sweden 649 53 5 24 18 100 23 42 
Total  7.392 35 15 12 37 100 52 49 
N=11,359. Totals do not always add up due to rounding. 
4.2. Sex 
Although, as might be expected, there was a clear difference between the 
sexes when asked if they considered themselves religious (44 per cent males; 
60 per cent females) or spiritual (42 per cent males; 57 per cent females), Table 
7 shows that there was almost no difference between males and females who 
considered themselves ‘only-religious’ (14 and 16 per cent respectively) or 
‘only-spiritual’ (12 and 13 per cent). 
 
Table 7: Religiosity compared to spirituality by sex (%) 
Sex 
Neither 
religious 
nor 
spiritual 
Religious 
but not 
spiritual 
Spiritual 
but not 
religious
Both 
spiritual 
& 
religious
Total All religious 
All 
spiritual 
Male 43 14 12 30 100 44 42 
Female 28 16 13 44 100 60 57 
All respondents 35 15 12 37 100 52 49 
N=7,391. Totals do not always add up due to rounding. 
4.3. Age 
As can be seen from the right-hand figures in Table 8, when age is held 
constant there was very little difference between the percentages of respondents 
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under 55 calling themselves religious and those calling themselves spiritual. 
Respondents over 55 were more likely to call themselves spiritual than those 
under 55, but they were far more likely to call themselves religious. Put another 
way, the majority of young people denied they were either religious or 
spiritual, while the majority of older people affirmed that they were one or 
other or both. Respondents under 25 were marginally more likely to call 
themselves spiritual than religious, however, ‘only-religious’ increases with 
age, and there are actually twice as many under-25s (17 per cent) as over-64s (8 
per cent) calling themselves ‘only-spiritual’. A further breakdown by country 
indicates that this is a general pattern (albeit with a few wobbles), with a higher 
percentage of ‘only-spiritual’ the younger the respondent. This is especially 
evident among the Scandinavians, with over a third of Swedes under-25s 
compared to a fifth of the over-64s, and a quarter of Danish under-25s 
compared to less than a tenth of the over-64s claiming to be ‘only-spiritual’.5 
In other words, while the additional use of ‘spirituality’ does not 
compensate for the drop in religiosity amongst the younger generations, when 
used as an alternative to religiosity it exposes an alternative way of being 
something other than secular. 
 
Table 8: Age by religiosity/spirituality (%) 
 Neither 
religious nor 
spiritual 
(a) 
Religious 
not 
spiritual 
(b) 
Spiritual 
not 
religious
(c) 
Both 
religious & 
spiritual 
(d) 
 
 
Total
All 
religious
s 
(b+d) 
All 
spiritual 
 
(c+d) 
Under 25 41 14 17 28 100 42 45 
25-34 41 14 13 31 100 45 45 
35-44 39 13 13 35 100 48 48 
45-54 35 14 13 38 100 52 51 
55-64 28 18 9 44 100 63 54 
Over 64 26 17 8 49 100 66 57 
N=7378. Totals do not always add up due to rounding. 
 
It might of course be that such patterns are related to changing age rather 
than any changes in society as a whole, and that not only would we have got 
similar results 50 years ago, we shall have a similar age distribution in the mid-
twenty-first century. There was, however, no evidence that the older 
                                                          
5 There were too few ‘only-spiritual’ respondents in any cohort for there to be any significant 
pattern among either the Portuguese or the Polish respondents. 
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respondents were less religious when they were younger. Another possibility is 
that young people are not doing and believing something fundamentally 
different from their elders, but are merely using a different concept popularised 
within youth culture through such media as the Beatles and Californian 
counter-movements. More research needs to be conducted into both these 
possibilities, especially in Europe. 
4.4. Beliefs 
Moving from the ascribed variables of sex and age to questions that could 
provide some clues as to what clusters of beliefs might be correlated with the 
different combinations of religiosity and spirituality, Tables 9 and 10 show 
respondents’ answers to questions about their images of God and what they 
think is likely to happen to them after they die.  
 
Table 9: Concepts of God: Q32 “Which of these statements comes nearest to 
your own belief?” (%) 
 
Neither 
religious nor 
spiritual 
Religious 
not 
spiritual 
Spiritual 
not 
religious 
Both 
religious & 
spiritual 
All 
I believe in a God with whom I 
can have a personal relationship 7 45 9 62 33 
I believe in an impersonal spirit 
or life force 15 14 28 11 15 
I believe that God is something 
within each person, rather than 
something out there 
28 37 35 26 29 
I don’t believe in any kind of 
God, spirit or life force 29 1 15 0 12 
I really don’t know what to 
believe 22 4 13 1 10 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
N=7,313. Percentages do not always add up to 100 due to rounding. 
 
Here a pattern emerges which clearly supports the suspicion that leading a 
spiritual life can mean at least two very different things to different 
respondents: those who report that they are both religious and spiritual would 
appear to be more traditionally religious according to the ideal-typical model 
set out in Table 1 than are ‘only-religious’ respondents, while those who are 
‘only-spiritual’ are likely to be less traditionally religious than ‘only-religious’ 
(though more religious than ‘neither religious nor spiritual’). This was evident 
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so far as the item concerning the respondents’ image of God was concerned: 62 
per cent of ‘both’, compared to 45 per cent of ‘only-religious’ and less that one 
in ten ‘only-spiritual’ believed in a personal God, while for the ‘only-spiritual’ 
respondents the most popular option was the God within (35 per cent), followed 
by an impersonal spirit or life force (28 per cent) and not knowing what to 
believe (13 per cent); there were also 15 per cent who did not believe in any 
kind of God. 
 
Table 10: Life after death: Q.33 “What do you think happens to us after death?” 
(%) 
 
Neither 
religious 
nor 
spiritual
Religious 
but not 
spiritual 
Spiritual 
but not 
religious
Both 
religious 
& 
spiritual 
Nothing – death is the end 43 17 24 8 
There is something, but I don’t know what 23 38 32 36 
We go either to heaven or to hell 2 15 4 24 
We all go to heaven 1 5 1 6 
We are reincarnated – that is, after our physical 
death we are born in this world over and over 
again  
3 5 12 8 
We merge into some kind of eternal bliss after this 
life 1 4 3 8 
Other 2 1 4 3 
I don’t know whether there is anything or not 26 15 22 8 
Total 100 100 100 100 
N=7,314. Percentages do not always add up to 100 due to rounding. 
 
Not unexpectedly, the ‘only-spiritual’ respondents were the ones who were 
most likely to opt for reincarnation (12 per cent),6 but many more (32 per cent) 
chose the ‘something, but don’t know what’ option. The pattern observed in 
                                                          
6 Those who are familiar with the European Value Surveys will notice that the percentage of RAMP 
respondents affirming that they believe in reincarnation is less than half that for the EVS (24 per 
cent of British respondents in 1990 (Ashford & Timms, 1992)). This is due to the EVS question 
asking whether the respondent believed or did not believe in reincarnation – and being able, as 
many did, to say that they believed both in reincarnation and, in another question, in resurrection. 
RAMP respondents were asked to choose between reincarnation and other possibilities. (For an 
interesting discussion about the ways the concept of reincarnation is used in Britain, see Walter & 
Waterhouse, 2001). 
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Table 10 also repeated itself with 30 per cent of ‘both’, 20 per cent of ‘only-
religious’ and 5 per cent of ‘only-spiritual’ respondents believing we go to 
heaven or hell. The same pattern appears when we look at responses to 
questions added to the British survey as shown in Table 11 in so far as they 
were replying to questions about issues such as the return of Jesus, the 
existence of Satan and the power of prayer. 
 
Table 11: Religious/Spiritual percentage agreeing with statements 
 
Neither 
religious 
nor 
spiritual
Religious 
not 
spiritual 
Spiritual 
not 
religious
Religious 
and 
spiritual 
I believe in the power of prayer 9 60 24 77 
Jesus will return to the earth some day 6 37 8 52 
One can see the work of Satan at work in the world 
today 11 33 16 50 
People are responsible for everything that happens 
to them 51 50 49 39 
Most churches are dead or boring 39 24 41 29 
There are spiritualists who bring authentic 
messages from the dead to the living 28 23 28 32 
People are so afraid of being thought to be racist 
these days that blacks and Asians are given 
preferential treatment 
47 54 43 42 
On the whole I trust alternative medicine more 
than I trust orthodox medicine  19 31 32 25 
Crystals have a special power to heal or help us 11 20 25 21 
Human beings have made contact with extra-
terrestrials who have visited earth in UFOs 19 18 37 26 
There is intelligent life on other planets 38 36 65 38 
 
In other words, so far as conventional Christian beliefs were concerned, 
respondents who said they had a spiritual life and combined it with religiosity 
would be mapped close to the religiosity pole of the ideal types depicted in 
Table 1, but respondents claiming to have a spiritual life while denying that 
they were religious would be mapped at the spirituality end – and those calling 
themselves religious but not spiritual would be somewhere in the middle. 
Patterns for other beliefs were less easy to detect, however. Clearly the 
variety of different meanings and characteristics related to leading a spiritual 
life were not going to emerge through cross tabulation alone, so, using the extra 
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data obtained from the British survey, factor analysis and principle component 
analyses were used to probe a bit further into the variety of profiles correlated 
with those who felt they had some sort of spiritual life. 
4.5. Principle components from the British data 
In a number of principle component analyses applied to the data (bringing 
back into the calculations respondents who had opted for a neutral response to 
questions 37 and/or 39), the first component always reflected general religiosity 
and spirituality, but there was quite a lot of variation between the different 
countries when it came to subsequent components, and within a country 
according to the items that were loaded onto the components. By applying the 
analysis to the British data, which had had an extra forty-one statements added to 
the end of the questionnaire, a three-component solution seemed to offer a fairly 
clear summary of the patterns of correlations in the data (albeit one explaining 
only just over a quarter (27 per cent) of the variance in the data). Component 
scores were computed during the analysis as summary measures of the dimension 
for cross-validation with other key variables in the survey. The numbers in Table 
12 give the correlations between each item and each component. 
Component 1: Traditional religiosity 
The component that emerged most clearly accounts for 14 per cent of the 
variance. Correlating the component score with questions 37 and 39, it was 
found to be positively related both to religiosity (Pearson's correlation coeffi-
cient = 0.76) and to spirituality (0.50). Items with high loadings on this compo-
nent indicated a strong acceptance of orthodox Christian dogma (around 70 per 
cent of Britons call themselves Christians of one sort or another), and the im-
portance of religious practices. A conviction that both God and Satan are active 
in the world and that prayer can make a difference also loaded highly on this 
component, as did support for mainstream religious leadership and the belief 
that it should play a central role in the society as well as in individuals' lives. 
Component 2: Unorthodox authoritarianism 
The second component accounts for 6 per cent of the variance. There was no 
correlation (at the 0.05 level of significance) between the component score and 
either religiosity or spirituality. Mainstream religious beliefs did not load highly 
on this component; instead the dimension reflected a number of non-orthodox 
beliefs that could be described as superstitions and possibly science fiction. A 
generally negative reaction towards religious people and some quite strong eth-
nocentric, racist, and anti-minority-religion sentiments figured in this component. 
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Component 3: Liberal spirituality 
The third component also accounts for 6 per cent of the variance. Its 
component score was uncorrelated with religiosity, but positively correlated with 
spirituality (correlation = 0.36), and it was the component that most clearly 
resembled the model of spirituality characterized in Table 1. Items with high 
loadings reflected unorthodox rather than traditional Scriptural beliefs, but these 
tended to be related to ‘other worlds’ and alternative perspectives rather than 
specific superstitions. Tolerance for minority beliefs and practices was reflected 
in high loadings for the relevant survey items, and statements in support of multi-
culturalism also loaded relatively highly. The racist and ethnocentric attitudes 
found in component 2 had negative loadings in this component. 
 
Table 12: Principle Components Analysis from British Data (N=1058) 
Components  
1 2 3 
I believe in the power of prayer 0.80   
Jesus is both God and man 0.75   
In deciding between right and wrong, I am influenced by my religion 0.74   
Everyone should receive Christ into their lives 0.70   
Jesus will return to the earth some day 0.70   
A religious service is important for celebrating a birth 0.69   
A religious service is important for celebrating marriage 0.66  -0.25 
A religious service is important for celebrating death 0.62   
Jesus was a prophet 0.60  0.22 
There are angels 0.59 0.20  
One can see the work of Satan at work in the world today 0.56   
If people have no religious beliefs, it may become more difficult to have good 
moral behaviour in society 0.51   
Jesus never existed -0.50 0.23  
Jesus was a religious leader 0.49   
The more science advances, the more difficult it is for me to believe in God -0.49   
If you want people to tell the truth in court, then they should be made to swear 
an oath with reference to God 0.47  -0.26 
In making laws about moral question, such as abortion and euthanasia, 
representatives of the main religions should be consulted 0.47   
Religious leaders should give a much clearer direction on moral behaviour 0.43   
I experience something beyond everyday reality all the time* 0.43  0.29 
The main religions should have an influence on politics in my country 0.41   
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Components  
1 2 3 
My certainty about religious and spiritual questions is stronger than it was ten 
years ago 0.40  0.21 
No one can know for certain that God exists -0.40   
The mainstream religions should be more concerned with the Millennium  0.32 0.25  
Whether one is religious or not, one ought to support the national Church of the 
country one belongs to 0.32 0.27 -0.34 
Nearly all religious people are hypocrites or fanatics -0.32 0.31 -0.22 
A holy object can protect or help people 0.31 0.36  
Most human suffering in this world is because of God punishing us for our sins 0.31 0.24  
There are spiritualists who bring authentic messages from the dead to the living  0.59 0.29 
Human beings have made contact with extraterrestrials who have visited earth 
in UFOs  0.58 0.32 
Crystals have a special power to heal or help us  0.58 0.20 
Some people can remember a bit of what happened in a past life  0.58  
A talisman or lucky charm can protect or help people  0.44 0.26 
I consult my horoscope daily*  0.43  
There is intelligent life on other planets  0.40 0.35 
I trust alternative medicine more than I trust Orthodox medicine  0.37  
Most human suffering in this world is because of fate or destiny 0.24 0.36  
Women are more spiritual than men  0.33  
Science can, by itself, give meaning to life  0.30  
People are so afraid of being thought to be racist these days that blacks and 
Asians are given preferential treatment  0.30 -0.30 
The increasing variety of religious groups in our society is a source of cultural 
enrichment   0.63 
People should be allowed to take soft drugs if this is part of their religious 
ritual -0.22  0.55 
Jehovah’s Witnesses should be allowed to practise their religion in the country  -0.21 0.50 
Girls should be allowed to cover their heads in school if this is part of their 
religious tradition   0.50 
Even if people belong to a particular religion, they should still feel free to draw 
on other religious traditions   0.49 
People should be allowed to commit suicide for religious reasons   0.35 
`New Age' ideas are a threat to our society   -0.34 
The Church of England should stay as the Established Church in England 0.21  -0.33 
For me, God is just what is valuable in human beings  0.29 0.23  
In deciding between right and wrong, I am influenced by the law 0.27  -0.20 
Most churches are dead or boring -0.26 0.25  
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Components  
1 2 3 
In deciding between right and wrong, I am influenced by my upbringing 0.22   
People are responsible for everything that happens to them  0.29  
I am less sure that freedom of religion for every individual is as important as I 
thought it was ten years ago  0.27  
In the final analysis, I should look after my own interests even if this means I 
spend less time looking after other people   0.26 -0.21 
My conscience is the source of my morality  -0.24 0.21 
If a nurse is asked to assist in a legal abortion, she should be allowed to refuse 
for religious reasons  -0.21 0.26 
How you live is more important than saying you believe particular doctrines or 
attending a place of worship   0.25 
More attention should be paid to environmental issues by the main religions   0.23 
Parents should be allowed, for religious reasons, to prevent their children 
having a blood transfusion   0.22 
Most modern cults/new religions are harmful   -0.22 
Variables are mostly 1-7 scales (some 1-5, indicated with *). The response indicates the response 
category with the highest coding (e.g. typically 7 = strongly agree). 
(Component loadings given for unrotated solution, correlation matrix analysed.) 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper has reached no final conclusion. It describes an unfinished 
journey. But it does invite scholars of religion to pursue the path of 
understanding the beliefs and practices that are being subsumed under the 
general concept of spirituality, and of exploring the ways these relate to the 
diversity of religiosities and secularisms that can be found in contemporary 
society. 
One thing that emerges quite clearly from the RAMP and other data is that 
the term ‘spiritual’ means different things to different people, some seeing it as 
complementary to religiosity, others in opposition to it, and yet others 
understanding the two concepts as having more complicated relationships, with 
one encompassing or overlapping with the other. The questionnaire was not, 
however, a sharp enough instrument to be able to identify and disentangle these 
diverse meanings. 
The evidence indicates both that secularisation is not yet triumphant and 
that claims that secularisation is really a unidimensional shift from religiosity to 
spirituality are not viable - there is far more than that going on. Space permitted 
only three components to be described, but manipulating the data in a number 
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of different ways can result in the emergence of several further clues about 
different ways of ‘being religious’. Some variations of the (widely defined) 
New Age understanding of spirituality caricatured in Table 1 are certainly to be 
found in contemporary Europe but, in both theory and practice, it is an 
amorphous, rather than systematic or well-developed package – New Age ideas 
by their very nature eschew both dogma and boundaries but celebrate 
individual choices and emphases which, at their non-extreme extreme represent 
the multiplicity of countless self-constructed ‘Sheilaisms’.7 Yet, at the same 
time, there are clusters of beliefs and practice that cohere together – even if 
they are not recognisably captured by any unambiguous label. 
The exact label is not, of course, important – it is people’s beliefs and 
practices that we want to explore. But, although qualitative research can 
employ other tools, language is a fundamentally important medium through 
which beliefs and practices are transmitted. And, just as the sociology of 
religion had to learn that merely asking whether our respondents believe in God 
does not distinguish between many different kinds of beliefs in many different 
conceptions of gods, so we now have to develop yet more sophisticated and 
sensitive ways of distinguishing between different ways of being religious 
and/or spiritual that may owe as much to individual constructions as to 
institutionalised traditions. If we want to tap into this variety we have to devise 
ways of translating the concepts that we use in our interviews and, more 
challengingly, our quantitative research so that we communicate the same 
meaning to the Polish peasant and Armenian engineer as we do to the 
Californian student, the Swedish housewife, the Greek priest – and, perhaps, 
the Nigerian fisherman and the Chinese bureaucrat… It is a long and 
convoluted journey, full of unexpected twists and turns – but undoubtedly one 
that we need to travel if we want to find out what is going on out there. 
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Miklós Tomka 
COMPARING COUNTRIES BY THEIR RELIGIOSITY IN 
EASTERN EUROPE 
Country-by-country differences of religiosity cover a wider range in 
Eastern than in Western Europe (Halman, 2001). They include type and 
direction of recent religious development and the actual extent of religiosity in 
individual countries. These differences have their roots in history and in 
denominational structure, in political developments and in behavior of the 
churches, and not least in social conditions and changes. 
One important, geographically dividing factor is the split between Eastern 
and Western Christianity (Huntington, 1996). Orthodox culture has a history 
different from Western Europe. In the fights between papacy and the empire 
Western Christianity became a co-producer of the differentiation of the church 
and the state. It contributed to differentiation processes in Renaissance, Refor-
mation and Enlightenment both in a supporting and in an opposing way. It was 
one of the indispensable actors of socio-cultural differentiation and conse-
quently of secularisation of Europe in a similarly ambivalent manner. It coop-
erated in the production of conditions necessary for democracy and pluralism 
and individualisation. In modern time Western Christianity and churches 
forwent previous ideological hegemony and accepted the dynamic of a basic 
cultural competition. In accepting their own classification as parts of a pluralist 
society and culture even their identity became dependent on profane reality. 
Orthodoxy has a different history, lacking substantial events of social 
differentiation. Its unity with culture, society and the political power is founded 
on the conviction of a fundamental harmony between the church and the state. 
The thesis of such a harmony tempered tensions between both and conclusively 
did not contribute much to the growth of modern conditions. If Western 
Christianity preserved a balance between innovative, modernizing capacity and 
the function of socio-cultural and political preservation, in Orthodoxy the second 
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predominated. It can be assumed that this difference has an impact on the 
attractiveness of religion in general and especially in times of rapid social change. 
Contemporary orthodoxy seems to be rooted basically in popular culture. Its 
strongholds are rather everyday religious practice and beliefs than dogmatics and 
juridical regulations; rather liturgy and representations in arts than rational 
teaching; rather monasteries, holy persons, pilgrimages and the religious calendar 
with many feasts and holy times than centralized church institution; rather the 
tradition of grandmothers, the ‘babushkas’ than organized church life and 
education. It is not our concern, whether the difference in character of Western 
and Eastern Christianity expresses different stages or rather a different way in 
historical development. It has to be yet stressed that sociology of religion 
emerged in Western culture. Concepts and indicators interpreting and measuring 
religion were derived from Western experiences and from the vision of a Western 
modernisation. This one-sidedness is reflected in non-European cultures (Bellah, 
1965; Srinivas, 1969; Srivastava, 1969). It should be taken into consideration in 
respect of Orthodox societies too. The present study concentrates on the countries 
with substantial Catholic populations, following ‘Aufbruch’-survey (Tomka and 
Zulehner, 1999; 2000). (From the only Orthodox country, which participated in 
this research, ‘Aufbruch’ investigated merely the Western region of the country, 
Transylvania, with its historical belonging to Western Christianity and with big 
Catholic and Protestant populations.) 
Denominational structure can be a relevant factor in other respect as well. 
In denominationally mixed countries one can expect longer experiences of 
coping with differences than in mono-religious societies. The first type may be 
more inclined to pluralism and to competition than the second. Cultural 
diversity is no guarantee for a higher degree of tolerance and cooperation. It 
can be a source of polarisation and hostility too. Diversity represents, though, in 
any case alternatives and excludes the idea and experiences of one single 
possibility of thinking and behaving. 
The different role of Catholicism and Protestantism in European history is 
sufficiently analyzed. The two branches produced specific patterns for sacred-
profane-relations and for communal and social integration; indeed, they had 
dissimilar contributions to modernisation in Europe. This difference has its 
expressions and reflections in religious life and organisation as well, which are 
presumably relevant in contemporary times too. Catholic or Protestant 
dominance in a country may explain much from religious developments 
(Martin, 1978). 
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Another field of explanation is history and politics. Historical experiences 
may have long lasting effects. Memories, whether a specific church was 
traditionally an institution of power and dominance, on the side of the “ruler” 
or even “conqueror”, or on the contrary a vehicle of the opposition from below, 
a source of national identity obstructing assimilating attempts, may decide 
about their present reputation (Benavides, Daly, 1989; Houtart, Rousseau, 
1973; Lanternari, 1970). Related to present developments the question is, how 
strong are the need for and the strife to socio-cultural regeneration, for 
recapturing a stable national identity and which chances and role wait for the 
church(es) in this endeavor. In the struggle to overcome inferiority complexes 
countries of Eastern Europe can not refer to their political or economic strength 
but to performances and qualifications in history and their cultural heritage, the 
remembrance of which has a very Christian frame of reference. 
The extent of resenting religiosity may be influenced, further on, by the 
historical location of a society as political center or periphery. Centre-nations of 
big empires started earlier with modernisation and secularisation than 
populations on the peripheries of empires. Peoples on the periphery preserved, 
though, their traditions and religion not only because of their inferior status and 
the delayed development, but as instruments of opposition against oppression 
as practiced by stronger secularized centers (Spohn, 1998). 
Communism created its own contexts. Totalitarianism suspended the 
differentiation of the social system and slowed down secularisation 
accordingly. On the other hand, religion with its institutional network offered 
alternatives to authoritarian systems. Both facts contributed to stabilisation  and 
increase of the social function and presence of religion. Churches with a strong 
underground dimension in past decades can now apparently more successfully 
rely on their immediate political history than others which established a 
compliant cooperation with Communist systems. Religious opposition against 
the ruling system won sympathies even in non-religious strata. A stronger and 
longer religious persecution can be, on the other hand, an explanation for losses 
in religious culture and populations as well. 
These and other factors may individually or in combination decide about 
the present religious situation and the course of religious development. 
Additionally to these, however, social conditions and changes may have their 
own separate relevance. A well known hypothesis stresses, that advances of 
modernisation influence religious change. This hypothesis could be tested by 
comparison of countries with specific values of modernity and of religiosity. 
This project required the creation of indicators of religiosity and of modernity. 
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Indicators of religiosity as used for comparison in the present study are 
factor values won from 10 individual indicators: belief in God; the image of 
God as a caring person; experienced closeness to God; the image of Jesus; 
belief in resurrection; membership in a church; the nature of relations to 
church; frequency of church-going; frequency of prayer; and finally religious or 
non-religious identity1. 
Modernity and modernisation can be conceptualized and operationalized in 
several ways. For the comparison of the countries included in the Aufbruch-
survey, which measured religiosity in the countries of East-Central-Europe in 
1998-1999, internationally comparative data allow the indication of three main 
dimensions, those of industrialisation, culture and population development 
(Human.., 1997; The Sex.., 1997). The index industrialisation is created out of 
data of the share of not agricultural employment from total employment and per 
capita consumption of electricity. The intended combination of both indicators 
required yet their standardisation. The present study looked for averages of the 
nine countries and expressed the values of each indicator in individual countries 
in per cent of the average. These percentages, as being similarly proportional 
expressions could be added and averaged. In a country-by-country comparison 
                                                          
1 This set of indicators showed close correlations. A factoranalysis resulted in one factor, explaining 
64,74 per cent. The questions and answers were as follows: Q29. “There is a God who takes care of 
each individual human being.” - Agreement or disagreement expressed on a 5-point scale. Q75. 
“Do you belong to any church or religious community at present?” yes/no. Q78. “How closely do 
you consider yourself to be bound to your church/ religious community?” 1= isn’t a member, 2= 
not closely at all, … up to: 6=very closely. Q184. “Which of the following sentences best describes 
your own position?” 1- I do not believe in God, 2- I do not know if God exists and I do not believe 
that we can attain certainty in this regard, 3- I do not believe in a personal God but I believe in a 
higher power. 4- Sometimes I believe in God, but other times I do not. 5- Even though I have my 
doubts, I believe in God. 6- I know that God exists, there is no doubt about it for me. Q196. “Which 
one of these statements best expresses your own opinion?” 1- I am not quite sure if Jesus really 
lived or not. 2- I know that Jesus was merely an extraordinary man. 3- I cannot decide if Jesus was 
just a human being or also a divine person. 4- I do not understand it entirely but I believe that Jesus, 
who lived among us as a man, is also a divine person; 5- I am convinced and believe strongly that 
Jesus, who lived among us as a man, is the Son of God and a divine person. Q197. “How often do 
you go to church to worship, not including occasions like weddings, baptisms, funerals, etc...?” 6- 
daily or more often; 5- once or several times a week; 4- at least once a month; 3- several times a 
year (or: on important holy days); 2- less than this;1- never. Q198. “Disregarding whether or not 
you go to church, would you say that you are…” 5- especially religious; 4- religious in some way; 
3- neither religious nor non-religious; 2- non-religious to an extent; 1- strongly non-religious? 
Q199. “How often do you pray?” 6- daily or more often; 5- once or several times a week; 4- at least 
once a month; 3- several times a year (or: on important holy days); 2- less than this; 1- never. 
Q201. “How close do you feel to God?” 6- very close; 5- close in some ways; 4- I cannot say; 3- 
not very close; 2- not close at all; 1- I do not believe in God; Q232. “People will rise from dead 
with body and soul.” - Agreement or disagreement expressed on a 5-point scale. 
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both individual indicators and the industrialisation-index correlate significantly 
with the level of religiosity. 
Modernity in culture and communication were indicated by per capita 
expenses for public education, the copies of published books per thousand 
inhabitants and the ratio of internet-households. National values were 
transformed, once again, into percentages of the nine-country-averages and the 
values of two kinds of education were averaged. Individual indicators and 
index-values correlate with religiosity. 
The characterisation of population development is based on the 
reproduction-rate of work-force in 1997, and on the growth-rate of the 
population between 1950 and 1995. An index is created by the same method as 
in the above cases. Individual and integrated indicators correlate with the 
degree of religiosity. 
 
Table 1: Relative values of indicators of modernity and of religiosity in nine East-
Central-European countries (In per cent of averages of the same countries). 
 CZ SI H SK HR PL LIT RO UA 
Not agricultural 
employment from total 
employment 
106,7 112,6 101,9 105,5 100,7 87,5 98,3 91,1 95,9 
Per capita consumption of 
electricity 146,6 142,7 90,6 116,1 68,1 89,6 78,3 63,1 104,8 
Industrial development 126,7 127,7 96,3 110,8 84,4 88,6 88,3 77,1 100,4 
Per capita expenses for 
public education 130,7 137,8 146,8 107,3 78,2 102,4 67,2 46,6 83,0 
Copies of published books 
per thousand inhabitants. 136,7 226,9 150,3 97,7 88,6 42,1 115,7 27,0 15,0 
Internet-households per 
thousand inhabitants 270,0 219,0 200,7 63,7 60,2 72,0 7,9 6,1 0,3 
Culture and communication 133,7 182,4 148,6 102,5 83,4 72,3 91,5 36,8 49,0 
Population-growth-rate 
between 1950 and1995  68,8 98,7 81,7 116,4 88,4 117,0 110,0 105,2 105,9 
Reproduction-rate of work-
force in 1997  91,8 87,8 88,8 112,7 93,8 114,7 107,8 101,8 100,8 
Population development 80,3 93,3 85,3 114,6 91,1 115,9 108,9 103,5 103,4 
Religiosity factor 167,5 112,0 118,6 91,5 31,7 20,0 61,9 33,1 102,6 
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These figures are obviously in accordance with the secularisation thesis. 
There remain, however, questions for the interpretation of the above data. 
Country-by-country observations of Eastern Europe reflect not only varying 
completions of modernity, but specific histories of modernisation with differing 
social consequences. Is the perfection of modernity or rather the speed of 
modernisation the decisive factor of religious change? Do the present results 
express stable and enduring interrelations or do they indicate rather temporary 
arrangements of a cultural lag? 
A related problem consists in a peculiar character of modernisation in 
Communism. Post-world-war-II systems promoted vehemently industrialisation 
and urbanisation in Eastern Europe. They transformed the family by obliging 
women to take a job. They persecuted religion both with ideological motives 
and because religion and churches were the most effective force of opposition. 
More important than anti-religious policy became the remodeling of human 
conditions and society. Especially the abolition of private property in 
agriculture, the organisation of Socialist state farms and ”cooperatives” and the 
following rural exodus contributed to the destruction of local bonds and 
community ties. These changes corresponded at the best partially with 
economic aspirations of the people but limited their civil rights by the intensifi-
cation of political centralisation. Party-states destroyed networks of civil 
society and limited the differentiation of the social system. Authoritarian state 
hindered and penalized public initiatives and the creation of independent clubs 
or associations. The lack of social autonomy created an obstacle for social 
adaptation to new socio-economic conditions and contributed to an increase of 
social problems accordingly. The combination of an enforced and unbalanced 
modernisation and of a tutelage by the state atomized society (Hankiss, 1990). 
The same politico-economic practice eliminated the meaning of individual 
endeavors. Individual endeavors and styles, if any, did not easily find commu-
nal support for themselves, because of disintegration of society and the official 
control over the life of citizens. Deviant behavior spread. The loss of individual 
meaning and the irrationality of authoritarian politics created anomy. One of 
the most peculiar measurable effects of “communist modernisation” was a 
phenomenon strongly deviating from global tendencies, the spread of stress-
diseases and as a consequence, a decrease or at least a lacking increase of life 
expectancy all over Eastern Europe, beginning in mid-sixties and reaching in 
the mid-nineties (Vallin, Meslé, 2000). 
One may argue, that in disturbing community relations and fighting tradition 
totalitarianism demolished the actual milieu of religious life too. As far as 
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religion is understood as a cultural system (Geertz, 1966) or as an institution of 
social memory (Hervieu-Léger, 2000), the weakening of systemic character of 
society includes the deterioration of religious conditions, independently of the 
autonomous or coerced character of this development. Religious community and 
organisation act often as entities counteracting social disintegration. Religious 
motivation may and in communist period did preserve and generate social bonds 
with better results than any other agency promoting community creation and civil 
society. This did not yet diminish the relevance of the fact, that the artificial and 
forceful decomposition of genuine social organisation severely impaired religious 
life in Eastern Europe. The destruction of socio-cultural autonomy and self-
determination was possibly more harmful for religion and the churches than any 
explicitly intended and realized persecution of religion. 
Religion is, however, by no means merely a stabilizing institution or 
custom and tradition only. On the contrary, it can be innovation, initiative, 
autonomous value orientation (Williams, Cox and Jaffee, 1992) and a disrup-
tive social force as well (Houtart, 1992; Smith, 1996). Allport distinguishes 
intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity. The first one expressing an independent final 
value and goal, the second one is an instrument for the sake of other values and 
interests (Allport, 1950). The two types emerge in combination. It would be, 
though, a mistake to underestimate the first part, the initiating, challenging and 
transforming capacity of religion. 
In one of his early works Berger attributed only a dependent role to 
religion, - and came to wrong conclusions. Churches in modernity have to 
choose, according to this early idea of Berger, between the preservation of their 
faith or their flock. Stressing orthodoxy would initiate a loss of membership, 
whilst an emphasis on membership requires liberalisation of the teaching. In 
any case in the confrontation with socio-cultural changes religion and churches 
lose a part of their former substance (Berger, 1969). Since Weber and the 
Protestant-ethic-debate there should be, though, no doubt about the possibility 
of a genuine autonomous role of religion in social development. Not surpris-
ingly Berger’s thesis got vehement opposition from champions of a missionary 
church (Thung, 1976). And the American religious history in late sixties and 
seventies offered empirical disaffirmation of the above alternative (Kelley, 
1972; Roozen and Hadaway, 1993). The dynamism of religious change is a 
relevant feature in the analysis of East-European developments too. 
Social sources of religious dynamism can be traced both in the realisation 
of conscious religious options of mature individuals and in emotional religious 
fervor of socially or culturally uprooted people and in the strife for community 
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of like-minded people. Modernity creates conditions which dissolve tradition 
but are favorable to religious ferment. Modernity includes differentiation of life 
conditions, mobility, as well as promotion of rationality and individualism. 
Higher reflexivity and transitory life conditions are typical for younger adults, 
especially students and young graduates. Religious increase is just in these 
groups most significant in Eastern Europe. With the comparison of cohorts, i.e. 
groups defined by the years of their births, changes in the same groups can be 
compared over time. (Table 2).2 
In older age groups some substantial religious change is not visible or 
religiosity even decreases in several countries. With the exception of two out of 
ten countries survey data prove a religious increase in the life of younger 
cohorts in past ten years. It demonstrates country differences too, which fit 
remarkably well into the argumentation about Communist modernisation. In the 
countries, where strong rural structures and culture were preserved (i.e. because 
the socialisation of agriculture remained partial, peasants stuck to their lands 
and industry could not fully absorb the population surplus), like Poland, 
Ukraine, Romania and – maybe – Croatia, actual generation differences in 
religiosity are small. Under such conditions in any of the cohorts a substantial 
change in religiosity over time can not be expected either. 
Countries, like the Czech Republic, Hungary and to some extent Lithuania 
represent the opposite type with rapid socio-economic change in Communist 
time, with big generation differences as a consequence, but with a tendency 
towards equalisation after the collapse of Communism. This return to previous 
proportions includes the stability of religiosity among people born in and before 
World-war-II. (A small decline of religiosity in some countries is a 
consequence of the death of the oldest.) A more spectacular realisation of the 
same tendency is the increase of religiosity among younger people, born after 
1960, who reached their maturity and started their life in the atmosphere of the 
decay of Communism and the emergence of social autonomy. 
 
                                                          
2 1990 and 1999 figures are taken from European Values Study data-file, 1995 data stem from 
World Values Survey, which was proceeded as a repetition of the European Values Study. 
(Halman, 2001, Inglehart, 1997, Zulehner and Denz, 1993) The selection of the countries followed 
the Aufbruch-survey, in which the same hypotheses as in present article were tested. 
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Table 2: Ratio of self-expressed religious identity and of belief in God in ten 
countries in East-Central-Europe, in 1990, 1995 and 1999, in groups 
discriminated by the respective years of birth. (In %) 
Born: … before 1941 
… between 
1941-1960 
… after 
1960 
… before 
1941 
… between 
1941-1960 
… after 
1960 
year Identifies himself/herself as religious Believes in God 
Eastern Lands of Germany, previously German Democratic Republic 
1990 49,8 33,9 23,5 48,1 31,2 24,6 
1995 43,1 23,6 16,6 41,2 23,2 21,5 
1999 48,0 21,9 25,8 50,2 24,3 19,9 
Poland 
1990 97,6 95,4 95,3 99,0 96,1 97,3 
1995 95,5 92,4 92,9 … … … 
1999 97,0 92,3 93,2 98,4 95,8 97,7 
Lithuania 
1990 73,3 46,7 39,3 … … … 
1995 88,7 83,2 79,1 93,0 83,6 81,5 
1999 92,8 85,2 78,5 91,1 87,4 81,2 
Czech Republic 
1990 97,2 31,0 21,2 58,3 24,7 20,0 
1995 59,4 38,1 27,0 58,7 36,3 26,1 
1999 62,5 39,5 33,9 56,9 33,0 33,3 
Slovakia 
1990 90,1 72,5 69,9 87,4 67,0 64,0 
1995 88,4 78,3 67,8 90,9 81,6 72,7 
1999 92,8 81,2 76,1 93,1 82,4 77,7 
Ukraine 
1995 67,2 60,9 65,3 78,1 74,0 78,2 
1999 76,8 78,3 75,9 80,2 83,0 81,6 
Hungary 
1990 76,9 46,9 31,6 86,1 52,7 40,9 
1995 70,0 51,7 44,9 77,6 61,0 60,0 
1999 73,8 50,3 51,8 84,9 62,6 58,6 
Romania 
1995 87,8 83,2 81,1 98,1 96,7 95,8 
1999 92,1 86,4 77,6 95,9 98,2 94,9 
Slovenia 
1990 80,1 71,3 66,3 73,2 57,8 56,5 
1995 78,6 67,6 62,4 72,3 62,0 59,5 
1999 79,7 67,8 67,0 74,6 63,5 61,5 
Croatia 
1995 80,7 69,3 66,3 90,0 77,3 78,0 
1999 86,3 83,4 83,3 93,7 91,1 91,5 
Source: 1990 and 1999 figures are taken from European Values Study data-file, 1995 data stem 
from World Values Survey, which was proceeded as a repetition of the European Values Study. 
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Available survey data are, however, insufficient for the indication of 
changes for one crucial dimension of religiosity. The extent of a possible 
transformation of religiosity from a passively participating and customarily 
institution oriented to an active and self-styled one is not yet established. Actual 
data and the knowledge concerning religiosity and religious change in Eastern 
Europe are therefore in final result highly unsatisfactory. Much evidence is 
available about modernisation and its economic, social and cultural dimensions. 
Country-by-country differences of secularisation in a sense of de-
institutionalisation are well known. Evidences show how socio-economic and 
political developments shaped the religious landscape. Systematic research 
about autonomous processes within religion and the churches is rare yet. This 
lack hinders the understanding of the growth of new religious movements or of 
religious revival in general. The same ignorance obstructs any valid prognosis 
as well. The discovery of this new domain may be the key for future relevance 
of sociology of religion in Eastern Europe. 
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Olaf Müller 
RELIGIOSITY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: 
RESULTS FROM THE PCE SURVEY1 
1. Introduction 
Looking at the state and development of religiosity in the former 
communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, one can see a quite 
heterogeneous landscape. Whereas in Poland and Romania the social 
significance of the churches as well as of religion in general seems to be as high 
as decades ago, in East Germany, the Czech Republic or Estonia a huge decline 
in traditional forms of religion can be observed. On the contrary, in Russia and 
Albania there seems to be a tendency towards a re-vitalisation of religion. Since 
all of these countries suffered from their communist past, this raises several 
questions concerning the causes of the national differences behind the pure fact 
of political repression of religion. What are the reasons for survival – or decline 
- of religion under these unfavourable circumstances during the communist 
period? What can we expect for the future development? 
Generally speaking, there are 3 - partly competing – hypotheses, which are 
discussed in contemporary sociology of religion: 
1. The secularisation hypothesis, which assumes a general decline of 
religion. Main cause is the worldwide modernisation process, which leads 
to a decline of the meaning of religion because of an antagonism of 
modern age and religion per se (Wilson, 1982). 
                                                          
1 The project “Political Culture in Central and Eastern Europe” (PCE) is in charge of the project 
group of the same name at the European University Viadrina and at the Frankfurt Institute for 
Transformation Studies (F.I.T.), Frankfurt (Oder). Members are Detlef Pollack (head), Jörg Jacobs, 
Olaf Müller, and Gert Pickel. The PCE survey was carried out in September 2000 in 11 countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe. The main coordinator regarding the fieldwork was INRA Germany. 
The survey was founded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) and the Volkswagen 
Foundation. 
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2. The privatisation/individualisation hypothesis: According to this 
approach, there is generally an individual need for religion. The decline of 
institutionalised forms of religion is not denied, but religion will continue 
to exist in the private sphere (Luckmann [1967] calls it “invisible 
religion”). 
3. The re-vitalisation hypothesis: A certain amount of societal need for 
religion is postulated. On the religious marketplace, the supply side 
determines the demand for religion (Iannaccone et al., 1997). According 
to this thesis, the removal of anti-religious repression should lead to a re-
vitalisation of religion in Eastern Europe after the breakdown of 
communism (Jagodzinski, 2000:54). 
 
In order to analyse the development of religiosity in Eastern Europe one 
has to take quite a lot of factors into account. Apart from socio-historical 
aspects (e.g. the state-church relations, especially the collaboration vs. 
resistance of the national churches during the communist period and World 
War II with/against the political authorities [Höllinger, 1996], the role of the 
churches during the transition process etc.), the degree of the socio-economic 
development and the dominant denomination are mostly emphasised in the 
literature (Haller, 1988; Pickel, 1998; Tomka and Zulehner, 1999). This 
contribution deals especially with the question of how modernisation effects 
and the religious socialisation within the families influence the development of 
religiosity at the individual as well as at the societal level. 
2. Religiosity in the 1990s 
The pattern of religiosity in Western Europe seems to support the argument 
concerning the influence of the dominant denomination quite well. As the 
development in Western Europe shows, de-churching occurred earlier and to a 
higher extent in Protestantism as compared to Catholicism (cf. also Haller, 
1988; Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere, 1993). Indeed, the Protestant societies of 
Scandinavia show the lowest rates of church attendance and belief in God. 
Denominationally mixed countries, such as Great Britain, West Germany, or 
the Netherlands take a middle position. Predominantly Catholic states, such as 
Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Portugal are characterised by considerable high rates 
of church attendance and belief in God.2 
                                                          
2 Naturally, there are some exceptional cases: Strictly following our typology, we would expect 
Northern Ireland somewhere in the middle, whereas France should take a top or at least a middle 
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Table 1: Indicators of “traditional” religiosity in Europe 
 Belief in God (%) Church attendance p.a. (mean) 
 1991 1998/*2000 1991 1998/*2000 
Italy 86 88 24 21 
Portugal  92 20 22 
Spain  82 18 19 
Ireland 95 94 41 38 
France  52 7 8 
Austria 78 81 18 16 
Netherlands 55 59 11 10 
Switzerland  73 11 10 
West Germany 67 62 13 10 
Great Britain 69 68 11 10 
Northern Ireland 95 89  27 
Sweden  46 5 5,5 
Denmark  57 5 5 
Norway 60 58 5 5 
Poland 95 95* 37 33* 
Slovakia  77* 22 20* 
Slovenia 61 61* 14 11* 
Hungary 64 67* 8 8* 
East Germany 25 24* 3 3* 
Czech Republic  32* 9 5* 
Latvia  72 6 7 
Estonia  47*  3,5* 
Albania  86*  8* 
Romania  98* 17 14* 
Bulgaria  66* 6 6* 
Russia 47 66* 4 4* 
Source: PCE 2000; ISSP 1991, 1998 
                                                                                                                                
position. The reasons why these countries do not follow the expected patterns are mainly 
determined by their specific historical background and will not be discussed here. – Although there 
is also some evidence for a correlation between the socio-economic development of a region and 
the level of religiosity of its population (e.g. Scandinavia vs. Southern Europe), denomination 
seems to be more important. However, these results do not contradict secularisation theory 
automatically. Assuming a correlation between modernisation and a decline in religion, 
secularisation theorists refer to a process in the long run that cannot be measured by single 
indicators such as current GDP rates adequately. 
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In East Europe, we can observe some similar patterns. Countries with a 
denominational mixed population (East Germany, Estonia) are characterised by 
low rates of church attendance and belief in God. They seem even more 
secularised than the highly modernised, Protestant societies of Scandinavia. 
Countries where the majority of the population belongs to the Roman-Catholic 
denomination, show some higher figures. Among these countries, Slovenia 
(which is at the same time the mostly modernised country within this group) is 
a bit more “secularised” than Slovakia. Due to the extremely high relevance of 
religion as a source of national identity, Poland takes an outstanding position 
(as well as Ireland and Northern Ireland in Western Europe). 
Although being predominantly Catholic, the Czech Republic seems also to 
be one of the most secularised societies. Regarding belief in God, Bulgaria and 
Russia reach figures also to be found in the Catholic countries of Eastern 
Europe. According to this indicator, Romania belongs to the most religious 
countries. Generally, the church attendance rates in the Orthodox countries are 
rather low. Surprisingly high – and in sharp contrast to its image as “most 
secular country in Europe” - is the extent of religiosity in Albania, with an 
astonishing 86 percent who believe in God. 
3. Religious socialisation within the family and religiosity in 
adulthood 
One of the most common statements of the proponents of the secularisation 
hypothesis refers to the declining role of the main churches in the modern 
world, i.e. the disappearance of institutionalised and “public” religion (Martin, 
1978).3 In East Europe, this process was enforced additionally by the anti-
religious repression by the state. Although this repression could not destroy 
religiosity among the people altogether, it was forced into a very private sphere 
at least (similar to other non-conform positions or actions; Pollack, 1998; 
Tomka, 1991). Since an alienation from the church does not necessarily mean a 
disappearance of religiosity in general, such tendencies cannot be taken as an 
indicator of secularisation. According to Luckmann, we have to distinguish 
between institutionalised, public forms of religion, and more “invisible” ver-
sions (Luckmann, 1967). Nevertheless, we have to investigate the cumulative 
                                                          
3 This hypothesis is not let unchallenged within the sociology of religion: Some authors stress 
especially the increasing relevance of public religion during the last years (Casanova, 1994). 
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effect of a twofold secularisation process in Eastern Europe – forced by 
modernisation and by the political authorities. At least three of the five 
dimensions of religiosity identified by Glock (1954) – the ideological 
(“belief”), the ritual (“practise”), and the cognitive (“knowledge”) component – 
require a certain stock of knowledge or belief shared by a collective. The 
significance of supporting institutions should be obvious, if one refers to the 
plausibility of religious meanings. As a believer you need a steady social 
support, i.e. a socio-cultural context where the meanings “make sense” (Berger 
and Luckmann, 1966). Usually, support is given by the religious community 
you belong to. However, it was the anti-religious activity of the communist 
regime that hindered the maintenance as well as the emergence of such a 
“plausibility structure”. 
Assuming that the religious education or affiliation during childhood 
determines the further religious needs of a person to a considerable extent, the 
emergence of religiosity has to be seen as a part of the development of one’s 
personal identity (Erikson, 1950; Fowler, 1981). Generally, the family seems to 
be the most central agent of socialisation (Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle, 
1997:98ff.). As already stated, the parents’ role was of particular importance 
during the communist period, when structures of religion were almost non-
existent in public. During this time, the danger for religion was alienation 
through several steps: First, the families would not attend church services 
together anymore. Religious communication outside the family would be 
reduced. From an “optimistic” point of view, one could assume that religious 
practises would be exercised at home instead. However, what about the long-
term stability of “hidden” religiosity within the families without functioning 
religious communities, and without personal experiences with public forms of 
religion? Thus, from a rather sceptical position one could also argue that the 
absence of public religion is merely a first intermediate state of the seculari-
sation process.  
In order to analyse such a scenario, one should take a look at the church 
attendance of the families during the last decades. Chart 1 shows the dramatic 
decline of the number of families, which went to church together at least once 
per month. 
Regarding the strength of the church, Poland is once more a special case: 
The church is today almost as strong as it was 60 years ago. About 90 percent 
of the families are still going to church at least once per month. 
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Chart 1: Family ties with church 
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Poland is followed by the Catholic countries Slovakia and Slovenia, which 
have started from quite a high level of church attendance in the 1930s. But, a 
huge decline of church ties is visible. Whereas about 90 percent of the families 
had been monthly churchgoers between the two World Wars, today only every 
second family attends church services together. Even more dramatic is the 
development in Romania and Hungary. The Czech Republic, East Germany, 
Bulgaria, Estonia, and Russia show the lowest values today. One should notice, 
that the starting level was considerably lower than in other Catholic states and 
Romania. Therefore, the process went off more slowly - especially in the 
successor states of the Soviet Union, where the communist regime had already 
been installed in 1917. In almost all countries the period between the 1950s and 
the 1970s is characterised by the biggest decline. 
Of course, an alienation from the church must not mean a renunciation of 
religiosity in general. As mentioned before, the religious life within the families 
became the most important factor for the survival of religion in communist 
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Europe. As can be seen in Chart 2, the anti-secular resistance of the families was 
the strongest in Poland, closely followed by Romania, where nearly all 
respondents tell about a religious education at home. If we remember the high 
rates of believers in Romania today (see Table 1), we can assume a survival of 
religion in an “invisible”, privatised form during the communist times – despite 
the fact that the political regime was very rigid. In Slovakia and Slovenia, almost 
80 percent of people have been brought up in faith. A remarkable resistance 
against the anti-religious tendencies existed also in Hungary, which takes a 
middle position. Albania is once more a surprise: About 60 percent were brought 
up in faith (this cannot be completely explained by “rationalisation effects” or 
“failures of memory”). Remembering the fact that religion was officially 
forbidden, this is an astonishing number. Opposite to this, a minority of people 
has had a religious socialisation at home in East Germany, the Czech Republic, 
Russia, and Estonia. The different power of resistance of the dominant 
denominations and modernisation effects are noticeable again. 
 
Chart 2: Religious socialisation within the family 
Percentage of respondents who were brought up in faith by his parents
Source: PCE 2000
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So far, the state and development of religiosity has been analysed on a very 
aggregated level. Naturally, a phenomenon like secularisation can only be 
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understood as a process. The deeper it is implemented in everyday life of the 
individuals, the more irreversible it will be. Thus, it is necessary to include the 
individual level into our analysis, and to look at the influence of religious 
socialisation in childhood on religiosity in adulthood. 
 
Table 2: Religious socialisation as a child and “traditional” religiosity in 
adulthood 
 Belief in God (%) 
Church 
attendance 
p.a. (mean) 
Trust in 
church 
(mean)1 
Religious self-
assessment 
(mean)2 
Albania brought up in faith 93 10 0,75 0,97 
 not brought up in faith 75 5 0,60 -0,10 
Bulgaria brought up in faith 89 8 0,70 0,92 
 not brought up in faith 41 3 0,50 -0,89 
Czech brought up in faith 75 13 0,52 0,41 
Republic not brought up in faith 8 1 0,23 -1,84 
Estonia brought up in faith 83 7 0,74 0,49 
 not brought up in faith 33 2 0,56 -0,87 
East brought up in faith 58 6 0,52 -0,09 
Germany not brought up in faith 6 0,3 0,29 -2,36 
Hungary brought up in faith 84 11 0,51 0,17 
 not brought up in faith 36 2 0,30 -1,78 
Poland brought up in faith 96 35 0,56 0,99 
 not brought up in faith 74 19 0,33 -0,39 
Romania brought up in faith 98 14 0,84 0,96 
 not brought up in faith 92 8 0,75 0,19 
Russia brought up in faith 97 7 0,71 0,81 
 not brought up in faith 50 2 0,50 -0,97 
Slovakia brought up in faith 88 25 0,60 0,49 
 not brought up in faith 30 3 0,35 -2,05 
Slovenia brought up in faith 76 14 0,46 0,56 
 not brought up in faith 21 2 0,22 -1,03 
1 Scale from 0 (no confidence at all) to 1 (great deal of confidence) 
2 Scale from –3 (extremely non-religious) to +3 (extremely religious) 
Source: PCE 2000 
 
The results from Table 2, where those who were brought up in faith are 
compared with persons that grew up without religious socialisation at home, 
support the assumption concerning the strong influence of the socialisation in 
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childhood. In all countries, those who were brought up in faith show a 
remarkably higher degree of belief in god, church attendance rate, and trust in 
church as an institution. Therefore, with regard to the development of 
“traditional” religiosity we must question the re-vitalisation hypothesis 
seriously. It is not the supply side that determines the need for religion: Without 
corresponding religious experiences in the past, there doesn’t seem to be such a 
need at all.4 
4. The future of religion in Central and Eastern Europe 
What can be expected regarding the development of religion over the next 
years? Will the next generation still – or again – grow up within a religious 
context, or will the secularisation process continue? 
As long as one doesn’t distinguish between age cohorts, one cannot say 
much about the future process. In order to shed some light on that, we will 
compare families who experienced a “break” of the socialisation process within 
two generations (respondent as well respondent’s children), either from a 
secular toward a religious socialisation, or vice versa (Chart 3). 
The proportions of those who were brought up in faith but don’t (didn’t/do 
not intend to) bring up their own children in faith had been subtracted from the 
proportion of those who did not have a religious socialisation in childhood, but 
bring up (brought up/intend to bring up) their children in faith. Those families, 
who didn’t experience such a change, were not included. 
In Albania and Russia, the proportion of those families that turned back 
towards religion over three generations is clearly higher than of those who 
became secular (about 20 respective 10 percent of all families). In Poland and 
Romania (on a very high level) and Estonia (on a very low level) these groups 
are almost of the same size (this does not mean a lack of changes!). The 
number of families turned away from religion over the generations is larger in 
Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and especially in Hungary 
and East Germany. For the latter countries, a tendency toward a secularisation 
can hardly be ignored. 
                                                          
4 As exceptions we can notice Albania, Romania, and Poland. The differences between the religious 
and non-religious socialised persons are not so large there. Also those respondents who report not 
to be brought up in faith show considerable high rates of personal religiosity. On the macro level, it 
points to the fact that the social significance of the church as well as religion in general is obviously 
very strong in these countries. Thus, there are (still) social norms that are able to prevent a 
renunciation of the church and religion. 
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Chart 3: Religious socialisation within the family: 
Secularisation/revitalisation index 
toward religion away from religion
Percentage of respondents who were not brought up in faith but do/did/intend to bring up their own children in faith minus 
percentage of respondents who were brought up in faith but do/did/intend not to bring up their own children in faith
Source: PCE 2000
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Up to now, we haven’t got any information about the dynamics of the 
disappearance of religious socialisation within the families over the last 
decades. In order to analyse this development, we have to consider the time 
period when the respondents were children. If we correlate the current age of 
the respondent with his socialisation when he was a child, cohort effects can be 
observed: Only in Poland and Romania a religious socialisation within the 
family is not correlated with the time period the respondent grew up in. 
For all the other countries, we find a positive correlation between the age of 
the respondent and a religious upbringing – or, vice versa: The younger the 
respondents, the less they report a religious socialisation during their childhood. 
The strongest effects are to be found in East Germany (ß=.38), the Czech Re-
public (ß=.34), and Estonia (ß=.26). The correlations appear to be the weakest 
(but still significant) in Slovakia (ß=.19), Russia, and Bulgaria (both ß=.17). 
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These results can be interpreted as evidence for a renunciation of individual 
religiosity over the last decades. The extent is not as large as it is with the 
church attendance (see Chart 1). And, in comparison with the decline in church 
attendance, the renunciation of individual religiosity seems to occur with a 
temporal delay.5 Thus, we can state for almost all of the observed countries 
(except for Poland and Romania) a second, ongoing process which follows the 
mainly politically forced renunciation of the churches: Due to the steady 
disappearance of religious education within the families, the younger 
generations do not have “religious roots” anymore. 
As already mentioned, these tendencies are reinforced by the process of 
modernisation. The influence of modernisation effects on each individual 
becomes obvious, if we differentiate the respondents concerning some socio-
demographic variables. Since modernisation is characterised by a general 
increase in the educational level and processes of urbanisation, the (formal) 
level of education and the region where the respondents live are useful 
indicators. And, as expected according to the modernisation thesis, the better 
educated, as well as the residents of the cities, are less religious and less tied to 
the church in almost all the cases (tables A and B in the appendix). Assuming 
that younger people are more influenced by modernisation processes than older 
ones (Inglehart, 1977), the differentiation between age cohorts confirms these 
results once more. The younger the respondents are, the lower are their church 
attendance rate as well as their religious self-assessments.6 
And, especially among the younger generations the influences of 
modernisation effects are additionally reinforced by the lack of religious 
socialisation (which partially is an effect of modernisation, too). If we look at 
the trends of modernisation and religious socialisation, then there is a lot of 
evidence that a huge increase in traditional forms of religiosity in the most East 
European countries cannot be expected. But, at least one opposite factor should 
                                                          
5 Up to this point, this assumption is rather derived “indirectly” from comparisons of macro data by 
further analyses not shown here. In order to analyse this in detail, it needs longitudinal individual 
data, of course. 
6 Bulgaria is the only one significant exceptional case. Here, the patterns regarding the dimensions 
such as age, education, and region are quite unclear. But, just because of its uniqueness Bulgaria 
refers to some other factors which cannot be discussed here in detail: Of course, at the individual 
level religiosity can emerge at any time in the life cycle, even without any experiences in 
childhood. This often happens in times of personal crisis or strokes of fate. If one takes into account 
the social situation of the majority of the population especially in Bulgaria (the similarity to Russia 
should be obvious), a turn towards religion seems to serve here as one means to cope with such 
crises (for the problem of religion and coping see Pargament, 1997). 
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be kept in mind that is stressed by the re-vitalisation theorists: Due to the 
disappearance of the political repression of the churches and religion, the 
“supply side” expanded since 1989/90. Maybe there is some demand for new 
offers? One indicator to analyse this question could be the number of those who 
turned toward religion after they have formerly been non-religious. 
 
Chart 4: Turns towards religion in Europe 
Percentage of respondents who „believe in God now, but didn‘t used to“
Source: PCE 2000
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Chart 4 shows that there is a certain amount of such persons in every 
society. But, the figures for Western and Eastern Europe are not too different. 
In almost all countries there are about 5 to 10 percent of the individuals who 
turned to religion during their life. However, in Albania, Russia, and Latvia the 
rate is considerably higher and reaches about ¼ of the population or even more. 
In these tree countries, a re-vitalisation of religiosity can hardly be overlooked.7 
                                                          
7 Regarding the future development of this tendency one has to notice that the numbers of those 
who became religious among the younger generation in the transition countries are slightly higher 
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Up to this point, the signs are not in favour of a re-vitalisation of traditional 
religion in the most countries of Eastern Europe. But, does this mean the end of 
religion? As some scholars argue, it doesn’t. They do not deny the decline in 
institutionalised, traditional religiosity in general. But, the individuals would 
become by no means atheists. Instead, they are searching for more 
individualised, “newer” forms (Luckmann, 1967). 
 
Table 3: Religious socialisation and “alternative” forms of religiosity in 
adulthood 
  Belief in faith-healer (%) Belief in effects of Zen meditations, Yoga (%) 
Albania brought up in faith 45 7 
 not brought up in faith 19 3 
Bulgaria brought up in faith 26 8 
 not brought up in faith 15 9 
Czech  brought up in faith 20 21 
Republic not brought up in faith 8 21 
Estonia brought up in faith 26 25 
 not brought up in faith 24 34 
East  brought up in faith 9 12 
Germany not brought up in faith 4 15 
Hungary brought up in faith 34 22 
 not brought up in faith 26 26 
Poland brought up in faith 27 7 
 not brought up in faith 26 18 
Romania brought up in faith 9 11 
 not brought up in faith 12 16 
Russia brought up in faith 50 30 
 not brought up in faith 49 38 
Slovakia brought up in faith 39 17 
 not brought up in faith 36 31 
Slovenia brought up in faith 17 17 
 not brought up in faith 15 29 
Respondents who believe “strong” or “to a certain degree”. Source: PCE 2000 
                                                                                                                                
at best than in Western Europe (the only one exception is again Albania with about 40 percent 
among the persons between 18 and 29 who turned to religion). The results from our PCE study 
differ from the ISSP 1998 figures to a certain degree. But, generally, one has to be very careful 
concerning the interpretation of these figures due to the small n problem. 
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Table 3 shows, that considerable parts of the East European population 
believe in phenomena like faith-healers or in the effects of Zen meditation or 
Yoga at least “to a certain degree”. However, one has to distinguish rather 
“old” forms (here: faith-healers) and newer phenomena (here: Zen meditations, 
Yoga). The older forms are obviously more accepted by those people who have 
been brought up in faith. Remembering their higher degree of religiosity in a 
traditional sense, these forms seem to be accompanied by a “traditional” 
religiosity.8 Although new religiosity cannot be characterised as a mass 
movement, the pattern regarding more modern forms like belief in the effects of 
Zen meditation or Yoga are very interesting: Firstly, on the macro level, these 
phenomena seem to be more accepted in the countries where the people are less 
religious. Secondly, in every country (except the Czech Republic) mainly those 
without any religious socialisation during their childhood believe in Zen and/or 
Yoga.9 However, one has to remember that it is (still) a minority, which is 
attracted by such phenomena. It is still too early to make any general statements 
about this topic. The future will show whether it is more than a fashion. 
5. Conclusion 
In view of our results, we cannot expect a huge increase in traditional 
forms of religiosity in the most East European countries. The modernisation 
process, combined with anti-religious attempts by the political authorities, 
caused conditions not in favour of religion. The decline of traditional religiosity 
becomes apparent with regard to church attendance rates, but can be shown also 
for “private” shapes as like belief in God. The steady transmission of religious 
ideas from generation to generation is becoming increasingly interrupted. The 
process is far advanced in East Germany and the Czech Republic, but is also 
continuing to spread in most other countries. There are only very few 
exceptional cases, which resist this trend. Especially in Poland and Romania 
religion never lost its social significance; in Russia or Albania even a revival 
was experienced. Due to the fact that the younger, the well educated, and the 
town dwellers are mostly alienated from traditional religion, it is to be expected 
                                                          
8 This is also supported by additional analyses, e.g. individual correlations (Müller et al., 2003). 
Although the differences between the observed groups are not so clear as in Table 2, one cannot 
speak about a considerable turning to these forms of religiosity. 
9 One possible explanation could be, that it is something like an effect of a rather post-materialistic 
movement against modernity. In any case, it is a phenomenon that is worth to be observed in 
further analyses. 
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that this trend will continue in the long run, too. On the other hand, exactly 
these social groups are mostly receptive to newer religious forms such as Zen 
or Yoga. However, one has to keep in mind that it is still a minority, which is 
attracted by such phenomena. Thus, there is little evidence that the de-
institutionalisation of religion will be completely compensated by an increase 
in individualised, syncretistic religiosity (Pollack and Pickel, 1999; Pollack, 
2000; Müller et al., 2003). 
Of course, there are good reasons to avoid all too simple statements about 
the development of religion in general. Although we can observe some general 
patterns, we have to take into account differences determined by the national 
context of a country (denomination, modernisation, church-state relations, etc.). 
Furthermore, we have to differentiate between different forms of religiosity 
(“traditional” versus “alternative”). In order to get better answers concerning 
the future development of religiosity in Central and Eastern Europe, we have 
also to study generational differences (Tomka, 2001:26). If we want to find out 
more about general mechanisms how religiosity is transmitted, and if we want 
to know how it changes over time, the ideal design would be a long-term 
longitudinal cross-country study, which is representative for the general 
population. Since the carrying through of such a huge project is unfortunately 
not to be expected in the short term, we should use the studies we have to hand 
(ISSP, World Values Survey, Aufbruch, RAMP, PCE) even more 
systematically and in comparison to each other. 
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Appendix: Social structure and religiosity 
 
Table A: Church attendance 
 Age cohort Educational level Region 
 
Pop. 
∅ 18-29 30-45 46-60 >61 low middle high urban rural 
Albania 8 6 6 10 13 13 7 6 7 8 
Bulgaria 6 5 4 5 7 8 5 4 6 5 
Czech Republic 5 3 4 4 10 12 4 3 4 6 
Estonia 3 2 3 2 4 4 3 3 2 3 
East Germany 2 1 2 2 3 5 2 2 2 3 
Hungary 8 5 5 7 13 11 5 8 7 9 
Poland 33 32 31 32 41 40 32 32 31 37 
Romania 14 11 10 15 20 20 12 12 12 16 
Russia 4 2 3 4 6 5 3 4 4 4 
Slovakia 20 19 17 20 28 27 20 18 15 26 
Slovenia 11 8 11 11 14 16 10 8 8 14 
Church attendance p.a. (mean) 
 
 
 
Table B: Religious self-assessment 
 Age cohort Educational level Region 
 
Pop. 
∅ 18-29 30-45 46-60 <61 low middle high urban rural 
Albania 0,50 0,26 0,40 0,63 1,01 1,0 0,44 0,18 0,47 0,54 
Bulgaria -0,06 -0,29 -0,09 -0,23 0,23 0,40 -0,20 -0,22 -0,07 -0,05 
Czech Republic -1,07 -1,44 -1,39 -1,09 -0,14 0,11 -1,17 -1,34 -1,20 -0,86 
Estonia -0,55 -0,70 -0,62 -0,72 -0,16 -0,15 -0,65 -0,62 -0,58 -0,53 
East Germany -1,55 -1,81 -1,95 -1,56 -1,03 -0,91 -1,65 -1,72 -1,68 -1,33 
Hungary -0,54 -0,89 -0,83 -0,59 0,08 -0,04 -0,65 -0,78 -0,80 -0,10 
Poland 0,91 0,87 0,80 0,90 1,20 1,19 0,88 0,77 0,81 1,04 
Romania 0,92 0,72 0,81 0,93 1,26 1,25 0,83 0,76 0,80 1,06 
Russia -0,40 -0,61 -0,44 -0,58 0,05 -0,26 -0,60 -0,41 -0,41 -0,35 
Slovakia -0,07 -0,27 -0,27 -0,05 0,54 0,65 -0,08 -0,37 -0,39 0,33 
Slovenia 0,15 -0,04 0,16 0,23 0,27 0,67 0,11 -0,14 -0,08 0,41 
Scale from –3 (extremely non-religious) to 3 (extremely religious) 
Source: PCE 2000 
 

 79 
Detlef Pollack 
INSTITUTIONALISED AND SUBJECTIVE RELIGIOSITY 
IN FORMER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL 
AND EASTERN EUROPE 
1. Introduction 
In assessing the development of religion in Western Europe, more and 
more sociologists of religion are using the concept of religious individu-
alisation. According to these sociologists, we can observe not a secularisation 
but an individualisation, privatisation, and pluralisation of religion in Western 
Europe. The individualisation thesis (Luckmann, 1967; Hervieu-Léger, 1990; 
Gabriel, 1992; Krüggeler, 1993; Davie, 1994) points out that the decrease in the 
social relevance of institutionalised forms of religion in modern societies does 
not mean that religion is generally losing its significance, but that the individual 
will maintain his or her religiosity, but altering its contents and forms. Whereas 
in pre-modern societies meaning in life used to be provided by large, global 
religious institutions, in modern societies individuals choose their religious 
orientations autonomously, falling back on different religious traditions and 
merging these to form individual religious patchworks. Thus, individual 
religiosity and institutionalised church adherence are increasingly diverging in 
modern societies. Although many people have become estranged from the 
church, they have turned to new forms of religion like New Age, Zen-
Meditation, astrology, occultism, esoteric and psychological groups, and other 
not so highly institutionalised forms of religion. 
Regardless of whether this description of the religious development in 
Western Europe is accurate or not (see Pollack, 1996; Pollack and Pickel, 
1999), I would like to raise the question of whether this theoretical model used 
for Western Europe can also be applied to the analysis of religious 
developments in Eastern Europe. In order to answer this question, we must 
distinguish between different religious dimensions. Building on the concept of 
religious dimensions provided by Charles Glock (1962), I differentiate between 
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church adherence, traditional, church-related religiosity, and religiosity outside 
the Church.1 Certainly different indicators can express these dimensions. 
Usually, church attendance is used as an indicator for church adherence, and 
belief in God as an indicator for traditional, church-related religiosity. It is, 
however, difficult to grasp the diffuse forms of religion that exist outside the 
Church. I use astrology and belief in faith healers or lucky charms as indicators 
of older forms of religiosity outside the Church, and belief in the effects of Zen-
Meditation and belief in the message of New Age as indicators of new forms of 
religiosity outside the Church. Most of the data I refer to are based on the 
project “Political Culture in Central and Eastern Europe” (PCE), a 
representative opinion-survey carried through by me and my collaborators2 in 
11 Central and Eastern European countries in autumn 2000. This survey 
included Russia, Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Eastern Germany, Hungary, and Albania. 
2. An overview on the religious situation in Eastern Europe in 
comparison to Western Europe 
The data presented in Table 1 give some first insights into the religious 
situation in Eastern Europe in comparison to the West. I would like to mention 
four features: 
1) Compared to Western Europe there are some highly secularised 
countries in Eastern Europe in terms of traditional indicators of religion: church 
membership, church attendance, belief in God. The Czech Republic, the eastern 
part of Germany, Estonia, and Russia belong to these highly secularised 
countries. Undoubtedly, the high percentage of non-confessional people can, to 
a considerable extent, be attributed to the communist regimes’ repressive poli-
tical measures against churches and believers during the time-period before 
1989. In all of the countries mentioned above, the share of people belonging to 
a church and regularly attending Sunday services was considerably higher at 
the beginning of the communist era than at its end (cf. Pollack, 2001:138). 
2) The confession that was able to resist the political and ideological 
pressure during communist times most strongly was the Catholic Church. In 
contrast, the political pressure most negatively affected the Lutheran churches. 
                                                          
1 In Pollack/Pickel 1999 we discuss the question, how this concept can be elaborated and used in 
the form provided above. 
2 I thank Jörg Jacobs, Olaf Müller and Gert Pickel (Frankfurt/Oder) for their substantial help. 
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For example, consider the originally dominant Lutheran countries East 
Germany and Estonia, where church members now constitute only a minority 
(see Table 1). Church adherence and religiosity is also higher in the 
predominantly Catholic Western European countries like Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
and Ireland compared to countries like Sweden, Denmark, Norway, in which 
the Lutheran confession prevails (see also Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Indicators of church adherence, Christian religiosity, and religiosity 
outside the Church in Europe (%) 
 
Church 
membership 
1998/*2000 
(%) 
Church 
attendance per 
year 1998/*2000
(mean) 
Belief in God 
1998/*2000 
 
(%) 
Astrology 
1998 
 
(%) 
Lucky 
charms 
1998 
(%) 
Italy 93 21 88   
Portugal 92 22 92 30 45 
Spain 86 19 82   
Ireland 94 38 94 19 25 
France 54 8 52 41 24 
Austria 88 16 81 35 35 
Netherlands 42 10 59 24 21 
Switzerland 91 10 73 47 40 
West Germany 85 10 62 45 46 
Great Britain 50 10 68   
Northern Ireland 86 27 89   
Sweden 72 5,5 46   
Denmark 88 5 57   
Norway 90 5 58   
Poland 82* 33* 95*   
Slovakia 72* 20* 77* 49 48 
Slovenia 65* 11* 61*   
Hungary 58* 8* 67* 40 34 
East Germany 24* 3* 24* 27 34 
Czech Republic 27* 5* 32* 53 50 
Latvia 66 7 72 66  
Estonia 22* 3,5* 47*   
Albania 77* 8* 86*   
Romania 96* 14* 98*   
Bulgaria 44* 6* 66* 65 57 
Russia 37* 4* 66* 56 72 
Source: PCE 2000; ISSP 1998. 
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3) The level of modernisation in terms of industrialisation, urbanisation, 
Gross Domestic Product etc. also has a considerable impact on the vitality of 
church adherence and religiosity. If you take the Catholic Western European 
countries into consideration, you can detect that the more highly industrialised 
countries have a lower rate of church attendance and belief in God than the less 
developed countries (see also Martin, 1978). For example, compare Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, and Ireland with France and Austria (see Table 1). The same 
holds true for countries that are not predominantly Catholic, and can be 
discerned by comparing Northern Ireland to the rest of the country. We can 
observe similar differences in Eastern Europe. Among the Catholic countries, 
Slovenia and Hungary – the most industrialised states – are at the same time the 
most secularised. In the group of the countries which are not predominantly 
Catholic, East Germany, the Czech Republic and Estonia as the most developed 
countries show the lowest rate of church attendance and religiosity. 
4) Finally, figures measuring religiosity outside the Church in Eastern 
Europe are remarkably high. In Western Europe, affirmation of belief in God is 
always higher than acceptance of astrology or faith healers (see Table 1). In 
Eastern Europe, in some cases the acceptance of religiosity outside the Church 
is almost as high as belief in God, in others it is equal or even higher (East 
Germany, Czech Republic). 
3. The change of church adherence and religiosity in Eastern 
Europe 
Over the last few years, many sociologists observed an outstanding 
religious revival in the post-communist countries. It is quite reasonable to 
expect such a religious upswing. If we take into consideration the figures in 
Table 2, however, we observe great differences between the individual 
countries. In certain countries like Albania and Russia, indeed we can find a 
dramatic increase in church membership and belief in God. In Albania, for 
example, 44 per cent of the population confirmed that they now belong to a 
religious denomination but did not use to, and 33 per cent confirmed that they 
now believe in God, but that they did not use to. In contrast, only three per cent 
wholly withdrew from church or from belief in God. In some countries there is 
only a small increase in church participation and religious orientation, for 
example in Bulgaria and Estonia. In Estonia, the increase in the level of 
religiosity and church adherence is not very significant (see Table 2). 
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Table 2: Change of church adherence and religiosity (%) 
Change of church membership Change of belief in God  
Growth Decrease Growth Decrease 
Poland 3 5 2 4 
Slovakia 5 14 7 11 
Slovenia 3 15 5 14 
Hungary 4 11 5 10 
East Germany 1 19 3 15 
Czech Republic 4 10 5 10 
Estonia 6 8 13 5 
Albania 44 3 31 3 
Romania 4 0,5 3 1 
Bulgaria 7 3 11 3 
Russia 11 1 25 3 
Source: PCE 2000 
In most of the countries investigated in our survey we are confronted with a 
clear decrease in the social significance of religion and church in the long run. 
This is the case in Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, East Germany, and in the 
Czech Republic. Even if a certain upswing in the religious field took place in 
these countries immediately after the breakdown of communism, this religious 
revival is by no means able to compensate for the losses the churches had to 
suffer during communist times. It is not incidental that these processes of 
secularisation are especially striking in highly industrialised countries. If indeed 
there is a positive correlation between modernisation and secularisation (which 
many sociologists question, see for example Warner, 1993) then we have to 
expect an ongoing process of religious decline in these countries. Still, in some 
countries like Poland or Romania, indicators for religiosity and church 
adherence are virtually stable on a high level. 
4. Religiosity outside the Church 
What about religiosity outside the Church, the indicator we used to investi-
gate those diffuse forms of religion which the critics of the secularisation thesis 
stress so strongly? Unfortunately, due to the lack of data we are unable to make 
any statements about the developments of religiosity outside the Church over 
the recent time-period. A look at Table 3 again reveals that forms of religiosity 
outside the Church are widespread in Central and Eastern Europe. In Estonia, 
Albania, Hungary and Slovakia almost one third, in Russia even more than one 
third of those questioned confessed their belief in astrology, faith healers, or the 
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effects of Zen-meditation. But only a small percentage declared that they 
believe in the message of New Age, which, by the way, was not familiar to 
most of the respondents. Similarly, only a few confirmed belief in occultism, 
spiritism, and mysticism. When distinguishing between older and newer forms 
of religiosity outside church, we detect clear differences between countries. In 
countries like Albania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, in which the 
percentages of people with traditional belief systems are high, older forms of 
religiosity like astrology or belief in faith healers are more broadly accepted 
(see Table 3). In more secularised countries like the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
East Germany, or Slovenia, the share of people believing in the effects of Zen-
meditation is relatively high. At the same time the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
East Germany, and Slovenia belong to the most highly developed countries in 
the East. In these countries people can more easily afford to attend courses in 
Zen-meditation, Yoga, or energy training and people are more likely to develop 
a body- and wellness-culture in which religion is taking on a non-traditional, 
individualised function. 
 
Table 3: Religiosity outside the Church (in %) 
Country Astrology/ Horoscope 
Faith-healer 
 
Effects of Zen 
meditation, Yoga
Message of New 
Age 
Albania 25,0 34,6 5,4 4,6 
Bulgaria 18,2 19,9 8,3 2,3 
Czech Republic 17,4 12,4 20,7 2,0 
Estonia 25,6 23,6 30,5 3,7 
East Germany 10,9 5,6 12,6 1,6 
Hungary 24,1 30,7 22,7 8,1 
Poland 7,9 26,5 7,6 1,9 
Romania 22,9 9,3 11,4 2,2 
Russia 46,7 48,7 34,9 7,7 
Slovakia 22,1 38,6 19,2 3,2 
Slovenia 17,0 16,3 19,5 7,7 
Source: PCE 2000 
Percentage of respondents who “believe strongly” or “believe to a certain degree”. 
 
5. Religious individualisation in Eastern Europe 
Does this mean that we can observe a tendency towards pluralisation and 
individualisation of religion in former socialist countries? In order to test this 
Institutionalised and Subjective Religiosity in Former… 
 85 
hypothesis, I have correlated the three dimensions of religion we have 
distinguished above. As one can see in table 4 (column A), there is a high 
correlation between traditional religiosity and church attendance in Eastern 
Europe. In column B, we can observe that traditional religiosity and religiosity 
outside the church (old and new) as well as church attendance and old forms of 
religiosity outside the church are also positively correlated in most cases. 
Concerning the relationship between church attendance and new forms of 
religiosity outside the church, we find either no significant correlation, or even 
a negative correlation. A negative correlation can again be detected in countries 
with predominantly traditional belief systems like Poland, Slovakia, or Albania. 
This indicates that in these countries traditional and highly institutionalised 
forms of religion do not support the emergence of new forms of religion. In the 
other countries, there is a stronger blending of traditional forms of religion and 
new, more non-institutionalised religious ideas. 
 
Table 4: Intra-religious relations and individualisation in comparison 
 A B1 B2 B3 C1 C2 C3 C4 
Poland .31 n.s. .24 -.09 n.s. n.s. n.s. +.13 
Slovakia .47 n.s. n.s. -.19 -.12 -.11 n.s. +.13 
Slovenia .47 .21 .27 -.09 -.08 n.s. n.s. +.17 
Hungary .32 .24 .14 n.s. -.12 -.13 n.s. n.s. 
East Germany .47 .28 .07 n.s. -.15 -.09 +.09 +.26 
Czech Republic .55 .22 .12 n.s. -.09 n.s. n.s. +.18 
Estonia .31 .33 .09 +.15 n.s. n.s. +.09 +.12 
Albania .16 .35 .12 -.13 -.08 n.s. -.15 n.s. 
Romania .08 n.s. -.14 n.s. -.08 n.s. +.07 +.20 
Bulgaria .29 .33 .11 n.s. n.s. n.s. +.12 +.14 
Russia .28 .32 n.s. n.s. -.10 -.09 n.s. n.s. 
Source: PCE 2000 
A = correlation belief in God and church attendance 
B1 = correlation belief in God and religiosity outside the church (old and new) 
B2 = correlation church attendance and religiosity outside the church (old – Astrology) 
B3 = correlation church attendance and religiosity outside the church (new – Zen/Yoga) 
C1 = correlation values individualisation and church attendance 
C2 = correlation values individualisation and belief in God 
C3 = correlation values individualisation and religiosity outside the church (old – Astrology) 
C4 = correlation values individualisation and religiosity outside the church (new – Zen/Yoga) 
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Now, let us concentrate on the analysis of the correlation between different 
forms of religion and an indicator for individualised orientations. I used the 
intention to pursue an unusual and extravagant life as indicative of individu-
alisation (see column C). As expected, the correlation between traditional 
religiosity, church attendance, and old forms of religiosity outside church and 
this indicator is mostly negative or insignificant. However, the indicator of 
individualised orientations correlates positively with new forms of religiosity. 
The more people are willing to pursue an extravagant life, the more they are 
likely to accept new forms of religiosity. 
 
Table 5: Religious socialisation in childhood and religiosity in adulthood 
 Belief in 
God 
 
 
 
(%) 
Church 
attendance 
p.a.4  
 
 
(mean) 
Trust in 
church 
 
 
 
(mean)1 
Religious 
self-
assessment 
 
 
(mean)² 
Belief in 
faith-healer
 
 
 
(%)³ 
Belief in 
effects of 
Zen 
meditation 
and Yoga 
(%)³ 
 Brought up 
in faith 
N
ot brought 
up in faith 
Brought up 
in faith 
N
ot brought 
up in faith 
Brought up 
in faith 
N
ot brought 
up in faith 
Brought up 
in faith 
N
ot brought 
up in faith 
Brought up 
in faith 
N
ot brought 
up in faith 
Brought up 
in faith 
N
ot brought 
up in faith 
Albania 93 75 10 5 0,75 0,60 0,97 -0,10 45 19 7 3 
Bulgaria 89 41 8 3 0,70 0,50 0,92 -0,89 26 15 8 9 
Czech Republic 75 8 13 1 0,52 0,23 0,41 -1,84 20 8 21 21 
Estonia 83 33 7 2 0,74 0,56 0,49 -0,87 26 24 25 34 
East Germany 58 6 6 0 0,52 0,29 -0,09 -2,36 9 4 12 15 
Hungary 84 36 11 2 0,51 0,30 0,17 -1,78 34 26 22 26 
Poland 96 74 35 19 0,56 0,33 0,99 -0,39 27 26 7 18 
Romania 98 92 14 8 0,84 0,75 0,96 0,19 9 12 11 16 
Russia 97 50 7 2 0,71 0,50 0,81 -0,97 50 49 30 38 
Slovakia 88 30 25 3 0,60 0,35 0,49 -2,05 39 36 17 31 
Slovenia 76 21 14 2 0,46 0,22 0,56 -1,03 17 15 17 29 
Source: PCE 2000 
1 Scale from 0 (no confidence at all) to 1 (great deal of confidence) 
2 Scale from –3 (extremely non-religious) to +3 (extremely religious) 
³ Respondent believe “strong” or “to a certain degree” 
4 p.a. per annum = per year 
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This result is confirmed if we consider the impacts of religious socialisation 
during childhood on religiosity during adulthood. Table 5 reveals a clear picture. 
Regard the indicators belief in God, religious self-assessment, trust in church, 
church attendance, or belief in old forms of religiosity outside church like belief 
in faith healers or astrology. In every case, people who were brought up in faith 
are more likely to accept these religious attitudes and behaviours as adults than 
people without a religious upbringing. The opposite holds true for the effects of 
religious socialisation on the acceptance of new forms of religiosity outside the 
Church in adulthood. In this case, people who were not brought up in faith tend to 
believe in the effects of Zen-meditation more often than people who were 
religiously socialised. New forms of religion have gained a certain independence 
from traditional belief systems. 
6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, we can state that new forms of religiosity outside the Church 
are emerging in Central and Eastern Europe. The upswing in these new forms, 
however, seems to follow different patterns than the development of traditional 
forms of religion. In predominantly Catholic countries, the new forms tend to 
stand in contrast to the Church. In more secularised countries, new forms of 
religiosity do not contradict the institutionalised forms of religion. In Estonia, 
they even merge with these institutionalised forms (see table 4, column B3). 
This implies that the more a country becomes “unchurched,” the more religios-
ity outside the church is merging with ecclesiastical forms of religion and 
constituting a syncretistic whole. To a certain extent, however, these new forms 
of religion are not based on the effects of religious socialisation processes, and 
can be understood as an expression of individualisation processes. 
Nevertheless, we should not overestimate these tendencies towards religious 
individualisation. Firstly, only a small share of the population is interested in 
these new forms of religiosity at all (see table 3). Secondly, even if religious 
socialisation is not a necessary precondition for accepting these new religious 
orientations, many people who were brought up in faith also believe in the 
effects of Zen-meditation, Yoga, energy training, or New Age (see table 5). 
Although we should not exaggerate the processes of religious individualisation, 
one question remains. What are the social causes of this tendency? I would sug-
gest attributing it to the processes of a belated modernisation that countries like 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, East Germany, or Slovenia are presently facing. 
 
Detlef Pollack 
88 
References 
Bruce, S. 1999. Choice and Religion. A Critique of Rational Choice Theory. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Davie, G. 1994. Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without belonging. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Gabriel, K. 1992. Christentum zwischen Tradition und Postmoderne. Freiburg/Basel/ 
Wien: Herder. 
Glock, C. Y. 1962. On the Study of Religious Commitment. Religious Education 
(Special issue). 
Hervieu-Léger, D. 1990. Religion and Modernity in the French Context: For a New 
Approach to Secularization. Sociological Analysis 51:S15-S25. 
Krüggeler, M. 1993. Inseln der Seligen: Religiöse Orientierungen in der Schweiz. In 
Jede(r) ein Sonderfall? Religion in der Schweiz, edited by A. Dubach and R. 
Campiche, 93-132. Zürich; Basel: NZN Buchverlag. 
Luckmann, T. 1967. The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society. 
New York: Macmillan. 
Martin, D. 1978. A General Theory of Secularization. New York: Harper & Row. 
Pollack, D. 1996. Individualisierung statt Säkularisierung? Zur Diskussion eines neueren 
Paradigmas in der Religionssoziologie. In Religiöse Individualisierung oder 
Säkularisierung: Biographie und Gruppe als Bezugspunkte moderner Religiosität, 
edited by K. Gabriel, 567-85. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus. 
Pollack, D. 2001. Modifications in the Religious Field of Central and Eastern Europe. 
European Societies 3:135-165. 
Pollack, D. and G. Pickel. 1999. Individualisierung und religiöser Wandel in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Zeitschrift für Soziologie 28:465-483. 
Warner, S. 1993. Work in Progress: Toward a New Paradigm for the Sociological Study 
of Religion in United States. American Journal of Sociology 98:1044-1093. 
 
 89 
Enzo Pace 
CATHOLICISM IN ITALY. THE SOFT 
SECULARISATION IN A POST-IDEOLOGICAL SOCIETY 
1. The last battle of the Counter Reformation. An introduction. 
We are concerned here with a European country that, for different 
historical reasons, has been influenced by Catholicism, moulded deeply by the 
parochial civilisation, on the basis of the organisational schemes and socio-
religious codes of the Counter Reformation (Davie, Hervieu-Léger, 1996). We 
will be dealing mainly with Italy, a case which will be used as a testing for the 
following working hypotheses. 
In spite the strong effort made by the Italian Catholic Church, since the 
Vatican II, to reform the Counter Reformation model, the outcomes are not 
brilliant. If we assumed two strategic elements of the original project came up by 
the Vatican II, both of them have been missed. The de-clericalisation of the 
Church and, alternatively, the stronger participation of the laymen and women 
have been minimized by a “clerical party”, that has been able to fight the new 
movement of reform risen during the Seventies. This clerical party had not a real 
theological soul, but only the idea to impose discipline upon those Catholics 
(priests and laymen and women) who imaged an alternative model of church, 
less hierarchical and more communitas. So they tried, particularly during the 
John Paul II papacy, to re-establish the lost order. The reality is now completely 
different. The fear of the soft “protestantisation” of the Italian Catholicism 
(according, for instance, to the point of view expressed by “Comunione e 
Liberazione”, a new-integrist movement born at the beginning of the Seventies) 
encouraged some bishops and theologians (belonging to this “clerical party”) to 
promote a complete restoration of the clerical power in many aspects of religious 
life. The negative effect of this project is a fading of laymen and priests hopes of 
reformation of the Church. And, meanwhile the project was met with success, 
the features that persist are the crisis of vocation, the ageing of the clergy and a 
low turnover of replacing the priests in the parishes. 
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In spite of the genuine effort made by new catechistic movement – 
developed during the Seventies – to change the traditional Tridentine 
catechism, the reality shows the persistence of the same framework that 
traditionally has shaped the process of the transmission of the faith from a 
generation to another. If some contents have been changed and adapted to a 
new (modern ?) style of communication (less dogmatic, more narrative of the 
Christian event of salvation), the methods and practices go on according to the 
formal Tridentine scheme. What’s the essence of this scheme? It assumed the 
fact that you were naturaliter believer and, the problem was how to bring you 
up with a coherent belief system (clearly based on the recognition of the 
ecclesiastical authority). The religious transmission system in the Italian 
parishes persists up to now according to the pattern invented four centuries ago. 
Every Saturday, in the afternoon, the children go to the parish and they are 
organized in classes with teachers (mostly women ): as a rule, the teachers, 
following a schoolbook – a simple version of the official catechism- expound 
the doctrine according to a classical method question-answer, from generation 
to generation, the teachers used to do. The main focus of this method is not 
discovering the Christian event and sharing the communitarian experience of 
salvation, but reproducing the general scheme magister-discepuli, assuming 
that the truth is given for granted and the faith is not an emotional and rational 
experience, but over all a doctrine to be learned. Since the Counter Reformation 
(and, partially up to now) the main goals of the transmission have been : what’s 
to be believed in (faith is a doctrine), what’s to be achieved (the 
sacramentalisation of the life cycle), what you have to do (in moral terms) and 
what you have to ask for God’s help (set of prayers and rituals). The results of 
the routinisation of the Tridentine model of catechism are: instead of a model of 
initiation to the Christian faith, it became and is still nowadays a conclusion of 
the Christian life for many adolescents. In fact, the collapse of the presence of 
adolescents in the parishes starts just after the sacrament of confirmation and 
represents an empirical evidence. The phenomenon reflects the soft 
secularisation of the Italian society that occurred in the past forty years: the 
adults are always confident towards the Catholic Church, in spite of their 
attitudes, their behaviour is shaped by “secular” values (not yet inspired by and 
in conformity with Catholic doctrine). And they usually think that it’s 
important for their children to achieve a Catholic instruction. At the same time 
they think they have carried out their task by delegating it to the church to bring 
up their children in a Catholic environment. The absence of the spirit of the 
“community”, that in the past worked linking the family and the parishes, 
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represents one of the most important reasons of the crisis we are trying to 
explain. It’s another face of the coin: the process of individualisation of belief. 
2. The social and religious change 
The secularisation of customs and lifestyles, conventionally dated in Italy 
from the referendum which passed the approval of the divorce with a substan-
tial majority (over 60 per cent in favour) in 1974, did not reduce the space 
occupied by religion. It was the start of a process of individualisation of belief: 
believing, practising Catholics, who favoured the innovations of the second 
Vatican Council, began to discover that “obedience is no longer a virtue” and 
thus to render their religious faith more credible. The authority of the Catholic 
hierarchy no longer appeared absolute; people began to think differently, felt a 
growing need for independence which combined, due to favourable circum-
stances and ongoing changes, with modern ways of thinking and lifestyles, 
focussing on the assertion of the individual and his/her prerogatives. There was 
a shift from inclusion, which stratified individuals into the Catholic bloc of 
collective belief, to breaking away from the meaning networks which had 
protected and encaged individuals for a considerable length of time. This shift 
from stratification to differentiation meant that for the first time there was 
pluralism within Catholicism, producing schisms and fractures which still go 
unmended. New generations sprang up, who begin to “run their own 
businesses” as regards ethics, politics and religion. We move in Italy towards a 
type of secularisation we could sum up with the sentence like that: “I proclaim 
myself Catholic, but I do as I please”. Catholicism persists as what Luhmann 
(1991) would call a code of symbolic generalisation, but is no longer a genera-
tive grammar for the life of the individual and society. It is collective memory, 
but no longer has intentions towards social action. The analysis which follows 
attempts to verify empirically the basic hypothesis set out above by reviewing 
the findings on the most recent studies on religiosity, and, at the same time, 
“letting them speak for themselves” as regards the central theme of the present 
paper: the eclipse of theology in favour of the routinisation of charisma. 
3. Plural Catholicism 
Let us now take a look at some indicators which measure the processes 
described above. The figures speak for themselves, and tell us about a society 
hovering between being without and not against the Church, i.e. between 
religious modernity centred on individual needs and somewhat feeble 
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faithfulness to church-oriented-religion. It explains why the majority of 
families delegate the religious instruction to the parishes. 
Let us start with a simple statement: Italians no longer recognise the 
Catholic religion’s claim to absolute truth (Table 1): 
 
Table 1: Opinions on religion’s claim to truth (per cent responses; item with a 
single mode of response)  
Opinions % n=4469 
All religions are false 2,2 
There is something true in all of them 32,8 
There is only one true religion, the others contain only partial truths 32,5 
There is only one true religion, the others are false 12,0 
I am unable to reply 10,6 
No data 2,0 
Source: Cesareo et al, 1995. 
 
Only a very small minority are firmly convinced of the existence of only 
one true religion. Two other elements support the partial data in Table 1: 
a) the percentage of those who regard religion as the repository of absolute 
truth increases by six points (18 per cent) among those who state they 
believe in Jesus Christ and the teachings of the Catholic Church; 
b) six out of ten Italians endorse the statement: “I would like there to be a 
religion based on a few fundamental common beliefs, which would unite 
Christians, Moslems, Buddhists and other believers” (the figure rises to 70 
per cent among those who believe in God or in a supreme being, but who 
do not belong to any specific religion). 
To sum up, it could be argued that the Catholic Church is no longer capable 
of presiding over the symbolic boundaries of its system of belief (Pace, 1995). 
The widespread relativism among the population may be interpreted as an 
indicator of the tendency among the majority of Italians to “move freely” in the 
construction of their own belief system; a religious mobility which appears 
extremely modern (Hervieu-Léger, 1999; Berger, 1967, 1979, 1992). In 
predominantly Catholic societies, paradoxically, such a relativistic attitude to 
the religion of birth may be widespread. Therefore, it is a question of a more 
profound attitude which leads to “believing in the relative” and it may coexist 
alongside beliefs and religious practices which are clearly inspired and 
Catholicism in Italy. The Soft Secularisation in a Post-Ideological Society 
 93 
influenced by the religion of birth, Catholicism. Ninety-three per cent of the 
Italian population continue to call themselves believers, and 84 per cent refer to 
Catholicism as their religion, but within the latter category, 53% profess, 
without doubt, their faith in Christ and the teachings of the Catholic Church, 
whereas the rest distance themselves partially from the doctrine of the Church. 
If we focused on the adhesion to certain sacraments, we could accurately 
measure the type of post-traditional religiosity widespread in Italian society. I do 
not allude to the attendance at Sunday Mass, which has been stationary for a 
number years with a national average of around 30 per cent (with lowest percent-
ages for those between the ages of 18 and 39), but to the permanent and extended 
breach of faith between believers and their Church, marked by the collapse in the 
practice of confession, as can be seen in the following table (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: The practice of confession among the Italian population (%) 
(responses to the question “How often do you go to confession?”)  
Gender Age  Average 
M F 18-21 22-29 50-64 65-74 
Never 26 32 19 22 29 30 19 
Years apart 22 25 19 24 25 23 18 
1-2 times a year 15 16 15 17 15 14 14 
Several times year 21 19 24 19 20 20 23 
Once month 13 7 13 13 8 10 20 
Sev.times a month 3 1 5 5 2 2 6 
N=4474. Source: Cesareo et al., 1995 
 
The fact that on average, nowadays, only a very small proportion of believing 
and practising Catholics (3.1 per cent) go to confession (a practice which the 
generations born in the 1940s and 1950s were told should be carried out on a 
weekly basis) means that a Catholic country like Italy has undergone a profound 
change. If we examine the reasons given by the interviewees in the national 
research study cited, we find that many of them (almost 40 per cent of responses) 
agree with the idea that “a priest is not needed, it is enough to repent before God”. 
It is interesting to note that women are well-represented here in statistical terms; 
indeed young women are most convinced of this attitude, a sign of independent 
belief. We should also note that the emerging trend towards independence of 
belief undermines the feeling of belonging to church-oriented-religion, since – at 
least in Italy – one in three Italians, albeit in different ways, says they feel part of 
an ecclesial institution (Cipriani, 1994; Garelli, 1995, 1991). It can therefore be 
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stated without undue emphasis that the weakening of the ties between believer 
and confessor in a predominantly Catholic society has produced a silent 
revolution in the hearts and minds of many people (including those who believe 
and faithfully keep to traditional religious practices). The unexpected effects of 
this silent revolution have manifested themselves over a relatively long period of 
time and involved at least two generations: the generation which directly – and 
enthusiastically – experienced the reforms of the second Vatican Council, and 
that of their children, often born and raised in a family environment where 
religion was still talked about, but in a liberal, critical and anti-authoritarian way 
(obviously with regard to ecclesiastical authority). What are the unexpected 
results we mentioned above? It is worth noting at least three: 
a) the weakening of the link in the transmission of erga omnes moral models 
which were originally drawn up by theologians and later translated into 
codes of conduct applied to people’s concrete behaviour, which the priest 
would recommend to those who went to confession regularly; 
b) the deconsecration of the figure of the priest and his power to “bind and 
unbind” and “pardon sins”, in exchange for the heightened value of the 
primacy of the individual believer’s conscience in dealing directly with God; 
c) the progressive detachment of various spheres of the life of the individual 
(moral, economic, political and sexual) from the religious control of the 
Church, acting through its “specialists in the treatment of souls”. 
The first case involves the weakening of a means of religious communication 
which, in the history of Catholic countries such as Italy, has played a central role 
in the spiritual orientation of great masses of believers, be they poor or rich, 
peasant or king. In an institution like the Catholic Church, that “great mother” 
always willing to forgive her wayward children, confession was something of a 
“microphysics of holy power”, placed in jeopardy by the principle of 
conscience’s independence. With the loss of this practice, it is as if there were a 
generalised symbolic code of communication between the institution of the 
Church and the mass of the faithful. As a result the priest, according to the few 
studies which exist in Italy at least (Garelli, Brunetta, Pace, 1991; Garelli, Pace et 
al., 2003), is regarded increasingly as a witness to the faith and less and less as 
the bearer of holy functions, increasingly as a social group-leader and less and 
less as the mouthpiece of an eschatological message. 
We are in front a paradox: on the one hand the deconsecration of the 
image of the priest and, on the other, a great effort made by a part of the 
Catholic Church to re-establish the supremacy of the sacred charisma of the 
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priest. The attempts made by the Italian Church to redefine its public role 
have so far been in vain; Italians pay great respect to what the Church says 
and does (in moral and social fields or themes to do with questions of life and 
death), but they have learned to choose for themselves which parties best 
represent their ideas and interests. 
Indeed, despite everything we have so far shown, the image of the Catholic 
Church held by Italians is a largely positive one. On the scale devoted to trust 
in the institutions, the Church receives over 60 per cent; on their annual tax 
returns, 40 per cent of Italians assign a small proportion of their income to the 
Catholic Church; 90 cent of Italians entrust their offspring to the parish for 
instruction in the Catholic catechism; in the same way, Italians continue to get 
married in church, have their children baptised and ask for a church funeral. 
And the list goes on, producing a series of crude data which piece by piece 
begin to give the overall picture of religious belief. Further light is shed on the 
matter if we examine the following list (Table 3): 
 
Table 3: Classification of the perceived importance of the actions the Catholic 
Church should perform (average value in per cent on the total responses in 
decreasing order; n = 4500) 
1st help the needy and the suffering 66.2 
2nd educate the young  47.3 
3rd announce Jesus Christ and spread the Gospel 38.9 
4th promote peace among nations 33.5 
5th give the sacraments 19.2 
6th fight the Mafia 17.3 
7th send missionaries around the world 17.1 
8th provide social services run by the Church 15.8 
9th take a stand on social question 13.2 
10th hold a dialogue with other religions 12.9 
11th clearly define what is good and what is evil 10.4 
Re-elaborated data from Cesareo et al, 1995 
 
Apart from certain oddities, such as the fact that “fight against the Mafia” 
precedes, by a statistically almost insignificant margin, “send missionaries 
around the world”, what is striking is the clean break between the socio-
educational role assigned to the Church by the great majority of Italians and the 
task of redemption, recognised by a minority. This minority is further reduced 
when the moral authority of the Church is mentioned (10.4 per cent). This 
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figure is not an anomaly, but forms part of the cluster of data which confirms 
the growing distance between the individual’s conscience and the doctrine of 
the Catholic Church in the moral field. These findings are supported by the data 
on moral questions, where Italians think differently from the official teachings 
of the Catholic Church, reported in the following table (Table 4): 
 
Table 4: Indirect indicators of cognitive dissonance in the moral field between 
Italians and official Catholic doctrine (in % on total valid responses) 
Do not disapprove of divorce 63.0 (n = 4492) 
Do not disapprove of sex before marriage 69.0 (n = 4463) 
Do not disapprove of cohabitation  64.5 (n = 4481) 
Do not disapprove of contraceptives 71.7 (n = 4472) 
Source: Cesareo et al, 1995   
 
On the more traditional questions, those for which the Church authorities 
have long tried to draw the line between what is licit and illicit, there is a high 
level of cognitive dissonance among Italians. Thus, the ethical and moral 
sphere also appears to be no longer governed by religious norms, at least not 
according to their definitions in official Catholic doctrine. The erotic sphere, to 
take up Weber’s point again (Weber, 1971), especially among the younger 
generation, seems to be almost completely subjective and self-governed by the 
individual. Sexuality no longer appears to be functionally linked to procreation, 
going by what emerges from a recent in-depth study on the subject (Garelli, 
2000). This explains, among other things, why the younger generation tends to 
delay getting married (average age for marriage is now 30-35 years, after a 
period of cohabitation) and plans their families, and why the birth rate is 
constantly decreasing (around 1.1). The models of procreation have changed 
(De Sandre et al, 1998) and are not influenced culturally as pervasively as they 
used to be by the ethical models put forward by the Church. 
The unsustainable lightness of being Catholic in Italy should by now be 
easier to comprehend. 
4. The paradoxes of religious transmission in predominantly 
Catholic countries 
To what has gone before, we could add one last series of data, which 
further highlights the paradox of a traditionally Catholic society, such as Italy. 
The data concerns the transmission of religion. Although no specific national 
Catholicism in Italy. The Soft Secularisation in a Post-Ideological Society 
 97 
research is available, but only regional and local surveys, the glimpses which 
these afford us, are illuminating. The paradox is similar in many aspects to that 
noted above: the vast majority of the younger generation are today socialised in 
pre-adolescence (11 – 14 years) and partially in adolescence (15 –17 years) in a 
religious environment, in particular in Catholic parish organisations (95 per 
cent of the age-groups indicated). Attendance at Catholic catechism school 
(traditionally on Saturday afternoon) combines with the mass attendance (again 
96% of the age-group in question) of the weekly one-hour (Catholic) Religious 
Instruction lesson, on a voluntary basis in all state schools. Up to the age of 15 
–16, between parish and school, the younger generation come into contact with 
religious themes (very varied at school, more closely linked to the modern 
modules of the catechism in the parish) for a total of 60 hours per year exposure 
to religious communication. They form relations, sometimes close, sometimes 
not, with priests (less and less so, especially in state schools) and with 
religiously committed lay men and women. If we take into account the fact that 
religious socialisation in the parish starts at 6 years of age in a light and playful 
way, the total number of hours spent listening to people talking about religious 
matters becomes much greater. The most tangible result of widespread religious 
socialisation is Sunday Mass attendance, which is relatively high up to age 14, 
and then falls drastically from the age of 15 on, as can be seen in the following 
table (Table 6): 
 
Table 5: Attendance Mass by pre-adolescents and adolescents in Italy 
1993-94 (% of total, by age and sex) 
  Regularly Few times a month Few times a year Never 
Males 64.2 16.8 12.5 5.1 
Females 76.8 10.5 7.7 3.5 Age 11-14 
Average 70.4 13.7 10.2 4.3 
Males 33.9 18.3 30.1 16.9 
Females 55.2 16.4 19.0 8.5 Age 15-17 
Average  44.4 17.4 24.7 12.8 
Source: Istat, 1996 
 
There is nothing new about the drop in religious practices after pre-
adolescence. What is noteworthy, however, is what is left unsaid in the data, 
but which can be intuited: the pressure exerted by families to ensure their 
children are socialised into religion. The children receive an impulse to go to 
the parish and attend Catholic Religious Instruction at school from the adult 
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world, from almost all adults, even those who, as our previous data shows, are 
non-practising and may be very detached from the world of religious belief. 
Almost all Italian adults approve or place a positive value on the fact that their 
children frequent “the church”. This is essentially because parents delegate the 
function of religious education to the Catholic Church, since they themselves 
are unable to undertake it. This explains both the trust which generally speaking 
Italians are willing to place in the Catholic Church and the attention – 
sometimes due to expediency or for ulterior motives – which Catholic, secular 
and left-wing leaders reserve for the Church authorities. To sum up, practising 
Catholics, Catholics “without a church” and non-confessionals all seem to be 
interested in preserving the socio-educational role of the Catholic Church in 
Italy. But – and here lies the paradox – this in fact reveals the family’s inability 
to transmit religious feeling and a sense of belonging to a religious community. 
Most adolescents never manage to perceive this feeling and this sense of 
belonging, because “religion” turns into just another “boring” school subject. 
Religion ends up boring most adolescents, as it can be seen from a study carried 
out on secondary school pupils in a region of Northern Italy in 1995-6 
(Castegnaro, 1996) (see Table 6): 
 
Table 6: Attitudes and behaviour of adolescents in the first three years of 
secondary school (11-13 years of age) in the Veneto Diocese 
(% of single items and total) 
 11 years 12 years 13 years Total 
Mass every Sunday 72 66 63 67 
Communion every Sunday 76 69 63 69 
Follow the Sunday sermon  56 51 37 48 
Confession once a month 67 63 42 57 
Think that kids go to Mass because they are made to 27 36 56 40 
Get bored at catechism 19 33 37 29 
Pray every day 66 57 44 55 
Feel the image of God is far away 46 54 69 57 
 
Religious transmission, therefore, seems to be a loss-making enterprise: a 
substantial amount of energy is invested (families trustingly send their offspring 
religion-oriented activities, priests engage in mass catechism, Catholic teachers 
do their utmost to instruct the younger generation in religion, by making little 
mention of Christianity, and so forth). But the losses are considerable, since large 
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numbers of young people, at the turning-point between pre-adolescence and 
adolescence, choose to remain orphans of the “holy mother Church”. 
In a survey, using qualitative methods (life stories), carried out by a 
researcher from the Pontifical Salesian University of Rome, we read: “the 
abandonment of ecclesial life by the young and adolescents … almost always 
appears (from the life stories) to be unmotivated or without a specific cause. It 
often comes across as a sort of evaporation, which takes place either in the 
absence of the development of a significant religious maturity and sense of 
belonging to the Church, or because the experience of life within the Church or 
Catholic associations is not attractive enough to compete with other experiences 
in the daily life of young people” (Pollo, 1996:366). In other words, the places 
where religious transmission takes place have not been able to offer young people 
personal religious experiences (not influenced by others) and enable them to 
identify with a lively community (and not just with adults, teachers and priests). It 
is no by accident that the only associations for the young and adolescents which 
seem to be able to offset the inevitable increase in the number of “orphans of the 
holy mother Church” effectively are traditional organisations such as the boy 
scouts, on the one hand, and new emotional communities of a charismatic or neo-
catechumenical nature, on the other. The former offers a well-tried training in 
interaction between adolescents and adults, through an educational experience 
which combines a play with the transmission of values which are increasingly 
widespread nowadays in the collective consciousness (public spirit, respect for 
the environment, team work, etc.). The latter, by contrast, aims for the emotive, 
and therefore more engaging, dimension; a dimension which breaks with the 
traditional roles of the clergy and laymen and overcomes the generation gap 
(Hervieu-Léger, 1999; 1993). 
The Catholic religion is something of a luxury item which all Italians keep 
with them, in part because ever since childhood they had always taken its 
presence for granted, and in part because it acts as a perspective of meaning for 
the world of adult life (regardless of whether the adults are practising Catholics 
or not). It is a luxury item which may be used at moments in life of sadness or 
happiness (births, weddings and funerals), but which is unable to lend support 
and coherence to the various spheres of life, which have come to differentiate 
themselves in the minds and personal situations of many people. For the vast 
majority of Italians, reference to the Catholic religion remains a symbolic 
resource which gives the impression that what is in reality deeply divided is 
still united. The Italian political scene bears ample testimony to the fact that 
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“Catholics” are more divided than ever before on everything from economics to 
morality. 
5. Conclusions 
The case of Italy constitutes a kind of test-bed where we can put to the test 
the hypotheses and concepts expressed in this work. In Italy, Catholicism 
increasingly accomplishes the task of representing the collective identity of a 
nation afflicted with a weak sense of national unity, whereas it is no longer 
able, as it was in the recent past, to integrate the various spheres of individual 
and social life, orientate behaviour with respect to faith and morals, in 
economic and political fields. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Italy has 
become a post-Communist country: the two ideological totalities, which had 
faced each other from 1948 to the end of the Soviet regime (Michel, 1994), 
Communism, on the one hand, and Catholicism (a religious faith, society and 
political party at one and the same time), on the other, have ceased to integrate 
individuals and social groups. Politically, Italy has therefore also become a 
post-Catholic country; with the disappearance of the traditional enemy, 
Communism, the raison d’être of a Catholic party, more or less bound to the 
Church of Rome, was lost. 
Because of the separatist claims of a new party, the Northern League 
(Diamanti, 1993), the Catholic Church in Italy managed to accredit itself as the 
guardian of national unity, under threat from separatism, and as the guarantor 
of values common to the Italian people, values, it would appear, deeply rooted 
in Catholicism. Thanks to this felicitous set of circumstances, the Italian 
Church has sought to wipe out the memory of its initial aversion to the liberal 
state after the Risorgimento, its historical compromise with Fascism and its 
direct support of the Christian Democrat party in the first twenty years of post-
war Italian democracy. In Italy, post-Communist times led the Church of Rome 
to re-establish an equation which had never really existed in its integrity: 
national identity equals Catholic identity (Pace, 1993). 
And there is another paradox in the case of Italy. If we consider the way in 
which the Italians’ sense of belonging to the Church and adhesion to the system 
of religious belief have been progressively secularised, we cannot help but 
observe, as a substantial section of bishops and priests have done – speaking 
openly in these terms – that “authentic” Catholics are now in the minority. 
Probably due to an awareness of this weakness, the Catholic Church is trying to 
assert itself as a collective actor and make its presence felt in the public sphere 
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on themes which it feels are of crucial importance from the ethical and religious 
point of view (Pace et al, 2001; 2003). 
We could sum up the Church’s strategy as: fighting the individualisation of 
belief by reviving the public role (Casanova, 1994), which seemed bound to 
diminish after the collapse of the political hegemony of the Christian Democrat 
Party. It is, in truth, a complex strategy and one that has roused differing 
opinions within the Catholic world and among the bishops. 
This strategy copes with two difficulties: a) on the one hand, it tries to 
reduce the complexity within the Italian Catholicism reconstructing and restor-
ing the clerical power, but in the presence of a dramatic crisis of the personnel 
(decrease of vocations, aged priests, insufficient rate of the new ones for the 
turnover...), b) on the other, the desacralisation of the priest’s “charisma” 
without a real involvement of the lay men and women in the religious life of the 
parochial communities stirs up the prevalence of the function over the 
charisma. In any case the silence of theology is deafening. Theology means not 
only the specialists of the science of God, but the reflection of a community of 
believers which are able to overcome the routine and imagine new languages 
for the salvation. Otherwise, it’s very high risk to transform the Catholicism 
into a “comfort without soul” (theology and communitarian life), an ideological 
resource for imaging the unity of the Nation, in spite of the fragmentation and 
individualisation of the belief system, and the Catholic Church (in terms of 
clerical institution), the supreme National-Values-Keeper. 
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Kati Niemelä 
BETWEEN EAST AND WEST – FINNISH RELIGIOSITY 
FROM AN EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 
1. Introduction 
Finnish religiosity is characterised by a low level of public attendance, but 
a fairly high level of private religiosity. Even though the Finns are among the 
most passive participants in religious services in Europe, religiosity still has a 
strong hold on day-to-day life in Finland. In measures of private religiosity, 
Finland stands above the European average. A typical feature of Finnish 
religiosity is that the proportion of those practising religion privately, but not 
publicly is rather high. 
In the beginning of the 1990s Finland was hit by an economic recession. 
This led to interesting changes in the attitudinal climate. At that time many 
measures of private – but not public – religiosity showed an increase. 
This article examines religiosity and its latest changes in Finland from a 
European perspective according to EVS (European Value Study) data of 2000 
and according to some other national research data. 
People in Finland are categorised into four groups according to their 
religiosity: active believers (11%); basic believers (33%); passive believers 
(33%); and non-believers (16%). Compared with other European countries, the 
proportion of active believers in Finland is low while the proportion of basic 
and passive believers is relatively high. Religiosity among different groups of 
Finns is examined. 
2. Historical background 
Finland is a country with both eastern and western influences. Christian 
influences reached Finland around the year 1000 from both east and west. The 
missionary efforts of the Western Church were, however, stronger, and by the 
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end of the fourteenth century most of Finland was under the Roman Catholic 
Church as well as under Swedish rule. 
In the beginning of the sixteenth century the Protestant Reformation 
reached Sweden and Finland. In 1593 Lutheranism became the state religion. 
Russia ended Swedish rule over Finland by conquering Finland in the 
beginning of the 19th century. Finland became an autonomous Grand Duchy in 
the Russian Empire. Even though the ruler was now the Orthodox Tsar and not a 
Lutheran king, the Lutheran Church remained the state church of Finland. At the 
time of Russian rule Orthodox Christianity spread to western Finland chiefly 
through Russian soldiers and merchants. In the late nineteenth century some 
attempts were made to use the Orthodox Church as a vehicle of Russification 
(Murtorinne, 1992:397–400). At the same time an idea of the church as a 
defensive wall against the east was strengthened (Murtorinne, 1992:395). 
In 1917 Russia plunged into the chaos of the Revolution: Finland seized the 
opportunity and on December 6, 1917 the Parliament approved the declaration 
of independence. Shortly after the declaration, civil war broke out in Finland. It 
was a war between the Government forces, known as The Whites, and ex-
tremist left-wing forces known as The Red Guards, inspired by the Bolshevik 
Revolution. The Reds wanted to create a socialist Finland, possibly in the union 
with emerging Soviet Russia. Virtually the entire clergy supported bourgeois 
Finland, the Whites (Murtorinne, 1995:117). The prototype of an ideal citizen 
was a white pietist soldier (Huhta, 2001). 
At that time relations between the Finnish church leadership and the 
organised working class were distant. The organised labour movement was 
characterised by a church-opposing attitude. They saw the church as an ally of 
a capitalistic society, against which they should fight (Murtorinne, 1995:32–
36:110–111). The Whites, therefore, saw the church as a bastion of the legal 
order, the national tradition, and Western culture. The church was expected to 
foster morally upright citizens, loyal to the state. The bloody war was won by 
the Government forces (the Whites) with the help of German troops sent to 
southern Finland. 
Freedom of religion was gained in 1923 in Finland. Still the number of 
non-Lutherans remained low and only a small minority resigned from the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church. 
Finland fought three interconnected wars during the Second World War. One 
of them was the Winter War against the Soviet Union in 1939–1940. During that 
war the church was seen as a source of support and unity in the struggle, which 
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was characterised as a struggle in defence of “home, faith and fatherland”. The 
Winter War was seen not only as a fight for the fatherland, but as a fight for the 
Lutheran faith against the atheist Bolsheviks (Murtorinne, 1995:233). Finland's 
stubborn resistance against a fifty-times larger nation seized the attention of the 
world press, which wrote about the “Miracle of the Winter War”. In the ensuing 
peace of Moscow, Finland was forced to cede large eastern parts of its territory. 
As a result of the Winter War the position of the church as a folk church was 
strengthened and its links with the labour movement improved. Finland no longer 
was clearly divided into the Whites and the Reds (Murtorinne, 1995:234). 
In the post-war period secularisation gained ground in all the Nordic 
countries. The position of religion at the centre of society’s values weakened, 
and many areas of life adopted their own morality and sets of values with only 
tenous links to religion and the church. Since the mid-sixties Finnish culture 
has been shaken by migration from rural to urban areas, emigration, growing 
influence from abroad, the pluralistic image of the world conveyed by the 
media, and the universal crisis of authority (Salonen et al., 2001:9). 
The economic situation in Finland has showed mainly clear improvement 
in the post-war period except in the beginning of the 1990s, when the country 
was hit by an unusually deep recession. 
Since 1995 Finland has been a member of European Union. 
3. Church membership in Finland 
Nowadays Finland is one of the most Lutheran countries in the world: in 
200185 per cent of Finnish people belonged to the Evangelical Lutheran Church 
of Finland. Church membership, however, is a very neutral feature of religiosity 
in Finland as well as in other Nordic countries. Religiosity in Scandinavia is often 
described as “belonging without believing” (e.g. Davie, 2000). Most people in 
these countries do belong to the church but many do not believe in the teaching of 
the church. Scandinavian people find their identity in membership: Belonging to 
the Evangelical Lutheran Church is a part of national identity. 
The Lutheran church has a very special status in the lives of Finnish 
people, even more special than in other Scandinavian countries. Even though 
only a minority of Finns are active members of the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church of Finland, the vast majority of Finns belongs to it. This is related to the 
issue of national integrity. One reason of the strong connection between being a 
Finn and a Lutheran has been seen in the fact that Finland was under Russian 
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rule throughout the nineteenth century. At that time and after gaining independ-
ence, for the majority of Finns, Lutheranism was and is what distinguishes 
them from the Slavs. Acting as a guarantor of ethnic identity gives religion an 
additional purpose and appeal (see also Bruce, 1999; 2000). 
According to the Gallup Ecclesiastica 1996 – survey, 78 per cent of Finns 
regard themselves as Lutheran, while only 45 per cent regard themselves as 
believers. Being a Lutheran is clearly more a part of a national identity than a 
religious confession. The same trend can be seen in Russia in the 1990s. Ortho-
doxy has a certain function as kind of a basis for ethnic identity (Kääriäinen 
and Furman, 2000:65–68). 
In addition to the Lutheran Church, the Orthodox Church is another religious 
denomination with a status of a folk church in Finland. One per cent of popula-
tion belongs to the Orthodox Church, and the same amount of Finns belongs to 
all the other religious denominations. 13 per cent of Finns are not members of any 
registered religious denomination. The challenge to the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church does not come primarily from other religious communities, but rather 
from an increase in the number of those with no religious affiliation. 
 
Table 1: Finnish population by adherence to religious communities 1920-2000. 
Statistics Finland (%) 
Year Lutheran Orthodox Other Unaffiliated 
1920 98.1 1.6 0.3 0.0 
1940 95.9 1.8 0.3 2.0 
1960 92.4 1.4 0.7 5.5 
1980 90.3 1.1 0.7 7.8 
2000 85.1 1.1 1.1 12.7 
4. Finnish religiosity at the beginning of the third millennium 
According to the EVS data from 2000, three out of four (74%) Finnish 
people believe in God, while the corresponding figure for all Europeans in the 
sample is 71 per cent. Half (49%) of all Finns believe in a personal God (39% 
of all Europeans in the sample) and 64 per cent of Finns regard themselves as 
religious (66% of all Europeans). Even among those not belonging to any 
religious community, a substantial proportion is religious. Only one fifth (22%) 
of Finns say they never pray, compared to 33 per cent of all Europeans. 
In most indicators of private religiosity, Finland stands above the European 
average, but when it comes to public attendance the case is different. Even 
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though most Finnish people regard themselves as religious and tend to pray, the 
Finnish people are passive in attending religious services. Finland is among the 
most passive countries in religious service attendance in Europe together with 
the other Scandinavian countries, Russia and Estonia. Only 12 per cent attend a 
religious service at least once a month, while the corresponding figure among 
all Europeans in the sample is 31 per cent. A marked falling-off in religious 
service attendance has occurred over a long period of time. However, this has 
not resulted in abdication of religious belief (see also Grace, 1999). 
If we compare Finland with other European countries, a basic feature of 
Finnish religiosity is that the proportion of those who practise religion privately, 
but not publicly is relatively high. For example, only one third (33%) of Finns 
who pray more than once a week also attend religious activities at least once a 
month, while two out of three (66%) of all Europeans who pray actively do so. 
Although the Finns are not very active participants in public religious activity, 
Christianity is nevertheless a significant component in many people’s daily life. 
4.1. Increase in private religiosity in the 1990s as a response to 
economic recession 
At least since the Enlightenment, many Western intellectuals have 
anticipated the death of religion. As late as in the 1980s, many intellectuals 
remained confident that religion was not going to survive for long. This seemed 
to be also the case in Finland: In the beginning of the 1990s most indicators 
showed that the trend was toward secularism and toward the ever-decreasing 
meaning of religion in the lives of Finnish people. Values based on religion had 
lost their status in society and they had been replaced by the whole new sets of 
values and morals that have only loose links with religion and the church. 
However, in the 1990s reawakening of interest in religion in Finland was 
noted. The economic recession in the beginning of the 1990s marked a turning 
point. At that time there was, for example, a marked increase of unemployment. 
Before the recession many indicators of religiosity had showed lowest figures 
ever in Finland. But during and after the recession, many indicators showed an 
increase in Finnish religiosity. For example, the number of those who regard 
themselves as religious and the number of those believing in God in accordance 
with Christian doctrine increased. According to the Gallup Ecclesiactica 1999 
survey, half of the population said they believe in God as taught by Christian-
ity, while at the beginning of the 1990s only a third had expressed such a belief. 
The number of those trusting the church and seeing the church capable of giv-
ing adequate answers to the problems of today increased as well in the 1990s. 
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Table 2: Number of those trusting in the church in Finland, 1981-2000, 
according to EVS surveys (1981, 1990, 1996 and 2000) and Gallup Fennica 
surveys (1986 and 1993) 
Trust in church % 
1981 54 
1986 52 
1990 32 
1993 38 
1996 55 
2000 57 
 
Table 3:Belief in God among Finns, 1976–2001 according to Gallup 
Ecclesiastica and Monitor surveys (%) 
 1976 1982 1984 1987 1991 1993 1994 1999  2002 
I believe in God as taught by 
Christianity 51 44 47 44 33 37 38 47 39 
I believe in God, but in a way that 
rather different from what is taught 
by the church  
22 23 24 27 30 30 25 27 31 
I don’t really know whether I 
believe in God or not 17 13 15 15 18 17 18 12 17 
I doubt the existence of God 4 4 5 4 5 7 8 5 5 
I do not believe in the existence of 
God 5 6 5 9 8 7 8 6 6 
Unable or unwilling to reply 1 10 4 1 6 2 3 3 1 
N 1301 1026 974 499 2007 1989 1226 992 1024 
 
The uncertain economic situation in Finland in the beginning of the 1990s led 
to the growing importance of shared communal values, particularly in the early 
part of the decade people needed security and seemed to be convinced that 
traditional Christianity could provide it (Heino et al., 1996:10–11; Salonen et al., 
2001:14). Many scholars (e.g. Bauman, 1990; Giddens, 2001) view the decline of 
certainty as a basic feature of the society today, and as a factor that favours a 
resurgence of religion. The arguments of contemporary scholars differ from each 
other, but they stress several common features which favour religion and are 
regarded as typical in contemporary "advanced" societies: the importance of 
moral and existential questions and the need for security in a complex reality 
(Bauman, 1990; Giddens, 2001). During the 1990s, an increase in religiosity has 
also been reported in several other Western European countries. 
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In the 1990s the role of the Evangelical Lutheran Church became more 
public, and religion, the Church and faith became in many ways more a public 
matter as many Finnish celebrities spoke openly about their faith and some 
influential figures (including Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen) joined the 
Church. This encouraged ordinary citizens to discuss spiritual issues and 
declare their faith in God. 
Privatisation is generally regarded as one aspect of secularisation. However, 
according to Casanova (1994:215) privatisation is only an option, not a modern 
structural trend. Therefore, religion has also an option of entering the public 
sphere anew and deprivatize. This requires, however, that religion ceases to de-
fend its own privileges and focus more on defending human rights instead. In the 
1990s the Church participated in the public media discussion in society openly 
defending the Finnish welfare state and highlighted the need for it. As a result of 
the recession in the first half of the 1990s, the problem of social exclusion had 
become more severe, particularly as a result of the increase in long-term 
unemployment and severe indebtedness. While traditional welfare services were 
scaled down, the so-called “third sector” was faced with the challenge of taking 
up a greater share of the responsibility in the welfare area. Parishes, Christian 
organisations, and other citizens associations were thus obliged to reassess their 
role in public life as service providers and as defenders of civil society. 
This kind of increased public role and a new entrance into the public sphere 
requires religion to have either through doctrine or through cultural tradition a 
public, communal identity like the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Finland has. 
So it can be capable of resisting the pressures to become solely or primarily a 
private “invisible” religion of individual salvation. With the increasing social 
services during the recession, the church attained a very visible, public role 
(Yeung 2003). By transferring the defense of their particularistic privilege to 
the human person and accepting the principle of religious freedom, the church 
can be in a position to enter the public sphere anew, this time to defend the 
institutionalisation of the modern universal rights, the creation of a modern 
public sphere, and the establishment of democratic regimes. Casanova calls this 
a transformation of the church from state-oriented to society-oriented. 
However, whichever position it takes, the church will have to justify it through 
open, public, rational discourse in the public sphere of civil society (Casanova, 
1994:220–224). 
To sum up: the time of recession reinforced the public role of the Church in 
several ways: First, the growing insecurity at the time of crisis strengthened 
communal values: people needed security and were convinced that the Church 
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could provide it. Second, partly as a response to this need, issues of faith were 
discussed in the media more openly than previously. Third, the Church took 
more active role in social issues and became a strong defender of civil society. 
Fourth, the media responded very positively to this role change and the Church 
attained a very visible role in the media. 
In spite of the reinvigorated public role of the Church, the growing 
publicity and reawakening of religious interest in Finland did not result in more 
active participation in traditional religious activities. For example, regular 
church attendance did not increase in the 1990s. Only measures of private 
religiosity showed an increase. 
The changes reported above are also consistent with several arguments of 
the secularisation theory. According to them, the modernisation of a society 
leads to secularisation, which can be seen, for example, in a decline in interest 
in religions (Berger, 2002; Bruce, 2001). However, the figures regarding 
private religiosity in the 1990s in Finland do not show a decline. This raises a 
question whether the time of recession can be seen as a time of de-
modernisation. From certain aspects, a period of recession (and the economic 
and societal changes occurring during it) can be seen as a time when society 
does not develop toward greater modernism. Therefore, the recession can be 
seen as favorable to de-secularisation. 
Steve Bruce (1999:17) argues that modernisation makes the church form of 
religion impossible and therefore re-enforces denomination and cult forms of 
religion. During the recession, a reverse process can be seen. The Finns’ 
perception of the Evangelical Lutheran Church became more positive in many 
ways, while the attitudes toward many other religious groups (which in the 
Finnish context can be seen as denomination or cult forms of religion) became 
more negative. Thus, it seems that the time of recession favored especially the 
church form of religion. This can be seen as consistent with statements of 
Bruce, but in an opposite way. 
The latest figures from 2002 show that the reawakening of religiosity has 
been temporary. With the improvements in economic welfare and the stabilized 
economic situation in Finland the number of those believing in God in line with 
Christian doctrine has diminished again to the level of the beginning of the 1990s. 
But was there any real change in the content of the Finns’ faith during the 
recession? Statistics show that the share of those Finns who believed as taught 
by the Church increased during the recession and again declined after the turn 
of the new millennium. But probably the change is not as remarkable as the 
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impression given by the statistics. It is obvious that the Finns’ perception of the 
Church and their attitudes towards it became more positive during recession, 
but was that all? Do the changes in proportion of those who say they believe in 
God as taught by the Church only reflect the Finns’ general perceptions of the 
Church? If we look at the proportions of Finns who regard God as a very 
important part of their lives before the recession, during it and after it, there are 
no changes in numbers. This supports the view that the only thing that actually 
changed were the attitudes towards the Church, not the content of faith. 
4.2. Religiosity among the different groups of Finns 
At the end of the 20th century the attitudinal climate in Finland was 
characterised by increasing fragmentation. Many values and attitudes were no 
longer shared by the whole nation. On the contrary, different groups shared 
different values and attitudes. Groupings according to attitudes were more 
complex than before and the group divisions were not necessarily based on 
traditional categories of gender, age, or class. There were for instance, 
numerous different subgroups among the young (RISC Monitor, 2001:3; Helve, 
1996). Even though the group division has become more diversified, some 
common trends among the traditional groups can still be seen. 
4.2.1. Regional differences 
The area around the capital of Finland, Helsinki forms a deviating area 
from the rest of the country in its religious climate, which is characterised by 
secularisation more clearly than elsewhere. Central and northern Finland 
comprise the most religious areas. Half of those living around the Helsinki area 
regard themselves as religious, compared to almost three out of four of those 
living in central and northern Finland. The same trend can be seen in all the 
other measures of religiosity as well. 
Even though people living in the Helsinki area are far more passive in 
practising religion than other Finns, the number of those thinking about the 
purpose of life is almost as high as in other parts of Finland. About half of 
Finns in all areas think of such things often. But the number of those who find 
the church capable of giving adequate answers to the problems of today is far 
lower in the Helsinki area than in other parts of Finland. The people in the 
Helsinki area also think that other religions, not only Christianity, can provide 
answers in seeking the meaning of life. According to EVS data from 2000 only 
24 per cent of Helsinki area residents think that it is important to stay in one 
faith, compared to 35 per cent of other Finns. 21 per cent of people in the 
Helsinki area think that it is important to study the teachings of other religions, 
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while the corresponding figure among other Finns is only 16 per cent. This is 
connected to the clearer pluralisation  of the capital area: People do think about 
the deeper meaning and purpose of life, but answers are not sought only from 
Christianity or not even from religions in general. The authority of Christianity 
in giving answers to people’s question about life has diminished in the Helsinki 
area more clearly than in other parts of Finland. 
However, Christianity still has a strong ritual position in the capital area. 
People there do wish religious services to be held to mark occasions such as 
birth, marriage and death nearly as often as other Finns. The difference between 
the percentage of people wanting such services held in the capital area versus 
other parts of Finland is far lower than could be assumed by the differences in 
religious attitudes. 
 
Table 4: Number of those regarding themselves as religious among different 
groups of Finns according to the EVS 2000 survey (%) 
 % 
All 61 
Women 72 
Men 50 
18–24 years old 37 
25–34 years old 51 
35–49 years old 61 
50–64 years old 68 
65– years old 79 
Helsinki area (Uusimaa) 52 
Southern Finland 63 
Eastern Finland 56 
Central Finland 70 
Northern Finland 73 
Entrepreneur 69 
Upper clerical employee/manager (white collar worker) 54 
Lower clerical employee (white collar worker) 62 
Blue collar worker 51 
Pensioner 75 
Full-time mother 74 
Student 54 
Unemployed 51 
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Table 5: Belief in God among different groups of Finns according to the EVS 
2000 survey. 
 
There 
is one 
God 
There is 
some sort 
of spirit or 
life force 
I really 
don’t know 
what to 
think 
I don’t think 
there is any sort 
of spirit, God or 
life force 
Can’t 
say 
All 49 31 11 7 2 
Women 55 32 8 3 2 
Men 41 30 14 12 3 
18–24 years old 32 35 17 13 4 
25–34 years old 40 42 9 7 2 
35–49 years old 46 32 12 7 3 
50–64 years old 51 28 11 7 3 
65– years old 68 24 5 3 0 
Helsinki area (Uusimaa) 41 36 14 8 1 
Southern Finland 47 33 10 7 3 
Eastern Finland 46 34 11 6 3 
Central Finland 60 24 7 7 2 
Northern Finland 62 18 9 7 4 
Entrepreneur 57 27 12 3 1 
Upper clerical employee/manager 
(white collar worker) 43 34 14 8 1 
Lower clerical employee (white 
collar worker) 52 31 7 8 2 
Blue collar worker 37 36 14 10 4 
Pensioner 62 26 7 4 1 
Full-time mother 60 29 10 0 1 
Student 37 35 13 11 4 
Unemployed 40 36 10 9 5 
 
4.2.2. Gender differences 
Finnish women are clearly more religious than men. The gender 
differences in Finland are greater than in Europe in general. Three out of four 
women regard themselves as religious, compared to only half of men. Two out 
of three women find comfort and strength in religion, compared to a little more 
than one third of men. Christian beliefs as well as religious activities are also 
more common among women. 58 per cent of men say they attend religious 
services less than once a year or never, while the corresponding figure among 
women is only 33 per cent. 
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Even though men are more passive in practising religion both publicly and 
privately, they still think, nearly as often as women, that religious services 
should be held to mark birth, marriage and death. Therefore, even though 
religion seems to have lost its meaning in the lives of Finnish men, religious 
rituals still have a strong hold on their lives. 
4.2.3. Age differences 
The worldview of the contemporary youth can help us make some 
predictions about the future of religiosity in Finland. If we look at their 
worldview and religious attitudes, it is easy to predict that Christianity will 
probably lose its impact in the years to come. 
Youth and young adults are characterized by secularisation in many ways 
clearly more than older age groups. Christianity does not play as big a role in 
the lives of young people as in the lives of people in older age groups. Only 37 
per cent of those 18–25 years old regard themselves as religious, while 79 per 
cent of those 65 or older do. Among the young, there are clearly more of those 
who do not believe in the existence of God or are uncertain about it than in 
other age groups. According to the Gallup Ecclesiastica 1999 survey, 12 per 
cent of those 15–24 years old do not believe in the existence of God, while only 
5 per cent of those in older age groups do. 26 per cent of the young doubt the 
existence of God or do not know whether they believe in God or not, compared 
to 15 per cent of older people. 
Christianity is no longer the only religious option among young people. 
While more than half (58%) of those 65 years old or older think that it is 
important to stick to a particular faith – a faith which is most often regarded as 
Christianity – of those under 25 years old only 16 per cent do so. On the other 
hand, young people are more open to the teachings of other religions. It is 
probably partly due to their better knowledge of other religions. For the young, 
Christianity is no longer the only truth; therefore, the individualistically 
thinking young people see that they can construct their own worldview from 
different sources. 
The young do not see the church as very capable of giving answers to 
contemporary problems. Especially in other than spiritual matters, the trust in 
the church among the young is very vague. Concerning social problems, only 
16 per cent of the young think that the church can give adequate answers. One 
third of the young believe that the church can give adequate answers to moral 
problems, one-fourth to family problems. However, half of the young still 
regard the church as capable of giving answers to spiritual problems, and 
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therefore, see that the church still has a certain authority in spiritual matters. 
After all, it seems as though the church, and religion in general, has been 
strongly compartmentalized into its own narrow life area in the minds of young 
people. The church is seen as capable of being responsible only for spiritual 
matters, and not capable of handling any other life matters. 
The differences between the younger and older generation are not only due 
to the age difference. Young people today are not only less religious because 
they are younger, but they are also less religious than the older generation was 
at their age. Thus, a generational shift has also occurred. 
4.2.4. Religiosity and social class 
There are some clear differences between the social classes in Finland. 
Those having less education and belonging to the group conventionally known 
as the working class – a term which is no longer very appropriate – are the most 
passive both in private and public religious activities and the most seldom 
express Christian beliefs. Among the supporters of the political parties that 
attract the working class, there are fewer religious people than among other 
parties. The supporters of the Left Alliance Party are the least religious, while 
the supporters of the Finnish Centre Party are the most religious. If the effect of 
age is eliminated from the level of education, those with a high level of 
education appeal to be clearly more religious than those with low or no 
education. In Western Europe, Christianity in general appeals more to the well-
educated population than the less educated (see Davie, 2000:68–69). 
5. Types of Finnish religiosity 
Using different indicators of religiosity, the Finns were categorised into 
four groups according to their activity in practising religion publicly and 
privately and according to their belief in God. The classifying variables were: 
z Religious service attendance, 
z Frequency of prayer and 
z Belief in God. 
 
1. ACTIVE BELIEVERS: 14% of Finns (25% of all Europeans) 
z Believe in God 
z Attend religious services at least once a month 
z Pray weekly 
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Active believers attend religious services regularly and they are active 
prayers. They regard themselves as religious and find comfort and strength in 
religion. They believe in life after death and in other typical Christian doctrines. 
Most of them (90%) believe in a personal God, others in some sort of spirit or 
life force. God is an important part of their lives; two out of three answered 10 
on a 1–10 scale when asked the importance of God in their lives. 
Active believers are convinced that the church can give adequate answers 
to people's problems. Almost all of them consider it important to hold religious 
services for birth, marriage and death. 
The majority of Finns falling into this category are female (60%). Over half 
of active believers are over 50 years old. 
 
2. BASIC BELIEVERS: 35% of Finns (23% of all Europeans) 
z Believe in God 
z Attend religious services at least once a year 
z Pray at least sometimes 
z (Do not belong to “Active believers”) 
 
Basic believers attend religious services typically during specific holidays 
like Christmas and Easter. Most of them regard themselves as religious and find 
comfort and strength in religion. Two out of three believe in a personal God, 
one third believes that there is some sort of spirit or life force. 
The majority of basic believers regards God as rather important in their 
lives (four out of five answered at least 6 on a 1–10 scale when asked the 
importance of God in their lives). Two thirds believe in life after death and in 
most other Christian doctrines. However, basic believers tend to believe also in 
non-Christian beliefs, such as re-incarnation, telepathy and lucky charms. 
Basic believers think that the church is quite capable of giving adequate 
answers to people's problems. Almost all of them consider it important to hold 
religious services for birth, marriage and death. 
Almost two thirds of those falling into this category are female. Basic 
believers are equally found in all age groups. 
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3. PASSIVE BELIEVERS: 25% of Finns (22% of all Europeans) 
z Believe in God or do not know whether they believe or not 
z Attend religious services less than once a year 
z Pray at least sometimes 
Passive believers have a positive attitude towards religion, but are passive 
in practising it. Two thirds regard themselves as religious and half of them get 
comfort and strength from religion. They either believe in God or are not sure 
whether they believe or not. Half of them believe in a personal God and almost 
half of them believe in some sort of spirit or life force. They think that the 
church can give some answers to contemporary problems. Almost all of them 
think that it is important to hold religious services for birth, marriage and death. 
There is an equal proportion of men and women among passive believers. 
The vast majority of passive believers are under 60 years old. 
 
4. NON-BELIEVERS: 16% of Finns (19% of all Europeans) 
z Do not believe in God 
z Do not attend religious services OR do not ever pray 
 
Non-believers do not believe in God, and either never attend religious 
services or never pray. Most of them never attend religious services and those 
who do attend, do so only on special occasions. Nine out of ten never pray. 
Most non-believers regard themselves as non-religious, one fifth as convinced 
atheists. They do not find comfort and strength in religion nor does God play 
any role in their lives. They do not believe in the teachings of the church and do 
not see the church as capable of giving adequate answers to people's problems. 
Only half of them think that it is important to hold religious services for birth, 
marriage and death. The majority of non-believers are male (70%). They are 
over-represented in young age groups: Almost half of them are under 30 years 
old. Most often they are young men. 
Ten per cent of Finns and eleven per cent of all Europeans in the sample do 
not fit into any of these four categories (mostly due to incomplete answers). 
When comparing Finland with other European countries, the number of 
basic and passive believers is relatively high, while the number of active 
believers is low. In that sense Finland comes closest to Iceland, Belarus, and 
Latvia (see Table 6). 
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Table 6: Number of active believers, basic believers, passive believers and non-
believers in different European countries 
 Active believers 
Basic 
believers 
Passive 
believers 
Non-
believers 
Other or 
non-specified 
Malta 80 11 6 0 3 
Poland 69 20 7 2 8 
Ireland 64 21 8 3 4 
Northern Ireland 49 15 25 6 5 
Italy 46 30 12 6 6 
Portugal 46 16 30 4 4 
Slovakia 44 18 19 14 5 
Croatia 42 30 12 7 9 
Romania 41 40 8 2 9 
Austria 31 29 23 10 7 
Spain 28 23 31 11 7 
Greece 27 50 3 7 13 
Lithuania 22 28 16 10 24 
Belgium 21 19 27 25 8 
Netherlands 20 15 21 38 6 
Germany 19 17 15 39 10 
Luxembourg 18 26 21 23 12 
Ukraine 16 32 23 15 14 
United Kingdom 15 12 43 22 8 
Hungary 15 20 29 28 8 
Belarus 12 37 25 14 12 
Finland 14 35 25 16 10 
Latvia 11 32 27 17 13 
Bulgaria 11 27 16 27 19 
Czechia 10 11 21 48 10 
France 9 15 33 35 8 
Iceland 9 37 33 11 10 
Denmark 8 21 30 27 14 
Estonia 7 17 20 37 19 
Russia 7 22 35 24 12 
Total 25 23 22 19 11 
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6. Discussion 
Finland is an exceptionally religiously homogeneous country. Only a few 
percent of Finns belong to religious denomination other than the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church. A typical feature of Finnish religiosity is that public atten-
dance in religious services is very low, but in measures of private religiosity 
Finland stands above the European average. A typical Finn does practise relig-
ion privately, but not publicly. 
Many new religious denominations have faced difficulty in recruiting 
members in Finland. This is partly due to the fact that the Lutheran church has 
a very special status in the lives of Finnish people. Partly it is due to the fact 
that the Finns are not very willing to be actively and strongly religiously 
engaged, which is often presumed on the part of the new religious organisa-
tions. For the Finns, religiosity is a private matter. They do want to practise 
religion privately, but are not willing to be very actively involved in any public 
matter of religiosity. 
Even though most Finnish people attend religious services rarely, they have 
not abandoned their deep religious attitudes. This is the case also in many other 
West European countries. Davie (1999:68) describes West Europeans more as 
unchurched rather than simply secular. Even though many Europeans have 
ceased to participate in religious activities organised by religious institutions, 
they have not abandoned many of their deep-seated religious inclinations. 
However, using the term unchurched is not very appropriate in describing 
Finnish religiosity. The Lutheran church still has a very special status in the 
lives of Finnish people, even more special than in other Scandinavian countries. 
Even though it is easy to leave the church and thus save taxes, very few people 
do so. The vast majority of Finns belong to the Evangelical Lutheran Church, 
even though only one in ten are its active members. This is related to the issue 
of national integrity. 
We have to be cautious when using the term secularisation in discussing 
the Finnish case. It is true that attendance in religious services is falling and 
religion has become more and more a private matter in Finland, but when it 
comes to measures of private religiosity, there was an increase in various as-
pects of it in the 1990s as a response to economic recession and religion still 
plays a certain role in a day-to-day life of most Finns. The newest figures show, 
however, that the reawakening of religiosity was temporary. With the improv-
ing economic welfare and stabilized economic situation in Finland, the figures 
regarding religiosity have diminished again to the level of the mid 1990s. 
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But was there any real change in the content of the Finns’ faith during the 
recession? It is obvious that the Finns’ perception of the Church and their 
attitudes towards it became more positive during the recession, but was that all? 
Do the changes in faith seen in statistics only reflect the Finns’ general 
perceptions of the Church? This question remains partly open. In any case, the 
changes in Finnish religiosity at the turn of the millennium show the sensitive 
connection between religiosity and changes in society. During times of 
economic and social uncertainty, people have a tendency to seek security in 
traditional institutions such as the church. 
If we examine the worldview of the young, it is also easy to predict that the 
chain of collective religious memory is becoming weaker. Christianity no 
longer plays the same role in the lives of the young as in the lives of older age 
groups. Especially among young men there is a substantial proportion of “non-
religious” persons. 
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Irena Borowik 
RELIGION AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN POLAND IN THE 
PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATION 
1. Introduction 
There are three important notions in my article so that each of them could 
become a sufficient subject of the article itself: transformation, religion and civil 
society. Is it possible to discuss some of them while neglecting the other? I don’t 
intend to go into details in understanding and analysing the concepts of transfor-
mation and its features. In this matter I would like to make only a few preliminary 
remarks that do not pretend to be nothing more but a kind of introduction to 
discussion of “civil society”. Understanding of transformation depends quite 
obviously on understanding of society. Those sociologists who look at society in 
a rather structural perspective put stress on systemic changes (for instance in 
economy) and on the structure of society – for instance appearing of middle class 
and weaknesses of its formation (Staniszkis, 1999:168-174). Those who pay 
more attention to the social consciousness express an opinion that the easiest part 
of the reform is systemic institutional and legal reform, and that the 
transformation of social awareness poses the greatest problems (Ziółkowski, 
1995:177). Others warn that transformation proceeds at its most fundamental 
level in neither economics nor politics, but at the level of culture. They perceive a 
‘break’ in peoples’ world-view, that in the light of the changes brought by 
globalisation, the ordinary person feels without stability or trust, briefly – 
traumatized (Sztompka, 1996). In all perspectives it is clear that transformation 
brings a lot of problems that could not be solved neither from night to night nor 
from decade to decade. In some features of transformation society we can discern 
a state of anomie: rising levels of crime and unemployment, a decreasing birth-
rate; hardening conditions of living; a high level of suicide (usually for previously 
unknown economic reasons – losing one’s job, a lack of resources); the emer-
gence of homelessness. In spite of these difficulties experienced by societies in 
transformation and in spite of the different perspectives in understanding of 
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problems, one thing seems to be certain and – after 1989, the societies of Central 
and after 1991, the societies of Eastern Europe – define their own way in trans-
formation as democratisation. This self-description gives an additional argument 
for considering transformation in the context of civil society as quite frequently 
the term is used in this political context. 
Transformation time is a period of formation of new identities at many 
levels of social life: institutions (in the structural sense of organisations: 
schools, hospitals, factories, churches, foundations etc.), social consciousness, 
procedures of acting etc. All levels of changing identities relate one to each 
other and quite frequently they contradict. It concerns also civil society trans-
forming itself in democratisation process. It is worth to ask about direction 
(directions) of those changes and its interference with religious field and the 
Church. It is worth because in the opinion of many sociologists of religion 
including mine, the presence of religion at the level of civil society has an 
impact on the future of religion in the sense of its positive and reciprocal 
accommodation and co-operation with modernising social reality.1 
2. Understanding of civil society 
Civil society is mostly seen in opposition to some other realities: to the state, 
to the privacy, to political arrangements or to economy. Jurgen Habermas for 
instance seas the roots of civil society in opposition of public and private spheres 
that appeared by the end of XVIII century, where “carriers of the representative 
publicness” by polarisation finally split into private and public elements 
(Habermas, 1989:11). In the same process “Elements of occupational status group 
organisation, to the degree that they have already been involved in the urban 
corporations and in certain differentiations within the estates of the land, 
developed into the sphere of "civil society" that as the genuine domain of private 
autonomy stood opposed to the state.” (Habermas, 1989:12). In his 
understanding, formation of civil society started in coffee bars and pubs, as the 
places where public affairs and problems were discussed. Later it has developed 
                                                          
1 The process of modernisation is inevitable future of post-communist central part of Europe. One 
can argue that modernisation has already taken place under communism. On the one hand it could 
be true, especially as far as such processes as industrialisation, mass education, migration from 
villages to the cities and political rights of women are concerned. On the other hand social 
consciousness staying under pressure of communist ideology and mythology did not confront 
rationalisation and individualisation, what is typical for modernity. Collectivity went before indi-
vidual and unquestioning belief went before rational debate, ideals (of communism or socialism) 
went before pragmatism. 
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in different orders, chambers, and academies that were “Transcending the 
barriers of social hierarchy, the bourgeois met here with the socially prestigious 
but politically uninfluential nobles as "common" human beings” (Habermas, 
1989:34-35). “Common” human beings are gradually transferred into “common 
good” of “human rights” of human beings. 
J.L. Cohen and A. Arato sea civil society as the “third realm” differentiated 
from the economy and the state. It has “cross-cutting cleavages, overlapping 
membership of groups, and social mobility” and as such “is the presupposition 
for a stable democratic polity, a guarantee against permanent domination by 
any group and against the emergence of fundamentalist mass movements and 
antidemocratic ideologies” (Cohen & Arato, 1992:18). 
Similarly as opposing the state to civil society John A. Hall was relating to 
the historical opposition to despotism, “a space in which social groups could 
exist and move – something which exemplified and would ensure softer, more 
tolerable conditions of existence” (Hall, 1995:1). 
As an intuitively “obvious” definition of civil society, Ernest Gellner propo-
ses to understand it as “that set of diverse non-governmental institutions, which 
is strong enough to counterbalance the state, and, whilst not preventing the state 
from fulfilling its role of keeper of peace and arbitrator between major interests, 
can nevertheless prevent the state from dominating and atomising the rest of 
society” (Gellner, 1995:33). Perez-Diaz understands civil society as “social 
institutions such as markets and voluntary associations and a public sphere 
which are outside the direct control of (...) the state” (Perez-Diaz, 1993:57). 
Thus in the broadest perspective civil society could be understood as 
horizontal linkages between people and groups of people grouped together, 
sometimes organised, acting in favour of “common good”. Rising of civil 
society and discussion concerning it is related to political issues and to the 
theories and ideologies of democracy. 
Civil society is seen as an enemy of authoritarian rulers and powers. 
Important and interesting analysis by Robert Putnam (1995) concerning civil 
society in Italy proves the truth of this statement. He discovered that Northern 
Italy historically better developed forms and the institutions of civil society 
while Southern part, for many reasons not. In his opinion civil societies “cause 
better efficiency and stability of democratic government” for their “internal” 
influence of single members and “external” influence on broader social 
spectrum (Putnam, 1995:137). 
Putnam opposes the types of local social relation based on the civil network 
and the type of relations he calls patron–client, based on personal dependence, 
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limits of freedom, not equal rights of participation in social life etc. (Putnam, 
1995:152). This second type of arrangements is typical, for example, for regions 
influenced by Mafia. It could be also compared to a totalitarian rule where the 
individuals were forced to seek support from those who were rulers and stood 
higher at any level of social hierarchy. It could be also compared to a totalitarian 
rule where individuals were forced to seek support from those who were rulers and 
stood higher at any level of social hierarchy. Then in his opinion civil society is a 
clear condition of development of democracy. Victor Perez-Diaz, while thinking of 
Spain, is of the same opinion. Explaining conditions of successful transition to 
democracy he mentions four “causal factors” starting from that of traditions of civil 
society, that in his opinion “accustomed the population to polycentric forms of 
order such as markets, social pluralism, and public debate” (Perez-Diaz, 1993:39) 
3. Civil society and religion in Polish history 
Scientists while talking about civil society quite frequently use the 
expression “return”, for instance the title of the excellent book by Victor Pèrez 
– Díaz is “The Return of Civil Society. The Emergence of Democratic Spain” 
(1993). How the birth of civil society could be seen in Poland? How religion 
and the Church are related to the birth of civil society before the partitions? 
Answering to these questions would require more research in history. 
Looking at the more recent past, namely at the time before the collapse of 
communism, in Polish context rise of civil society is associated with political 
opposition towards communist state and government. J.L. Cohen and A. Arato 
are right while saying that the “opposition of civil society and state made its 
most dramatic return in East Europe, particularly in the ideology of the Polish 
opposition from 1976 to the advent of early Solidarity and beyond” (Cohen & 
Arato, 1992:31). Victor Perez-Diaz is convinced that emergence or develop-
ment of civil society as such in authoritarian and totalitarian regimes “prepares 
the way for its transition to a liberal democracy and a full-fledged market 
economy” (Perez-Diaz, 1993:56) so to say structurally. In Cohen and Arato’ the 
opposed terms are used: “Society against the state, nation against state, social 
order against political system, pays real against pays legal or official, public 
life against the state, private life against public power, etc.” (Cohen & Arato, 
1992:31). On the other hand one of the most influential Polish sociologists, 
Jerzy Szacki, is of the opinion that the term “civil society”, invented in Western 
scientific and democratic tradition was simply implemented to political events 
and processes in Poland. As he pointed out that “from its Western friends 
dissidents from Central-Eastern Europe got knowledge that process initiated by 
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them is ‘revival of civil society’” (Szacki, 1997:17). The other important 
specificity of the rise of civil society in Central-Eastern Europe was “morality” 
of it, that was civil society of “dissidents, democrats and clerics” in comparison 
to the middle class aiming at getting more independence from the state in 
Western Europe (Szacki, 1997:27). 
On the one hand it was expressed by real presence of the Catholic priests 
among dissidents, on the other – the Catholic Church as an institution played a 
significant role in formation of civil society. One of the powerful symbols 
directed against the communist state and the party was the cross. As one of the 
sociologists counted there were over 1000 masses organised in 1980 at the 
factories fields. The Church and its members were, to a large degree, midwives 
of civil society. Pulpits, catechism classes, cloistered conference rooms, 
became arenas for debate of questions of the day. Religious ritual became the 
central expression and manifestation of civil society: procession, pilgrimages, 
attending mass, meetings with a pilgrim Pope. 
Making an attempt to summarise the role of the Catholic Church in the last 
two centuries we see a lot of functions played by the Church, not limited to 
religious field. 
The first field – the Church and the State 
The Roman Catholic Church in relation to the state played in the Polish 
past different functions: support of the state, replacement and opposition 
towards it. The mutual co-operation of the Church and the state was typical for 
many medieval countries, including Poland. In modern Europe two major 
models of relations between the Church and the state developed: in some 
countries religion has a national, state status (Great Britain, Scandinavian 
countries) and some countires introduced separation between them following 
the first example given in this matter by French revolution. In Poland the 
Roman Catholic Church as an institution has replaced the state through two 
centuries. Partitions provoked this function of the Church that was the only 
institution legally surviving and existing as unified structure. In this way the 
Church played the role of political body and structure unifying the regions of 
Poland cut into pieces by partitions. Simultaneously over two centuries of 
partitions trained the Church in Poland and formed around it civil society 
opposing to the state that continues to be seen as hostile after 1945. Thus 
relation of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland towards the state was 
contradictory – replacement of the state and playing the role of the state in 
times of partitions and – tradition of hostility towards the state, hostility 
supported by society. 
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The second field – the Church and political society 
The Church trough times of partitions and communism represented 
political society of the oppressed. Representatives of the Church were 
institutionally and privately involved in Polish uprisings of 1830 and 1863. 
Formation of political society in Poland is strictly linked to such values as 
patriotism, taking part in uprisings in fighting for independence and building of 
the Polish state. The Church and religion were important elements of it. 
Importance is reflected in significant Polish stories and dramas, such as that of 
Mickiewicz or Wyspiański. An image of Poland suffering in history as 
crucified Jesus Christ is a source of Polish Messianism, i.e. romantic vision of 
the important and mysterious role of Poland in European future. This function 
of representation of political society by the Church was continued after 1945, as 
totalitarian system did not allow forming political society as such. Religion and 
church in Poland acted in the name of political society and instead of it. It 
opposed to one-party system and political elite that did not represent political 
society but only party elite. 
The third field – the Church and civil society. 
The Church as an institution co-created civil society in Poland and the 
churches as buildings maybe played a role comparable to that by pubs in 
Western Europe as seen by Habermas. As a moment of the birth of civil society 
in Poland could be taken the institutionalisation of political opposition known 
as Workers Defence Committee (KOR) in 1976 and the rising of Solidarity 
Movement in 1980. Again the Church played a contradictory role – not only the 
Church did support development of civil society and legitimated opposition 
towards the state but also mediated between it and the society. 
Looking at it we may see a kind of “schizophrenic roles” in political and 
social practice of the Church in Polish history. In other words the Church as an 
institutional power played the role of a substitute of the state under partitions 
and a substitute of political society under communism. But it also mediated 
between the opposition and the state, helping in this way to find an agreement 
between the legitimated opposition and the state. All contradictions in the role 
of the Church placed between society and the state got their full importance 
after the collapse of communism making difficult for the Church in finding a 
new way. Thus the important question is what has happened to Polish society in 
transformation period and what has happened to civil society, religion and the 
Church. At first I would like to look at relations between civil society and the 
Church and then – more broadly, at relations with religion. 
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4. Civil society in Contemporary Poland and the Catholic Church 
Interdependencies between creation of civil society and religion in Poland 
as everywhere else are linked to the history, namely to the basic facts that start 
from strong relation of national identity with Catholicism that is historic choice 
of belonging to Western Christianity and Western – European culture. 
Post-communist transformation has brought radical changes to the 
institutional face of Poland. Above all the political structure has changed: the 
‘monocentric’ PZPR (Polish Unified Party of Workers) has been replaced by a 
broad spectrum of parties with an equally wide range of programmes, initiating 
the formation of political society. The civil society that emerged from the 
totalitarian pressure receives back its own voice and creates different agenda of 
social discourse: feminist groups, radio stations, television and print media, and 
pressure groups – for example Neutrum (Association for a People with a 
Neutral World-View, 1990), “Without Dogma” (Association for Law and 
Freedom), ecological groups, committees organised to discuss public questions, 
for example the Committee for a Referendum on Abortion, and numerous 
Catholic anti-abortion organisations. 
What characterises this ferment is a great degree of direct reaction to the 
activity of the Church – introduction of religious instruction to schools, 
initiatives to draw up a total ban on abortion, engagement with the campaign to 
quickly sign the Concordat with Vatican, and the resulting debates about the 
new constitution. Civil society, as every social phenomenon, has to be 
articulated. How is articulated civil society in Poland? What is, if it is at all, 
then the place of religion in public discourse? 
First of all transformation brought a natural, rapid and overwhelming 
process of differentiation of society. From day to day, in a revolutionary way, 
the state, political society and civil society became separated. The state got 
independence and political society rose as a result of democratisation, elections 
and system of representative parliamentary elections. In other words, political 
society received a chance of gaining self and every member of society received 
a chance to be a subject of political life by active membership in a chosen party 
or by simpler participation in elections. Political activity and some political 
knowledge necessary for it became a new task for everybody, unlike in the past 
where the basic political orientation lied fundamentally in dualistic vision, i.e. 
being with the communists or against “them”. Majority of Poles were against 
the communist regime as Solidarity movement proved it but members of the 
communist party together with their families counted also quite significant 3 
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million of supporters. New political scene is much more differentiated. There 
are parties with programmes addressed to different groups of interests: farmers, 
young business groups, former communists and workers et cetera. There are 
populist parties and the parties having sophisticated elite programmes, these 
having wide social support and quite insignificant one, presenting Catholic 
views and liberal ones. Together with differentiation of political scene it 
became necessary to learn it, following the changes and educating people in 
their rights. 
Civil society is in the re-creation, reformation. In all possible fields of 
activity people need to learn about their needs and ways of expressing it. Some 
movements can support it; for instance feminists movement support the fight 
for equal rights of women at the job market. Civil society visibly pointed at the 
problems engaging almost everybody. Abortion has become one of such hot 
issues in Poland for almost a decade. One additional problem became quite 
visible on this occasion: different pro-choice groups and movements in favour 
of referendum on this issue were born freely just as a result of civil activity of 
citizens while anti-abortion and pro-life groups arouse under very strict 
institutional activity and support of the Roman Catholic Church. It is not certain 
that the Catholics themselves wouldn’t act, maybe they would. In any way it 
proved that the Church and its hierarchy either do not trust to believers from the 
street or – they do not know how to stay aside and to allow people to act “from 
the bottom” just as civil society convinced that some values should be actively 
and visibly supported. 
Introduction of religious instruction to public school looked even more 
paternalistically. The way of this introduction was important, namely, on the 2nd 
of August 1990 Polish government took a decision about the return, as some 
interpretations say, or introduction – as others say, of religious instruction to 
the state school. One day later Ministry of education signed it up and the new 
decision came into life. Nobody, neither religious communities of Catholics nor 
members of other religious groups, was consulted. It proved again that the 
Church, two decades earlier giving support to the rise of civil society, and 
political opposition in Poland “forgot” the basic law of civil society- 
consultation, discussion, searching of “common good”. This way of 
introduction of religious instruction was criticised not only by anticlericals but 
also by Catholics. Jarosław Gowin, the Catholic journalist and the editor of 
“Tygodnik Powszechny”, a Catholic newspaper addressed rather to elite, wrote 
that instruction was introduced without waiting “for the results of an on-going 
debate and without going trough the necessary long statute procedures” 
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(Gowin, 1995:14). He also agreed with the general opinion that most of the 
activities of the Church at that time revealed a desire for actual privileges.” 
As examples he mentioned: “Beginning to return the wealth of the Church 
before general agreement on re-privatisation; speedy granting of a Catholic 
radio station before criteria for their distribution had been settled by law; 
undertaking to resume religious lessons in schools before any discussions with 
other smaller churches etc.” (Gowin, 1999:116-117). 
Primate Cardinal Glemp responded eloquently to such criticisms by 
commenting that “We always want to serve the nation any way we can, and no-
one can preach us how to do it. We understand the nation and we wish to serve 
it to the best of our understanding” (Gazeta Wyborcza 28.06.1992). 
Let me raise the argument that the Episcopal Communiqués and the above 
statements of various Bishops, including the Primate of Poland, Jozef Glemp, 
comprise two elements. Firstly, they perceive as identical the Polish nation, 
Polish Catholics and Polish Society. Of course, this is in the form of an appeal 
to Polish historical experience, the union between national identity and 
Catholicism, the role of the Church in the defence of Polishness, and from this 
eloquent historical circumstance comes the opinion explicitly expressed that the 
parliament elected in free elections should represent the Catholic values of a 
Catholic people, firm in their defence and serve their consolidation. 
The second element I perceive is the presupposition not only of single-
minded Catholic thinking in different matters, but a basic agreement of that 
opinions with that presented by the Church hierarchy. A message is very slowly 
reaching the Church hierarchy that there is a differentiation not only in society 
but also among declared Catholics. It seems as Miklós Tomka could be right 
expressing the opinion that for participation of the Churches in creative impact 
of religious aspect on social life and civil society could be quite difficult for – 
as he calls – big churches. In his opinion ”Even if churches contribute to the 
emergence of civil society, they may hinder the rise of other participants in the 
public scene because of their dominance (and perhaps because of their 
exclusivist behaviour)” (Tomka, 1999:57). In Poland – as majority of Poles 
belongs to the Catholic Church – not only outside differentiation but “other 
participants” inside the Church are important, so allowing them express 
different opinions would support civil society discourse. Obviously this kind of 
development would require a mutual confidence. On the side of believers con-
fidence that bishops would allow to act in favour of Catholic values even if this 
acting was not planned together with bishops and – on the other hand, bishops 
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have to believe that their faithful have their own Catholic sensitivity, imagina-
tion and will act in favour of Catholic values and not against the Church. 
Interesting comparison of two churches acting under different circumstances 
and in different ways is made by Katarzyna Gilarek, comparing the Catholic 
Church in Poland and the Church of England in Great Britain. After considering 
different items she concluded that “The Church of England in Great Britain 
seems to employ a completely different strategy in which democratic decision 
making and compromise is the main way of solving the controversial issues of 
the modern world” (Gilarek, 1999: 203). 
This situation was given attention by probably the most critical thinker in 
the Catholic elite, Father Professor Józef Tischner, who wrote “This political 
and even partisan We starts to overweight We, The Church. What does the 
Church do in this situation? Of course, it tries for identity, autonomy. It does 
not come easily, because it is easier to fight enemies than over-zealous friends” 
(Tischner, 1998:24). 
In the same manner, the secular elite criticised the politicised Church. 
Summarising voice in this discussion has been that of respected philosopher 
Leszek Kołakowski who states that if “the Church participates in political 
games – even if priests do not stand for Parliament – it must bear political 
defeats” (Kołakowski, 1996:10). The defeat of President Wałęsa was seen as a 
joint defeat of the Church. 
Kołakowski’s thoughts are an unusually accurate criticism of the Church’s 
engagement in politics, criticism that has been expressed by almost all possible 
circles in society: Catholic and secular elite and typical parishioners. Poles 
argue about which government – right or left – is better. They both exchange in 
leading the state. There are many important questions yet to be settled – 
legalisation of abortion or entry into the EU. The need to reduce the political 
engagement of the Church is one issue on which a consensus exists. 
Throughout ten years of transformation, polls and surveys have shown three-
quarters of the public think the Church is too involved in politics. 
We can summarise these considerations by formulating some propositions 
on the Catholic Church in Poland under the conditions of transformation. 
1. The methods and styles of organisation from the heritage of the past are 
incorporated into the reality of transformation: Messianism, Ritualism, 
ease of social engineering and turning against the state; 
2. Treating itself as an infallible institution, being in possession of the only 
true indisputable knowledge on what is “the best for the nation”. It is the 
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feature of authoritarian institution, relating infallibility not only to 
religious doctrine but to all matters including politics; 
3. It is unaware of multicultural society: either those who do not hear the 
‘admonition’ of the Church are outside the Catholic nation (because with 
regard to whom the Church is addressing, the Church has not reached a 
consensus), or Primate Glemp’s statement that he understands the nation 
is not true; 
4. It does not accept basic democratic rules: free choice, minority rights and 
pluralism. It uses the language of struggle and insulting epithets against 
its critics: post-communists, feminists, New Religious Movements. We 
can interpret this in two ways – either as a continuation of a fortress 
mentality or, the exact opposite, as a sign of a triumphal unwillingness to 
divide the ‘governing spirit’; 
5. Specifically, the current head of the Polish Church – Primate Glemp 
embodies every feature of the ‘People’s Church’. Unwillingness and lack 
of skill in discussing other ways of thinking; ignorance in relation to other 
religions; unwillingness to embrace change (for example, to increase 
involvement of the laity in the work of the Church), an emphasis on 
organisation, verticalisation of the functions of the Church, patriarchism 
in relation to new social movements, like feminism and organisations of 
defence of children’s rights. 
 
In the process of transformation there is an ongoing differentiation of 
society which touches religion and a following differentiation in all Catholic 
positions, in the Church hierarchy as well as the laity. This process tends to 
leave aside the bishops. The Church hierarchy in these changes finds itself in an 
uncomfortable position: for conservatives they are ‘not radical enough’ and 
‘too progressive’ when they accept entry to the EU and try, not very skilfully, 
to defend our ‘elder brothers’, the Jews. At the same time they are too cowardly 
and backward-looking for more open Catholics when growing contemporary 
problems are concerned. 
The sociologists of religion in many ways consider adaptation of the 
religious institutions to the processes of modernisation, secularisation and 
privatisation of religion. Taking their considerations into account the Catholic 
Church in Poland presents a more conservative than liberal face (Beyer, 1994), 
rather ‘entrenching itself’ than ‘marketing itself’ or ‘surrendering’ (Berger, 
1992). There is no doubt that it will continue to be important; the Church in the 
last decade has been very sharp in creating itself as a political institutional actor 
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and simultaneously put itself outside the discourse of civil society, which seems 
to be much more important for the future of religion. 
5. Transformations of social life, civil society and religion 
Looking at relations between civil society and religion understood in its 
institutional dimension we see fields of conflicts – between civil society and the 
Church, between political society and the church. Situation is changed as soon as 
we move to religion understood by its communitarian and individual dimensions. 
Transformation brought a lot of novelties in which religion is involved 
quite simply differentiating some areas of social life. Reformation of education 
system brought important change. Private and social schools were established, 
including Catholic ones. The latter enjoy popularity because of common high 
level in it and many additions to the programme, as languages. Additionally 
parents are convinced that the catholic school guarantees a proper moral level 
and control. More frequently Catholic school is led by male and female orders. 
Thanks to returning of church properties, to the monastic orders, hospitals were 
re-established. Some of them are very famous and have long-term traditions, 
operating very well in community, helping people. Apart from hospitals, mostly 
nuns lead the institutes of permanent care of old, ill and disabled. 
Reform of mass-media system meant again differentiation. Instead of two 
TV state programs and 3 radio programs, new and very different ones were 
established, including private and commercial TV channels, as POLSAT or 
TVN. It helped to create Catholic mass media – TV channel and two radio 
programs, including Radio Maryja that enjoys high popularity. Radio Maryja is 
a good example of present stage of developments in religious field in Poland. 
The owner of radio is monastic order in Toruń and it acts not only 
independently of Polish Episcopate but quite clearly it continuously opposes 
Episcopate. It seems that Polish bishops do not have influence on it and can not 
control it as the monastic order is subordinated directly to Vatican. Father 
Rydzyk is a leader of the Radio having all features described as a phenomenon 
of a charismatic leadership. About 5 million of listeners share majority of 
opinions presented there: anti-European and anti-Jewish, anti-communist, anti-
Masonry feelings and attitudes. Radio Maryja and Father Rydzyk established a 
movement around radio – Families of Radio Maryja. The father played an 
important role in politics. On the base of this movement he unified divided 
representatives of many small right wing fractions into a coalition of parties 
called Liga Rodzin Polskich (LRP – League of Polish Families) that entered 
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parliament in the last elections with 5% of support. Notwithstanding how it 
could be taken ironically, now this party could be seen as political 
representation of civil society formed by those Catholics who are rather 
traditional, conservative, anti-European, representing rather clear rejection of 
modernity, re-assessment of Polish tradition and fundamental view on those 
who have different opinions as strictly wrong. Ironically, because one of the 
virtues of civil society is at least being open to the dialog with those who are of 
different opinions in order to discuss issues and to listen to others. For LRP, the 
dialog is neither possible nor desirable and it is decidedly rejected. 
6. Conclusion? 
In my opinion it is not by chance that in Poland manifestation of civil 
society so much involves either religion (various groups representing either 
Catholics or Catholic Church as institution) or opposition towards religion, in 
other words, pro-religious or anti-religious sentiments. In other countries it 
doesn’t look like that. For instance in Italy, what Andrzej Rychard found 
striking, civil ties are “prevailingly secular ties – in other words, Italian 
Catholicism participates in building of civil relations to a low degree” 
(Rychard, 1996: 314). 
Something similar is noticed in respect to Spain, where “Spanish Catholics 
could be Catholic in church and perhaps at home, but they did not feel 
subordinate to the will of the church in the public sphere, that is, in most 
political, economic, or cultural matters” (Perez-Diaz, 1993:136). In Poland, 
although general observation could go in similar direction – Catholics 
frequently oppose an official teaching of the Church, at least significant number 
of Catholics oppose political engagement of the Church and so called moral 
teaching. On the other hand a lot of Catholics are ready to engage in 
manifestations of civil unity with the others directed by the Church in case it is 
organised on the national level. Members of parishes sign letters opposing 
unwanted exhibitions or movies or are engaged in manifestations of pro-life 
group et cetera. The priests teaching religion are the second persons after 
director in the public school and the most influential members of local 
communities. Maybe Srđan Vrcan is right when saying that the most important 
religious change in the nineties in the countries of CEE could be described as a 
shift “from privatisation of religion to its de-privatisation, from secularisation 
to de-secularisation of society”, indicating a turn from religion as theism with 
no public function whatsoever to religion as theism with very important public 
functions, and from religion located outside the preceding dominant social 
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system to religion having recently become an important part of the actually 
functioning social and political system in a basically twofold position by being 
at the same time both, an integral part to the system and standing above the 
system (intra and extra-systemic position and role) (Vrcan, 2001:98). 
At present stage in Poland this mixed character of civil society proves 
being in transitionary period. Civil society as such, as the whole society, is in 
the process of transformation and a kind of reformation. The past was devoted 
to the fight against communism and communist domination. Negative 
mobilisation was co-organised and supported by the Church. The Church and 
the representatives of civil society have now a new lesson and part of it is 
forgetting the past and learning new models and ways of operation. 
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Małgorzata Zawiła 
RELIGIOSITY AND MORALITY: ATTITUDES TOWARD 
EUTHANASIA AND ABORTION AS A MANIFESTATION 
OF RELIGIOSITY AND MORALITY RELATIONS IN 
CONTEMPORARY POLAND 
1. Introduction 
In this paper I consider attitudes toward euthanasia and abortion in the 
context of morality and religiosity in Poland. The main aim of this study is to 
answer the question: can attitudes toward abortion and euthanasia be understood 
as an indication of contemporary religiosity and morality in Poland? What can we 
say about the religiosity and morality of Poles, knowing their views on these 
matters? Is the process of modernisation apparent when considering moral 
attitudes? And, if it is, then in what way is it present in the morality and 
religiosity of Poles? 
My analysis in this study is partly based on the results of research conducted 
at the end of 2000 and beginning of 2001, studying 60 Polish physicians. Apart 
from the issues of abortion and euthanasia, the questionnaire used in the research 
also included questions measuring attitudes toward different aspects of death and 
dying: frequency and circumstances of thinking about their patients' deaths, the 
deaths of the physicians’ relatives and their own death. The physicians researched 
were mostly of the following specialisations: surgery, anaesthesiology, intensive 
care, paediatrics, internal medicine, oncology-chemotherapy, oncology-
radiotherapy, neurology, geriatrics, cardiology and others working in hospice, 
intensive care units in hospitals and palliative care wards. 
2. Features of Modernisation 
There are various ways of interpreting the changes that are taking place in 
contemporary society, including the issues of religiosity and morality. Prominent 
among them are theories of secularisation and privatisation. Both are processes 
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that accompany the modernisation of societies. Sociologists like P. Berger, D. 
Martin, T. Luckmann and many others have discussed those processes already 
for decades (Berger, 1967; Martin, 1978; Luckmann, 1967). The process of 
secularisation can explain some of the transformations that are taking place in 
modern society, including matters of religiosity and morality. However, as I will 
try to show in this paper, secularisation is not the only process that explains the 
changes in relations between religiosity and morality in contemporary societies. 
According to some functional definitions of religion, one of its main 
functions is creating and legitimising the world order, including the moral order 
(Berger, 1967). All the major religions have their sacred laws with their rights 
and wrongs. They all reveal which behaviours and thoughts are permitted, and 
which ones are forbidden. In traditional societies, breaking some sacred rule 
might lead to expulsion from the Church and society and, consequently, to 
social death. It was not possible to deny the Church's morals without social 
consequences. Religiosity and morality used to be regarded as inseparable. 
Breaking some moral rule, according to many religions, had its consequences 
not only in this world, but also after death in the form of divine judgement that 
assigns eternal reward or punishment. In traditional societies, the main reason 
for obeying moral rules was that of a religious character. The connection 
between religion and morality was obvious then. 
However, in contemporary society the situation seems to be different. 
There are many sociological theories concerning the character of the society 
that we live in and its transformation. There are many other processes like 
individualisation, pluralisation and fragmentation that accompany the moderni-
sation of society. There is a wide range of values, ideas, religious systems and 
lifestyles out of which everyone is able to pick and choose the ones that are 
most suitable for them. Everyone has to make the decision by him or herself. 
Some even claim that endless decision-making and individual choices are not 
just a possibility, but a necessity, in contemporary society (Bauman, 2000:236). 
There is no one right kind of food, house, music, political system, religious 
system or moral system. There are almost as many varieties as individuals. The 
existence of common values is questioned. There are many individual values 
instead. Of course, there are people and institutions telling us what is the best 
for us, but we must make all the decisions. Yet how many of us, members of 
modern or rather post-modern society, want to make all the decisions related to 
our lives by ourselves? How many of us want them to be independent and how 
many rely on someone else's choice? We do not want anyone to tell us what to 
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do, say, think etc. From the wide offer of goods, lifestyles and moral values 
addressed to us, we chose only the most convenient for us. That is what is 
called the society of choice as opposed to the society of fate. 
In the realm of sociological considerations of contemporary society, a 
theory of systems and subsystems of social existence has been developed and is 
widely used (Luhmann, 1995). According to this theory, politics, science, 
education and religion are separate spheres of social life today. Of course, they 
are in some relation with each other, but generally they are separate. Far-
reaching differentiation and specialisation are other hallmarks of contemporary 
society. For instance, a shaman, faith healer or priest is no longer the only or 
most common health, birth and death specialist. Now there are physicians, 
experts for almost every little part of our body and its various afflictions. In 
every sphere of people's activity there are some highly specialised experts. 
3. Abortion and Euthanasia in the Polish Legal System and in the 
attitudes of Polish society 
The purpose of this paper is to present the moral condition of Poles and its 
relation to religiosity in its cultural and legal context. I will illustrate it with the 
Poles' attitudes toward abortion and euthanasia – both issues of men's and 
women's moral choices and decisions. In the last decade, the matters of 
abortion and euthanasia have been widely discussed in Poland at the public and 
academic level. These problems are present in daily magazines, popular TV 
talk shows, radio programmes as well as in scientific literature and academic 
lectures. The character of these discussions (especially the public ones) implies 
that they are very controversial issues. 
Polish law, laid down in 1956, allowed the termination of pregnancy for 
several reasons: medical, social and when the pregnancy was the result of a 
crime. Medical and social reasons had to be confirmed by a doctor and a crime 
by the public prosecutor's office. In 1959, the law was changed and a woman's 
written declaration of her unfavourable social or financial situation was 
sufficient for a legal abortion. Since 1989, Polish Parliament has been engaged 
in the problem of abortion several times. Just after arranging the most important 
issues of government, in April 1990, the Upper House of Parliament made the 
first arrangements for a new abortion law. In the years 1990–93, the Lower 
House of Polish Parliament took into consideration four proposals for a new 
abortion law (two liberal and two restrictive) and a proposal for a public 
referendum. None of these was ever brought into effect. After those years of 
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heated public and political discussion, a new abortion law was finally passed on 
7 January 1993. It allowed an abortion for the following reasons: eugenic, 
medical and when a pregnancy is a result of a crime. After the elections in 
September 1993, the new Parliament tried to amend the law by adding a social 
reason for a legal abortion but the President put his veto on the amendments. In 
1995, the Parliament obliged the government to present a yearly report on the 
implementation of the abortion law. In 1997, the Parliament once more 
amended the law and, among others, added a clause allowing a social reason for 
having a legal abortion. The Upper House of Parliament appealed against the 
last amendments to the Constitutional Tribunal and, in consequence, the 
changes were withdrawn1. 
As we see, the process of laying down a new abortion law in Poland was 
quite long and complicated. Every attempt to liberalise the abortion law in Poland 
met many difficulties. The argumentation, especially from the opponents of 
liberalisation, was usually very far from scientific nature and rationality2. 
The laws on euthanasia have never caused as much public discussion as 
those on abortion. Euthanasia, defined as the practice of killing someone in 
order to relieve their suffering when nothing can be done to help them, is illegal 
in Poland and is treated in the courts as ‘privileged homicide.’ According to the 
Polish penal code for euthanasia, one can be punished with 3 months to 5 years 
of imprisonment. In some special cases, the judge may commute a sentence or 
desist from executing the punishment, however the code does not specify in 
which cases it is possible. 
There is a wide range of reasons for and against euthanasia and abortion: 
ontological, social and ethical – of religious and of lay character. The Roman 
Catholic Church's position on abortion and euthanasia is clear. There are 
special encyclicals on these issues: Evangelium Vitae concerning abortion and 
Iura et Bona concerning euthanasia, the Catechism of the Catholic Church, the 
Pope's letters and other Church documents. The Church's attitude toward the 
discussed moral issues is negative. However, as it may be inferred on the basis 
of sociological researches, there are believers who do not share that opinion. 
                                                          
1 The reason for appealing was a constitutional right to live of every human being without differen-
tiating and defining human being. 
2 A wide presentation of both sides' argumentation in a public sphere show J. Heinen and A. 
Matuchniak-Krasuska in their publication Aborcja w Polsce. Kwadratura koła. Also published in 
French. 
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As the research conducted in 1999 by the Public Opinion Research Centre 
in Poland (CBOS) show: 86% of all Poles are for the legalisation of abortion 
when the mother's life is in danger, 61% of those who participate in religious 
practices more than once a week are of the same opinion. 77% of all Poles on 
question: “What do you think, should terminating pregnancy be allowed by 
law?” answered “Yes” when the mother's health is threatened (46% of practis-
ing religious Poles), 72% are for abortion when the child is a result of a crime 
(30% of practising religious Poles), 62% when the child will be handicapped 
(36% of practising religious Poles), 38% when the mother is in a difficult eco-
nomic situation (19% of practising religious Poles) and 27% when the mother 
simply doesn't want the child (7% of practising religious Poles) (CBOS, 1999). 
As we see, the difference between the practising religious Poles and non-
practising Poles is clear but the attitude of some part of religious people, in-
cluding those attending church more than once a week, differs from the official 
moral teachings of the Church. In fact, 34% of people attending more than once 
a week have a restrictive attitude toward abortion (do not agree with abortion in 
any situation) and 19% of this group agree with abortion for economic reasons 
and when the woman doesn't want the child. The approval of abortion is more 
frequent when people attend once a week – from 85% when the mother's life is 
in danger to 20% when the mother simply doesn't want the baby. The numbers 
are significant when we consider the Church's attitude toward the issue. 
According to Libiszowska-Żółtkowska's research, over 4% of Polish 
intellectuals declaring themselves as ‘strongly believing’ and over 22% of those 
declaring themselves as ‘believing’ have a positive attitude toward abortion in 
situations of economic difficulty (Libiszowska-Żółtkowska, 2000:172). 42.5% 
of ‘strongly believing’ and over 11% of ‘believing’ are completely against 
abortion (in every case). Those people do not find any reason justifying 
abortion. Over 36% of ‘strongly believing’ and 66% of ‘believing’ intellectuals 
accept abortion for the same reasons as are allowed in Polish law. 
Research conducted in 1999 on Polish physicians shows that 69% of them 
have a positive attitude toward abortion in cases where the mother's life is 
threatened. 75% approve of abortion when a child has a genetic defect. Over 16% 
accept abortion for economic reasons (Grabski, 2000). Over 38% of all studied 
physicians consider abortion in general to be an ethical practice and 58% consider 
it to be an unethical practice. According to the results, some doctors accept 
abortion at the same time as considering it to be unethical. All research conducted 
in Poland shows that Poles' attitude toward abortion is more compatible with the 
Polish state’s law than with the moral teaching of the Roman Catholic Church. 
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According to my research, which was conducted among Polish physicians 
in 2001, negative attitudes toward abortion in all cases occur among physicians 
declaring themselves as ‘strongly believing’ or ‘believing.’ 7 out of 11 physi-
cians who were against abortion in all cases while answering to question: 
“Please tell what do you think; should woman have an opportunity of 
terminating pregnancy because of following reasons?” were ‘strongly 
believing’ and the remaining 4 were ‘believing.’ On this basis, we may infer 
that the negative attitude toward abortion has its main source in religiosity. 
However, not every physician from these two groups of ‘strongly believing’ 
and ‘believing’ was of the same opinion. The majority of ‘believing’ approve of 
abortion for medical, eugenic and legal reasons. The most important argument 
against abortion in other cases and alternative to it, for these interviewees, is the 
use of contraceptive devices. For example, a 46-year-old anaesthetist says: 
“Nowadays, the alternative for abortion is contraception.” (10)3. Those physi-
cians do not take into consideration the Church's standpoint in this matter and 
they are not influenced by it in making their moral decisions and choices. 
Another moral issue and the attitudes of Polish people toward it, considered 
in this paper, is euthanasia. From recently conducted research we know that 49% 
of Poles are for the legalisation of shortening a terminally ill patient's life when he 
or she requires it. 37% are against and 12% do not have any opinion on this 
matter (CBOS, 2001). Since 1988, the attitude toward euthanasia has been 
changing. In 1988, 30% had a positive and 47% had a negative attitude towards 
euthanasia. In 1999, 40% had a positive and 44% had a negative attitude toward 
euthanasia. According to these results, approval of euthanasia has increased since 
1988. When the word “euthanasia” is used in the question, the results are differ-
ent. 37% of all interviewed are definitely for and 38% are against euthanasia. The 
remainder are ambivalent toward this issue. Remembering that over 96% of Poles 
declare themselves to be believing Roman Catholics, the result of only 38% 
against euthanasia is very interesting (CBOS, 2001). 
Research conducted by Libiszowska-Żółtkowska (2000:188) showed that 
over 22% of Polish intellectuals are for euthanasia and 60% against this practice. 
According to the results of this research, negative attitude and religiosity are 
directly proportional. Nonetheless, over 17% of those declaring themselves as 
‘believing’ and ‘strongly believing’ have a positive attitude towards euthanasia. 
                                                          
3 In brackets after quotation from an interview I put a consecutive number of the interview and the 
interviewee's specialisation. 
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My interviews with physicians conducted included many open-ended 
questions that enabled a thorough analysis of their argumentation and reasons 
for and against euthanasia. The most frequent argument against euthanasia used 
by physicians was of an ethical but lay character. Here are some illustrating 
statements: ‘Because it's tantamount to homicide.’ (39, geriatrician), ‘One 
simply can't cause someone else's death.’ (32, anaesthetic) and ‘it's immoral’ 
(57, ophthalmologist working in hospice). In this category of arguments, 
interviewees very often compared euthanasia to homicide, talked about the 
legal consequences of this practice and considered it as immoral, but without 
referring to God, religion or the sacred character of life. There are 16 
statements classified in this category. 
The next largest category of arguments against euthanasia numbers 11 
statements. In this category, physicians talked about their job and duties as 
medical doctors. They also talked about medical ethics. Here are two examples: 
‘a physician cures not kills’ (13, general practice) and ‘it's against the rules of 
medical ethics’ (58, surgeon). 
The third largest category (seven interviews) includes arguments of a 
religious character. Interviewees whose arguments were classified in this 
category talked about God and religion. Here are some statements exemplifying 
this category: ‘I am not the Lord of life and death.’ (53, paediatrician), ‘I'm not 
God to decide whether somebody is to live or not.’ (47, general practice), ‘I 
don't approve of euthanasia for religious reasons. I believe that the only life-
giver is God and we cannot decide about somebody else's life.’ (43, 
dermatologist working in a hospice). 
There were also three opinions concerning physician's responsibility and 
conscience and three arguments that death should come in a natural way. The 
rest of the arguments weren't classified in any particular category. As we see, 
the arguments of strictly religious character are not the most common ones. 
Interviewed physicians tend to use ethical argumentation, but more that of a lay 
character than of a religious character. 
As these results show, the connection of religion and morality is no longer 
as clear and obvious as it once was. Poles' morality depends on their individual 
choice or state law more than on the moral teaching of the Roman Catholic 
Church. The contemporary moral order has more of a lay character than a 
religious character. The process of separating morality and religiosity can be 
observed recently. Today, moral issues are matters of independent and 
individual choice and not only thoughtless obedience to moral rules taught by 
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the Church. Believers seem to select only some of the values required by their 
religion, the ones that suit them. They tend to obey state law rather than sacred 
law – as we can see in their attitude towards abortion. I consider the religiosity 
of some part of Polish believers to be declarative and theoretical rather than 
‘real’, practical and having an influence on their everyday life. 
4. Concluding comments 
Secularisation theory may be used to interpret the empirical data presented 
above. The moral choices of Poles, even those who are believers, are no longer 
solely dependent on the Church's teaching but rely mostly on their own, indivi-
dual choice. Morality, like many other spheres of human existence, is in the 
process of separation from religion. It has not yet reached its conclusion as in 
other spheres (law, education, science, politics) but the process can already be 
easily observed. We can search for the origins of obeying state law rather than 
religious law in the characteristic of modern society called ‘consumer society.’ 
It describes a society whose characteristic feature is impatience (Bauman, 
2000) and expects almost immediate results for all its activities. Today, people 
do not think of the future consequences of what they do and in what way. 
Bauman claims that for post-modern man or woman there is no past and no 
future time; only the current moment is valuable and important. Contemporary 
life strategy is based on sudden, current needs and constant independent 
choices without perspective thinking (Bauman, 2000:142). The religious 
consequences of people’s moral choices are mainly very distant – of an escha-
tological character – and that may be the reason for a 'consumer' not obeying 
religious morals. The lay costs and benefits of people's activity are less distant 
and more present than a promised hell or heaven. That may be one of the 
reasons for today's morality. However, in my opinion, this thesis requires more 
empirical confirmation. What is more, according to Bauman, people these days 
don't make their choices in the name of abstract values, which are considered to 
be devalued (2000:141). Instead of this, what people take into consideration 
while making their decisions are the present costs and benefits. That also may 
be one of the reasons for such a division between faith and morality. 
Another possible explanation for the state of relations between morality 
and religiosity in contemporary society is also connected with the processes 
taking place in it – pluralisation and individualisation. Every moral issue, value 
and rule is now a matter of the individual's choice and the Church's moral 
teaching is only one of many directions that people can follow in their lives. 
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According to Borowik (1997:248), selectivity in accepting some of the moral 
norms taught by the Church, together with similar selectivity in choosing 
certain dogmas, is a feature of the privatisation of religion. The results of 
research show that Poles frequently express their need for individual choice, 
independent of the Church's expectations, not only in moral matters but also in 
strictly religious ones (Borowik, 1997:251). At the same time, the religious 
function of legitimisation of the world order, including the moral order, has 
been reduced. Instead there are other, lay systems fulfilling this function. 
As some other sociologists have claimed (Mariański, 1999:376), today in 
Poland we are dealing more with 'the process of the disintegration of moral 
values (moral crisis) than with a transformation of values'. According to my 
research, when considering physicians' arguments against euthanasia, we 
cannot say that there are no values at all or even that they are weakened. In my 
opinion, only the character and origins of the values have migrated into non-
religious realms. Compared with other professional groups, physicians very 
often refer to the rules of some kind of ethic (medical or other). At the same 
time, they do not refer to the moral norms taught by the Church. 
To conclude, I would claim that the issues of abortion and euthanasia and 
Poles' attitudes toward them are good examples of a social, including moral, 
transformation. The relations between religiosity and morality should be 
considered in the wider context of social change, modernisation with all the 
accompanying processes. However, the considered problem is multidimen-
sional and needs further empirical and theoretical study. What is more, the 
relations between morality and religiosity can be explained with many more 
general processes accompanying the modernisation of contemporary society, 
and it seems that these explanations do not exclude but complement each other. 
That is why this matter needs some more general, theoretical studies based on 
sociological research. By understanding the morality of modern society and its 
relations to religiosity, we understand a part of social existence. Through this 
example, we can also observe the transformation of the role of religion in 
contemporary society as a whole. 
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Barbara Thériault 
‘LE ROUGE ET LE NOIR’. 
THE GERMAN CHURCHES AFTER RADICAL 
POLITICAL CHANGE1 
1. Introduction 
The Protestant and Catholic churches were the only organisations in East 
Germany to retain strong ties and organisational structures with their West 
German counterparts. As such, they were both expected to undergo smooth and 
rapid institutional consolidation. Yet, the churches experienced difficulties at 
the beginning of the 1990s. Protestants and Catholics in the former GDR, 
people who are often remembered for their opposition to the communist regime 
and the role they played in harbouring the ‘Wende’ (the peaceful revolution of 
1989) were, in the context of unified Germany, critical of western church 
practices. This attitude was also more generally matched with criticism towards 
the market economy and military intervention abroad. Somewhat ironically, 
some Christians have become the defenders of some of the ideas borne by the 
former socialist party they once opposed to. This is the starting point of this 
paper in which we examine the rhetoric and strategies religious actors adopted 
in the re-establishment of the churches’ unity and, more broadly, German 
unification. Drawing on conceptual tools such as guiding metaphors and their 
related organizing principles, special attention is paid to the de defenders of 
East German guiding metaphors and what they reckon to be the ‘most modern 
definition of the church and its public role.’ We argue that their attitudes in the 
new Germany relate to their position in the ‘religious field’ after the implosion 
of state socialism and German unification. 
                                                          
1 The material used in this chapter is largely based on an article published in European Societies in 
2003 (volume 5, number 3) as well as a forthcoming book ‘Conservative Revolutionaries': 
Protestant and Catholic Churches in Germany after Radical Political Change in the 1990s (New 
York & Oxford: Berghahn Books). 
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This analysis is an attempt to explore the transformation of the churches’ 
guiding metaphors or conceptions of their public role after the collapse of the 
institutional order and ‘the religious work carried out by specialist agents’ 
(Bourdieu, 1987:119) in bringing them about. The framework developed by 
Albert O. Hirschman in The Rhetoric of Reaction (1991) enables us to delineate 
and compare the patterns of argumentation and the various strategies advanced 
by the advocates of East German conceptions and their opponents. Through the 
analysis of the debates that accompanied the re-establishment of the churches’ 
unity, we attempt to show how religious entrepreneurs manipulated definitions 
to either change or maintain the church’s definition of its public role, what we 
refer to as the ‘politics of institutionalisation.’2 As the genesis of the guiding 
metaphors is to be found in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), let us 
briefly outline the institutional order of the former GDR and the emergence and 
consolidation of church metaphors and their related principles. Once these are 
identified, it should be possible to follow their evolution after the collapse of 
the socialist state. 
2. The genesis of church guiding metaphors in the GDR… 
The GDR can be characterized by the fusion of all institutions and 
organisations, monopolisation of decisions and resources achieved through the 
Socialist Unity Party’s (SED) and legitimated by a particular philosophy of 
history, Marxism-Leninism (Arnason, 2000:72). This endeavour was not 
complete though, religion – and with it, its carriers – being an exception. The 
regime could in theory attempt neither to influence nor to incorporate their 
substance since it rejected religion (Lepsius, 1994:19). However, the SED 
attempted to curtail the churches’ and religion’s influence through political 
repression, bureaucratic harassment, constant monitoring as well as through the 
discrimination against Christians and the superposition of church practices with 
socialist rites.3 The churches’ presence in public organisations was notably 
                                                          
2 We have reviewed the main church publications in which the debate took place: Evangelische 
Kommentare, Lutherische Monatshefte, Kirche im Sozialismus, Herder-Korrespondenz; ost-west 
Informationsdienst; the publications of the churches and their welfare agencies among which 
Diakonie, Diakonie Jahrbuch, Caritas, Caritas Jahrbuch; theological journals such as Evangeli-
sche Theologie, Zeichen der Zeit; journals related to specific issues such as Christenlehre, Katholi-
sche Blätter. The epd-Dokumentation, where newspaper articles related to churches are reproduced, 
also proved to be a reliable source of information. 
3 The introduction of a civil youth consecration ceremony (Jugendweihe) coincides with member-
ship decline and was certainly instrumental in limiting the churches’ capacity of reproduction and 
influence on large segments of the population (see Pollack, 1994b:276). 
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curtailed and their membership dwindled. The Protestant churches’ membership 
dropped from 81 percent of the population at the outset of the GDR to 25 percent 
at its demise (Pollack, 1994a:373). Catholics, a minority in the eastern territories 
ever since the founding of the first German national state (Langewiesche, 1999: 
304), accounted in the early 1990s for only between four and six percent of the 
population depending on the region (Pilvousek, 1993). These figures contrast 
sharply with church membership in western Germany, which is estimated at some 
80 percent – the percentage of Catholics being slightly higher than that of 
Protestants (Pollack, 1997:395). In spite of lower membership and reduced public 
activities, the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches remained the only 
organisations in the GDR to enjoy any degree of internal autonomy. 
State socialism, conflated with the creation of the GDR in 1949 and the 
membership loss, compelled the churches to take position on their situation and 
role in the new context. They adopted different strategies towards the state as 
reflected in their guiding metaphors and translated into organizing principles. The 
Protestant Church leadership coined the formula of the ‘Church in socialism’, a 
metaphor that simultaneously encompassed the principles of accommodation and 
opposition to the state (Goeckel, 1990:247). In contrast, the hierarchy of the 
Catholic Church stressed the principle of ‘political abstinence’. However, both 
churches increasingly concentrated their activities in the parish. New organisa-
tional forms such as a religious or catechetical instruction, pastoral care of 
military conscripts, family circles, and counselling activities were created. Meta-
phors such as the ‘Minority church’ and the ‘Church in the diaspora’ also came to 
define the Protestant and Catholic Church respectively (Pollack, 1994a:165; 
Pilvousek, 1999). These symbolic representations combined to define religion’s 
public role and departed from the West German model of church-state relations. 
In the West, the Catholic and Protestant churches enjoy a special position: they 
are corporations of public law which give them access to a church tax levied by 
the state4 and public organisations (schools, army, prisons, hospitals, youth and 
counselling centres) as well as giving them the possibility to influence policies. 
3. … and radical political change 
Periods of radical political change – such as the ‘Wende’ – are characterized 
simultaneously by confrontation, polarisation, and reflexivity. Following the 
                                                          
4 This tax is paid by church members and collected by the state tax authorities; it represents about 9 
percent of an employee’s income tax. The Kirchensteuer is the churches’ main source of income. 
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collapse of an institutional order and the emergence of a new one, new 
metaphors ‘filter’ individual conducts: what had once been taken for granted is 
now challenged. As Nedelmann stresses, ‘processes of institutional demise [such 
as the collapse of the GDR] are easily extended to other institutions (and 
persons) which occur as a result of the fall’ (1995:29). Indeed, the collapse of 
the institutional order of the GDR brought down church metaphors. They have 
lost their validity or, in other words, their binding capacity. The legitimacy of a 
motto such as the ‘Church in socialism’ was severely questioned while the 
principle of ‘political abstinence’ became obsolete. If most Christians shared the 
opinion that the churches should strengthen their links with their western 
counterparts, there was no agreement as to the form this rapprochement should 
take. Whereas most Catholics, who had until then played a minor, unobtrusive 
role in the country’s political life, promoted and actually undertook significant 
reforms,5 a considerable number of Protestants seemed to have problems coming 
to terms with the new situation – a phenomenon that has hindered the re-
establishment of the church’s unity and inner consolidation. In this period of 
radical social change, both commentators and actors have often criticized the 
East German Protestant churches for not being prepared for unification. It was 
alleged that they neither had new models for church and society in a future GDR 
nor a unified Germany (see for instance Schröder, 1994:261). 
German unification through 'institutional transfer' (Lehmbruch, 1994), that 
is the extension of the structures of the Federal Republic to the East according 
to Article 23 of the Basic Law and the formal restoration of the Protestant 
federation of churches as well as the re-integration of Catholic dioceses,6 set the 
parameters within which the churches' guiding metaphors underwent a redefi-
nition. In theory, the churches did not have to re-unite, let alone at the speed it 
was carried out. Nevertheless, it was promptly ecxeuted.7 Following German 
unification and the re-establishment of the churches’ unity, debates emerged 
that opposed religious actors on the issue of the church tax, the pastoral care of 
soldiers in the army, religious instruction in state schools, and social welfare 
provisions, in which the religious actors contested the churches’ new public 
                                                          
5 Reforms that have been polemically described as a ‘re-Catholisation’ of East Germany (Neubert 
quoted in Lange, 1996:96). 
6 Another possible alternative, Article 146 of the Basic Law, foresaw the formation of a 
constitutional assembly and the drafting of a new constitution. 
7 An agreement could not be found on the issue of the Protestant Military Chaplaincy Treaty and 
was left to be dealt with at a later stage. 
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role. In spite of the maintained links, the churches in East Germany had devel-
oped new conceptions of their public role. The conflict between religious actors 
is, we argue, a conflict between these conceptions as to their legitimacy and as 
to whether to maintain or to challenge the organizing principles. The Protes-
tants, who had developed stronger institutions in the GDR, were more affected 
than Catholics. This is paradigmatically illustrated in the ‘Berlin Declaration of 
Christians from the two German States’ and in many articles in the press at that 
time. In the document signed by some 600 Protestants from East and West 
Germany on 9 February 1990 as a response to the ‘Loccum Declaration’ 
(BEK/EKD, 1990), a statement issued three weeks earlier by the eastern and 
western church hierarchies with the aim of promoting a speedy political and 
ecclesiastical unification, Protestants criticized the idea of a people’s church 
financed by and dependent on the state; on the contrary, the churches’ frugality, 
their status as a critical and alternative organisation and their commitment to 
peace and a ‘third way’ between capitalism and socialism were strongly 
emphasized. For their part, Catholics issued no counterstatements to the East 
German bishops’ declaration of 20 February 1990 on the societal role of 
Catholics in the new context (reproduced in Lange, Pruß et al., 1993:402-403). 
At first blush, the debates following the collapse of the GDR seem to 
oppose eastern and western actors as well as Protestants and Catholics. 
However, differences within all churches came to the forefront when state 
socialism collapsed. Pluralism and the introduction of the new legal framework 
for German unification also blurred the situation and made it difficult to identify 
‘eastern metaphors.’ In order to circumvent problems entailed by an East/West 
or Protestant/Catholic dualism and the evolution of discussion within the new 
framework, we suggest drawing on Albert O. Hirschman’s analogy (1991) and 
distinguishing the ‘defenders of the status quo’ from the ‘proponents of reform’.8 
From this viewpoint, the East German metaphors correspond to what religious 
actors considered worth maintaining for the future, what they routinely called 
the ‘positive experiences of the GDR and the “Wende”’ or, in the context of this 
study, the status quo, while reform corresponds to a departure from the status 
quo. The strategies of the actors are characterized by a conception of the church 
                                                          
8 In his writings on conservative politics, Hirschman uses the terms ‘reactionary’ and ‘progressive.’ 
His distinction is a reminder of Weber’s analogy between priests and prophets. According to 
Weber, the priests are the guardians of an institutionalised order and its principles, the prophets 
those without – or outside the sphere of – authority. The prophets question and criticize the 
application of the principles safeguarded by the priests. In this way, they can eventually become 
carriers of innovation (Weber, 1988 [1920]:268). 
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and specific patterns of rhetoric. They relate, to paraphrase Bourdieu, to the 
actors’ position in a field after radical political change.9 In the following, we will 
review the debates that followed the churches’ unification over the 1990s. The 
patterns of argumentation and the various strategies advanced by the advocates 
of the status quo and their opponents are delineated and compared in an attempt 
to reconstruct the ‘politics of institutionalisation,’ that is the conscious attempt at 
institutionalising and deinstitutionalising the guiding metaphor and their 
principles to a certain degree and direction (Lepsius, 1995:400). In so doing, the 
transformation of churches’ guiding metaphors and their organizing principles in 
the new context will become manifest. 
3.1. The Rhetoric of Institutionalisation and Deinstitutionalisation 
In his book, The Rhetoric of Reaction, Albert O. Hirschman (1991) 
provides a powerful instrument to analyse the rhetoric of Protestants and 
Catholics. Based on a study of conservatism, Hirschman shows that discourse is 
not shaped by ‘conservative personalities’ but by what he calls the ‘imperatives 
of the arguments.’10 He distinguishes three patterns of argument that are 
typically invoked by reactionaries seeking to maintain the status quo: jeopardy, 
perversity, and futility. The arguments can be used ‘by any group that opposes 
or criticizes new policy proposals or newly enacted policies’ (1991:7) and can 
be embraced by actors regardless of their actual validity or efficiency.11 These 
patterns of argumentation are matched with another triad characteristic of the 
advocates of reform: the synergy illusion, the imminent-danger thesis, and, 
once again, the futility argument. These pairs of arguments, he writes, ‘have 
considerable intrinsic appeal because they hitch onto powerful myths ... and 
influential interpretative formulas’ (Hirschman, 1991:166). Furthermore, they 
draw on scientific authority as the patterns of the arguments are invoked by 
actors and social commentators in a double hermeneutics (Giddens, 1984:284) 
that informs the ongoing discussion. This is particularly true if they are 
simultaneously actors and commentators, as is often the case for theologians. 
                                                          
9 Bourdieu defines a field as ‘a system of objective relations between social positions and a place of 
competition for the specific prize of monopoly as [religious] authority defined both as [religious] 
ability and social power’ (1981:270). 
10 In a similar way, Bourdieu (1981:270) evokes necessary strategies related to the actors’ 
structured interests and their position in a ‘field’. 
11 From this viewpoint, self-proclaimed ‘progressives,’ the leadership of the SED for instance, can 
also be described as conservatives. Conversely, Giddens (1996 [1994]) has qualified contemporary 
conservative parties as the sole carriers of a radical project. 
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The three pairs of arguments described by Hirschman are materialized 
through interactions: they respond to each other. The first argument identified by 
defenders of the status quo, jeopardy, states that the proposed reform threatens 
older reforms that have proven their worth. Reactionaries therefore argue that 
there is no need for quick change. They may also state that no one knows what 
the new reform will bring. Jeopardy’s counter-argument, the synergy illusion, 
advocates that new and old reforms will mutually reinforce each other 
(Hirschman, 1991:167). The second argument, the perversity thesis, claims that 
reform will not bring the intended effect, but its exact opposite. The attitude is 
concisely epitomized in the formula ‘ceci tuera cela’ or the ‘zero-sum game’ and 
the belief that ‘everything backfires.’ Advocates of the antithesis of perversity, 
the imminent-danger thesis, point to the potential dangers of inaction. The third 
line of argument, futility, is invoked by advocates of both status quo and reform. 
It asserts that the status quo-or reform depending on the point of view – is bound 
to be ineffective in the end for it runs counter to the laws of motion-or inertia 
(Hirschman, 1991:155). The typology allows for the reconstruction of debates 
from an East German point of view to see which organizing principles become 
manifest and are advocated, while pointing to the differences between Catholic 
and Protestant patterns of argumentation. Further, it prevents the injection of the 
narration with a value judgment. Although the rhetoric is contextual and materi-
alized through interaction, we shall, for clarity’s sake, present the arguments of 
the status quo, followed by those of reform, in the following account. 
 
Table 1: The Rhetoric of the Advocates of the Status Quo and Reform 
Reaction Change 
Jeopardy thesis Synergy illusion 
The new reform will jeopardize the older one. The new and the old reforms will mutually 
reinforce each other. 
Perversity thesis Immanent-danger thesis 
The contemplated action will bring disastrous 
consequences. 
Not to take the contemplated action will bring 
disastrous consequences. 
Futility thesis Futility thesis 
The contemplated action attempts to change 
permanent structural characteristics (laws) of the 
social order; it is therefore bound to be totally 
ineffective, futile. 
The contemplated action is backed up by 
powerful historical forces that are already ‘on the 
march’; opposing them would be utterly futile. 
Adapted from Hirschman (1991:167). 
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3.2. The Defenders of East German Status Quo 
Marshalling the arguments of the proponents of the East German status quo 
in the discussions that set religious actors against one another, one cannot fail 
to notice the use of the jeopardy, perversity, and futility theses. Defenders of 
the status quo often argued that the consequences of reform, in this case the 
extension of western institutions to the East, is unacceptable as they may entail 
great loss. They argued that the reforms undertaken in the GDR, above all the 
separation of church and state and the conception of a ‘minority church’ and its 
related principles – the voluntary character of the church’s offers, the critical 
stance of the organisation, and its preference for the poor and the weak – might 
be deinstitutionalised, in other words, jeopardized. They portrayed their 
experience as a milestone in church history, especially within German 
Protestantism.12 Falcke, a prominent Protestant from Thuringia (East), observes 
that the cultural and religious symbiosis between church, society, and the state 
had ended during the GDR (Falcke, 1997:101). In contrast as what they 
referred to as a ‘people’s church,’ the defenders of the status quo pledged for 
voluntary contributions from parishioners as opposed to a state-levied church 
tax; parish religious instruction as opposed to religious education in state 
schools; and pastoral care of military conscripts and soldiers in the parish as 
opposed to ‘military chaplaincy.’13 They advocated that these activities were 
genuinely church activities, should be integrated into local parish life and 
conceived as a service to people, and not as a church privilege. 
In line with the perversity thesis, advocates of the East German metaphors 
pointed to the vicissitudes of the western model of church-state relations. 
Cooperation with the state, they contended, imperilled the credibility that the 
church had gained in opposing the party-state in the GDR and left the impres-
sion that the church had sold out in exchange for privileges (Evangelische 
Kommentare, 1993: 705). For example, defenders of the status quo argued that 
the western model of military chaplaincy represented a threat to the churches’ 
independence and critical stance and even interfered with the biblical message. 
It was believed that the chaplaincy in the army tacitly supports military 
intervention and entails a loss of their position on peace (‘the ethics of peace’), 
                                                          
12 The Protestant Church had until then been a national church very close to the Prussian 
administration. 
13 Under the western Military Chaplaincy Agreement, chaplains have the status of civil servant for 
the duration of their five-year contract, work within the Bundeswehr and depend on the Ministry of 
Defence. 
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an issue particularly close to the hearts of eastern Protestants. To be sure, 
defenders of the East German status quo agreed in principle to the necessity of 
providing spiritual care to the soldiers and the population at large. However, the 
practices established in the GDR, had, their defenders claimed, withstood the 
test of time and were best suited for the secularised situation in the East. 
Given secular modernity, advocates of the status quo contended that it 
would be futile to engage in reform. In the discussion on the introduction of a 
religious instruction in state schools, they preached realism. They repeatedly 
stressed that they were not enough teachers of religion, not enough children to 
be taught to and, for that matter, no interest in religion for justifying the 
introduction of religious instruction in the former territory of the GDR. 
Furthermore, it was argued that the religious instruction as stipulated in the 
Basic Law was bound to be ineffectual as it came too late.14 Indeed, 
secularisation was described as an irreversible phenomenon that the churches 
were impotent to modify – a point also often made in academic discussions on 
the future of religion. Against this backdrop, the defenders of the East German 
status quo championed what they judged to be a modern interpretation of the 
church’s role and a promising, if not inevitable, path for the churches in the 
West as well. 
In contrast to a negative guiding metaphor, the ‘people’s church,’ the 
Protestant proponents of the status quo drew in discussions on the metaphor of 
the ‘Minority church’ while the Catholics emphasized the ‘Church in the 
diaspora.’ The voluntary nature of church activities, their autonomy and critical 
stance in society, as well as the value of the parish as the locus of religious life, 
were presented as ‘positive experience of the GDR and the “Wende”’ and 
important principles to be retained. By defending East German experiences, the 
guardians of the status quo become, in the pan-German context, the challengers 
of the West German system. As such, they are ‘conservative revolutionaries.’ 
The label does not echo some intellectuals of the interwar period;15 instead, it 
                                                          
14 According to Werner Simon, between 13 and 16 percent of the young people in the East are 
members of a Protestant Church while some 4 percent are said to be Catholics (Simon, 1998:563-
564). The number of children taking part in the religious instruction at the beginning of the 1990s 
was estimated at some 20 percent – 2 percent in cities (Ritter, 1992:35). The low number of 
Christian children actually confers strength on the argument. 
15 The expression was used in interwar Weimar Germany to relate to a group of radical, 
antimodernist intellectuals whose number included Martin Heidegger, Ernst Jünger, Carl Schmitt, 
and Hans Freyer (Fraser, 1989:35; Lenk, 1989). Of course, the notion is here conferred on a 
different definition, as it is associated with an attitude to change. 
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points to the religious actors’ attitude to change in a given social space, 
Germany after its unification. This generic category does not correspond to real 
groups; it points to the actors’ structured interests or their position in a 
‘religious field’ in which the defenders of reform hold more power (in terms of 
financial and organisational resources as well as prestige) in the struggle for the 
definition and the shaping of the church’s role. Although the category does not 
correspond to any real groups, ‘conservative revolutionaries’ nonetheless share 
some statistical characteristics such as being predominantly Easterner, 
Protestant, and relating to the Theology of Karl Barth. They are more 
represented among Protestants than Catholics. Nevertheless, in discussions of 
church activity in the new organisational fields, Catholics also stressed the 
positive experiences made in the GDR such as the importance of the parish as 
the locus of religious life, new pastoral concepts and the fusion of pastoral and 
caritative activities. As with the Protestant case, many Catholics were sceptical 
of a church characterized by a wide network of associations and a greater 
public role. 
3.3. The Challengers of the Status Quo 
Unlike exponents of the status quo, proponents of reform were convinced 
of the value and necessity of the western model of partnership with the state as 
in the case of the church tax, the military chaplaincy, the religious instruction in 
schools, and the provision of welfare services funded by the state. Those who 
are often referred to as the ‘liberal Protestants’ and a majority of Catholics 
pleaded for reform. They were for the most part, though not exclusively, West 
Germans and more likely to be numerous among bishops than pastors and 
laymen. They drew alternatively on the imminent-danger thesis, the synergy 
illusion, and the futility argument. German unification, they argued, represented 
the opportunity to undo the acts of an illegitimate regime. From this perspec-
tive, the advocates of reform argued that the provisions of the Basic Law and 
various legal texts of the FRG constituted a solid foundation for their work and 
therefore pleaded for their re-assertion so to catch up to the past. The model of 
the church as practiced in the West, they argued, presented a unique chance for 
mission in East Germany and a challenge for the church readily available to 
everyone as the people’s church, that is a church for the people (Neubert, 
2000b).16 In making their arguments, the liberal Protestants alleged an intimate 
                                                          
16 Similarly, Gerhard Robbers, professor of church law in Treves, claims: ‘Even more than in the 
old Federal Republic, it will be up to the churches in the new federal states to consider and defend 
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connection between democracy, bourgeois liberal values and principles, as 
represented by the Federal Republic and Christianity (Rendtorff, 1990).17 
In accordance with the imminent-danger thesis, the antithesis of perversity 
and the leitmotiv of German unification, reformers – both Catholic and Protestant 
– pointed to the risks of inaction. They stressed that the opportunities available 
after the demise of the GDR were unique and should not be missed. Failing to 
extend and re-assert the principles would bring disastrous consequences for the 
mission of the church, the parity and cooperation of the Catholic and Protestant 
churches as well as the financing of church activities (Binder quoted in Mehrle, 
1998:100). Indeed, they argued that giving up on military chaplaincy, religious 
instruction, and extensive welfare services would sound a death knell for the 
‘people’s church’. In sum, the defenders of reform did not accept the relegation of 
religion and morality to the private sphere (Thierse, 2000). 
Catholics decidedly strove for reform. They exhibited a positive attitude as 
well as faith in the future (see Wanke, 2000:120; Thériault, 1999:6). The 
episcopacy focused on the continuity of action and attitudes (Thériault, 2000:169) 
and typically portrayed the church as a diaspora church with a promising future 
(Wanke, 1992).18 Echoing the late 1980s, Bishop Wanke of Erfurt, notably 
recalls the motto of ‘the chance of the small number’ and stresses the proxy 
role of the small church for the whole community.19 Unlike those who saw the 
positive experiences of the GDR endangered, they advocated in the lines of the 
synergy argument that the new and old reforms would mutually reinforce each 
other. To sceptics, proponents of reform replied with a peremptory question: 
‘can we not trust God?’ (see for instance Steinke, 1992:37; Beck, 1998:71). In 
                                                                                                                                
the church’s legal institutions and regulations not as privileges... but to actively take up possibilities 
offered by this legal system’ (Herder-Korrespondenz, 1991:514). 
17 In contrast, the ‘conservative revolutionaries’ did not confer a normative status on modernity and 
advanced an antimodern or post-modern critique of contemporary society. They maintained that 
there is, to be sure, a connection between the idea of Enlightenment and the Christian message but 
also tensions that are at the core of their critique (see Falcke in Findeis and Pollack, 2000:459-460). 
18 Given the policy of ‘political abstinence’ of the Catholic episcopacy in the GDR, this could be 
seen to symbolize a new ecclesiastic paradigm although, as Richter rightly points out (1989:1240), 
the episcopacy would probably not use this terminology. In the pastoral letter issued after the 
‘Wende,’ the episcopacy stressed continuity. No mention was made to justifying the Catholic 
Church’s past silence nor to acknowledging the role of Protestants in the ‘peaceful revolution.’ The 
letter was received with much disappointment by the Catholics who expected from their bishops a 
clear position on the political and social change. 
19 Similarly, sociologists of religion talk of a ‘vicarious religion’ (see for instance Davie, 2000). 
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this way, advocates of the synergy thesis presented reform as a matter of faith, 
thereby expelling and delegitimizing opposition to reform. 
In making their case, the reformers portrayed the former GDR as a ‘land of 
opportunity.’ From this viewpoint, those socialized under state socialism were 
perceived to be in need of spiritual answers and guidance (Friemel, 1992:31; 
Beck, 1994:87).20 Following this logic, the small number of Christians in East 
Germany was not seen to reflect a rejection of Christianity (Neubert, 2000a; 
Tiefensee, 2000). Because of the secularisation promoted by the party-state, it 
was contended that most East Germans never had a chance to get acquainted with 
Christianity.21 Furthermore, Christians, it was asserted, were an important minor-
ity as ‘carriers of the intellectual and cultural foundation of society’ (Feiereis, 
1997). In promoting the introduction of western-style practices, advocates of 
reform challenged the alleged effects and sources of secularisation and, in this 
way, conferred power on religious actors as well as a public role on religion. 
With political unification, a rhetorical device often expounded by proponents 
of reform was to present the defenders of the status quo with a fait accompli. 
German unification meant the extension of the Basic Law to the East. Reformers 
acknowledged that it would admittedly be desirable to amend the western model 
but that there was no serious alternative to it. With matter-of-factness and realism, 
they enumerated a host of practical problems and technical details in their 
justification of the western status quo: reform would be too difficult to enact and 
entail too much paper work and no one knows what would come out. In addition, 
they asked two decisive questions, which stressed the complexity of the issue at 
hand and the limits of time and resources: how was the East German model to be 
organized? and, especially, how would it be financed?22 
In the course of the ‘politics of institutionalisation’, the defenders of reform 
mainly advanced financial and organisational arguments, but also moral ones. 
They pointed to the contingent nature of the existing institutions and attempted 
                                                          
20 Drawing on Luckmann, Neubert claims that religion does not disappear. Socialism, he maintains, 
can be contemplated as a religious phenomenon (2000a:379). 
21 Conversely, reformers criticized some church officials for having accepted and even promoted 
secularisation. 
22 Confronted with the ‘dictate of reason’ and the argument that things are too complicated to be 
altered, Noack, bishop in Magdeburg (East), retorted: ‘the popular appeal to simplicity and clarity 
can, in view of the complicated issue at stake, take on demagogical traits’ (1997:160). The bishop 
also stressed: ‘It also numbs theological discussion when everything is immediately to be converted 
into practical policy. Questions related to God’s commandments and obedience are quickly 
relegated to secondary importance’ (Noack, 1997:150). 
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to delegitimize them by recalling their origins in the GDR, occasionally 
levelling personal attacks against defenders of the status quo. In this respect, 
reformers often called those labelled here as ‘conservative revolutionaries’ 
either naïve or self-righteous. They argued that the latter advanced an anti-
modern critique that failed to distinguish between an authoritarian regime, such 
as the GDR, and a democratic and liberal one, such as the FRG.23 By way of 
example, reformers argued that the ethics of peace and the watchdog role or 
‘guardian office’ developed by Protestants in the GDR were no longer relevant 
in a democratic state (Huber, 1998:305). They criticized their opponents for 
downplaying the negative components of authoritarianism or totalitarianism.24 
They condemned what they saw as the glorifying the GDR and the continuation 
of the deeds of an illegitimate state.25 In this way, the defenders of the East 
German status quo were seen as to unjustifiably take issue with the foundations 
of modernity and liberal principles. 
The origins and the genuine historical character of the guiding metaphors 
put forward by the defenders of the East German status quo were repeatedly 
called into question by their challengers. Reformers argued that if church 
officials had been given a choice they might have accepted a church tax levied 
by the state, religious instruction in schools, etc. In making their case, the 
reformers claimed that certain ‘prerogatives,’ such as the financing of social 
welfare organisations, the retention of parochial structures and the large 
administrative apparatus were not seriously called in question and that religious 
practice was low. Reforms undertaken in the GDR, it was contended, had been 
forced by the party-state. They reformers further argued that some defenders of 
the East German status quo had also with cooperated the state-with an 
illegitimate state – and had had implication with the stasi, the secret police. 
Neubert (1993) asserted that their self-righteous tone was unjustified for the 
                                                          
23 Such arguments relativized the importance of the opposition movement that developed around the 
Protestant Church in the GDR. For instance, Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, a liberal theologian from the 
old Federal Republic, argues that most grassroots groups did not advance any ‘real’ fundamental 
critique from the standpoint of human rights, but instead sought to reform socialism (Graf, 1996). 
24 Graf comments: ‘on a theological level, they neutralize the concept in a way that totalitarianism 
can become a quality both of the ruling system of the GDR and the society of the Federal Republic. 
The “open totalitarianism” of the GDR corresponds to an “insidious totalitarianism” in the FRG’ 
(1990:736). For a recent example of such arguments, see also the declaration issued by former East 
German activists on 13 December 2001 ‘Wir haben es satt’. 
25 This line of arguments was repeatedly invoked in the discussion on LER (Lebensgestaltung, 
Ethik, Religion), a subject introduced by the eastern Land of Brandenburg as an alternative to the 
western-style religious education in public schools. 
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eastern churches were, in fact, ‘people’s churches,’ only with less members 
(see also Pollack 2000:26). The analysis of the debates thus shows us, as 
Rehberg points out, ‘that well-founded moral and theoretical dualisms (such as 
enforcement and agreement) do not take us that far empirically, as coercion 
may mobilize and lead to agreement and agreements are often based on 
obligation’ (1994:51). 
Although the defenders of the West German system can be seen, from the 
eastern point of view, as reactionaries, the label ‘conservative revolutionaries’ 
remains useful – if only as an ‘ideal type’ – to characterize the metaphors and 
strategies of the defenders of the ‘East German model.’ Indeed, the advocates 
of the East German status quo rejected the point of view advocated by the 
reformers and propounded a conception of religion and society that did not 
confer a normative status on modernity (understood as a rational project with 
liberal values and democracy at its core). When the principles of the West 
German system were transferred or reiterated to the territory of the new 
Republic, the defenders of the East German status quo challenged them and 
became ‘outsiders’ within the churches. This position conferred on them a 
critical character and committed them to a particular type of strategies. Indeed, 
the moral utopianism that characterized the ‘conservative revolutionaries’ after 
radical political change stands in sharp contrast with the apparent pragmatism 
of reformers. 
4. Lessons from the ‘politics of institutionalisation’ 
A glimpse at the debates within the churches suffices to affirm that the 
protagonists opposed conflicting patterns of rhetoric related to readings of the 
new Germany informed by a conception of modern secularity and modernisation 
that pertains to the churches’ conception of their role as minority organisations 
and their determination – or indeed unwillingness – to cooperate with authorities 
in unified Germany. Marshalling the arguments of the defenders of the East 
German status quo after radical political change, we notice that guiding meta-
phors and principles were formulated in the new context against the background 
of a negative guiding metaphor: the much criticized ‘people’s church,’ a church 
model deemed outdated. They were developed, to paraphrase Carl Schmitt (1963 
[1932]), in a ‘friend-enemy’ relationship. The advocates of the East German 
status quo promoted the critical role and independence of the church, the prefer-
ence for the voiceless, the voluntariness, and the central role of the parish 
community. In trying to legitimate the principles, religious entrepreneurs 
attempted, in their interactions, to manipulate definitions and make use of 
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available standards of virtue: they conferred moral value onto their models and 
pointed out the instrumental character of competing ones (1995:24). 
Institutionalising is, as in the words of Selznic, to ‘infuse with value’ (quoted in 
Scott, 1987:494). As such, the re-establishment of the churches’ unity and, by 
extension, German unification can be depicted as processes of ‘normative 
integration’ (Thumfart, 2001). 
 
Table 2: Organizing Principles, Strategies, and Arguments of the Proponents 
and the Challengers of the Status Quo 
 Status Quo 
‘Minority church’ 
Reform 
‘People’s church’ 
Organizing 
Principles 
Central role of the community 
Preference for the voiceless (‘for others’) 
Critical role (independence) 
Voluntariness (negative right) 
Service (Dienst) 
Society as a whole 
Partnership with state (Gestaltung) 
For all (positive right) 
Strategies 
Moral value 
Defamation 
(Opportunism) 
Instrumental value 
Defamation 
(No believe in God/democracy) 
Rhetoric 
Jeopardy 
Perversity 
Futility 
Synergy 
Imminent-danger 
Futility 
 
5. Conclusion 
As the study of the inner church debates, one important aspect of the 
transformation process taking place within the Protestant and Catholic 
churches, allowed for a description of the dynamic of the churches’ guiding 
metaphors as well as the strategies and patterns of rhetoric of their guardians 
after radical political change. We have shown that the search for religious 
authority in the 1990s was signposted by the dramatic fate of the GDR and 
German unification through the transfer of institutions. Because the West 
German institutions were reiterated and transferred to the East, most of 
demands of the proponents of the East German status quo were not materialized 
into practice. In fact, the defenders of the East German status quo became the 
underdog. But, as institutions need acknowledgement to become binding and 
some principles are still contested in spite of sanctions that were taken to 
discipline critics, the defenders of the East German status quo were also 
successful in institutionalising some principles that were most present in the 
GDR. Some adjustments were thus made to the military chaplaincy in the East 
and a new form of interconfessional instruction was established in the eastern 
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state of Brandenburg (Mehrle, 1998). Furthermore, the positions and strategies 
of the advocates of the eastern status quo have conferred them with a critical 
force in the new Germany. They have so challenged the legitimacy of the 
dominant model of church and society. In the context of ‘actually existing 
capitalism,’ those Christians who had voiced criticism regarding the socialist 
regime and had appeared to play an important role in the remarkable events of 
1989 opposed western church practices, but also military intervention abroad 
and some economic policies, while favoring political practices developed in the 
GDR and during the ‘Wende.’ This stance unwittingly makes them, it might be 
argued, the defenders of the ideas and practices borne by the former socialist 
party they once opposed and helped to unsettle. 
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Marjan Smrke 
RELIGIOUS FORMS OF SOCIAL MIMICRY 
IN A SOCIETY IN TRANSITION1 
1. Introduction 
My contemplation of religious forms of social – that is to say human – 
mimicry began as an anecdote: as a sociologist predominantly engaged in 
studies of religion, I regularly read Družina, Slovenia’s main Catholic weekly. 
In an editorial some three years ago I came across the supposition that “the 
position of the Church in Slovenia has become even worse over the last ten 
years”. Nothing new, I thought, just an old Church mantra, which was regularly 
iterated even during the era of Catholic Austro-Hungary. It is, supposedly, 
always worse than before. That same day, during a stroll outdoors, I noticed a 
cobweb through which I could see the village church. There was no spider on 
the web, just something as grey as the cobweb itself, most probably the remains 
of a fly. That very instant a fly was caught in the web. “The remains of a fly” 
burst into life and became a spider, quickly wrapping its prey into a cocoon. A 
thought crossed my mind. Were the lamentations of some of the representatives 
of the Catholic Church in Slovenia merely a mimic strategy aimed at capturing 
a desired prey? – Namely: holding a privileged position in society. 
During my short stay in London last September I read in The Guardian (6th 
September) an article entitled Pop and new age beliefs “have killed 
Christianity” (Finn, 2001). The author, Gary Finn, provided commentary on a 
statement by the Metropolitan Archbishop of Westminster, Cardinal Murphy-
O'Connor, claiming that Christianity in Great Britain has died out. In another 
article – Christianity faces day of judgement – published the next day, Martin 
Wainwright wittily pointed out that such whining has a long tradition 
(Wainwright, 2001). That very same day it was announced that Tony Blair had 
                                                          
1 This article is dedicated to dog Puda, who is herself extraordinarily resemblant of a footnote. 
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decided to increase the state’s contribution to religious schools. It seems that a 
similar pattern emerges in both cases: playing (simulating) the role of the loser 
in order to attain a certain goal more easily. 
The question remains: Does the sociology of religion detect these and 
similar such occurrences adequately? Would the term religious mimicry be 
applicable here? And are there many such instances of this trait in other former 
socialist states of Central and Eastern Europe? 
2. Mimicry in science 
The notion of mimicry was first established in zoology. In 1862 the English 
naturalist Henry Walter Bates (1825-1892) published the results of his 
observations on the butterflies of the Amazon forests: some palatable butterflies 
were strikingly similar to unrelated species of unpalatable butterflies. Through 
imitating an unpalatable species (the model) a more palatable species (the 
mimic) gained protection from predators (the operators). In the light of 
Darwinian theory, which had been postulated a mere three years earlier, Bates 
explained this ability as a consequence of evolution through natural selection. 
Bates’ observations on mimicry did indeed provide the strongest of arguments 
in support of Darwin (Owen, 1980:115). Furthermore, a special type of 
mimicry – Batesian – was named after him. Batesian mimicry is a form of 
biological resemblance in which a noxious, or dangerous, organism (the 
model), equipped with a warning colouration, is mimicked by a harmless 
organism (the mimic). Another form of mimicry was named after the German 
zoologist Fritz Müller in 1878. In Müllerian mimicry two or more unrelated 
noxious, or dangerous, organisms exhibit closely similar warning systems, such 
as the same pattern of bright colours. The operator, which has learned from 
experience that one of the organisms is noxious, will also avoid the other 
organism even though it is a different species. Both organisms thus benefit 
from their resemblance. 
The British zoologist Denis Owen broadly defines (zoological) mimicry as 
“a process in which one animal (called the operator) is unable to distinguish a 
second organism (the mimic) from either another organism or from part of the 
physical environment (the models); the consequence of which is to increase the 
chances of survival of the mimic” (Owen, 1980:115-116). 
In recent decades the notion of mimicry has also been used in some other 
biological disciplines, such as molecular biology (molecular mimicry), botany 
(plant mimicry) and ethology (from entomology to primatology). While the 
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first scientists who observed mimicry wrote mostly on mimicry between 
species (interspecific mimicry), it is now common to write on mimicry within 
individual species as well (automimicry or intraspecific mimicry). The 
ethologist Wolfgang Wickler writes: “Mimicry means deception, and deception 
is of common occurrence in all kinds of communication between organisms, 
whether they belong to different species or to one and the same species 
(intraspecific mimicry)” (Wickler, 1965). While the initial observations on 
mimicry were generally ones of protective mimicry, at a later stage various 
kinds of aggressive mimicry were also detected. Aggressive mimicry is defined 
as a resemblance of a predator (or parasite) to a harmless animal (in order) to 
facilitate approach to the prey (or host). 
The notion of mimicry is only seldom used in the social sciences – mostly 
in (social) anthropology. Only exceptionally can it be encountered – according 
to my own examination of literature and glossaries of terminology – in 
psychology and sociology. Psychology widely uses the notion of imitation, but 
generally fails to identify mimicry as a specific kind of imitation. In sociology, 
mimetic behaviour is only partially and unsatisfactorily covered by 
conformism. Oxford sociologists Diego Gambetta and Michael Bacharach 
(Gambetta, 2002) together with the Ukrainian scientist Alla Lobanova 
(Lobanova, 1999) are among the few who have researched mimicry. As far as I 
am able to establish, there is as yet no extensive example of mimicry in the 
sociology of religion2. Some interesting discourses are to be found in the field 
of cybernetics; sociobiologist Richard Dawkins (The Selfish Gene, 1976) has 
also written on this issue.3 
In anthropology too, mimicry has no clearly defined meaning. Desmond 
Morris uses the term dominance mimicry to indicate the imitation of the status 
symbols of social domination in order to attain the impression of dominance 
(Morris, 1994:105). Edward Hagen investigates exploitive mimicry as 
                                                          
2 Stark and Bainbridge include the notion of deception as a special form of intersection strategy in 
their splendid theory of religion; however; they do not provide any analysis of it (Stark and 
Bainbridge, 1989:173). Rene Girard, the philosopher and anthropologist of religion, uses the notion 
of mimicry as one of the central notions of his work; however, it does not apply to the forms of 
behaviour which are associated within the terms of this article. 
3 It seems that a number of artists have devoted more time and energy on this sociological topic 
than the sociologists themselves. The best such example might well be Woody Allen's 1983 film 
Zelig. The main character, Leonard Zelig, is a human chameleon, who – physically and indeed in 
his entirety – adapts to any given social environment. When amongst physicians, he becomes a 
physician; when amongst Hasidic Jews, his beard grows – instantly. Zelig’s mimicry results from 
an exposure to strong social pressure during his childhood. 
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“deceptive strategies designed to extract social benefits from others” (Hagen, 
1995). The Slovene anthropologist Stane Južnič perceives the question of social 
mimicry in the area of man’s self-reflection, and about replacing the original 
with the acted. This is demonstrated mostly as an ability to simulate and 
dissimulate. Južnič believes that such behavioural patterns or strategies occur 
not only in individuals but also in groups and communities (Južnič, 1987:22, 
1993:110). Following their goals, various social players simulate – feign, 
pretend to be something they are not; or dissimulate – act that they are not 
something which they are (or lack something which they have). In Južnič’s 
opinion politics is a field of mimic behaviour, and this is best exhibited in so-
called chameleon-like changes – the adaptation of one’s own particular political 
colour to that of the environment. 
3. Social or human mimicry 
Human mimicry – that is to say social mimicry – is here defined as those 
activities performed by an individual or various social groups (all the way up to 
the national or civilisational level) which aim – by way of simulation or 
dissimulation – to increase the possibility of success (or reduce the possibility 
of a failure) in a given social environment. In order to deceive the other player, 
the mimic imitates a certain (social or natural) model.4 This activity is not 
necessarily a conscious one. 
In comparison with mimicry in other species, certain peculiarities of human 
mimicry should be noted: animal mimicry is limited mostly (but not 
exclusively) to the field of genetics, while human mimicry is limited mostly 
(but not exclusively) to civilisation and culture. As Richard Dawkins has 
suggested: human mimicry is about memes. The primary instruments of 
expression of mimicry are “standpoints”, “convictions”, “habits”, feelings... 
and not the characteristics which are directly conditioned by genetics. An 
animal cannot change its genetically conditioned mimetic signals and 
strategies, while man can.5 Of importance here is man’s ability to anticipate 
                                                          
4 In my opinion mimicry is mimicry even if it is not successful. In this regard Owen’s cited 
definition is debatable. 
5 To illustrate the difference between animal and human mimicry let’s compare two “genetic 
fishers” – the angler fish (phrynelox scaber) and the alligator snapping turtle (macroclemys 
temminckii) with the “cultural fisher” – a fisherman. For the purpose of fishing, both the angler fish 
and the turtle use a natural appendage which deceives the operator through having the appearance 
of its own prey. Conversely, the fisherman deceives the operator with an ideal mimic of a prey 
(moving bait in the case of line fishing, and a fly in the case of fly-fishing, etc.). A “genetic” fisher 
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developments in the social and natural environment, an ability which may be 
developed to a greater or a lesser degree in any individual and thus vary from 
one person to another. While mimicry in animals is an evolutionary adaptation 
which improves the chances of their survival, human mimicry is primarily a 
strategy for obtaining less critical benefits, though survival too, may also be an 
issue. 
4. Classification of social or human mimicry 
Social or human mimicry can be classified with regard to the mimic, the 
model, the signals, the operator, the benefits, or even the types or forms 
(strategies) of mimicry. It can further be classified according to the instruments 
of expression as well as the arena in which it occurs – political6, sporting7, 
economic8, military9, sexual10, hunting11, artistic12 mimicry... Furthermore, 
mimicry can vary according to age group and social class. 
                                                                                                                                
is not capable of immediate mimetic innovation, while man is even able to organize competitions 
and tournaments based on such ongoing mimetic innovation. 
6 Politics is a field of mimetic “jeux sans frontières”. It cannot be ascribed solely a negative epithet 
to these “jeux”. 
7 Mimicry is an essential part of most sports. Simulations and dissimulations represent much of the 
play. A good referee (operator) is one who can clearly distinguish between (dis)simulation and 
reality. A good opponent (operator) can adroitly read the intentions and schemes of a rival – 
mimetic strategies included. 
8 An example: the Slovene enterprise Perutnina Ptuj manufactures a widely marketed salami 
sausage called “Poli”. Its imitators try to deceive potential buyers (the operators) to instead 
purchase their products (called “Poly”, “Pili” and suchlike) which highly resemble the model. 
9 The military sphere is particularly rich in mimicry: the operator (enemy) is to be confused and 
confounded, deceived into incorrectly assessing the mimic’s power, deployment and intentions. 
The model can indeed be the operator itself. The Trojan horse – the gift of Greeks – is a legendary 
example of military mimicry. 
10 An example: the contemporary fashion industry offers a number of accessories which increase 
the mimic’s resemblance to the ideal sexual model thus increasing the mimic’s chances of 
deceiving the operator. 
11 A hunter’s imitation of animal noises to deceive the prey is an example of interspecific hunting 
mimicry. Add to this the hunter’s camouflage in the colour of the ambient environment. 
12 The occurrence of artistic mimicry can be recognised in Bahtin’s evaluation of the role of 
fictional characters such as the buffoon and the fool, as well as the personification of stupidity or 
insanity. Only by way of such a mask is the literary hero (and possibly the author) permitted to 
criticise social conventions with impunity (Bahtin, 1975/1982:284-290). Sergej Eisenstein's 1947 
epic, Ivan the Terrible, is one of the most dramatic examples of artistic mimicry. This critique of 
Ivan the Terrible is in reality Eisenstein's veiled opinion of Stalin’s rule. 
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The mimic is defined as the social player who performs mimicry. The 
model is what the mimic imitates. The operator is the social player who 
(potentially) is to be deceived by the mimicry. The signals are the 
communication units of the mimicry that are intended to cause the mimic to be 
mistaken for the model by the operator (i.e. to disinform the operator). The 
forms and strategies of mimicry are the methods utilized by the mimic in order 
to deceive the operator. 
Any social player can be a mimic, a model or an operator. The operator 
may, or may not, be the victim of mimicry. Mimicry can be detected, and 
detection depends on how (un)accomplished it is, as well as on the operator’s 
own skills of mimicry detection. On occasions the operator desires to be “a 
victim” of mimicry. 
Mimicry can be protective or aggressive, while the power relationships 
between mimicry and demimicry, as the ability to detect mimicry itself, tends 
to vary and can differ from one social environment to another. What can be 
discerned or differentiated as mimicry in a certain social environment, may not 
be perceived as such in a different social environment. It is only in a specific 
cultural environment that a certain mimic behaviour has its true meaning. 
5. Religious mimicry 
Religious mimicry is that type of human mimicry which occurs in the field 
of religion. Its players – mimics, models and operators – are all involved in a 
game that in some way or other concerns religion. The models and/or mimics 
and/or signals and/or operators derive from the sphere of religion. 
A mere look at some syntagms in the sphere of religion indicate that this is 
indeed a rich field of (de)mimetic activity. Furthermore, the only expressions in 
the Slovene language which have evolved from the root hlinjenje (simulation) 
are svetohlinjenje (to simulate piety) and svetohlinec (an apparently pious 
person who prevaricates their piety). The intentions of religious mimicry 
widely differ, they may be protective, aggressive, life-threatening13 or entirely 
innocent. Some of the models of religious mimicry are specific and can 
                                                          
13 Note Bowker’s daring comparison of the world of religions with lush vegetation: Within that 
“luxurious vegetation” lie the ruthless predators of power and ambition. (Bowker, 1997, XXIV) If 
such a comparison is reasonable, the assumption that mimicry also occurs in the religious world 
would also make sense. Isn’t a rejection of mimetic behaviour in people merely a form of 
dissimulation? 
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encompass religious ideals, persons, as well as a variety of empirically 
unconfirmable supernatural instances. 
Below are some legendary, historical and contemporary examples of reli-
gious mimicry: 
1) The Bible (Judges, 3:15-22): Judge Ehud appeared before Eglon, King 
of Moab, saying: “I have a secret message for you, O king.” The King said, 
“Quiet!” And all his attendants left. Ehud then approached the King while he 
was sitting alone in the upper room of his summer palace and said, “I have a 
message for you from God.” As the king rose from his seat, Ehud reached with 
his left hand, drew a sword concealed on his right thigh and plunged it into the 
King's belly. 
What is the distribution of roles here? The word of God, something 
pertaining to God, something elevated or a person with exalted intentions (a 
prophet) is the model; Ehud is the mimic; the words of trust are signals; Eglon, 
King of Moab, is the operator. The naive operator fails to detect Ehud’s 
mimicry and becomes its victim. In this instance mimicry is used as the 
instrument of an aggressive act.14 
2) Some Hindu and Muslim men living in the Indian state of Punjab wear a 
Sikh turban as a means of protection against harassment and even violence in 
this Sikh-dominated province.15 A Hindu or a Muslim is the mimic in this case, 
a Sikh is the model, a turban is the signal, while the Sikh extremists are the 
operators. Here, mimicry is an aid to survival.16 There are numerous similar 
examples from European history of conformist religious behaviour 
demonstrated by non-religious or differently-religious minorities faced with a 
repressive religious majority17 or a conformist non-religious behaviour of a 
religious minority in conditions of secularistic absolutism. 
3) Another similar example from India: in the midst of an inter-caste 
conflict a Vaisya introduces himself as a Brahmin to attackers who are 
                                                          
14 This form of aggressive mimicry resembles some forms of molecular mimicry: the aggressive 
mimic deceives the molecule’s defence system with a false signal. 
15 Documented in the movie The Asia Highway, HNK. 
16 Shia Islam permits denial of ones faith providing that such an act saves a man’s life;  mimicry is 
thus permitted in extreme circumstances. 
17 The historian Gerhard Schneider writes in his Der Libertin (1970) of the “social mimicry” that 
European libertines were forced to perform during the 16th and 17th centuries. Outwardly they 
conformed to the religious status quo, while in private they practised a dissolute lifestyle. 
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themselves Harijans. And saves his life by so doing.18 The Vaisya is the mimic, 
the Brahmin is the model, and the Harijans are the operators. A word suffices 
as the signal. 
4) There is a tradition in the canon of several Christian churches that they 
are the one and only true scion of the Body of Christ. In this centuries-old 
mimetic self-perception (which evokes St Paul as the authority), the Church is 
the mimic, while the “Body of Christ” (with all the emotional admixtures of the 
divine and the victim) is the model. The operators are diverse and include lay 
persons, non-church society and even the state. 
In the early 20th century several influential theologians of the Slovene 
Roman-Catholic Church argued that the Church was literally the embodiment 
of Christ’s mystical form. “This metaphor was raised to the level of a religious 
and social fact which was supposed to be 'obvious' or empirically verifiable, 
while at the same time it was treated as literal Truth”. (Dragoš, 1998:31) This 
meant that he who “attacks” the Church or its role in society, attacks Christ 
himself. The goal of such mimicry was to protect the privileged social position 
of the Roman Catholic Church.19 
5) In the 1960’s and 1970’s, military regimes in South America chose 
images of the Virgin Mary as their emblem. Perry and Eccheveria’s treatment 
of the Church’s legitimisation of these regimes has a telling title: Under the 
Heel of Mary (1989). In this case the Virgin Mary was the model, the military 
regime assisted by the Roman-Catholic Church was the mimic, while the 
people of the country and the international public were the operators. On 
account of Mary the operators were not supposed to notice the jackboot “heel” 
of repression. 
6) A superstitious example: contemporary astrologers imitate two models 
simultaneously – a priest as well as a scientist. Indeed, some astrologers in 
Great Britain wear a variation of a clerical gown and operate with the latest 
ideas from the physical sciences.20 21 In Slovenia astrologers emphasise the 
                                                          
18 Documented in the movie The Asia Highway, HNK. 
19 Nowadays the metaphor (the model) of the mother is predominant: the Church is like a mother, 
the nation is like a son. Which is basically to say he who criticises the Church is like a son who 
attacks his mother. 
20 Documented in the movie Twinckle, Twinckle. 
21 The example is along the lines of the Grant’s definition of mimicry in the field of cybernetics: 
“Mimicry is an infection strategy in which a meme attempts to imitate the semiotics of another 
successful meme” (Grant, 1990). 
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academic titles which they have acquired at Astrological Universities. Their 
mimicking of reputable models is aimed at persuading operators (the 
superstitious public) to place their trust in them. 
In the light of an analysis of argumentation, mimetic strategies rest on an 
inclination of people to accept three cardinal mistakes in argumentation: 
mimicking the victim represents argumentum ad misericordiam, whilst 
mimicking authority represents either argumentum e consensa gentium or 
argumentum ad verecundiam. 
In the example of the mimetic behaviour of a world religion it can be seen 
that the basic mimic strategies arise as a result of the social and historical 
development of that particular religion. Christian mimetic strategies arise as a 
consequence of two formative periods: the Jewish Old Testament parochiality 
and Christian parochiality within the bounds of the Roman Empire. I believe 
that the two characteristic elements mentioned at the beginning of this article 
arise as a consequence of these periods. 
6. Religious critique of religious mimicry 
There exists not only a rich mimetic tradition in religions, but also the 
tradition of a critique of mimicry or so called de-mimicrisation. This critique 
applies to mimetic behaviour both within religions as well as in the secular 
world. As mimicry itself, the mechanisms of its unveiling are also the result of 
social evolution. Religious schisms, the creation of new sects and religions are 
inevitably accompanied by a critique of religious mimicry in religious tradition. 
Such critiques are easily detected in Christian gospels, Buddhist scripts, as well 
as some texts of new religious movements22: in the name of newly (or re-) 
discovered authenticity, such texts reproach falsity and (dis)simulation. 
In his A Prelude Concerning the Babylonian Captivity of the Church 
(1520), Martin Luther defined the Catholic clergy as follows: “Although they 
are wolves, they want to be taken for shepherds; although they are Anti-Christs, 
they want to be revered as Christ.” (Luther, 1520/1888:537) Luther often 
compares the Catholic clergy to hunters. He refers to the papacy as a “reign of 
Nimrod” (Gen, 10:8-9), a mighty hunter and the founder of the kingdom of 
                                                          
22 At the same time, some new religious movements are criticised precisely for their mimicry (and 
using this very term). The Church of Scientology is thus said by some (look Schmidt, 1998) to be 
an organisation hiding behind a religious/church model in order to deceive naive operators, namely 
the state and (potential) adherents. 
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Babylon (Luther, 1520/1888:498). In his 95 theses (1517), Luther considers 
indulgences as “the nets for fishing the wealth of people”.23 Regardless as to 
whether one agrees with Luther or not, it must be admitted that he was 
reproaching the Catholic Church for what he believed was its mimicry: in this 
instance the operators (believers) were being made to believe that the mimic 
(the Catholic Church) was the same as the model (Christ), while in actual fact 
the mimic was the opposite of the model. In light of this, Luther’s notion of the 
“invisibility of the church” represents a rejection of the (misleading) mimetic 
signals. Primož Trubar, the leading figure of the Reformation movement on 
Slovene territory, had a similar enlightened operator role: he believed he saw 
through the mimetic strategy of the Roman Catholic Church, labelling the 
Jesuits as “a guild of wolves in sheep’s clothing” (1575), and clerical celibacy 
as “the holy mask of concubinage”. Furthermore, Trubar considered the 
Catholic clergy false prophets and false Christs. 
It seems that cultural – that is to say human – mimicry is more complex 
and variable than genetic mimicry; religious mimicry, however, appears yet 
more convoluted again. Why is this so? People are usually taught that religion 
is the realm of truth, inviolable truth and authenticity, and it is for this very 
reason that one can find so many appealing models and mimics. The viewpoint 
of Richard Dawkins is well worth considering here. According to Dawkins, 
during the early indoctrination periods of any religion a “program” is instigated 
into a believer who opposes any critical attitude towards that particular faith.24 
In terms of the theme discussed here, this program prevents or hinders the 
detection of mimicry. Any attempts at a critical treatment of religion are treated 
as sinful or a ridiculous and futile effort (see example of Doubting Thomas) 
(Dawkins, 1976: 251, 1991). 
7. Old moths – new light; social transition and religious mimicry 
Major social changes are (hypothetically) of similar significance for social 
mimicry as major disruptions in habitat are for animal species. Probably the 
best known zoological example of this is the peppered moth (Biston betularia) 
living in the industrial north of England during the latter half of the 19th 
                                                          
23 Luther’ early writings are also full of anthological examples of protective mimicry. In his 81st, as 
well as a number of later theses, Luther, the critic, is disguised behind the views of “shameless and 
impertinent laymen”. 
24 With the notable exception of Buddhism, which explicitly advises a critical attitude towards 
religious authorities and established convictions. 
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century. Prior to the advent of industrial pollution lighter coloured moths were 
more successful in a mimetic sense, as they were less visible in light 
environment than the darker coloured moths. When the environment became 
blackened with the soot of industrial pollution, the darker peppered moth 
became, through natural selection, more abundant (Owen, 1980: 20-21). 
The fall of Communism represented the onset of relatively rapid changes in 
the social environments of Central and Eastern European countries. Alongside 
the desire for change, uncertainty and fear as to what the future may bring were 
also present. Anxiety or ambition – in the sense of “Who is going to win?” 
(Barker, 1997) – was also manifest. Old party (civil-religious) ideologies were 
in decay everywhere. It was obvious that people were changing their basic 
political “colours” following the downfall of “the reds”. Political colour 
became an important part of transitional jargon. Many would say that these 
were just metaphors; nevertheless, they were metaphors for developments with 
tangible consequences. The correct anticipation of changes of colour in the 
social environment seemed to many a matter of vital importance. 
In order to fully comprehend the mimetic developments in the period of 
transition, one should be aware that such behaviour was also practised during 
the Communist and pre-Communist eras. The “religious” aspect of this 
mimicry included mostly simulations and dissimulations of behaviour as 
regards religion in line with the expectations of the Party or, in the pre-
Communist era, the Church. As regards Slovenia, the following sociological 
commentary on the indicators of secularisation during the 1970s is worth 
considering: “The prevailing non-religious orientation of the higher social 
classes in Slovenia can be explained by the fact that as a rule such classes (in 
all societies) tend to conform more to the prevalent cultural patterns. In the case 
of Slovenia, they behave in the manner they believe is determined by the 
official ideological pattern. Based on all of the above, this is particularly 
applicable as regards clerks and officials. /.../ Should this formula change, 
changes in the ideology of officialdom can also be anticipated” (Roter and 
Kerševan, 1982:107-108). 
The above expectations were further confirmed by surveys of religion-
related changes during the 1990s. Within the relatively small changes detected 
in the basic indicators of the religiosity of the entire population (Smrke, 1999), 
the largest changes towards a seemingly greater degree of religiosity were 
identified in the very classes which Roter pointed out as the most conformist. 
The change index in the high officials of Slovene society (i.e. the highest of 
three sub-categories of this class) was 139 (Smrke and Uhan, 1999). Although a 
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“non-religious” orientation still prevails amongst this particular group, it can be 
assumed that a portion of high officials anticipated “religiousness” as a 
prevailing or prospective ideological pattern, and thus adopted it. 
An explanation of such changes is attempted in the following presentation 
of the first of three selected transitional forms of religious mimicry. 
1. Mimicry of individuals when an anticipated pro-religious change in the 
social environment is the model. 
Over recent years I have been following the careers of five selected 
Slovene intellectuals who started publicly emphasising their Christian Catholic 
orientation in the 1990s. I analysed their articles and public appearances. Prior 
to the political changes in Slovenia, all five were members of the Communist 
Party; four of them have PhDs. In the socialist era two were involved in the 
implementation of restrictive party directives regarding the social position of 
the Roman Catholic Church. During the 1990s all five publicly demonstrated 
clear changes in their mimetic signals. During socialism they wrote cerkev (i.e. 
the Slovene word for church as the institution) with a lower case initial letter; 
today they all capitalise it. Before, they would write common era now they 
write Anno Domini. While they used to write god with a lower case initial, they 
now capitalise it (this can be documented in the case of four of them).25 While 
they used to perceive the Communist Party as “avant-garde”, they now perceive 
the Roman Catholic Church as “avant-garde”. The Church, according to one of 
the five, is the “spiritual centre of the Slovene people”. It seems as though the 
old moths have found a new light. 
 
church → Church  cerkev → Cerkev 
god → God  bog → Bog 
before the common era → Before Christ  pnš → pK 
 
It seems as though these individual’s anticipation of a change in the social 
environment corresponded to the figures below: 
 
                                                          
25 Herein I do not question any of the ways of writing this, furthermore in my opinion they are all 
legitimate. I merely wish to emphasise that a manifest change has occurred in a segment of society 
and that this change is the imitation of an anticipated change to the (model of the) social 
environment. Let it also be noted that at times it is not certain whether a discussed characteristic is 
the work of an author or possibly an editor. 
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 1.    2.  
ccccc  CCCCC  pnš pnš pnš  pK pK pK 
ccCcc → CCcCC  pnš pK pnš → pK pnš pK 
ccccc  CCCCC  pnš pnš pnš*  pK pK pK** 
 
 (* before the common era; ** before Christ) 
 
Namely, it was anticipated that the social environment would change from 
a Socialist/Communist dominated one to a Roman Catholic one. Those unable 
to adapt to such a changed environment would be excluded. As regards the 
motives behind such conversions,26 it seems that three types of motif intertwine 
in all five cases studied, elements of the: motif of St Paul – guilty conscience; 
motif of Maternus – (political) benefit;27 and motif of St Thais – repentance and 
the following change of lifestyle paradigm from libertine to (at least seemingly) 
Catholic. 
However, it appears as though the anticipated change of the social 
environment to a Catholic dominated one was not entirely accurate. Although 
there are several examples of converts gaining political benefit on account of 
their conversion, a few obvious cases of blatant opportunism were exposed to 
unpleasant de-mimetic criticism.28 The instances of rejection of religiousness as 
a criterion of social promotion didn’t decrease but rather increased during the 
1990s. How should this be understood? This at least partly indicates that a 
tendency has been detected that such criteria could become established in 
society. 
 
                                                          
26 This article does not resolve one of the most essential issues behind religious mimicry, namely: 
the relationship between conversion and mimicry. The key problem here is the distinction and 
differentiation between the simulated and the authentic. According to the definition applied in this 
text, the authentic conversion is not mimetic; however, this too could be disputed. 
27 A notable example is the 4th century post-Nicene Christian father, Julius Firmicus Maternus, a 
paradigmatic convert to Christianity for the sake of self-interest. After his conversion, Maternus 
became a zealous oppressor of pagans (De Errore Profanarum Religionum), drawing inspiration 
and justification for his activities on more bloody biblical texts. 
28 One of the most recent and unpleasant commentaries was delivered by the (dissident) Catholic 
Bishop Vekoslav Grmič: “It is the former Communist Party members, the “converts”, who are 
today most vocal in their condemnation of the Communist Party. They demand the wholesale 
purging from office of all those who were connected with the erstwhile regime, and would even 
sacrifice the innocent, thus being themselves less tainted. All this in order to rid themselves of an 
unpleasant feeling which pecks at their brain, namely that they too used to be Party members and 
carry the responsibility for many a thing.” (Večer, newspaper, Maribor, Slovenia, 25th October, 
2001) 
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Table 1: Percentage breakdown of responses to the statement: “Politicians who 
do not believe in God are not at all suitable for public office.” 
(SPO) Survey 
conducted in Slovenia 
I strongly 
agree I agree 
I neither agree 
nor disagree I disagree 
I totally 
disagree 
1992/1 1.9 8.1 17.5 35.5 25.0 
1995/1 4.9 6.0 13.9 14.9 54.6 
1997/2 6.1 4.5 14.4 9.0 61.5 
 
And what is the situation as regards this type of mimicry in other countries 
in transition? To what extent is the revitalisation of religiosity in Croatia 
(Vrcan, 2001:60-63) an actual true revitalisation of faith and to what extent is it 
merely a restoration of Catholic mimetic signals necessitated by changes in 
social environment? Don’t the conditions of “nationalisation of the sacred” or 
“sacralisation of the national” – in Vrcan’s opinion a characteristic of 
transitional Croatia – make it particularly difficult to keep the “colour” of 
(non)religious persuasion which differs from the colour of the (Catholic 
oriented) social environment? 
2. Mimicry of politics when the “National” Church or Christ(inanity) is the 
model. 
Last summer the media circulated a story suggesting that Radovan 
Karadžić, sought by the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague, now 
wears the robes of an Orthodox monk as a cover. If this were possibly true, it 
would be an anthological example of religious mimicry. Several other similar 
examples of mimicry are to be found in Karadžić’s erstwhile military-political 
career. In early 1990s Karadžić was regularly seen (through deftly stage-
managed media coverage) in churches and surrounded by Orthodox clergy. 
Signals such as lighting candles, kissing the cross, and the like were purposely 
made to convince the operator (the international public) that the goals of his 
military-political activity were in fact the same as the model being imitated. If 
the model was the national church, this was fairly well true. 
3. Mimicry of a religious institution which desires a privileged position in 
society. 
Several mimetic strategies can be recognised in the presentations of the 
Roman Catholic Church in the post-communist countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. One of the most interesting strategies is that hinted at by the 
ironic title of an article by Pawel Zalecki: The biggest and oppressed: The 
Roman Catholic Church in Contemporary Poland, which was presented at the 
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third ISORECE conference (Zalecki, 1997). Seemingly opposite mimetic 
signals are combined here – the signals of small size and signals of large size. 
In the same breath the Roman Catholic Church in post-communist societies 
speaks: 1.) of its being “pushed into the catacombs”, about the “social 
significance of the Church being belittled more than any subculture”, about 
“second-class status of Catholics”29; and 2.) about all imaginable indicators 
proving that the Roman Catholic Church is the largest, most important and 
central social institution in the country.30 The simultaneous imitation of the 
neglected child model together with that of a giant who should have a special 
role leaves one with the impression of a giant baby of some sort. A naive 
operator, the state for instance, can easily fall prey to the role of an ardent 
provider for the noisiest fledgling cuckoo. 
Similar mimetic strategies abound in the animal world. A butterfly with an 
eye-spot can confuse an operator trying to assess its size. Similarly, as needs 
may be, a puffer fish can make itself small or large. 
In Homer’s Iliad (dis)simulation is perceived as a characteristic which is 
not alien to the gods. In times of “transition” it is particularly typical of people. 
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Ankica Marinović Bobinac 
DIMENSION OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE AMONG 
ADULT POPULATION IN CROATIA 
1. Introduction 
Due to its complexity, the phenomenon of religion and religiosity in 
modern sociology of religion requires an analysis, not only of different aspects 
and dimensions but various theoretical approaches. Understanding of religiosity 
and its methods depends on a theoretical context, respectively, on the type of 
the questions to which we seek the answers. One of the ways of comprehending 
the phenomenon of religiosity is enabled by the research of certain dimensions 
from the aspect of the structure of religiosity. A deeper insight, however, can be 
obtained only if this way is connected to other theoretical approaches and 
sources. The structure is a way of organizing particular elements that make a 
whole. From the point of view of the structure, a majority of big religions 
consists of the following elements that are interconnected: doctrine, rituals, 
experience, knowledge, values, norms, institutions and personalities of religion. 
Religions differ one from another in the way in which these elements make a 
whole. A dimensional approach means the research of the mentioned elements 
and their relationship at the level of an individual (Bainbridge, 1997; Glock, 
1962; Glock-Stark, 1966; King-Hunt, 1972; Roof, 1979). In this way, a 
prevailing of a particular element determines the type of religion, and the level 
of development or the dominance of a certain dimension of religiosity indicate 
the type of religion, respectively the type of a believer. The analysis of a 
particular dimension is only one of the elements of comprehension of the 
religious phenomenon that should be observed so separately as well. 
Consequently, the analysis of knowledge does not speak of anything else but of 
how much a respondent is familiar with the facts of religion that is the subject 
of the analysis. So, the intensity of religiosity and the level of acquaintance 
with the facts of one’s own religion should not necessarily overlap. A person 
can be deeply religious with a minimal knowledge of the facts of his/her own 
religion, or, on the other hand, very well informed, but not religious. Within 
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this context, dimension of religious knowledge means the level of being 
informed and the believers’ acquaintance with the doctrines and the normative 
content of religion. It relates to the expectations that a religious person is 
familiar with the basic principles and facts of his/her religion and its sacred 
manuscripts. There are significant differences within and between religions 
referring to what a religious person should know and what should be the quality 
of such knowledge to become the indicator of religious adherence (Glock, 
Stark, 1966). 
In comparison to the other dimensions that have been the subject of many 
researches, this dimension has not been investigated much widely, (Glock, 
Stark, 1966; King-Hunt, 1972; Faulkner, DeJong, 1966; DeJong, Faulkner, 
Warland, 1976; Cornwall, Albrecht, Cumingham, Pitcher, 1986). The thing that 
should be measured, as Glock terms it, is the religious literacy, which would 
imply different types of questions: a) the questions about the origin and the 
history of religion to which one belongs, b) the questions on the modernity of 
religion to which one belongs, c) the questions about other religions, d) the 
questions related to the checking of secular knowledge, e) the questions related 
to the religious facts from the fundamental books, f) comparison of the 
acquaintance with the origin of one’s religion with the knowledge about its 
history and contemporariness, g) the attitudes towards knowledge (the interest 
in acquiring knowledge, the importance of knowledge and the type of 
knowledge that is considered as relevant), h) the questions related to the testing 
of the level of sophistication while reading the Bible and other religious 
literature (the critical or non-critical attitude towards the Bible)1. It would be 
useful to have a typology of believers with regard to the various aspects of 
religious knowledge: from religious illiterates, through the many levels of 
religious literacy, to those who are very well acquainted with their own 
religion, but also with the literature that challenges or is critical of it, etc. Of 
course, this exceeds the framework of this study made on the basis of the 
research results in which this aspect of the dimension of knowledge was only 
one of the research objectives. 
The problem regarding how to measure knowledge is related to the type of 
the question and the way in which they are asked. The only right way is the test 
of knowledge what might be somewhat embarrassing for the respondent having 
                                                          
1 Acquaviva and Pace (1996) suggest the four ideal sides of the quadrangle of the religious 
perception: The perception of the origin of man, origin of the Universe, origin of good and evil and 
life after death. 
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regard to the implications that ignorance, as such, normally causes anyway2. 
The questionnaire does not deal with the attitudes but knowledge, what might 
cause aversion/antagonism, even rejection. Consequently, composing of such a 
test requires a considerate and subtle approach to the respondent through a 
serious and tactful formulation of the questions (King & Hunt, 1969; DeJong, 
Faulkner, Warland, 1976). 
2. Dimension of religious knowledge in Croatia 
The data from sociological-religious researches in Croatia indicate that a 
traditional adherence to religion and the Church is markedly a phenomenon of 
the majority of population, at personal and group level, as well3. Traditional 
religiosity is mediated through the family socialisation with the recognizable 
elements: the implicit sequence of the Sacraments received at some points in 
life or on special occasions, attending religious instruction, religious education 
in family and at least occasional going to the Church. In such cases, God 
represents more a traditional value: revered as a Supreme Lord, the most 
important events in life are done in his name but there is no constant focus on 
his presence (Dugandžija, 1990:15). God is distant and the way to reach him 
goes via many unavoidable mediators: the priests and the Sacraments. All good 
is done in his name, he is being called for help to protect from evil, but he is 
being invoked at places meant for this purpose, and, of course, when one is in 
distress. Such type of religiosity is more typical for big religious communities 
and for majoritarian religions. 
The dimension of religious knowledge has not been the focus of interest of 
Croatian socio-religious researches so far, so this research is the first attempt to 
get the basic information on knowledge about their own religion of the Catholic 
majority of the respondents. This is also the basic aim of this analysis. In the 
                                                          
2 In composing the questionnaire, the findings of King and Hunt (1969, 1972) were applied, who, 
by using the approaches of Glock and Stark, drew up an integral questionnaire which consisted of 
10 scales for questioning all the dimensions. Some other questionnaires on the dimensions of 
religiosity have also been consulted (DeJong, Faulkner, Warland, 1976; Cornwall, Albrecht, 
Cumingham, Pitcher, 1986). 
3 S. Vrcan speaks of the basic features of traditional religious behavior: a) primary religious 
identification, b) at least a minimum acknowledging of the confessional adherence, c) at least some 
participation in religious services related to the important periods and events in human life 
(Baptizing, First Communion, Confirmation, Wedding, Death, Funeral), at least a minimum degree 
of taking part in exercising of such forms of religious behavior or secular behavior with religious 
characteristics that assumed the features of real folk customs (celebration of certain holidays), e) 
participation in at least a minimum elementary religious instruction (Bahtijarević, Vrcan, 1975:15). 
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majority of religious researches the respondents have been asked if they read 
the Bible, if they read the religious press (Bahtijarević, Vrcan, 1975; 
Bahtijarević, 1985; Plačko, 1991; Moral i religija u Hrvatskoj 1997; Religijske 
promjene i vrijednosti u hrvatskom društvu, 1999; Aufbruch, 1997), if they 
listened to the Catholic Radio, if they watched the religious program on TV 
(Religijske promjene i vrijednosti u hrvatskom društvu, 1999; Aufbruch, 1997; 
Moral i religija u Hrvatskoj, 1997), but they have never been asked how much 
they know the facts from the Bible, the major Church events and other aspects 
that the dimension of religious knowledge covers. 
The results of the mentioned researches (Črpić, Kušar, 1998; Marinović 
Jerolimov, 2000; Aračić, Črpić, Nikodem, 2003) showed that the respondents 
were not interested in an active individual learning of the facts of their own 
religion and that they hardly follow the events within their own Church: 
a) that they hardly read the Bible 
b) that a very low percentage of the respondents listen to the Catholic radio 
program regularly 
c) that more than one half of the respondents never watches the religious 
program on TV. 
Some Croatian theologians have only parenthetically touched this topic at a 
theoretical level and basis their pastoral practice experience (Šagi-Bunić, 1981; 
Šimunović, 1996; Tamarut, 1996). Beginning with ascertaining a prevailing 
traditional religiosity that many live through inherited and customary forms 
(Catholicism, loyalty and piousness), to whom religiosity means more a symbol 
of a historical provenance, a sign of social and cultural appurtenance (Tamarut, 
1996:108), in which many alienated from Christian belief or are poorly familiar 
with it, Šimunović (1996:93) pleads for an ‘authentic Biblical formation’, since 
there is an alarming Biblical malnutrition of the Catholic believers (Šagi-Bunić, 
1981:460). Besides this, Šimunović suggests that there is ‘a significant 
analphabetism in religion and religious infantilism of the adults in their life’s 
prime, mainly of those from 25 to 40 years old’ and a non-existence of the 
spirit of criticism due to the lack of knowledge of the very basis of their 
religion. By the analysis of available variables, on the sample of dominantly 
Catholic believers, in this study we will try to ascertain if the theses of the 
mentioned theologians are founded. 
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3. Methodology 
These data are taken from the research Religijske promjene i vrijednosti u 
hrvatskom društvu – (Religious Changes and Values in Croatian Society) 
carried out by the Institute for Social Research in 1999 in Zagreb and Zagreb 
region on the sample of 705 respondents. 
This analysis is aimed at determining an elementary level of religious 
knowledge of the respondents – some aspects of basic religious literacy4. 
We selected the two groups of indicators that show a partial insight in 
elementary religious knowledge of their respondents: 
1. The indicators of knowledge acquired by reading the Bible (active 
participation in liturgies): knowledge of the writers of the Gospel and the 
acquaintance with the Old-Testament prophets. 
2. The indicators of knowledge acquired by religious socialisation (religious 
instruction and more intense learning prior receiving the Church 
Sacraments), knowledge of the Ten Commandments and knowledge of 
the Seven Holy Sacraments. 
Both groups of indicators have been intersected by the following variables: 
a) socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents – sex, age, 
residential status, education and occupation; 
b) confessional self-identification – data on confessional self-
identification have been summarized in five categories: Catholics, 
Orthodox, Muslims, others (all who have declared themselves 
confessionally but don’t belong to any of the three previous 
categories) and the respondents without confessional self-
identification; 
c) religious self-identification – examined on a 6 degrees scale: 
1. convinced believer accepting all what his/her religion teaches 
2. religious, although does not accept all what his/her religion teaches 
3. thinking a lot about this, but not quite sure if he/she believes or not 
4. indifferent towards religion 
5. not religious, though having nothing against religion 
6. not religious and opposing to religion. 
                                                          
4 In some supposed future research, focused on this very topic, it would be interesting to study all 
the aspects of the dimension of religious knowledge mentioned in this introduction and to 
determine a typology, if any, of religious knowledge of the Catholic believers in Croatia. 
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Considering that the majority of the respondents placed themselves in 
the first two categories on the continuum, due to the requirements of a 
statistical mass, the scale was compressed/reduced to three degrees: 
1. convinced believer accepting all what his/her religion teaches 
2. religious, although does not accept all what his/her religion teaches 
3. others – uncertain, indifferent, non-believers and opponents to 
religion 
d) attending religious instruction 
4. The results of the research 
4.1. Knowledge acquired by reading and studying the Bible 
The two following variables also give a partial insight in knowledge 
acquired by reading and studying the Bible: knowledge of the authors of the 
Gospel and the acquaintance with the Old-Testament prophets. The question 
relating to the acquaintance with the writers of the Gospels contained an offer 
of seven names: John, Jacob, Peter, Mark, Matthew, Paul and Luke. 
 
Table 1: The answers to the question: Which of the offered names are the 
writers of the Gospels? (John, Mark, Matthew and Luke) in % 
 N % 
Correct answers 177 25.1 
Incorrect answers 435 61.7 
No answer 93 13.2 
Total 705 100.0 
 
As the mentioned variable belongs to the Christian alphabet due to the fact 
that every extract from the Bible during services and on other ecclesiastical 
events refers to the author of the Gospel and to the other elements that 
obligatorily accompany the extract, a high rate of correct answers was to be 
expected. Moreover that 42% of the respondents attend the service, 16.3% 
twice a month, 24.7% once a week, or 0.9% every day, and another 43% attend 
on occasion (15.0%) or only on important church holidays (27.7%)5. However, 
                                                          
5 These data are taken from the research: Religijske promjene i vrijednosti u hrvatskom društvu – 
Religious Changes and Values in Croatian Society. 
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despite this fact, only 25.1% of the respondents are familiar with the four 
authors of the Gospel. The majority of the respondents (61.8%) knows only 
some of them or is only vaguely guessing. 
Considering that this is the first (and partial) investigation of the dimension 
of religious knowledge in Croatia, there is no empirical data, nor theoretical 
conception based on them that might indicate that there are some differences in 
degrees of religious knowledge with regard to socio-demographic characteristics 
of the respondents. 
So, we assume that younger and more educated respondents originating 
from bigger cities have a higher degree of religious knowledge, especially if it 
comes to the elementary facts. 
Consequently, the variable – knowing the authors of the Gospel – is 
intersected with socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents. 
Table 2 shows a statistically substantial difference in the acquaintance with 
the authors of the Gospel. The variables involved are only age and occupation 
of the respondents. 
 
Table 2: Familiarity with the authors of the Gospel and socio-demographic 
characteristics of the respondents (%) 
 Correct Incorrect No answer Total 
Occupation χ2=30.537    
Farmer 
Worker 
Clerk 
Expert, Manager 
Others 
20.0 
13.4 
21.6 
36.1 
31.4 
75.0 
68.4 
65.4 
53.1 
58.8 
5.0 
18.2 
13.1 
10.9 
9.8 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Age χ2=25.606    
18-30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
61 and more 
38.0 
20.7 
30.3 
14.5 
20.5 
52.1 
66.2 
55.9 
70.9 
64.7 
9.9 
13.1 
13.8 
14.5 
14.7 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
 
According to expectations, younger respondents (from 18 to 30 years old) 
demonstrated that they know the answer the best. As regards to the occupation, 
those whose position is higher in the social structure – experts and managers, 
gave the most accurate answers, followed by clerks and the least correct 
answers were those of the farmers. 
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The same variable was intersected by the confessional and religious self-
identification. However, having in mind a large number of the cells in table 
with the frequencies lower than 5, the interpretation using X square test was not 
justified. Namely, 92.2% of the respondents are Catholics. All other 
confessions (Orthodox Serbs, Muslims and “others”) belong to the group of 
only 4.1%. Confessional adherence was not declared by 3.7% of the 
respondents. So “Catholics” constituted a separate category with the answers 
shown for all four analyzed indicators of religious knowledge. The next table 
illustrates the distribution of their answers. 
 
Table 3: Familiarity with the authors of the Gospel among Catholics 
Answers N % 
Correct answers 169 26.0 
Incorrect answers 411 63.2 
No answer 70 10.8 
Total 650 100.0 
 
According to the data shown in Table 3 only one fourth of the Catholics in 
the sample answered to this question correctly, what implies a great deal of 
ignorance as far as this really fundamental Biblical fact is concerned. 
 
Table 4: Familiarity with the authors of the Gospels and religious self-
identification (%) 
Religious self-identification Answers 
Convinced believers Religious Others 
Correct 24.4 30.9 14.3 
Incorrect 67.8 55.6 55.2 
No answer 7.8 13.6 30.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
χ2=44.074 
 
With regard to the acquaintance with the authors of the Gospel, a 
statistically significant difference is ascertained among convinced believers, 
religious and others. We can observe that with the increasing of the degree of 
religiosity, grows the percentage of those who know the correct answer 
(although the difference among convinced believers and religious is not that 
big), but also grows the percentage of those who are unfamiliar with the answer 
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(among those who didn’t know the answers, more than a half were convinced 
believers, about one third religious ones and one tenth were others), what is not 
a surprising information if the sample consisted of the majority of the religious 
respondents (85.1%). 
The next variable (the acquaintance with the Old-Testament prophets) 
made more difficulties for the respondents. A choice of six names was offered: 
Isaiah, Matthew, Jeremiah, Elias, Deuteronomy and Isac. 
 
Table 5: Familiarity with the Old-Testament prophets (Isaiah, Jeremiah, Elias) 
Answers N % 
Correct answers 40 5.7 
Incorrect answers 507 71.9 
No answer 158 22.4 
Total 705 100.0 
 
Acquaintance with the Old-Testament prophets is even more deficient. 
Only 5.7% of the respondents (only 40 in 705) recognized the three Old-
Testament prophets (Isaiah, Jeremiah and Elias), and even 71.0% of the 
respondents gave wrong answer to this question and another 22.4% didn’t 
answer at all. 
There was not a statistically significant difference in knowledge of this fact 
that might be connected with any of the socio-demographic features. The 
respondents of both sexes, of all age groups, of different residential statuses, of 
all levels of education and of different vocational groups are likewise poorly 
acquainted with this Old-Testament fact.6 
 
Table 6: Familiarity with the Old-Testament prophets among Catholics 
Answers N % 
Correct answers 39 6.0 
Incorrect answers 480 73.8 
No answer 131 20.2 
Total 650 100.0 
 
                                                          
6 Similar to the previous variable, while intersecting by confessional self-identification the 
interpretation with χ square test was not justified due to the same reasons. 
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Out of 40 respondents that gave the correct answer, 39 were Catholics. But 
this fact reveals more the ignorance of the Catholics than it points to their 
knowledge, as a great deal of the Catholics did not answer accurately (94%). 
The Table 7 exhibits the results of intersecting the same variable with 
religious self-identification. 
 
Table 7: Familiarity with the Old-Testament prophets and religious self-
identification 
Religious self-identification Answers 
Convinced believers Religious Others 
Correct 6.4 6.1 1.9 
Incorrect 76.8 70.4 59.0 
No answer 16.8 23.5 39.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
χ2=24.855 
 
All three subcategories show very poor knowledge of this relevant Biblical 
fact. However, there is a statistically significant difference among convinced 
believers, religious and others with regards to this question, as well. The same 
conclusion emerges again – in spite of poor knowledge through all three 
subcategories, with the increase of the level of religiosity, the acquaintance 
with the Old-Testament prophets is growing to some extent. 
If for nothing else, the answers to these two questions alone support the 
thesis of Šagi-Bunić (1981) and Šimunović (1966) on ‘Biblical malnutrition’ of 
Catholic believers in Croatia. If we compare the results of the two socio-
religious researches in Croatia – Religijske promjene i vrijednosti u hrvatskom 
društvu (Religious Changes and Values in Croatian Society) (which was 
carried out in Zagreb and the Zagreb County) and Vjera i moral u Hrvatskoj 
(Belief and Morality in Croatia)7 regarding Catholic believers’ reading the 
Bible, we can notice that they also point to a plausibility of the mentioned 
thesis. According to the results of the first research, even 81% of the 
respondents do not read the Bible: never (30%) or rarely (51%). The results of 
the second mentioned research that covered whole Croatia show that 43% of 
the respondents do not have or do not read the Bible, and 50% of them have 
                                                          
7 The research ‘Belief and Morality in Croatia’ was carried out by the Catholic Theological Faculty, 
University of Zagreb in 1998, on the sample of 1245 respondents. 
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read it and don’t read it any more, or read it occasionally (Črpić, Kušar, 
1998:533). Only 0.9% of the respondents from Croatia read the Bible every day 
and 4.4% from Zagreb and the Zagreb County read it regularly (although its 
meaning is not specified), what is completely in accordance with these findings. 
As far as other confessions are concerned, this sample is too narrow to allow 
making conclusions about each of them. However, the investigation Vjera i 
moral u Hrvatskoj (Belief and Morality in Croatia) carried out on the sample of 
2000 respondents, 55.65% of the Muslims declared that they ‘occasionally 
consult the Bible’, atheists, agnostics and those who simply are not believers 
‘read the Bible almost more often than the Catholics, or at least, just as often’ 
(Črpić, Kušar, 1998). According to the same authors, ‘the most faithful readers 
of the Bible are the members of various Christian sects who (100%) read the 
Bible every day’ (Črpić, Kušar, 1998). 
In conformity with these data, a socio-religious research ‘Religioznost 
malih vjerskih zajednica u Hrvatskoj (Religiosity of small religious 
communities in Zagreb)’8 in 1987, showed that 45% of the respondents read the 
Bible on a daily basis, and another 25% several times a week. This rate would 
be even higher, if the sample had not contain some traditional minority 
Churches, such as the Evangelical and Croatian Catholic Church whose 
members read the Bible less, trusting more in mediation of the Biblical 
knowledge, and the Jewish Community (Plačko, 1991:32). 
From the shown data it is obvious that a small number of the Catholics 
reaches for the Bible on a regular basis. The Bible is a highly appreciated book 
but rarely taken. The priests are in charge of reading it and it is kept on 
consecrated places in the Church, on the altar mostly, and at home – in glass 
showcases/china cabinets. Even its appearance (black, heavy, hard-cover 
edition) and the places where it is kept seem to alienate it from the believers. In 
the Protestant and other Christian Churches, the Bible can be found everywhere 
– on benches, tables; it is handed out to accidental passers-by, thus encouraging 
them to reading. They don’t look posh at all, they are of a pocket-size and with 
covers in various colors. Comparisons point to the fact that there are differences 
within Christianity: a stronger focus of the members of smaller religious 
communities to a direct and individual approach to the Bible and a greater trust 
of the believers of traditional communities in an indirect approach – through 
                                                          
8 The research was made by The Institute for Social Research in Zagreb on the sample of 16 
communities, totaling 200 respondents. 
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persons that are mediating Biblical knowledge. There is also a movement 
within the Catholic Church aiming at returning the Bible into the hands of the 
believers. We are still talking about the elitist communities whose followers 
find the Biblical togetherness with all the Christians to whom reading the Bible 
is an everyday activity. 
4.2. Knowledge acquired through religious socialisation (religious 
instruction and more intense learning prior receiving the Church 
Sacraments) 
Traditional Catholic believers become Catholics by birth and they get 
acquainted with the religion of their forefathers through the process of religious 
socialisation carried out in the family and in the Church through religious 
instruction. They confirm their Catholic status through the ceremonies of 
transition – Sacraments, for whose receiving some knowledge is needed. The 
following variables point to such type of knowledge: familiarity with the Ten 
Commandments and the Seven Holy Sacraments. 
The respondents were asked: Do you know the Ten Commandments? The 
offered answers were: I do, I know some, I don’t know. In this question we 
were counting to a certain degree on sincerity, since many might feel irritated 
or discouraged if asked to quote in written all the Ten Commandments (be it 
due to their possible ignorance or due to extensive work – duration of writing 
down all the Commandments in an already large-scale questionnaire). So we 
chose this more neutral form. 
 
Table 8: Answers to the question: Do you know the Ten Commandments? 
Answers N % 
I know them all 508 72.4 
I know some 174 24.7 
I don’t know 13 1.8 
No answer 10 1.4 
Total 705 100.0 
 
Almost all the respondents are totally or partly familiar with the Ten 
Commandments. This information might be confusing at first sight if compared 
to the answers to the previous two questions, but at the same time it has sense and 
can be explained because the Catholic believers (except during the course of 
religious instruction which they attended at a high rate – 86.7%) have never been 
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asked about the direct familiarity with the Bible by anybody. The fact is that at 
each service one of the Gospels is being read (with a stress on its author) but the 
respondents that attend the service regularly and at a high rate, seem not to 
memorize these repeated data. The genuineness of the mentioned percentages is 
supported by the fact that prior all the ceremonies of transition, they acquire, 
respectively, repeat some basic prayers and the facts of the Christian faith, such 
as the Ten Commandments or the Seven Holy Sacraments. This is the reason why 
they remember them much longer. 
When intersecting the variable familiarity with the Ten Commandments by 
socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents, a statistically significant 
difference was found only with regard to the residential status of the 
respondents. The respondents living in cities know the Ten Commandments 
better than those coming from small towns or villages. 
 
Table 9: Familiarity with the Ten Commandments and socio-demographic 
characteristics of the respondents (%) 
Place of residence Answers 
Village Small City 
I know them all 74.8 60.0 72.0 
I know some 15.5 35.0 25.9 
I don’t know 9.7 5.0 2.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
χ2=21.115 
 
Table 10 illustrates the distribution of the answers among Catholics: there 
is a high rate of familiarity with this religious fact that is being acquired during 
the process of socialisation. 
 
Table 10: Familiarity with the Ten Commandments among Catholics (%) 
Answers N % 
I know them all 39 6.0 
I know some 480 73.8 
I don’t know 131 20.2 
Total 650 100.0 
 
The Table 11 shows if convinced believers differ in this sense from 
religious and others. Although the percentage of those who know all the Ten 
Commandments is very high, in this question there is also a statistically 
significant difference between the three subcategories. 
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Table 11: Familiarity with the Ten Commandments and religious self-
identification (%) 
Religious self-identification Answers 
Convinced believers Religious Others 
I know them all 84.9 70.0 33.3 
I know some 11.8 28.4 60.0 
I don’t know 3.4 1.6 6.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
χ2=114.384 
 
The next question was: How many Sacraments are there? The respondent 
had to write down only the number (seven). 
 
Table 12: Answers to the question: How many Holy Sacraments are there? (%) 
Answers N % 
Correct answers 482 68.4 
Incorrect answers 117 16.5 
No answer 106 15.0 
Total 705 100.0 
 
The percentage of correct answers to this question is somewhat lower, but 
still high. Namely, almost 70% of the respondents answered accurately, what 
supports the previously supposed explanation about better knowledge of the 
religious facts that are being repeated in order memorize them. Intersecting the 
variable – knowledge of the Sacraments by socio-demographic characteristics 
showed that there is a difference among the respondents also only in relation to 
their residential status. 
 
Table 13: Knowledge of the Seven Holy Sacraments and socio-demographic 
characteristics of the respondents (%) 
Place of residence Answers 
Village Small City 
Correct 89.3 55.0 65.1 
Incorrect 5.8 5.0 18.9 
No answer 4.9 40.0 16.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
χ2=34.453 
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It is obvious that the respondents coming from the cities know the Holy 
Sacraments, as well as the Commandments much better than those coming 
from small towns or villages. 
 
Table 14: Familiarity with the Holy Sacraments among Catholics 
Answers N % 
Correct answers 471 72.5 
Incorrect answers 112 17.2 
No answer 67 10.3 
Total 650 100.0 
 
If compared to a considerable unfamiliarity with the writers of the Gospel 
and the Old-Testament prophets, the Catholics demonstrated considerable 
knowledge of this religious fact that is being acquired in the process of 
socialisation. However, one third did not know the answer to this question. 
 
Table 15: Knowledge of the Holy Sacraments and religious self-identification 
(%) 
Religious self-identification Answers 
Convinced believers Religious Others 
Correct 82.6 63.0 32.4 
Incorrect 10.4 21.8 25.7 
No answer 7.0 15.2 41.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
χ2=114.383 
 
With a growth of the degree of religiosity, grows the rate of correct 
answers within the three subcategories. Consequently, the Catholic believers 
remember the facts from their religion that are checked and insisted upon by the 
Church authorities (but only occasionally, in some important life moments) 
better than the facts that they hear once a week but without any obligation of 
memorizing them. 
The analyzed variables were intersected by the variable – the attending of 
religious instruction. We presupposed the existence of a positive correlation 
between the attending of religious instruction and knowledge of the examined 
facts. The intention was to determine if the attendants of religious instruction 
know the elementary religious facts better than non-attendants. From the 
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results of the research we can see that 87% of the respondents attended 
religious instruction. 
 
Table 16: Familiarity with the authors of the Gospel and attending religious 
instruction (%) 
Attending religious instruction 
Answers 
Yes No There is no such thing in my religion 
Correct 25.8 20.9 14.3 
Incorrect 63.1 54.7 28.6 
No answer 11.1 24.4 57.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
χ2=23.647 
 
Table 16 demonstrates that attending religious instruction has an effect on 
better acquaintance with the authors of the Gospel. The respondents who 
attended religious instruction gave most correct answers. 
Nevertheless, we can see that even 74.2% of those who attended religious 
instruction didn’t answer correctly or didn’t answer at all. 
 
Table 17: Familiarity with the Old-Testament prophets and attending religious 
instruction (%) 
Attending religious instruction 
Answers 
Yes No There is no such thing in my religion 
Correct 6.4 1.2 0.0 
Incorrect 73.9 60.5 42.9 
No answer 19.8 38.4 57.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
χ2=22.165 
 
Table 17 demonstrates that in spite of poor acquaintance with the Old-
Testament prophets, still the respondents who attended religious instruction 
answered more accurately. 
Similar to the previous table, a general bad knowledge of this biblical fact 
is even more obvious from this table (even 93.7% of the respondents didn’t 
answer correctly or didn’t answer at all). 
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Table 18: Familiarity with the Ten Commandments and attending religious 
instruction (%) 
Attending religious instruction 
Answers 
Yes No There is no such thing in my religion 
Correct 78.1 32.6 28.6 
Incorrect 19.8 60.5 14.3 
No answer 2.1 7.0 57.1 
Total 100.0 86.8 
100.0 
12.2 
100.0 
1.0 
χ2=142.824 
 
Table 18 shows a high degree of correlation between the familiarity with 
the Ten Commandments and attending religious instruction. Thus, the majority 
of the respondents who attended religious instruction answered correctly. 
Unlike the previous two variables, only 21.9% of those who attended religious 
instruction didn’t answer correctly. 
 
Table 19: Familiarity with the Seven Holy Sacraments and attending religious 
instruction (%) 
Attending religious instruction 
Answers 
Yes No There is no such thing in my religion 
Correct 74.2 31.4 14.3 
Incorrect 16.7 17.4 0.0 
No answer 9.2 51.2 85.7 
Total 100.0 86.8 
100.0 
12.2 
100.0 
1.0 
χ2=126.436 
 
Table 19 has similar results as the previous one. The correct answers were 
given mainly by the attendants of religious instruction, among which there were 
few who did not know the correct answer (25.9%). It is obvious that the 
attendants of religious instruction know these facts much better, learning of 
which was intensified in the period of preparation for receiving the Holy 
Sacraments, than those facts that can be learned by reading the Bible and which 
have never been checked. So, in spite of the high rate of the attending of 
religious instruction, a great number of the Catholics do not know (recognize) 
the authors of the Gospel and the Old-Testament prophets. Nonetheless, the 
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attending of religious instruction does have impact on better knowledge of 
religious facts. It was to be supposed that younger population would show 
better knowledge of all the analyzed indicators due to their attending of 
religious instruction in a relatively near past, but it was shown only in relation 
to the acquaintance with the authors of the Gospel. 
5. Conclusion 
Basis the indicators of the two types of knowledge: knowledge acquired 
through religious socialisation (religious instruction and more intense learning 
prior receiving the Church Sacraments) and knowledge acquired by reading the 
Bible (active taking part during the Church service), the thesis present in the 
Catholic theological literature (Šagi-Bunić, 1981; Šimunović, 1996) about the 
ignorance of the Catholic believers and unfamiliarity with the contents of their 
own religion, was confirmed. It is obvious that a traditional bonding with 
religion and the Church relies more on the spoken word and verbal 
communication than on the written word (Vrcan, 1975). So, it is the parent, the 
priest (the preacher) and the religious instruction teacher who are the mediators 
of information and knowledge and not the religious books and the religious 
press. 
There are religions in which some particular kind of knowledge is a 
prerequisite of everyday religious activities (as it is the Bible for the majority of 
the Protestant denominations). Knowledge acquired through religious 
socialisation comes to the second place (since a person approaches such 
religions mostly through conversion and his/her former religious life is not 
relevant any more). On the contrary, the Catholics in Croatia show more 
knowledge when it comes to the facts apostrophized in the course of religious 
socialisation. They don’t read and are poorly acquainted with the Bible, and are 
totally unaware of the events in the Catholic Church, what could be seen in this 
research concerning the examining of the familiarity with the Second Vatican 
Council. 
It turned out that socio-demographic characteristics have little impact on 
the level of knowledge of the examined elementary religious facts. It also 
turned out that the respondents who were Catholic believers and who attended 
religious instruction prevail in the category of the respondents who answered to 
the questions correctly. However, they also dominate within a much bigger 
category of the respondents who did not know the correct answer to the basic 
Christian facts – acquaintance with the authors of the Gospel and the Old-
Testament prophets. 
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The obtained results point to a certain passivity of religion on a cognitive 
level and to a mostly unaware pragmatism – acquiring of the facts needed for 
some concrete purposes (Communion, Confirmation, Wedding), to the 
detriment of those facts that are very often available but knowledge of which 
has never been checked. 
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Keishin Inaba 
ALTRUISM AND RELIGION IN EUROPE: 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES OF MOTIVATION 
1. Introduction 
According to the European Values Study in 1990, one in four Europeans 
undertakes unpaid work for a variety of voluntary groups and charitable 
organisations. A higher proportion of samples in the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Scandinavia excluding Denmark involved in voluntary work than other countries 
such as Portugal and Spain. Voluntary workers tend to be more trusting of others 
than the population at large, they are more reflective and moralistic than non-
volunteers, and less materialistic and more likely to be regular church-goers 
(Barker, et al., 1992:39). Why do religious people do voluntary works and 
charitable activities? It would not be just to say they do it for the sole purpose of 
recruiting new members. On the other hand, it is too simplistic to attribute it to 
genuine altruism, because religious people’s voluntary works and charitable 
activities tend to have some unique constructions which will be discussed in this 
chapter with three types of motivation: empathy, rational choice and soteriology. 
Although religion in modern society loses a major role in providing a moral order 
for the society, religion still seems to exercise influence over an individual’s 
private life by supplying moral values. One of those moral values is altruism. By 
using some data from European Values Study and my own research in UK1, this 
paper will theoretically discuss altruism and why some religious people in Europe 
do voluntary works and charitable activities. 
The term ‘altruism’ was coined by the French sociologist, August Comte 
(1798-1857) and entered the English language in 1853 in translation. Since then 
altruism has been an analytical concept in the social sciences. Originally, 
Comte used altruism to denote the unselfish regard for the welfare of others, or 
                                                          
1 An early form of this chapter first appeared in ‘Voluntary Work, Altruism and Religion in 
Europe’Informationes Theologiae Europae, pp.35-46, 2003. 
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a devotion to the interests of others as an action-guiding principle (see Wispe, 
1978: 304). Apart from external forces such as increased status, social desir-
ability or social approval, it has also been pointed out that feelings of guilt can 
motivate altruism and that feelings of guilt seek compensation that can be 
achieved through altruistic acts (Carlsmith & Gross, 1968; Regan et al., 1972). 
If altruism is, however, defined as the willingness to help others without 
normative obligation and without expecting benefits at a later time, we could 
rarely find actions altruistically motivated. Therefore, this study has adopted 
the definition by Montada and Bierhoff (1991:18): ‘behaviour that aims at a 
termination or reduction of an emergency, a neediness, or disadvantage of 
others and that primarily does not aim at the fulfilment of own interests’, 
adding that ‘the behaviour has to be carried out voluntarily’. 
2. Studies of altruism and religion 
There has been a considerable volume of empirical research into the 
correlation between altruism and religion (Inaba, 2000). Some researchers have 
found religion related to altruistic behaviour. In 1973, the American Institute of 
Public Opinion (Gallup) conducted a survey of 1502 respondents. This survey 
included the question, ‘How often do you feel that you follow your religious 
beliefs and take concrete action on behalf of others?’ Barbara Langford and 
Charles Langford (1974) assessed this survey and pointed out that church 
attendants perceived themselves as more helpful towards others than non-church 
attendants. A study by Nelson and Dynes (1976) was conducted in the Southwest 
of the USA eight months after a city had been struck by a damaging tornado 
which produced extensive and varied helping behaviour. Independent variables 
were devotions such as the frequency of table prayers, church attendance and 
subjective religiosity. Dependent variables were contribution to the funds, 
donation of goods and participation in formal voluntary social work. The findings 
showed that independent variables were positively related to dependent variables. 
Cline and Richards (1965) conducted a survey in the Salt Lake area2 in the 
USA and reached different conclusions, finding no relationship between the 
religiosity factors (as measured by frequency of church attendance, frequency 
of prayer, and contribution of money) and such variables as ‘having love and 
compassion for one’s fellow man’, and ‘being a Good Samaritan’. Darley and 
                                                          
2 Religious preference was 72 per cent Mormon, 9 per cent Protestant, 4 per cent Catholic, and 4 
per cent other. 
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Batson (1973) and Annis (1976) also showed that religiosity was unrelated to 
offering help to others. In another study, no relationship was found between 
religiosity and volunteering to help people (Smith et al. 1975). Moreover, 
Rokeach (1969) noted that those who rated high on church attendance were 
more likely to be insensitive and unconcerned for disadvantaged groups. 
I now turn to consider why there was such disparity in the results of the 
above studies in the 1960s and the 1970s. One possibility is that altruistic 
attitude might be so much a part of many organised religions that respondents 
failed to answer self-report inventories honestly. On the other hand, religious 
people might be more likely to answer questionnaires with honesty, because of 
their beliefs that a Supreme Being knows people’s acts in all situations. Meth-
odological problems such as the measurement of altruism, the measurement of 
religiosity, the amount of respondent diversity, and the control of situational 
variables might contribute to the mixed results (cf. Spilka, 1970). 
Since the 1980s, various studies have shown that religion promoted altruism. 
An analysis based on findings from a questionnaire survey of 300 undergraduate 
students in the USA indicated that religious persons were more likely to carry out 
altruistic acts (Zook et al., 1982). In the study by Lynn and Smith (1991), those 
who did voluntary work in the UK gave religion as one of the main reasons for 
their participation. By analysing various surveys such as British Social Attitudes, 
Gallup Poll and British Household Panel Survey, Gill concludes: 
there is a great deal of evidence showing that churchgoers are relatively, 
yet significantly, different from nonchurchgoers. On average they have 
higher levels of Christian belief (which is hardly surprising), but, in 
addition, they usually have a stronger sense of moral and civic order and 
tend to be significantly more altruistic than nonchurchgoers (1999:261). 
Research by Perkins (1992) examined the relationship between Judeo-
Christian religiosity and humanitarianism. The study was based on data collected 
during 1978-1979 at five diverse colleges and universities in England and the 
USA and data collected during 1988-1990 at the same institutions. The two state-
ments used to measure humanitarianism were (1) ‘People who have done well in 
life have an obligation to help the less fortunate’ and (2) ‘It is the responsibility of 
all members of society to help those members who are unable to help them-
selves.’ The two statements used to measure religiosity were (1) ‘People would 
be better off if they returned to religion, not only for spiritual and ethical guidance 
but for answers to many questions which mankind is too limited to answer 
satisfactorily’ and (2) ‘Religion can help resolve and give guidance to the press-
ing moral, social, and even political problems of the day.’ Perkins concludes: 
Keishin Inaba 
210 
Religiosity appears to be most salient in directly promoting 
humanitarian compassion. The influence of many socio-demographic 
factors often associated with social compassion in other populations 
failed to attain any level of significance among these student data. 
Hence these data suggest that the nature of one’s religious commitment 
might remain one of the few important influences on humanitarianism 
for young persons in the college setting cross-nationally (1992:359). 
The study of Yablo (1990) contrasted native-born Thai and the USA 
citizens on the relation between religion and altruistic behaviour. The results 
showed that the people in Thailand, where 95% of the population is a Buddhist, 
displayed a stronger orientation towards altruistic behaviour than the USA 
citizens. Interview results revealed qualitative differences in philosophies and 
rationale regarding altruistic behaviour: the Thai interviewees were influenced 
by Buddhist doctrine, while the USA interviewees reported being less in-
fluenced by religion and more influenced by pragmatic considerations. The 
findings of this study suggest a relationship between cultural and/or religious 
values and altruistic behaviour. 
Regarding the contribution of religion to voluntary work, Wilson and 
Janoski (1995) analysed the data derived from the three-wave Youth-Parent 
Socialisation Panel Study by the University of Michigan. The results indicate 
that the relation between religion and voluntary work is complex and that there 
should be caution in generalising about the connection. With regard to the habit 
of Americans of giving to charitable organisations, Regnerus et al. (1998) 
found the correlation with religiosity by analysing the data from the 1996 
Religious Identity and Influence Survey. The 13 per cent of the American 
population that considered itself non- religious gave less money to charitable 
organisations than did the rest of the population that held religious beliefs to 
some degree. Moreover, the results showed that ‘which religious tradition a 
person professes and practices is less important than the fact that they practice 
one’ (Regnerus et al., 1998:490). 
3. Motivation for altruism 
Although there seems to be no motivation which is common to everyone, 
several prominent frameworks are readily available for explaining the 
motivations for charitable activities, and these frameworks are nearly universal 
and therefore legitimatise to draw on in accounting for one’s own behaviour 
(cf., Wuthnow, 1995:61, Inaba, 2001). The European Values Study in 1990 also 
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found those frameworks, or three distinguished factors; namely altruistic 
motives, instrumental motives, and obligatory motives. Altruistic motives 
included ‘a sense of solidarity with the poor and disadvantaged’, ‘compassion 
for those in need’, ‘identifying with people who are suffering’, ‘to help give 
disadvantaged people hope and dignity’, and ‘to make a contribution to your 
local community’. Instrumental motives included ‘having time on your hands 
and want something worthwhile to do’, ‘personal satisfaction’, and ‘to gain new 
skill and useful experience’. Motives of obligatory and personal satisfaction 
included ‘an opportunity to repay something, give something back’, ‘a sense of 
duty, moral obligation’, and ‘to bring about social or political change’, but also 
personal satisfaction. The correlation of personal satisfaction with a sense of 
duty may imply that ‘a part of the satisfaction gained relates to the effective 
discharge of obligations’ (Barker, et al., 1992:40). The survey also found that 
voluntary workers had more altruistic and obligatory motives than instrumental 
motives (Barker, et al., 1992:40).  
 
Figure 1: The results of selected countries, the UK, Demark, Germany and the 
USA 
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Source: Barker, et al., 1992:41 
 
In order to compare the results of surveys undertaken in different countries 
and interpret what the variations in these results may imply, Barker, et al (1992) 
converted the results of the European Values Study in 1990 into standard 
scores, or ‘Z scores’. These standard scores were calculated from the combined 
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scores for all the countries in the survey, and the mean score for all countries is 
set to zero and the deviation of each country from the average is expressed in 
terms of ‘standard deviations’ from the mean (Barker, et al., 1992:3). 
As the figure shows, in the UK volunteers stress altruistic motives and 
social obligation, whilst instrumental motive is of less importance. A similar 
situation is ascertained in the USA. By contrast Germany and Denmark regard 
instrumental motives as important, but their situation is different: in Denmark 
altruistic motives and social obligation are of unimportance, whilst the different 
motives are of roughly equal importance in Germany. As Figure 1 shows, when 
it comes to motivation for voluntary works and charitable activities, there seem 
to be no reasons that are common to all. However, three categories, namely, 
‘empathy’, ‘rational choice’ and ‘soteriology’ seem to be useful in attempting 
to sketch out motivations for performing charitable activities of religious 
people. We shall now examine the motivations under the three headings. 
3.1. Empathy 
Sympathy is a similar concept but carries connotations of being on 
someone’s side. People can empathise with their enemies though people may 
not sympathise much. If you take some action in sympathy with someone else 
or in sympathy with what they are doing, you do it in order to show that you 
support them (cf. Campbell, 1998:17). Empathy means identifying and feeling 
sympathy for another person. There is an abundant literature on ‘the empathy-
altruism hypothesis’ emphasising that sympathy or empathy for the needy is the 
motive for altruistic activities. One feels sorry for homeless people or people in 
need and wishes to reduce their distress. Wuthnow (1995) analyses the same 
motivation of young people for caring acts in the category of ‘humanitarianism’. 
According to Wuthnow, humanitarianism means: 
supplying aid, such as food, clothing, and shelter to victims of war or 
natural disaster. The goal is to eliminate pain and suffering. More gen-
erally, humanitarianism combines a feeling of compassion or sympathy 
with a value that attaches importance to helping those toward whom 
one feels compassion (1995:65, 66). 
The term ‘empathy’ may be more conceptual than the term ‘compassion’. 
Some religious people may talk about empathy as their motivations for 
voluntary works and charitable activities by using the term ‘compassion’. One 
feels sorry for homeless people or people in need and wishes to reduce their 
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distress. Some religious people feel compassion for those people who are 
suffering and they reach out to those suffering people. 
On the other hand, some people feel empathetic distress themselves when 
they feel sorry for those who are suffering. Their distress arises from the 
unpleasant emotions which they feel as a result of seeing the homeless people 
or people in need. Alternatively, their distress may arise from emotions of guilt 
or shame they anticipate if they do not help. In any case, they feel sorry for 
people in need and carry out acts to help them. Their actual altruistic acts also 
relieve themselves from their own empathetic distress. I call these kinds of 
motivation for altruistic acts ‘the empathetic distress motivation’. 
3.2. Rational choice 
We shall now examine whether it is rational for some religious people to 
have altruistic concerns and commitments. According to Schmidtz3 (1995), 
rational choice consists of maximising one’s utility subject to a budget constraint, 
and in recent times theorists have taken the term ‘utility’ to mean something 
related to or identical to preference satisfaction. In some cases there are reasons to 
embrace and nurture one’s concern for others, and the reasons have to do with 
what is conducive to one’s utility. It is rational to be peaceful and productive in 
order to create a secure place for oneself in society, which requires one to have a 
regard for the interests of others. People have self-regarding reasons to internalise 
other-regarding concerns. On the other hand, one seeks not only to earn the 
respect and concern of others but also to earn one’s own respect and concern. 
Moreover, it is a simple fact that a person of principles inspires more respect than 
a person driven by mere expedience (Schmidtz, 1995:110). 
Our ultimate interest is in having something to live for, being able to 
devote ourselves to the satisfaction of preferences we judge worthy of 
satisfaction. Not having other-regarding preferences is costly, for it 
drastically limits what one has to live for… Concern for ourselves 
gives us something to live for. Concern for others as well as ourselves 
gives us more (Schmidtz, 1995:105, 106). 
Some voluntary works may be considered to be based on rational choice. 
                                                          
3 In this study, I am referring to the discussion by Schmidtz (1995) on rational choice and altruism. 
Regarding the discussion on rational choice and religion, Iannaccone (1997) covers the framework 
for the scientific study of religion. 
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In the field of social psychology, altruism is classified as ‘reciprocal 
altruism’ (exchange relations) or ‘kin altruism’ (communal relations) (cf., 
Campbell, 1998). Reciprocal altruism is the idea that altruism can be the 
product of natural selection if one behaves altruistically to others who have the 
same predisposition to behave altruistically also. One cares for someone else in 
the hope of receiving help in return, and in such case the altruistic acts are like 
insurance (cf., Wuthnow, 1995:70). As there is often a delay between an 
altruistic act and the reciprocation of the act, it occurs in those species where 
members live in stable social groups, have long memories, and a good ability to 
recognise altruistic acts. This involves the calculation of rewards and costs for 
particular courses of action. This suggests that people in general try to maxi-
mise their rewards and minimise their costs. The focus is upon the individual 
making implicit calculations about what is most beneficial to him or her. 
Regarding reciprocal altruism, Wuthnow (1991:90) emphasises that ‘acts of 
compassion are discrete gifts that have real and symbolic value in order to 
suggest that they also embody, like any good or service, an investment of time 
and energy’. Citing the arguments about gifts and reciprocity by Alvin 
Gouldner (1977), Wuthnow notes: 
giving creates an asymmetry or imbalance in social relationships that 
people feel compelled in some way to rectify. In some contexts the 
norms of the situation may require only that you say a sincere “thank 
you” to the person who has given you a gift. In other circumstances 
you may be expected to give that person a gift of equal value sometime 
in the future (1991:90). 
The socio-biological theory of altruism emphasises that biological and 
social conditions develop altruism and that human beings are genetically 
programmed to be altruistic for the sake of promotion of survival. Within the 
field of socio-biology, ‘kin altruism’ is a contemporary view on altruism 
(Wilson, 1978:53-56; Degler, 1991:279-285). Within this discussion, Browning 
(1992:422) explains: 
altruism is frequently defined as behaviour that appears to sacrifice 
one’s immediate reproductive advantage but which, in the long run, in 
fact contributes to one’s reproductive advantage; i.e., the continuation 
of a percentage of one’s genes in the genes of one’s children or close 
relatives (1992:422). 
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Kin altruism is based on the idea that family, partners and close friends are 
inter-dependent (cf., Campbell, 1998). We may say that kin altruism is based 
on natural affection towards family and close friends rather than rational 
choice. In these relationships, solidarity and harmony are emphasised; one pays 
attention not to what others have done for him or her but to their needs. Kin 
altruism expands to reciprocal altruism by the notion of the norm of social 
responsibility, which states that people should help those who are dependent on 
each other. This norm encourages people to go beyond family and friends and 
to help strangers. Some voluntary works may be based on reciprocal altruism. 
Many research findings show that good mood and happiness can facilitate 
altruism, and Wuthnow (1995:67) also points out that individual happiness and 
the good of others are not incompatible but are in fact linked. In his own survey 
(1991), many people reported that helping others made them feel good and was 
a good way of gaining a sense of satisfaction and fulfilment for themselves4. 
Gaining fulfilment for themselves and feeling good can be considered as 
compensation for the time and energy invested. This is also the case of rational 
choice. Some religious people’s motivations for voluntary works seem to be 
based on rational choice in the sense that they calculate the benefits they will 
receive later. However, this calculation of benefit may not be their primary 
objective of their voluntary works. 
3.3. Soteriology 
The third motivation is soteriological. Religion has been always concerned 
with soteriology. Wilson notes: 
The central religious question is, ‘what shall we do to be saved?’ The 
answers to it justify religious practice. Just what salvation means varies 
from one culture to another, and so do the ways of attaining it. Men may 
seek salvation from immediate and pressing ills that afflict them; or 
salvation may be seen as the liberation of a people and the establishment 
of a new political dispensation; or it may be a preoccupation with benefit 
after death. Salvation extends from therapeutic relief to transcendental 
reassurance or social transformation (1970:21). 
                                                          
4 In his survey, 51 per cent of the public said they receive a great deal of personal fulfilment from 
doing things for people; another 38 per cent said they receive a fair amount of fulfilment. Among 
those currently involved in charitable or social-service activities, 63 per cent said doing things for 
people was a source of a great deal of fulfilment (Wuthnow, 1991:87). 
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Voluntary works of religious people may be also motivated by the quest for 
salvation, because the quest for salvation can produce certain consequences for 
practical behaviour in the world. Weber notes: 
It is most likely to acquire such a positive orientation to mundane affairs 
as the result of a conduct of life which is distinctively determined by 
religion and given coherence by some central meaning or positive goal. 
In other words, a quest for salvation in any religious group had the 
strongest chance of exerting practical influences when there has arisen, 
out of religious motivations, a systematisation of practical conduct 
resulting from an orientation to certain integral values (1978:528). 
Weber (1978:532-534) discusses salvation attained through good work. He 
assumes two different forms of a developing systematisation of an ethic of 
good work. In the first form, ‘the particular actions of an individual in quest of 
salvation, whether virtuous or wicked actions, can be evaluated singly and 
credited to or subtracted from the individual’s account’ (ibid.:533). The second 
form treats ‘individual actions as symptoms and expressions of an underlying 
ethical total personality’ (ibid.:533). Although Weber distinguishes the two 
forms, he concludes that these two produce very similar practical results. 
Weber remarks: 
the social and ethical quality of actions falls into secondary importance, 
while the religious effort expended upon oneself becomes of primary 
importance. Consequently, religious good works with a social orientation 
become mere instruments of self-perfection: a methodology of salvation 
(ibid.:534). 
If the ministry of Jesus is a paradigm of altruism, his death, as interpreted 
by his followers, was its ultimate manifestation. For Christians, states Novak 
(1992:9), ‘Jesus is the altruistic man who died for others as he had lived for 
them. Altruism is the very stuff of the Christian God’. In Christianity, however, 
the terms ‘agape’ or ‘love’ are usually used instead of the term ‘altruism’ (cf., 
Jennings, 1996; Rigby & O’Grady, 1989). Browning (1992:422) remarks 
‘Agape, the Greek word most often used to refer to the rule or law of love in the 
New Testament, is defined in many Protestant sources as entailing primarily 
impartial, self-sacrificial action on behalf of the other and without regard to 
oneself’. However, only ‘the religious virtuosi’ can achieve the extreme self-
sacrificial formulations of the Christian concept of love that exclude all self-
regarding motives. Weber (1978:539) remarks ‘not everyone possesses the 
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charisma that makes possible the continuous maintenance in everyday life of 
the distinctive religious mood which assures the lasting certainty of grace’. The 
extreme self-sacrificial formulations of the Christian concept of love symbol-
ised by the cross have the possibility to deny kin altruism and reciprocal 
altruism. The extreme self-sacrificial formulations may be too hard for ‘the 
average person’ to practise. Consequently, as Browning (1991:423) points out, 
in stark contrast to the initial goals, these extreme self-sacrificial formulations 
may fail to extend natural kin altruism to the wider community, or rather 
function to diminish wider altruism. 
Nevertheless, some religious people may value self-sacrifice. For them, 
‘salvation may be viewed as the distinctive gift of active ethical behaviour 
performed in the awareness that god directs this behaviour, i.e., that the actor is 
an instrument of god’ (Weber, 1978:541). Weber (1978:541) calls this type of 
attitude ‘ascetic’. Concentration upon the actual pursuit of salvation may entail a 
formal withdrawal from the ‘world’: from social and psychological ties with the 
family, from the possession of worldly good, and from political, economic, 
artistic, and erotic activities – in short, from all creaturely interests. One with such 
an attitude may regard any participation in these affairs as an acceptance of the 
world, leading to alienation from god (Weber, 1978:542). For instances, some 
people think of self-sacrifice, acts of service to God, helping God's work, and acts 
for the greater glory of God. They believe that God will bless their acts. Thus, I 
suggest, there is a strong link between the rational choice and soteriology. 
Although there is a utilitarian aspect in soteriology, there is a possibility 
that ethics based on soteriology facilitate altruism and charitable acts, since the 
pure heart itself is regarded as life’s highest reward in a number of religions. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper presented three main motivations for voluntary work and 
charitable activities of religious people. The first one is empathy and the 
empathetic distress motivation was also considered. The second motivation is 
rational choice. Reciprocal altruism, kin altruism and a sense of satisfaction 
were considered as rational choice. The last motivation is soteriology, and 
Christian concept of love, self-sacrifice, and blessing from God were discussed. 
Religious people tend to believe that everything is a gift from God and they 
need God’s endorsement of their social life. Religious teachings may play the 
role of prescribing moral precepts. On the other hand, altruism may be 
developed best not by reading about teachings, or by listening to the sermons, 
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but by the relationships with others who have the same faith and try to help 
each other. If it is the case, religious people in some country may stress 
altruistic motives more than religious people in some other country; even so, 
there seem to be no single motivation for voluntary works and charitable 
activities of religious people which are common to all. To back up this 
theoretical perspective, more case studies in various countries in Europe are 
required, but I assume that further research on voluntary work and charitable 
activities of religious people in Europe will verify the validity of the theoretical 
perspectives presented here. 
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James T. Richardson and Alain Garay 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
FORMER COMMUNIST STATES1 
1. Introduction 
The European Court of Human Rights, located in Strasbourg, France, is 
playing a very important role in defining religious freedom and the meaning 
of religious pluralism in an expanding Council of Europe, as well as for the 
rest of the world. The Council of Europe now includes all traditional Western 
European countries and many countries formerly a part of the Soviet Union. 
The Court is now exerting its authority over former Soviet Union Member 
Countries, attempting to encourage them to become more open to the values 
espoused by the Council of Europe, including the values of freedom of 
religion and belief, as well as freedom of association and expression. As the 
Court takes this approach to new Member States, it may also become more 
willing to exert authority over Western European long-term Member States in 
Article 9 cases. And, the ECHR, as perhaps the premier human rights court in 
the world (for good or ill), sets an international standard when it acts on 
religious freedom matters. 
2. Article 9 
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, 
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public 
                                                          
1 Data for this report were gathered while on sabbatical leave from my home university, during 
which I was able to visit the European Court of Humans Rights in Strasbourg. The Jehovah’s 
Witnesses legal staff have also been very helpful. Work on this project was facilitated by the 
Rockefeller Foundation, which approved a stay in fall of 2001 at the Study and Conference Center 
at Bellagio, on Lake Como, Italy. 
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and private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to 
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of 
the public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
This Article has been much-discussed in terms of its history and meaning. 
For a full reading of the history of the development of the specific language see 
Carolyn Evans (2001), who also has the more thorough discussion of the 
jurisprudential history of Article 9. The historical analysis contained herein 
depends heavily on the work of Evans, and that of Jeremy Gunn (1996) and 
Peter Edge (1998). My own visit to the ECHR in fall, 2001 also furnished 
considerable information of use in this analysis. After recounting the history of 
cases involving freedom of religion and belief claims, I will offer some 
suggestions about why the pattern of case law has developed as it has. 
3. Recent Background 
The ECHR had for decades demonstrated a remarkable reticence to over-
ride Member States in the area of religion, allowing considerable “margin of 
appreciation” of the historical and contextual needs and desires of political 
leaders of the individual countries. This posture has allowed some Member 
States to act in ways that significantly limit religious freedom and the 
development of religious pluralism (Richardson, 1996; Gunn, 1996; Edge, 
1998; Evans, 2001). As Carolyn Evans notes, the most important early decision 
involving Article 9 was perhaps Arrowsmith v. U.K., decided in 1978. In that 
case a pacifist was arrested for distributing pacifist literature to British soldiers 
about to be posted to Northen Ireland. She was found guilty of violating British 
law and appealed to the ECHR in 1975. The Court eventually said that while 
pacifism was covered under the “belief” provision of Article 9, not all actions 
influenced by belief were protected. 
Out of the Arrowsmith case came a “necessity” test that means no violation 
of Article 9 can be found unless a person’s beliefs require a given specific 
action (Evans, 2001:115). Thus if behavior is merely encouraged or permitted 
by a religion it is not protected under Article 9, an approach that rather 
automatically allowed the Commission (still feasible at that time) and the Court 
to disallow most claims made under Article 9. The Arrowsmith necessity test 
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was used for years as a way to defer to Member States when dealing with cases 
involving claims based on Article 9's guarantee of freedom of religion or belief. 
Only with the Kokkinakis case in 1993 did the Court seem to leave this 
very narrow and limited approach to cases involving claims of violation of 
Article 9 (Gunn, 1996:322; Evans, 2001:117). The Kokkinakis case was 
adjudicated on the basis of Article 9, and that case was decided only on a split 
vote of 6-3, even though the case involved application in Greece of a law 
making proselytizing a criminal offense. Kokkinakis had been found guilty, 
fined and sentenced to prison for allegedly attempting to proselytize the wife of 
a local Kantor of the Greek Orthodox Church. The Court, in ruling for 
Kokkinakis, did not, however, state explicitly that the proselytizing law was 
illegal under the European Convention of Human Rights (Evans, 2001). Also, 
some of the individual Court opinions were very critical of the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses proselytizing practices, with some opinions even equating them to 
the controversial so-called “brainwashing” process (Richardson, 1995:47-48). 
Nonetheless, the Kokkinakis case represents a milestone in the development of 
religious freedom in Europe, if not the world. 
A key decision that followed Kokkinakis and even seemed to contradict it, 
was Otto-Preminger Institut v. Austria, decided in 1994 in favor of Austrian 
authorities who had stopped the showing of a film that was thought to be 
offensive to many citizens of Tyrol, where the case originated. The case had 
been brought on freedom of expression grounds (Article 10) but resulted in the 
Court accepting the argument of Austria that this was really an Article 9 case. 
The Court asserted in dicta that the “respect for religious feelings of believers 
as guaranteed in Article 9.” (quoted in Evans, 2001:70). As Evans notes, there 
is no such right guaranteed in Article 9. Thus, this decision seems to turn 
Article 9 on its head and transform it into a way of protecting majoritarian 
interests. As Edge points out (Edge, 1998:681), this case was brought against 
the Institute because of complaints by the local diocese of the Roman Catholic 
Church. Edge, quoting from the opinion, said: “The Court...found it was a 
legitimate Convention aim to ‘protect the right of citizens not to be insulted in 
their religious feelings by the public expression of the views of other persons’.” 
This majoritarian thrust of Otto-Preminger was given more impetus shortly 
afterward with a decision from the U.K. Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, 
decided in 1996, was another case involving an allegedly blasphemous film 
(Edge, 1998; Evans, 2001). The Court, in ruling in favor of U.K. authorities who 
had refused to allow the film to be shown, “referred again to the ‘right of citizens 
not to be insulted in their religious feelings’.” (Quote from Evans, 2001:71) 
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Despite the seemingly contrary Otto-Preminger and Wingrove decisions, 
since 1993 the ECHR has found a number of other violations of Article 9, 
demonstrating a somewhat different approach to some such cases, and a greater 
willingness to address issues of state allowed discrimination on the basis of 
religious belief or practice. This new stance, if it continues, should encourage 
more official recognition of religious pluralism, both in older members of the 
Council of Europe as well as in Former Communist States. 
There have been about a dozen cases claiming violations of religious 
freedom that have been decided for the plaintiff(s) on the basis of Article 9, as 
well as other cases involving religious freedom claims that were decided on 
another basis that seemed to affirm freedom of religion and belief. Granted, 
eight of the post-Kokkanakis cases have also come from Greece, and six of 
those have involved Jehovah’s Witnesses (but not all are proselytizing cases). 
One Greece case involved proselytizing by Pentecostal Church members, and 
another involved allegations of state interference in the internal affairs of a 
Moslem group (a case with implications for how such groups are to be treated 
in Former Communist States). Thus it seems that the Court continues its efforts 
to criticize Greece’s legal strictures on proselytizing as well as other matters 
where government intrusion in the internal affairs of a religion or the practices 
of individual believers has occurred. 
However, there have been successful Article 9 cases as well from Saint 
Marin and Bulgaria, as well as an important case from Spain where govern-
mental collusion in a “deprogramming” was unanimously deemed a violation 
of Article 5 (dealing with false imprisonment), precluding the necessity for the 
Court to address Article 9 issues. A number of other Article 9 cases from 
France, Austria and former Soviet Union countries such as Russia are being 
brought before the Court, as well, inlight of recent major anti-pluralism legal 
developments in several countries (Shterin and Richardson, 1998, 2000, 2002; 
Richardson and Shterin, 1999; Garay, 2000; Richardson and Introvigne, 2001). 
Whether the new pattern of offering some support for religious freedom in the 
future remains to be seen. But, whatever the outcome of most recent submissions, 
ECHR will play a major role in how religious freedom is defined in the “New 
Europe” and elsewhere. 
This paper will briefly examine the recent decisions where violations of 
Article 9 were found, as well as some decided in favor of religious groups and 
individuals on other grounds. This examination will reveal the apparent new 
thinking on the Court concerning such cases, Otto-Preminger and Wingrove 
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notwithstanding. Describing this interesting recent pattern of more apparent 
willingness to affirm religious freedom in some cases and thereby to offer more 
legal sanction for pluralism is important. Attempting to explain this new more 
activist pattern of court decisions by the ECHR is a worthwhile scholarly 
exercise with implications for understanding how new states from the former 
Soviet Union will be integrated into the “old Europe.” We also will discuss a 
few of the recent submissions to the Court that have had a “friendly settlement” 
after the cases were accepted by the Commission. Such cases demonstrate the 
power of the Court to effect changes even without an official decision by the 
Court. And, a number of recent submissions to the Court will be briefly listed, 
to show where the Court may be headed, as it issues rulings applicable to a 
much-expanded Europe. 
4. Major Successful ECHR Cases Involving Article 9 and Related 
Articles 
The ground-breaking Kokkinakis case has already been described here and 
elsewhere (Gunn, 1996; Richardson, 1995; Evans, 2001). While this case was 
indeed a major decision of the Court, the question immediately surfaced as to 
whether this decision indicated a major shift in the thinking of those on the 
Court. The evidence suggests that the decision did indeed represent a change of 
direction for the Court, but one with some important qualifications, as will be 
seen. To demonstrate this point each of the successful cases involving Article 9 
and related articles will be briefly described in turn, starting with the other 
cases from Greece. 
Manoussakis and Others v. Greece 
Filed 8/7/1991 with judgment granted 9/26/1996 supporting right to 
assemble and legally register for a congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
Violation of Article 9 was found. 
Tsirlis and Kouloumpas v. Greece 
Filed 11/26/1991 with judgment granted 5/29/1997 allowing conscientious 
objector status to two Witnesses. Violations of Articles 5-1 and 5-5 were found. 
Georgiadis v. Greece 
Filed 2/27/1003 and judgment granted 5/29/1997 allowing conscientious 
objector status for a Witness. Violation of 6-1 was found. 
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Valsamis v. Greece 
Filed 4/26/1993 and judgment granted 12/18/1996 disallowing punitive 
action against Jehovah’s Witness students who refused to participate in a patriotic 
parade. Violations of Article 13 and 9, as well as of Protocol 1-2 were found. 
Efstratiou v. Greece 
Filed 4/25/1994 and judgment granted 12/18/1996 disallowing punitive 
action against Jehovah’s Witness students who refused to participate in a patriotic 
parade. Violations of Article 13 and 9, as well as of Protocol 1-2 was found. 
Thlimmenos v. Greece 
Submitted 12/18/1996 and judgment granted 4/6/2000 disallowing 
employment discrimination derived from earlier conviction for refusal by a 
Jehovah’s Witness to serve in armed forces. Violations of Article 14 and 9, as 
well as 6-1 were found. 
Larissis and Others v. Greece 
Filed in 1996 and judgment granted 2/24/1998 affirming Kokkinakis 
holding that proselytizing civilians is a legal activity, thus causing a violation of 
Article 9. The case involved members of the Pentecostal Church who were in 
the armed service who had proselytized soldiers under their command as well 
as civilians.(The Court did not find violations for proselytizing members of the 
armed services who were serving under plaintiffs.) 
Serif v. Greece 
Filled 10/9/1997 and judgment granted 12/14/1999 overturning conviction 
of Mr. Ibraim Serif for usurping the functions of a minister and wearing the 
uniform of a Moslem minister. Violation of Article 9. This dispute arose over 
elections to replace the Mufti of Thrace, with the Greek government siding with 
one faction and arresting the leader of the opposing group. 
Canea Catholic Church v. Greece 
Filed in 1996 and judgment granted 16/12/1997 overturning ruling that the 
Canea Catholic Church on Crete, built in the 13th century, had no legal 
standing under Greek law to defend its property from encroachment by 
neighbors. Violations of Article 6-1 and Article 14 were found. 
There is also an important early (1993) decision from Austria that did not 
involve Article 9 directly, but was of note nonetheless. Austria has also seen 
one major case decided, Hoffman v. Austria (filed 2/20/87) with a judgment on 
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6/23/1993, a month after the Kokkinakis decision. The ECHR ruled that a child 
could not be taken from its Jehovah’s Witness mother simply because of her 
religious participation. Violations of Articles 14 and 8 were found. 
The small republic of San Marino also had an Article 9 case worth 
mentioning. In Buscarini and Others v. San Marin, filed in 1994, a judgment 
was granted on 18/2/99 overruling a legal requirement of San Marin that those 
holding public office in the Republic be required to take a religious oath. 
Violation of Article 9 was found. 
Spain also received a ruling against actions taken there in a case 
involving “deprogramming.” In Riera Blume and Others v. Spain, filed in 
1997, a judgment was granted 14/10/99 in favor of the plaintiffs who had 
been imprisoned, with the assistance of the Catalan police, for 10 days for 
purposes of deprogramming them from a religious group, Centro Esoterico 
de Investigaciones, in which they were participants. The Court found a 
violation of Article 5-1, which precludes false imprisonment. 
Bulgaria lost a judgment in Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, filed in 1996, 
and decided on 26/10/2000. This is the first case to be decided before the 
ECHR from a Former Communist State, and thus is of special note. The case 
involved a dispute between two rival factions in the Muslim community, with 
the State siding with one faction and allowing what appeared to be a duly 
elected Mufti and his supporters to be ousted from office, thus losing control of 
Muslim facilities and finances. The ousted Mufti won judgments in the 
Supreme Court of Bulgaria, but the Council of Ministers refused to enforce the 
judgments. Violations of Articles 9 and 14 were found. 
5. Settlements Provoked by ECHR Filings 
Some important cases have been settled after submission to the ECHR, after 
admissibility was granted by the Commission on Human Rights, which screened 
cases prior to a major change in Court procedures that occurred in 1994. Included 
are two cases from Greece, both of which involved Jehovah’s Witnesses: 
Pentidis et al. v. Greece 
Filed 12/30/1993 and referred to the Court 4/17/1996, with settlement reached 
on 6/9/1997 allowing Witnesses to assembly and establish a house of prayer. 
Tsavachidis v. Greece 
Filed 9/20/1995 and referred to the Court 12/15/1997, with settlement reached 
1/21/1999 disallowed secret surveillance of Witnesses by police in Greece. 
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Bulgaria is another country that has been brought to the ECHR by the 
Witnesses, with the settlement of two cases leading to rather dramatic changes 
in how that country handles minority faiths. This represents a successful effort 
to use the Court to effect changes in a former Communist Country, which 
makes the cases notable. The cases brought to the Court that were settled, after 
admissibility was granted include: 
Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Bulgaria 
Filed 9/21/1995 and admissibility granted under Articles 6-1 and 13 on 
7/3/1997, with a settlement reached on 3/9/1998 allowing registration of a 
Witness congregation. 
Stefanov v. Bulgaria 
Filed 7/5/1996 and admissibility to the Court granted under Article 9, with 
a settlement on 5/3/2001 that guaranteed right to alternative service and that the 
length not exceed the military service requirement. 
6. Selected Recent Submissions: What Will They Reveal? 
A number of cases involving allegations of Article 9 (sometimes in 
conjunction with other articles) are pending with the Court, and what happens 
in these cases will demonstrate whether the Court will continue to build on its 
growing record of asserting itself in the area of religious freedom. I do not have 
a full count of all such cases, but do have a listing of cases involving Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, the most active religious group before the Court, as well as a few 
other recent submissions. 
Currently the Witnesses have cases pending from the following countries: 
Bulgaria: Two cases, one concerning deportation of missionaries and the 
other concerning refusal to allow the Witnesses to legally register locally. A 
question arises in these and other cases from former Soviet states as to whether 
the Witness cases from Former Communist States will be treated as Witness 
cases elsewhere, especially Greece. 
Austria: three cases, all dealing with refusal of government to register the 
Witnesses, and consequences of that in terms of qualifying under the conscien-
tious objector status, and being allowed to meet and function as a religion. 
Romania: three cases, including two involving refusal to register the 
Witnesses, one of which also involves failure to grant c.o. status because of the 
lack of registration; another case alleges an unfair trial in a case where the 
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Witnesses were beaten by a mob but were themselves found guilty of hitting 
and insulting members of the anti-cult group that was attacking them. 
France: One child custody case in which authorities took a child from a 
Witness mother because of the “...harsh, intolerant rules for child-rearing 
imposed on the children by members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses.” 
Georgia: Three cases, two of which involve the well-publicized ongoing 
violence against Witnesses in Georgia which apparently has official sanction as 
demonstrated by refusal of authorities to intervene; another deals with lack of 
ability to legally register Witness local congregations. 
Russia: Two cases, one involving the well-publicized effort of the Moscow 
prosecutor to dissolve the Jehovah’s Witness organisation there, in a case that 
has lasted for years, and another involving the shutting down of a congregation 
of deaf Witnesses in Chelyabinski. Claims of prosecutorial abuse, unfair trials, 
and denial of remedies are involved in these cases. 
 
There are also at least two other non-Witness cases pending from Russia, 
one involving a Unification Church affiliated group and the other involving 
Scientology. The UC case comes from St. Petersburg where the UC affiliated 
organisation Collegiate Association for the research of the Principle (CARP) 
was liquidated by governmental fiat, leading to a protracted legal battle that 
CARP eventually lost. CARP was duly registered as a legal association in 
1991, but was required by a 1995 law to reregister. However, authorities 
refused to allow this to occur and then dissolved the group because they were 
not properly registered. The submission claims violations of articles 6, 10, 11, 
and 14, with the major focus being on Article 11. 
The Scientology case also concerns problem with registration, and claims 
violations of articles 9, 10, 11, and 14. The 1997 law on religious freedom 
requires all religious groups to register, but disallows registration unless a 
group has been recognized in the country at least for 15 years. The Scientology 
group in Surgut City was organized in 1992, and the government has refused 
applications to register the group, causing considerable difficulty for the group, 
which as a result has no legal status or standing. 
7. Recent Dismissals of Cases Involving France 
There have been two recent major cases filed by the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
in France, both of which have been denied admissibility. One case, Tavernier 
et al. v. France, filed 12/3/1998, sought to establish that an anti-cult group, 
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UNADFI, did not have legal status to take actions against the Witnesses. The 
case was denied admissibility on 12/14/1999 on the grounds that the Witnesses 
could not demonstrate that they were victims under the Convention. Similar 
logic was used by the Court to dismiss another compliant, Christian 
Federation of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. France, filed 12/10/1999, but dismissed 
11/6/2001, again because the Court said that he Witnesses did not meet the 
definition of a victim. This application was replete with many instances of harm 
that individual Witnesses and Witness organisations had encountered because 
of official governmental reports and actions in France. Violations of Article 13 
(guarantee of an official remedy) in conjunction with 9, Article 6-1 (guarantee 
of fair trial), and Article 9 by itself. 
8. Conclusions: A Double Standard of Justice? 
This research has raised an important question why the current pattern of 
case law has developed with the ECHR, which started (finally) in 1993, finding 
for the plaintiff(s) in some Article 9 cases. But, as noted herein, there is 
something odd about these more recent cases, namely, most of them involve 
Jehovah's Witnesses and most of the cases come from Greece (including some 
non-Witness cases) and former Soviet Union countries. The one successful case 
from Spain, Riera Blume, is the only exception to this pattern of Article 9 
successes. And, it is worth noting that the two recent cases discussed seem 
contrary to the post-Kokkinakis posture, Otto-Preminger and Wingrove, were 
from long-term Council of Europe countries, Austria and the U.K. And, the 
cases that were brought against France by the Witnesses, which look somewhat 
similar to those brought against Bulgaria, were dismissed using some quite 
strained logic that does not comport well with what has happened in the 
Bulgarian cases, where the Court seem to be looking for ways to force change 
in Former Communist States, as they are integrated into the “New Europe.” 
It is possible that the theoretical perspective of Boyle and Thompson 
(2001) might explain some of what is going on, with their emphasis on the 
paradoxical finding that nations with more open political systems may have the 
most claims filed in international tribunals such as the European Commission 
on Human Rights. However, the Boyle and Thompson theorizing seems to 
leave considerable "unexplained variance" when looking at the ECHR record of 
the past 10 years. Some other variable(s) may be operating that will assist us in 
understanding the recent pattern of ECHR cases. 
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It does seem that the "margin of appreciation" generally afforded 
Member States by the ECHR is weakening, but in an interesting way. There 
still seems to be considerable deference shown to dominant and original 
members of the Council of Europe, but Greece seems to be being used as an 
example for other newer states, particularly those from the former Soviet 
Union. In short, it does not seem an accident that Article 9 started seeing 
some action (after 40 years of no violations found by the Court) right after the 
Soviet Union collapsed, and a number of former Soviet Union countries 
began seeking for membership in the Council of Europe. And, it does not 
seem an accident that Greece, which admittedly does have some egregious 
laws and practices concerning religion (especially toward the Witnesses), 
became the "poster child" for this new activism. 
The ECHR is, through its current approach, able to extend its authority 
with former Soviet states but in a way that does not upset the traditional 
deference shown over the years to original Member States. The ECHR can 
continue to disallow most claims being made by traditional Member States, 
while at the same time rightfully claim to be expanding freedoms of religion 
and belief in areas of the world where such values seem sorely needed. 
An alternative to this line of reasoning is obvious, of course. Some would 
argue that Greece and some former Soviet Union states have had or recently 
enacted quite punitive laws that do not affirm religious pluralism to the same 
extent as the legal structures in older Western European democracies do. There-
fore, the ECHR should be making decisions that force these new members of 
the Council of Europe to become more like those Western European democra-
cies. This argument, while appealing, does not seem to address the very 
punitive actions and laws passed in countries such as France and Austria, 
however. Thus, there does seem to be some other considerations operating in 
the recent pattern of decision involving Article 9 and related articles, leading to 
a possible “double standard” interpretation of recent ECHR cases. 
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Aleš Črnič 
DEFINING RELIGION IN THE CONTEXT OF NEW 
RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS 
1. Religion in (post)modern societies 
Religion is man's specific creation.1 As with many of man’s activities, 
religion is changing along with other changes within society. Thus, it would be 
hard to claim that religion is disappearing from modern or post-modern society. 
What we are witnessing in western societies are merely new ways of expressing 
religiosity, which are the consequences of changes within these societies. 
Religion in these societies has been restructuring and repositioning in the last 
few decades. Higher degrees of education, increased geographical and social 
mobility and the exposure to the media of mass communication make control, 
which religious institutions have over the use of religious symbols, difficult or 
even impossible. In this kind of a situation religion can often become subject to 
larger social controversies, since it becomes less predictable. 
Religion is suddenly no longer taken for granted, nor is it defined by the 
dominating traditional religion of its environment. An important argument for 
this kind of understanding can be found in the continuous growth of new 
religious movements (NRM), which are the products of people’s normal 
cultural activities. The substance and structure of these movements mirror the 
state of the western societies at the beginning of the century. To a great extent 
                                                          
1 The idea of religion as a social construct which appeared already in the ancient Greece – 
Ksenofanes (about 580-480 B.C.) – is supposed to be the first to conclude that man creates god 
according to his own image.The sophists and some other philosophers before Socrates (e.g. 
Democritus, Anaxagoras ...) came to similar conclusions. Related to these is the comprehension of 
gods known in the ancient Rome (Lucretius, Gaius Petronius), which ends in the 4th c. with the 
victorious appearance of Christianity. Only later in the times of Renaissance and Reformation the 
hermeneutics of doubt again prevail in the comprehension of religion (Smrke, 2000: 21-23). In the 
modern comprehension of religion, at least since the German philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach, 
religion is considered to be man’s formation (man is the one who creates god or gods according to 
his own image and not the other way around). 
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this state is defined by an inevitable variety and an exceptional diversity of the 
worldviews. In the social situation, when NRMs are becoming global cultures 
(Hexam and Poewe: 1997), which “travel the world and take on local colour, 
/.../ and have both a global, or metacultural, and a local, or a situationally 
distinct, cultural dimension” (ibid: 41), religious activities are being defined 
mainly by the principle of choice. Each individual decides about his or her 
religious choice, similar to any other activity, according to its rewards and 
costs, as Rodney Stark and William S. Bainbridge (1987) explain in their 
comprehensive theory of religion as a rational choice. 
This situation has added an additional dimension in the post-socialistic 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe where, after the fall of the Berlin wall, 
the established churches often try to attain the dominant position which they 
occupied before the climb of communism and socialism. This situation reopens 
a spiritual arena, which is interesting for NRMs (mainly those from the USA 
and Western Europe, as well as a small number of the newer ones, being more 
or less original and unique).2 
The ways of defining religion, under social conditions, which are 
significantly influenced by the deinstitutionalisation of religion and more or less 
massive appearance of new, more individualistic forms of religion3 (for example 
New Age), need to be carefully reconsidered, since it is the administrative and 
legal defining (setting of the conditions on which an organisation is allowed to 
acquire the status of a religion and thus become entitled to tax benefits, the 
presence in school programmes, access to public media, etc.) of religion which is 
becoming more and more connected to serious problems. 
Let me illustrate this with concrete example from Slovenia. In spring 2003 
the Hindu and Buddhist religious communities convened a press conference in 
Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia, where they revealed to the public their 
problems regarding the registration of their activities. Namely, religious commu-
nities in Slovenia have to register their activities at a competent governmental 
office and thus acquire the status of a legal entity. Since 1976, when the Law on 
legal status of religious communities was released, this office registered 31 
                                                          
2 For the analysis of the social status of NRMs and their relationship with the mainstream churches 
of Central and Eastern Europe, see Barker, 1997. 
3 In order to include in the studies also religious phenomena outside the dominating established 
religions and churches, researchers of religion formed new expressions, such as for example “invisible 
religion” (Luckmann, 1967). Several different expressions, e.g. bricolage, mix-and-match, do-it-
yourself religion, religion à la carte etc., have been used to describe modern religiosity. 
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religious communities, the last one in 1999. The Hindu and Buddhist representa-
tives, however, draw attention to the (in)activity of the agency since there was no 
response from the office for several months after the application for registration 
was made. These facts triggered a reaction from the ombudsman's office, they 
became a prey to the media and were internationalised by the Forum 18, the Oslo 
based human rights organisation.4 Thus, it was gradually revealed that around ten 
religious communities made a registration application in the past three years but 
the Office for religious communities simply did not deal with them. The head of 
the office, who has been performing this function since the middle of the year 
2000, alleged the main argument for such (in)activity to be the fact that the 
concept of religion has not been legally defined. According to his interpretation 
(as stated in the leading national daily newspaper),5 he was not able to register 
new religious communities since the criteria, according to which he could judge 
whether a certain group, which wishes to register as a religious community is 
really a religion, had not been legally defined. 
On account of the pressure of the above mentioned organisations and the 
public, the office registered three new religious communities in August 2003: 
fifteen months after applying for registration the Calvary Chapel Protestant 
church became the first new religious community to be registered in Slovenia 
since 1999; soon afterwards the office registered the Dharmaling Buddhist 
community (after seven months), and the Hindu community which has been 
waiting for registration for seventeen months. The office has declined to iden-
tify about seven more religious communities who were believed to be waiting 
for registration. 
Although a sort of unofficial moratorium on registration of new religious 
communities, which governed since 2000, seems to be over, the above 
presented events in Slovenia6 open up a range of interesting questions which 
are important for the field of academic research of religions as well as religious 
life in practice. They place focal attention on the principal question of how 
different social acteurs define religion. 
                                                          
4 Named after Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states: “Every 
person has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right includes the freedom 
to change religion or belief, and the freedom to express – either singly or together with others, and 
either publicly or privately – one's religion or faith through teaching, practice, worship and ritual.” 
5 ‘Delo’, 14.6.2003. 
6 For a more detailed report on the Slovene situation, see Črnič and Lesjak, 2003. 
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Different social acteurs of defining religion Officially recognised status of 
religion in the majority of legal systems ensures certain legal protection, several 
tax benefits, access to the public media, etc. Consequently, religion becomes a 
“cultural good” being fought for by various interest groups. It becomes a claim 
for certain groups to attain the social status and the benefits ensured by the 
status of religion (Introvigne, 1999). 
The defining of religion is thus not solely a task for scholars (as we can see 
from Slovene case). Definitions can have very concrete and serious practical 
consequences for individuals and various groups, as well as institutions. Namely, 
under certain conditions definitions become politically significant in the sense 
that they influence the relations of power. For that reason, definitions cannot be 
characterised as being merely theoretical. They can decisively influence the role, 
significance and borders of religion in public, social life. (Beckford, 1999) 
Definitions are not used (and constructed) exclusively by scholars but also 
by several different acteurs in the social arena. They may be used by politicians 
when defining the role of religion in society (e.g. in school system and other 
public institutions). The legal system may use them when deciding who is 
entitled to have the status of religion. Definitions are also used by established 
churches in order to strengthen their position in society and to express their 
position towards competitive religions. NRMs make use of these definitions 
when they strive to attain the legal status of a religion, which then makes their 
social activities and certain benefits7 connected with the status possible. 
Different parties show varying tendencies when defining religion. Social 
scientists generally use broader definitions in order to embrace as many reli-
gious phenomena as possible into the analysis. On the other hand politicians 
and the legal system, under conditions of increased competition among differ-
ent religious entities, often narrow this definition (politicians sometimes do it 
by using the criteria of authenticity and genuineness). The interpretation used 
                                                          
7 It should be mentioned that certain groups and organisations refuse the status of religion since its 
legal restrictions make certain activities, such as activities in schools, imposible. Thus, for example, 
Transcendental meditation of the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi (unsuccessfuly) tried to prove in the New 
Jersey Court that it is not a religious organisation but merely a meditative technique and as such it 
should be allowed to be taught in public schools. Also Brahma Kumaris and Ananda Marga (see 
Barker, 1989: 146) are avoiding the term “religion”. Similarly, primary schools in Slovakia had to 
give up the attempt to start introducing yoga in the school year 2000/2001 – first as part of physical 
education, later as an optional subject – after loud protests of the Roman Catholic and Evangelical 
churches, and also some parents; the main argument being that the Swami Maheshvarananda’s 
international association Yoga in Everyday Life is a case of a foreign hindu religious activity. 
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by politicians and the legal system often comes close to the popular under-
standing of religion, which is distinctly culturally conditioned and as such 
normally not inclined to the new ways of expressing religiosity. It usually 
defines religion with the terminology of the established mainstream religions 
(such as Christianity in all its different forms in the West), which are thus in a 
privileged position towards all other religious forms. A similar interpretation of 
religion is used by the mainstream churches. 
Accordingly, we can clearly distinguish between (1) the scholarly definitions, 
being constructed and used by social scientists, and (2) the institutional definiti-
ons of religion, which are formulated and used by various political bodies, courts, 
etc. (and are commonly influenced by the popular notions of religion). 
2. The approaches of social science to defining religion 
The basic guidelines followed by social science, in the theoretical defining of 
religion, seeks to create a definition which encompasses a wide circle of religious 
forms, and excludes those phenomena which have some characteristics of a 
religion, but could not be considered as one. The theoretical defining of religion 
roughly distinguishes between the two basic approaches: (1) substantial 
definitions which try to define what religion is, and to determine which elements 
distinguish religious categories from non-religious ones and (2) functional 
definitions which define religion according to the function it has for an 
individual and society. 
2.1. Substantial definitions 
The substantial definitions of religion are more specific than the functional 
ones and more explicit regarding the substance of religion. They are also nar-
rower and typically exclusive, enabling a clearer distinction between religious 
and non-religious phenomena. The substantial definitions are based on the West-
ern Christian view of the world and are therefore closer to the “common-sense” 
definitions of religion. Many non-Christian cultures have a radically different 
comprehension of religion. Therefore it is necessary to determine the basic ingre-
dients of religion which, being general, should also be sought in non-Christian 
religions. For this reason, substantial definitions use an additional criterion – a 
special relationship of human beings towards the world of gods and supernatural, 
which is an awe-inspiring relationship and is expressed in sacrifice and worship. 
However, this criterion does not solve all the problems. One familiar 
problem arises when dealing with the theravada Buddhism which does not 
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acknowledge the existence of god, but due to its overall comprehension and the 
directing of human life towards the “ultimate goal” and the breakout from the 
cycle of continuous rebirths and redemption in nirvana, it would be hard to 
abnegate their status of religion. A solution to this problem appeared with the 
introduction of the category of the sacred8 introduced by E. Durkheim within 
the frames of sociological tradition. It refers to an area which a group of beli-
evers determines as consecrated, as such distinguishes it from the profane, and 
protects it with certain ceremonies and rules (Durkheim, 1915:62). Durkheim 
comprehends religion as an attitude to all sacred things, which unite people into 
a moral community, the church.9 
Part of each religion is a system of beliefs about the world, which 
determines man’s “ultimate concern”10 and the area of the sacred, which 
requires an awe-inspiring relationship and is protected by taboos. Religion 
usually offers answers to the central questions about the meaning of life, about 
cosmogony, and also consolation due to the suffering and inevitability of death. 
It bases and strengthens the fundamental “truths” with ritual practice, which 
mainly supports and sustains the existing social order, and at the same time 
unites individuals into a community. Rituals include religious festivals, the 
sacraments (births, marriages, funerals) and similar activities, which symbol-
ically connect the spiritual and material world. 
The substantial definitions are suitable for the studying of religion in 
relatively stable societies, however, problems can arise when analysing religious 
changes, since it is difficult (or impossible) to find a substantial definition which 
                                                          
8 Within phenomenology of religion the sacred was defined and substantiated by Rudolf Otto as 
"mysterium tremendum et fascinans" (Otto, 1993). The sacred (numinous) is a terrifying and at the 
same time fascinating field, something, which seizes you with horror and attracts you at the same 
time. The Romanian historian of religion Mircea Eliade comprehends sacred as something which is 
beyond our powers of comprehension. 
9 In his book “The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life”, Durkheim gives a classical 
sociological definition of religion, and thus defines religion as “a unified system of beliefs and 
practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and 
practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to 
them.” (Durkheim, 1915:47) If we neglect the term church, we get a definition, which is still useful 
and involves four main sociological components; religion consists of beliefs, practice – rituals, the 
sacred, and of a community or a social organisation of people, united by a religious tradition. 
10 A liberal theologian Paul Tillich (1886-1965) comprehends religion as something which 
“concerns man as last”, which is his ultimate concern. Religion helps answer the ultimate questions 
of human life and thus gives meaning to the entire human life. That which “concernes man as last”, 
what is worth living and dying for, is their religion (regardless of the fact whether it contains 
conceptions such as god, soul, supernatural, etc.) (see Kerševan, 1995:20). 
Defining Religion in the Context of New Religious Movements 
 241 
would be permanently valid in societies that are constantly and sometimes rapidly 
changing. The advantage of the substantial definitions is thus their specificity and 
therefore usefulness in the empirical studies of religion. However, due to their 
tight dependence on the historical and cultural environment, they are rather 
ineffective when studying religious changes and non-Christian religious forms 
(see McGuire, 1992:11-13). Consequently the substantial definitions are less 
applicable when studying NRMs. 
2.2. Functional definitions 
Religion, as seen by the functional and more inclusive approach,11 is that 
which performs the function of religion. The two well-known functions of relig-
ion are the ones of integration and compensation. According to Durkheim’s 
classical sociological definition, religion is a factor, which unites individuals into 
a community called a church. This is the function of integration, which, by means 
of its notions, values, rituals, symbols, etc., joins people into a spiritual-moral 
community. The sole etymological explanation of the word root religiare 
indicates the integrative function of religion. The function of compensation is by 
all means best illustrated by the Marx’s denotation of religion as “the opium of 
the people”, which “has the effect of opium with its images of the heavenly world 
and the divine kingdom, or of the real inner spiritual reality against an otherwise 
unbearable external material social reality” (Kerševan, 1995:21). Religion offers 
consolation for human suffering and the inevitability of death. At the same time, 
religion usually legitimates, justifies, and strengthens the existing social order – 
this is called the legitimising function of religion. Apart from the above 
mentioned, religion also brings meaning into man’s activities and life in general – 
religion can be everything that gives meaning.12 
                                                          
11 The substantional definitions are considered to be exclusive, and the functional ones inclusive, 
but that is not always the case. The category of the sacred can, for example, be the basis of the 
substantional exclusive comprehension of religion, but it can, on the other hand, “annexionistically” 
spread the area of religion on anything people consider sacred (the sacred being undersood 
“functionalistically”, as something which is the most valuable and the most important for a human 
being/the society) (Kerševan, 1998:83, 84). 
12 The understanding of religion as a meaning-giving activity in the functional defining of religion 
is based on Weber’s and Simmel’s work. 
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The functional definitions13 usually include the majority of the elements of 
the substantial definitions, but are normally more comprehensive. While certain 
phenomena, such as ideologies, nationalisms, even atheism, Marxism, etc., are 
not considered as religion by the substantial definitions, the extremes of the 
functional definitions allow for this kind of denotation. Certain secular rituals 
of modern societies, for example political campaigns, television commercials, 
rock concerts and the Olympic games, perform many functions, which 
Durkheim has already defined as religious. They promote social solidarity and 
help construct collective identity. Accordingly, even activities such as sports, 
art, music, sex, etc. can be the source of religious elements. 
The main advantage of the functional definitions, if compared to the 
substantial ones, is their usefulness when studying the intercultural, trans-
historical and changeable elements of religion. This same characteristic, 
however, makes them less applicable in empirical studies, which require clear 
quantifiable definitions. But nevertheless the functional definitions are more 
useful than substantial ones when studying the activity and context of NRMs. 
2.3. Open definitions 
Although we could claim, that in the religious pluralism of modern 
societies, the functional and more inclusive approach has proven to be more 
useful than the substantial (more exclusive) one, both approaches also show 
some obvious weaknesses. The prevailing tendency in social science is, for that 
reason, to use different “open” definitions which more or less derive from the 
works of the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. He introduced a thesis 
in his Philosophical studies (Wittgenstein, 1958), according to which social 
phenomena which carry a common name do not necessarily have a common 
basis, however they are connected by a complex net of  “Family Resemblance”. 
Thus, for example, it is impossible to define the common basis of the games 
where family relations play the most important role. None of the resemblance 
(characteristics) is necessarily a component of an individual game. On the other 
hand, none of the games involve all characteristics of all games (see Smrke, 
                                                          
13 As an example of a functional inclusive definition of religion I quote Yinger’s definition, 
according to which religion is “a system of beliefs and practices by means of which a group of 
people struggles with the ultimate problems of human life ”, (Yinger: 1970:12) and Geertz’s five-
part definition: “A Religion is (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, 
pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a 
general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that 
(5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic” (Geertz, 1968:4). 
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2000:28, 29). Many authors applied this Wittgenstein’s conclusion to religion 
and found out that it is not possible to determine the basis of religion or a 
certain common characteristic (or a combination of characteristics), which 
would be typical for all religions. A special characteristic of religion is the net 
of (family) characteristics/resemblance, but none of the individual religions 
includes all characteristics of religion (in general). It is also not necessary that a 
certain characteristic is included in each individual religion. “The inclusion or 
exclusion of certain phenomena is not carried out by the deduction on the 
grounds of the exact rules about the belonging (to a variety of phenomena with 
the name religion); they are carried out with the help of analogy, that is, on the 
basis of the judgement, whether a certain system of beliefs and practices in a 
given example includes a sufficient number of dimensions and specific 
characteristics” (Kerševan, 1998:84). Thus, some world religions have less and 
others more common (family) characteristics; religion itself is a “phenomenon 
with blurred margins” (Smrke, 2000:29). 
The American philosopher Rem B. Edwards quotes some of the most 
typical family characteristics of religions: the belief in supernatural or superior 
beings; a complex view of the world which includes the explanation of the 
meaning of life; the belief in life after death; a certain moral codex sanctioned 
by (a) superior being(s); consideration of the question of evil; theodicy (the 
question of the meaning of suffering); prayers and ceremonies; sacred places 
and buildings; revealed truths; certain experience, such as awe and mysticism; 
deep intensive care for something; institutionalised social sharing of (some) 
characteristics listed, etc. (Edwards, 1972). 14 
The approach to defining religion that has been prevailing in modern social 
science is the unsubstantial, non-hegemonic and multidimensional one. “The 
purpose of sociology is not to find out (once and for all) what religion as such 
is, but to try to understand the logic which drives the transformations of the 
religious universe specifically through the social-historical manifestations” 
(Hervieu-Léger, 1999:84). The definition of religion is thus a dynamic concept 
dependent on several different contextual factors. As such, each definition 
should meet seven initial aims or criteria (Ferré, 1967:44-55): 
                                                          
14 English sociologist B. Wilson makes use of a similar approach to form a list of twenty most 
frequent characteristics of religion. In his detailed and extensive analysis, Wilson was able to apply 
the majority of his list (fifteen out of twenty items) to Scientology, which he then used as a basis to 
prove that Scientology should be granted the status of religion (Wilson, 1990:279-288). 
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1. A definition should cover a wide spectrum of religion, without narrowing 
down the area of study in advance. 
2. The definition should not be too loose and indefinite, as it has to 
distinguish between religious and non-religious phenomena. 
3. The thought that religion is relevant to the whole of a person’s life should 
be left intact. 
4. It should not bind to certain beliefs or cultural phenomena that are often 
connected with these beliefs (as for example the belief in God). 
5. The question of a private or public religion needs to be left open – it 
should not be judged or even stated, whether a religion is fundamentally a 
private or a public phenomenon. 
6. A definition should not judge a religion’s truth or falsity in advance. 
7. A definition should not judge whether a religion is harmful or beneficial 
in human life.15 
 
These kind of value- and culture-neutral definitions also encompass the non-
conventional religious forms and are thus very suitable for the investigation of the 
modern diverse and often extremely unclear religious situation. 
3. Institutional defining of religion 
The attempts to define the concept of religion are however, as already 
mentioned, not a task reserved for social scientists only. Although legal systems 
(constitutions and laws) of democratic countries commonly ensure freedom of 
religious activities, they do not include any specific definitions of religion. 
Despite this fact, state agencies (politics, judicature) often need to form at least 
some kind of definition of religion in order to be able to perform their duties. 
For that reason, courts often ask professionals (in this case social scientists) for 
their opinion in legal cases which deal with religion. However, the outcomes of 
such cases can be very different. Expert opinions16 are decisive only in some 
                                                          
15 A definition which abandons the understanding of religion as something a priori good and 
constructive, makes the abnegations to the religious status of many NRMs, which are considered 
deviant by breaking the law, impossible. Obeying the law cannot be the criterium according to 
which an activity of a certain group is considered religious or not (which certainly does not mean 
that laws don’t apply to religious groups, since democratic societies demand this kind of obedience 
from all social organisations). 
16 Naturally, not all social scientists define religion in the same way. While the majority of 
sociologists (but not all) use broad inclusive definitions and usually defend the rights of NRMs, 
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cases. Often institutional decisions are made on the ground of popular notions 
of religion, which are influenced by mass media and anticult groups. 
An example of an institutional approach to defining religion can be 
illustrated by examining the criteria, according to which the American Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) has been determining entitlement to income tax relief of 
religious communities since 1978. An organisation which would like to gain 
the right to this particular tax relief in the USA has to comply with the follow-
ing 14 conditions: a distinct legal existence; a recognised creed and form of 
worship; a definite and distinct ecclesiastical government; a formal code of 
doctrine and discipline; a distinct religious history; a membership not associ-
ated with any other church or denomination; an organisation of ordained 
ministers; ordained ministers selected after completing prescribed studies; a 
literature of its own; established places of worship; regular congregations; 
regular religious services; Sunday schools for religious instructions of the 
young; and schools for the preparation of its ministers (Inrovigne, 1999:46). 
In many countries religious groups are legally obliged to officially register 
their existence and activity. As a prerequisite these religious organisations have 
to fulfil certain legal conditions, which often involve a minimal number of 
devotees or a minimal time period for which the religion has to be present in a 
particular country. Consequently, the registration of many NRMs, which do not 
have a large number of devotees and/or have been active, by definitions of 
western societies, for a relatively short period of time, can be made extremely 
difficult if not impossible. 
The institutional defining of religion thus often restricts activities of NRMs, 
but on the other hand it frequently guaranties and protects their rights. The 
controversial relationship of several institutions and the public towards the 
Church of Scientology17 is used here as an example. In 1993 the already 
mentioned IRS approved tax relief to all branches of the Church of Scientology in 
the USA. However, this happened only after 25 years of severe legal discussions 
and public arguments in which Scientology was denied the status of religion by 
arguments such as the absence of religious rituals and prayers, the charging for 
the services of the Church of Scientology, whose financial structure is supposed 
to be similar to the one of a multinational company, the membership of 
                                                                                                                                
some psychologists and psychiatrists, on the other hand, often use exclusive definitions of religion 
and several theories of mental manipulation or “brainwashing” when they appear in the court as 
witnesses against NRMs. More in Melton, 2001; see also Barker, 1997. 
17 See Introvigne, 1999; also Melton, 2000. 
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Scientologists in other religious communities, supposed criminal acts of many 
Scientologists, etc. According to the opinions of several critics, the Church of 
Scientology is an organisation, which uses religion as a cover in order to follow 
mainly business goals. When Scientology was acknowledged the status of 
religion by the IRS (which thus considered the prevailing opinion of the 
scholars), a conflict between the American government and the Church of 
Scientology, which lasted several years, came to an end.18 
Meaningful example of institutional approach towards defining religion is 
the decision of the Italian Supreme Court, with which it stated that Scientology 
is a genuine religion.19 According to its verdict 
“the non-existence of a legal definition of religion in Italy (and 
elsewhere) is not coincidental. Any definition would rapidly become 
obsolete and would, in fact, limit religious liberty. It is much better 
(according to the Italian Supreme Court) not to limit with a definition, 
always by it’s very nature restrictive, the broader field of religious 
liberty. Religion is an ever-evolving concept, and courts may only 
interpret it within the framework of a specific historical and 
geographical context, taking into account the opinions of the scholars.” 
(Introvigne, 1999:65) 
                                                          
18 Similarly Scientologists faced some extremely intolerant public reactions in Germany. Many 
members of the government publicly condemned Scientology, the youth organisation of the 
Christian Democratic Union imposed a boycott on the films featuring Tom Cruise and John 
Travolta, who are the members of the Church of Scientology. This anti-scientological mood 
reached its peak in 1997 when government decreed official surveillance of the Church of 
Scientology. However, courts did not always act in accordance with this kind of public atmosphere. 
A series of important court cases ended in favor of Scientologists. In 1986 the religious status of the 
local Scientology organisation was rescinded by the Municipality of Stuttgart. Scientologists sued 
the Municipality, the Jurisdictional Court in Stuttgart passed judgement in favor of the 
Municipality, but the Court of Appeal in Mannheim invalidated this judgement in November 1997 
and returned the status of religion to the Scientologists (for a detailed report on the position of the 
NRMs in Germany see Schoen, 2001). 
19 In Italy, where the relationship of society towards non-traditional religions is less hostile, a whole 
series of court procedures related to the religious status of Scientology took place in the 1990s. In 
January 1997 the Court of Appeal in Rome decided against a judgement rendered by the Court of 
First Instance with the decision that the charging for the services is not in contradiction with the 
religious mission of Scientology and thus does not influence the religious status of the Church of 
Scientology. Similarly the court in Turin in March 1993 closed a 10-year-long procedure with the 
conclusion that Scientology is a genuine religion and consequently passed an acquittal sentence to 
21 Italian Scientologists charged with tax evasion. The Court of Appeal in Milan came to a 
different conclusion in 1993 and 1996, proclaiming that Scientology is not a religion. But 
eventually both verdicts were rejected by the Italian Supreme Court in October 1997 (for a more 
detailed report on the Italian situation concerning NRMs, see Introvigne, 2001). 
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As distinguished from the legislation (and also the practice in courts) of the 
majority of the Western democratic societies, which normally protect religious 
freedom and consequently the rights of NRMs, several reports of certain 
parliamentary, governmental and other administrative bodies usually are 
distinctively negative. Cases of such reports,20 which use theories “imported” 
from the USA on brainwashing,21 mental manipulation and mind control of 
NRMs to abnegate the status of a “genuine” religion, can lately be traced in 
France (Assemblée Nationale, 1996 and 1999; Observatoire Interministériel sur 
les Sectes, 1998; Mission Interministérielle de Lutte contre les Sectes – MILS, 
2000), Belgium (Chambre des Répresentants de Belgique, 1999), and Switzer-
land (Audit sur les dérives sectaires, 1997; Commission pénale pour les dérives 
sectaires, 1999). In France, where relationship of the public towards NRMs 
appears to be very intolerant, a severe “anticult” law was passed on 31st May 
2001 on the grounds of the above mentioned reports. The main goal of this anti-
cult law is to “strengthen the attempts to prevent and prohibit the cult move-
ments which threaten human rights and fundamental freedoms”.22 
4. Conclusion 
As we have shown, definitions of religion are not employed exclusively by 
scholars, but also by a wider public, politics, the legal system, and various 
religious communities. In (post)modern pluralist societies there is a need to 
form a concept of religion which will serve the cognitive needs (in academic 
research) as well as the broader social (political) needs. The concept of religion, 
however, always depends on the broader context and the specific goals of the 
person constructing it. As opposed to the expert definitions of religion (formed 
by social science), which are normally open and include also new, non-
traditional forms of religiosity, popular definitions are, on the other hand, 
considerably narrow and allow only slight deviations from the dominating 
Christian forms of religion. Institutional definitions usually aim at the middle 
ground between the expert and the popular definitions. 
Thus in practice social definitions of the term religion are often connected 
with conflicts. This is evident also from the Slovene case described at the 
                                                          
20 For a comprehensive overview of the European parliamentary and administrative reports see 
Richardson and Introvigne, 2001. 
21 For a more detailed analysis of the brainwashing theory, see Melton, 2001; see also Lesjak, 2001. 
22 For a more exhaustive description of the situation of NRMs in France, see Hervieu-Léger, 2001. 
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beginning. In certain countries – particularly the post-socialistic ones – 
religious organisations have to register with a competent state agency. “Not 
being registered might mean that religious body is unable to hire a hall for 
meetings, or even to use its own premises for acts of worship; it may even 
mean that it cannot function as a religious organisation in some societies” 
(Barker, 1997:58). If a certain group wishes to acquire the legal status of 
religion, it has to be first recognised by the state – which usually means that it 
also has to correspond (at least to a certain degree) with the concept of religion 
as accepted by society. 
In modern pluralist societies these requirements are, however, not always 
easy to meet. This applies particularly to many states of Central and Eastern 
Europe which legally (and formally) regulate the field of religious activities 
after the change of the political system. In these societies it is possible to detect 
clearly articulated and well led attempts of traditional churches to acquire the 
dominant social status which would be comparable with the one they had 
before the Second World War. On the other hand, these societies are exposed to 
invasion of different NRMs which enter this re-opened spiritual area. Both 
processes lead to the formation of different and often contradictory notions of 
religion. In practice, however, the social status of religion is most frequently 
based on traditional notions which are better suited to the established churches 
and often push new religious groups to the margins since these are usually 
associated with negative stereotypes. 
After 1978, when 913 members of the People’s Temple in Guyana (under 
the leadership of Jim Jones) tragically died, the American public became 
extremely suspicious and occasionally even hostile towards “cults”. A similar 
anticult mood was actuated in Europe by a series of 74 ritual suicides of the 
Solar Temple in France, Switzerland and Canada between 1994 and 1997. In 
many countries (USA, France, Germany, etc.) a stereotype appeared in the 
public perception of NRMs, according to which NRMs were seen as socially 
destructive and deviant organisations which, due to several illegal activities and 
“deceitful” techniques of membership recruitment (such as brainwashing, 
mental manipulation, mind control, etc.), were not considered to be “genuine” 
religions, but criminal associations whose motives were more financial than 
religious. As public activities of the anticult movements increased, a certain 
fear of “cults” prevailed in public mind. This fear can be traced, through its 
principal characteristics, to a process which sociology defines as moral panic. 
This public image of NRMs is, however, not confirmed by either the theory 
of social science or legal practice. On the contrary, a whole range of empirical 
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research disproved the credibility of the brainwashing theory and similar 
theories of mental manipulation. On the other hand, a series of court procedures 
ended with the ascertainment that the majority of NRMs are engaged in 
legitimate religious activities. Although many NRMs, which appeared in 
modern Western societies mainly in the second half of the 20th century, practice 
a different type of religiosity from the one of the established Christian churches, 
they are engaged in legitimate religious activities. 
The substantial approach, which defines religion according to its 
authenticity and genuineness, is for this reason becoming distinctly problematic 
in modern, religiously pluralist societies. Open definitions are therefore far 
more suitable in the described situation. They enable a better understanding of 
modern religious problems on the grounds of family resemblance within 
religion. These kinds of open approaches are the ones that enable the analysis 
and understanding of the modern dynamic religious forms. Religion is an 
extremely complex and diverse phenomenon, which needs to be studied from 
several different angles (and consequently within various academic disciplines). 
In this way, it is possible to develop a wide spectrum of several different 
legitimate definitions of religion. However, the demands for a universally valid 
definition of religion for all times and cultures are unrealistic. 
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Katarzyna Leszczyńska 
THE STANDPOINT OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC 
CHURCH IN POLAND AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC 
TOWARDS EUROPE, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS 
1. Introduction 
The structural changes of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the 
fall of the “Iron Curtain” and a real opening of these countries, which until 
recently were isolated from “Imperialistic societies” and the influence of the 
West, have involved progressive liberalisation in all domains of social and 
political life. The transformation of the system has had its expressions not only 
on the economic level or in domestic policy. One consequence of the system 
changes was a redefining of relations between the postcommunist countries and 
the countries of the European Communities (hereafter the European Union). 
The Communities made an agreement about the economic cooperation with 
Poland in 1989, and with Czechoslovakia in 1990. Next, the “Europe 
Agreements” (concerning the affiliation of, among other things, Poland and the 
Czech Republic with the European Communities) were concluded in Brussels, 
and became valid on 1st of January 1994 in Poland, and in the Czech Republic 
on 1st of January 1995. 
Due to the process of integration the Catholic Church in both countries has 
had to take a stand. The Holy See has tried not only to observe these processes, 
but also to engage in it, founding special institutions. The Popes of the period – 
Pius XII, John XXIII, Paul VI, and John Paul II have all declared support to the 
European integration. 
Local Catholic Churches, both in Poland and the Czech Republic, have been 
the actors in the social and cultural transformation at the turn of 80/90s. 
Obviously the role of the Roman Catholic Church in the Czech Republic is less 
important in society then the role of the Church in Poland, and its assessment of 
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Europe or the European Union has less importance for Czech society as a whole 
than the standpoint of the Church in Poland. Czech society is very secularist, and 
the Church is not very active in the political or social sphere and it even fears to 
step into social life – literally – because as Czech bishop Liška said “priests do 
not put cassocks on going out, in order to escape the risk of mockery". The 
Church in Poland is dominant, and Polish society, which is about 90 % Catholic, 
keeps sui generis “monopoly of belief”. The Church in Poland, despite 
secularisation or pluralisation of culture and religion in Poland, has still a high 
social authority, and a strong influence on moulding public opinion. 
What I should emphasize at the beginning of this article is that the 
identification of the European Union with Europe is not justified, however this 
happens often, in statements by Church leaders. The European Union is an 
economic and political organisation, and firmly emphasizes its neutrality in its 
outlook, which was expressed in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 and the Nice 
Treaty of 2000. However the Church, especially the Church in Poland when 
assessing the possible results of membership in the European Union 
(threats/costs or profits), takes the moral condition of Europe into consideration 
– including the European normative sphere (for example processes and 
phenomena such as postmodernism, secularisation, or pluralism)1. 
The issue of the standpoint of the Churches towards Europe and the 
integration process is multidimensional. It includes the estimation of Europe 
(understood as the social and cultural sphere), the stance towards the integration 
process and the stance towards the European Union, that is the structure which is 
emerging inside Europe as a result of this process. In this article2 I would like to 
present the standpoints of the both Churches towards the following aspects, 
which constitute a broadly-comprehended “European problem”. I mean: 
                                                          
1 Obviously we can suppose that the integration with European structures will have results not only 
in the economic, political or military community. Thanks to the Union’s basic rights such as free 
flow of the services, free flow of persons or better possibility of communication, cultural 
phenomena and processes that are more typical for Western Europe could diffuse more easily in the 
Eastern societies. However we should take into consideration that membership in the Union 
structures is not a necessary condition for development of the cultural trends that are typical for 
Western societies. 
2 The method of my research was content analysis. I have analyzed the following materials: in the 
case of Church in Poland – two Catholic papers “Niedziela” and “Gość Niedzielny” from 1990, 
1995, 1999, 2000; next the documents which have been located on the Catholic page 
www.opoka.org.pl, and the texts that I have found in book form. In the case of the Church in the 
Czech Republic the sources have been: “Katolicky Tydenik” (from 1990, 1995, 1999, 2000) and 
next the documents which have been published on page of the Episcopate www.cirkev.cz, and 
publications in book form. The unit of content analysis was the whole article. 
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z the assessment of Europe (understood as the social and cultural sphere) 
z the standpoint towards the integration (that is towards the process, which 
has been initiated after the World War II) 
z the standpoint towards the European Union, that is the structure which is 
emerging inside Europe as a result of this process. 
2. The Standpoint of The Roman Catholic Church in Poland 
Towards Europe, the European Union and the Integration Process 
At the threshold of the 1990s the Roman Catholic Church in Poland made 
few statements about Europe and the changes inside it. But amid this not very 
large number of clerical voices (at the beginning of the 1990), pro-European 
views were predominant. For example in 1990 Fr. Andrzej Madej OP (Madej, 
1990) wrote: “to return to Europe it’s to go to the sources of water in order to 
renew the Christian bath, (...) it’s to learn to speak ‘The Lord’s Prayer’ together 
with those, who were our enemies; to return to Europe it is to return to home 
from a faraway land”. 
It seems that Europe was not understood in the 1990s as a political 
structure which was forming or an organisation of European countries, but as 
the symbol and idea of freedom and it has functioned in consciousness as “the 
Promised Land”. The integration process had to bring a radical change in 
Poland’s3 situation. 
However a year later, when the “Europe Agreement” had been made, very 
negative statements on assessing Europe and its changes started to appear on a 
large scale. The clergy charged Europe with eradicating Christianity or with 
ethical weakness. They criticized European consumerism while integration was 
called a primitive universalism (Koprowski, 1991). I call this period in the 
Church’s views in Poland the Eurosceptic phase (1991-1997). 
In 1995 Primate of Poland Jozef Glemp4 called Europe “imagined” and he 
asked: “should we enter Europe (...) with legal abortion, with the violation of 
                                                          
3 We should emphasize that there is a conviction that the Roman Catholic Church in Poland has 
taken the position of Euroscepticism from the beginning of transformation (1989), and it has 
criticized (in the negative sense) the European order. In fact, analyzing the statements from 1991, 
we have to confirm this thesis. But we should not omit the short-lived enthusiasm which has 
appeared in 1990. 
4 I would like to remind the following statement of Glemp from the sermon from Bright Mountain 
in VIII 1995. He has warned of the European Union’s attack on Poland on three fronts: biological 
and economic, by depleting the common property and the base of maternity; moral – by the 
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Christian principles, with disrespect of marriage, or the family if these conditions 
do not nurture our independence, our identity? (from: Pieronek, 2000). I would 
like to stress that this statement is recognized as the first official declaration of the 
Polish Church’s stance towards the European integration process. 
The turning point in the standpoint of the clergy was 1997, when the Polish 
Episcopate paid an official visit to the European Commission in Brussels. 
Following conversations with Union officials, the Church supported the 
integration process and the future membership of Poland in the European Union 
officially. But what is interesting, Archbishop Tadeusz Gocłowski said “one 
ought to say, that the Church in Poland has never had reservations about the 
entry of Poland into the Union structures” (Gocłowski 1999) . This support (as 
it turned out) was not unconditional. The Church said “Yes” to integration, but 
on the condition of the simultaneous re-evangelisation of Europe. What is the 
standpoint of the Church in Poland towards Europe and the European Union? I 
would like to answer to this question presenting the results of analysis of 
documents of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland from years 1990-2000. 
2.1. Analysis: The Standpoint of the Roman Catholic Church in 
Poland 
During my research I have distinguished the following categories showing 
the standpoint of Roman Catholic Church in Poland (further “the Church”) 
towards the European integration process. I will present the results of research 
and I will answer to the following questions: 
1. How does the Roman Catholic Church in Poland evaluate the Europe? 
2. How is the European integration conceived by the Church? 
3. What is the assessment of the European Union in view of the related 
threats and chances ? 
2.1.1. Church in Poland towards Europe. “Two Europes” 
From the analysis of statements of the Church I have gained the impression 
that in the consciousness of the clergy two quite different “Europes” have 
appeared: “Christian Europe”, and the second, “pagan one” (in an ethical 
crisis). References designated to pagan Europe take up much more space than 
qualifications about the Christian one. 
                                                                                                                                
introduction of sexual education, by popularisation of the contraception and diffusing of the false 
understanding of family and feminism. The last front had religious dimension – the attack on the 
Church by anti-clerical propaganda. 
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2.1.1.1. Europe 1 – Christian Europe 
As indicators of the existence of Christian Europe I have recognized the 
formulas, in which there was unequivocal reference to this concept. For 
example, certain metaphors appear very frequently like the: “Christian roots of 
Europe”. They are often associated with the verbs : “to return”, “to come back”, 
“discover anew”, “refer to..” and the noun “return”. For example: “the return to 
the roots of Christianity” (Nycz, 2000). “Europe has its roots in Christianity” 
(Kamiñski, 2000). These verbs appearing near this metaphor are an indication 
that it speaks of a past Christian Europe, which this second (pagan) Europe 
should appeal to. 
Christianity is considered as something which shaped Europe: “the spiritual 
face of Europe has been shaped by the influence of Christianity”. (Życiński, 
1999b). And next: “leaving behind Europeans (…) through a negation of 
Christian values” (Pieronek, 1999). This vision of Europe can be seen in the 
statements of clergy from the beginning of the 1990s. 
2.1.1.2. Europe 2 – Pagan Europe 
In my analysis I considered as indicators of the existence of a second 
Europe: the key word “needs”, appears 13 times in different statements, as so 
does the metaphor of “organism”. These notions have been used to describe the 
phenomena and processes of Europe. 
Europe needs 
As an indicator of the second Europe, the occurrence of the expression 
“Europe needs” has been noticed very often in the documents. “Europe needs” 
so: “Christian inspiration” (Życiński, 1999b), “the experience of life with the 
Gospel” (Kamiñski, 2000), a “brave theological vision” (Życiński, 1999b), 
“values” (Chrapek, 2000), “Spirit” (Zimoñ, 1999), “new Samaritans” (Życiński, 
2000a). These expressions show generally the incomplete value of today’s 
Europe, because it is devoid of something crucial which is considered to be one 
of the constitutive elements of European culture – Christianity. 
The illness of Europe – that is the metaphor of organism 
The metaphor of organism (Wolińska) is a term, which gives the 
characteristics of organism for social phenomena enabling to consider some 
qualities as natural and good (life, health, height, soil, fruits), and others, 
strange to nature, as bad (bureaucracy, administration). But also in this organic 
vision we can show characteristics which speak of degeneracy (deteriorating, 
decaying, paralysis, illness). 
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I will describe the “illness of” Europe (Życinski, 1999b): “Europe is ill” 
(Życiński, 1999b, 1999c, 2000a), It has “lost its memory” (Kamiński, 2000), It 
“has amnesia” (Macharski, 1999), “the memory of Europe is very deformed” 
(Zięba, 1999), “the illness of the soul of Europe” (Kaczmarek, 2000), “Europe 
lost its vitality, or lost the instinct for self-preservation” (Kopiec, 2000), 
“Europe is wounded” (Chrapek, 2000). Sometimes statements refer to the 
“tiredness of Europe” (Macharski, 1999); but sometimes it is in “critical 
condition” (Tkocz, 2000). “Europe is dying (...) maybe this disease is curable 
but maybe it is the final collapse” (Michalik, 1999). 
-isations and – isms in Europe 
In the next part of my analysis I have discerned keywords, which I consider 
as indicators of the moral condition of European culture. They are: 
dechristianisation, postmodernism, relativism, liberalism, consumerism, 
secularisation. Due to lack of space this article will not present a detailed 
analysis for each of the phenomena. I will show just the fact, that these 
“keywords” appear in statements of the clergy from the beginning of 
Euroscepticism to 2000 (to the last documents analyzed as part of research) and 
they are all negative in character. 
2.1.2. European integration in the statements of the Roman Catholic clergy 
in Poland 
In the next part of the analysis I have tried to answer the question: what is 
the Church’s conception of the European integration process. I have discerned 
two main categories: “true/authentic integration” and “false integration”. 
2.1.2.1. True / authentic European integration 
This aspect started to appear in the statements of the Roman Catholic Church 
in Poland after the visit of the Episcopacy in Brussels. From the period of 
Euroscepticism (that is from 1991), we cannot find any words about possible or 
impossible manner of Europen integration, because everything connected with 
the EU was constantly criticized by the clergy. I will indicate the statements 
about the real integration: “full unity” (Kaczmarek, 2000), “true integration of 
the nations of Europe” (Śmigielski) or “durable foundation of unity” (Życiński). 
We can suppose if there is an authentic integration based on durable foundations, 
there also exists some kind of false integration. For example: “we should not 
delude ourselves that Europe can be integrated by the bureaucrats”, “the 
bureaucrats which come from Brussels are concentrated on the social-technology, 
technological progress and the quantitative indicators, and that is why, they are 
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not able to create a realistic picture of Europe, without appealing to the spiritual 
and cultural institutions” (Tkocz). What were these spiritual and cultural 
institutions? In these expressions the clergy indicates, we can say, the “unnatural” 
characteristics of the bureaucrats. It is worth noting that imputing some 
mechanical features for some social phenomena, are the indicators of their 
negative nature. The characteristics compatible with the nature’s rights have 
positive connotation (Wolińska). The notions: social-technology or quantitative 
indicators did not bring positive associations, particularly if they contrasted with 
the spiritual and cultural institutions. And similarly: “the increase of production 
is not a factor leading to unity” (Warzybok), “the integration process cannot be 
understood in the categories of economy or policy only” (Kamiński) or “if the 
integration ought to be permanent and fruitful, it cannot be reduced to the 
political and economic aspects” (Pieronek). 
2.1.2.2. Integration false/unreal? 
What should integration look like according to the Church in Poland? What 
was the foundation of the authentic integration process? In 1990 appeared the 
statement: “all Europe begins to integrate referring to the Christian roots” 
(Zimoń). The clergy talked and wrote about the modern integration based on 
Christianity. 
Pressure on the necessity to make integration more spiritual appeared 
particularly in the years 1999-2000. In the period of Euroscepticism some 
possibility of modification of the integration process was not mentioned. 
European integration had to be based “on the permanent foundation of 
unity” (Życiński) or on “the foundation of values corresponding with human 
nature and constituting the identity of the old continent” (Pieronek). What is 
this permanent foundation of unity? Which values correspond with human 
nature? The identity of Europe was also shaped by the values of the of 
Enlightenment. Possibly the clergy means the Christian axiology. But what 
should realisation of the integration on Christian foundations look like in 
practice? The next: “the integration process should be based on permanent 
values” (Śmigielski, Gołębiewski). 
Following statement seems to be very interesting: “in the integration 
processes the importance of religion was not appreciated and Christianity was not 
considered as one of the constitutive elements of the identity of Europe; it may be 
the source of considerable problems connected with integration” (Nycz). What 
part of the problems is it, and what kind of problems generally? Religion – that is 
Christianity – as the constitutive element of the identity of Europe should be the 
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remedy for these problems. But how should this postulate be realized? The new 
questions appear, however they are very difficult to answer. 
2.1.3. European Union. The perceived benefits and the threats 
During the content analysis of documents I have distinguished two main 
categories: costs/threats and opportunites connected with future membership in 
the European Union. 
2.1.3.1. Benefits: 
Among the chances connected with membership in the European Union the 
clergymen have enumerated: consumer protection, peace in Europe, economic 
development. Other statements about positive facets of Union are from single 
voices, such as: free flow of information (Gołębiewski), fight with organized 
crime (Orszulik), or taking profits from the Union’s budget (Gołębiewski). 
Consumer protection 
This aspect of the European Union was emphasized four times in analyzed 
documents. It appears only in statements from 1999 and 2000. The clergymen 
stated that some of the aims of integration are: “principles of consumer 
protection” (Orszulik), “improvement of products quality” (Skworc) , or “defense 
(...) of the rights and interests of the citizens of these countries” (Gołębiewski). 
Peace in Europe 
The role fulfilled by the European Union aspiring to maintain peace and 
safety, was stressed four times, also in the statements from 1999-2000. The 
clergy emphasized, that the European Union wants to have “common foreign 
politics and safety” (Orszulik) or that thanks to the membership, “we will be 
even closer to the system of European peace and safety” (Skworc). 
Economic development 
With the prospect of the future membership, European Union was 
characterized as a chance for rationalisation of Polish economy. Similar to 
earlier, this fact was stressed only in 1999-2000, and appeared five times in the 
statements. For example, the advantages of European Union are: “warranties 
for the stability of the foreign exchange rate, discipline of budget expenses, 
restriction of the height of public debt” (Gocłowski). 
2.1.3.2. Threats 
Issues of the costs and the threats connected with future membership in the 
European Union have started to appear since the critic of the European Union and 
Europe – that is between 1991-1997. But there was very often the discussion 
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about threats after the crucial visit of Episcopate in Brussels in 1997. The 
expressions like: “there are many secrets in the Union”, “many arrangements are 
completely hidden from the European societies” have pointed at the existence of 
the threats. The threats or the mysteries are not specified, and this ambiguity, or 
even esoteric of the Union can suggest, that besides what we know, there exists 
something else behind-the-scenes, out of society’s sight. 
Morality 
Vision of the European Union as a threat for morality has been created 
since the birth of the Euroscepticism, that is from 1991. The Union has been 
accused of providing Polish society with – according to the clergy – “only easy 
work, good food, entertainment and sex” (Glemp, 1995). The Union has been 
held responsible for abortion, destruction of the bases of maternity, sexual 
education, and contraception. Consequently, the EU has been perceived as a 
threat “financing sexual education, but in anti-educational sense, pornographic 
magazines, homosexual movements, anti-family propaganda” (Glemp, 2000). 
Identity 
According to the clergymen, the entrance to the EU should be perceived 
“in terms of fight (...) about being oneself” (Glemp, 1995). The clergy stated, 
that the EU “has made Poles believe that they should utter their “Polish”, and 
their national values” (Nagórny, 1998). After the visit in Brussels this kind of 
expressions started to appear rarely but they were still present. 
National Sovereignty 
This fear appeared in the statement, in the Eurosceptic period, and also 
appears in documents from 1999-2000. Example “we should see entry into the 
European Union in terms of a fight for independence” (Glemp, 1995), in 
another statement support for the membership has been considered “national 
suicide” (Maliński, 1995). 
Sale of the land 
Clergymen have taken note of this fact in the documents from the two last 
years. The threat is: “purchase of the cheap land” (Kamiński), “danger of 
foreigners buying up the Polish land” (Wesoły), or “the issue of selling the land 
off to the citizens from other countries” (Śmigielski). 
Agriculture 
In this aspect the Church has anticipated, that the EU could be the “reason for 
the total disaster of agriculture” (Kamiński), and “our agriculture is too weak to 
compete with the EEC (European Economic Community)” (Zawitkowski). 
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Economy 
European Union has also turned out to be a danger for the Polish economy. 
In this category I have placed also: “payment to the Union budget” 
(Gocłowski), “adjusting the law acts in many fields of economic life” (Glemp, 
2000), or “decline of competition of the Polish export” (Gocłowski). 
3. The Roman Catholic Church in the Czech Republic towards 
Europe, European Union and the Integration Process 
In 1989 Czechoslovakia, after the events of the Velvet Revolution, found 
itself in a new political situation. The Roman Catholic Church has participated in 
these crucial events, and this participation has been assessed favorably by Czech 
society. When Vaclav Havel became president of Czechoslovakia, his first 
official visitors were Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader of Tibet, and Pope John 
Paul II. During the visit of the Pope, one of the biggest squares in Prague – Sady 
Leteñskie which witnessed the Velvet Revolution in 1989 – was filled with 
thousands of the Czech pilgrims. Today the situation has changed dramatically. 
The Church is not present on the political scene, it does not present its views, and 
comments on events in the country only very seldom. It seems that nobody asks 
the Church in the Czech Republic about its opinion. Information connected with 
the Church has an occasional, cultural and customary character. During the last 
prepared list of Roman Catholic believers, the Church started to encourage the 
baptised to make declarations about their beliefs. 
In spite of this social and cultural situation, the Church has not been 
indifferent to the transformation in Europe, to the European integration. 
However, when I looked for the statements of the clergy about the European 
Union and integration process in Europe, I had the impression that only 
Cardinal Miloslav Vlk5 (Archbishop of Prague and Primate of the Czech 
Republic) was interested in changes in European policy. Of course, statements 
by other clergy appear very seldom, and they do not give a clear picture of 
views concerning the integration process. 
Taking into consideration analyzed statements, we can state with certainty 
that the Church in the Czech Republic has supported the European Union and 
the integration from the beginning of the 1990, and the standpoint of the 
                                                          
5 What is important, Cardinal Miloslav Vlk in 1993 (and in 1996 again) has been chosen as the 
president of the Council of Conference of Europe Episcopacies (CCEE). We can therefore see how 
his office has influenced the process of the European integration. 
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Church has not undergone evolution or even revolution (as the Church in 
Poland has). From the beginning of the 1990s the European integration has 
been treated as the chance to overcome past conflicts or for peace in Europe. 
On the 26 May 1998 the Czech Episcopate was invited to Brussels, where 
the Church in Czech said “Yes” to the idea of integration. The Czech Roman 
Catholic Episcopate has supported integration “a priori” (Bartak, 1998)6 and 
confirmed its earlier stance. 
3.1. Analysis: The Standpoint of the Roman Catholic Church in the 
Czech Republic 
In the content analysis of the statements of the Roman Catholic clergy in 
the Czech Republic I paid attention to the following issues: 
1. How was Europe assessed by clergy? 
2. How was the European integration assessed by the Church ? 
3. What profits will accession to the EU bring? 
3.1.1. Europe in the Statements of the Church in Czech Republic 
Visions of Christian Europe and Pagan Europe have appeared in the 
statements of the Czech clergy, however they are not as clear as in the case of 
the Church in Poland, because the clergy only mentioned the Christian identity 
of Europe very rarely. Nevertheless I have created the following categories: 
“Christian Europe” and “Pagan Europe”. But in this second Europe the picture 
is not as categorical as in the definitions of the clergy in Poland, because the 
phenomena considered as indicators of the European culture (such as seculari-
sation or pluralism) have not been assessed negatively by all commentators. 
3.1.1.1. Christian Europe 
As I said, talk of Christian Europe has appeared in the content of the 
documentation sporadically. The existence of this Europe is demonstrated in 
the statement: “European civilisation in the diversity of its culture is based on 
the Christian ideas” (Vlk, 2000a). 
                                                          
6 Worth quoting are the commentaries in Katolicky Tydenik (the Czech Catholic weekly magazine) 
concerning the standpoint of the Czech and the Polish Church towards the EU. Comparing these 
views we can remark that in Brussels “it was necessary to persuade the Polish Bishops that the 
European Union is not a synonym for pornography, cloning and commercials”. The fact – Bartak 
wrote – that the Polish Episcopacy has supported the integration, was considered a big success by 
the Council. 
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3.1.1.2. Pagan Europe 
I have considered the following “keywords” as indicators of the presence 
of the second Europe: postmodernism, secularisation, or pluralism, and also the 
expression: Europe needs. 
Europe needs 
When the clergy used the expression Europe needs, they showed the need for 
transformation in the future Europe. This indicator suggests, that in modern 
Europe something is lacking which is necessary. Example: “Europe needs divine 
mercy”, “help”, “forgiveness for its sins”, “conciliation”, “waking”, “under-
standing”, “hope” (Česká biskupská konference, 1999), “spirits” (Vlk, 1997a), 
“clever people” (Vlk, 1997a, 1997b). And also: “Europe in the time of transfor-
mations does not need to be a slave to ideology” (Vlk, 1997a: 59, 1997b: 69). 
Europe divided (separated) 
The following statements which described Europe by accentuating its 
crisis, have created a picture of a divided Europe as a result of the conflicts and 
wars between the nations or the societies in general. For example: “crushed 
Europe” (Česká biskupská konference) or “Europe divided”, or next: “we look 
at Europe – the war is going on continually! People still kill each other” (Vlk, 
1998:152). The religious divisions in Europe are emphasized, too: “the lack of 
unity amid the Christians and the lack of unity in the Europe have the same 
cause, therefore both processes cannot be separated” (Vlk, 1995c:271) or, “as 
the years go by, the religious gulf has deepened and influenced political 
development” (Vlk, 1995c:271). 
-Isation and -isms in Europe 
Similar to the Church in Poland, the clergy in the Czech Republic have 
showed concern about the following phenomena, which appear in the modern 
Europe. In turn: postmodernism, secularisation, individualism or nationalism. 
There was talk of dechristianisation in some of the documents. What is 
important, those phenomena which were assessed negatively by the Church in 
Poland, were assessed positively in the statements of the clergy in the Czech 
Republic. Europe is mostly considered in terms of individualism, or its results 
like racism, nationalism, or the conflicts/wars in Europe. 
3.1.2. The Roman Catholic Church in the Czech Republic towards the 
European Integration 
The clergy of the Church in the Czech Republic has enumerated the 
conditions that should be fulfilled during the process of the integration of Europe. 
They have pointed at the factors that are insufficient for the European integration. 
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3.1.2.1. Inappropriate Integration 
The clergy has emphasized that economics or politics should not be the only 
goals of the European integration. For example: “the unity of Europe in the 
political sense, the integration process accelerated by the countries (...) it is not 
only the matter of the project of any organisation or new structures in the political 
or economic sphere” (Vlk, 1995c). Here we can remark on the correspondence of 
opinions of the Czech and Polish clergy. The inappropriate integration was also 
compared to the creation of an organisation, or of some structures. And next: “the 
conciliation could not be achieved only by clever policy and diplomacy or 
management (Vlk, 1997b), “It is not possible to develop unity without taking into 
consideration the roots and the cause of the division in Europe” (Vlk, 1995c). The 
last quote suggests that the problem of religious divisions in Christianity cannot 
be omitted if we want to build European unity. 
3.1.2.2. Appropriate Integration 
On the other hand, the Roman Catholic clergy in the Czech Republic have 
emphasized these conditions, which, when fulfilled, will guarantee the suitable 
way of the realisation of the integration process in Europe. They stated: “one 
can build the Tower of Babel without the Holy Spirit, but it will make the 
misunderstanding between people” (Vlk, 2000b). According to the clergy, the 
integration process should be consecrated by Christianity, because in the other 
case the result of the integration will be comparable to Tower of Babel, which 
is associated with the conflicts and quarrels. And next: “unity could be 
protected by the grace of the Holy Spirit (Česká biskupská konference, 1999). 
The following statement: “It should be the foundations of God’s love, 
forgiveness and the truth of Gospel. It is the only power to create the integrated 
world” (List biskupów czeskich i morawskich), “this unity needs the soul, the 
new spirit, and the new culture of thinking and life” (Vlk, 1995c). 
3.1.2.3. The Church towards the European Union 
The attitude of the Roman Catholic Church in the Czech Republic towards 
European Union differs from the standpoint of Church in Poland. We cannot 
find there some catastrophic visions imputing the Union as a potential threat for 
morality, agriculture or economy. On the other hand, the positive aspects of the 
Union were mentioned very rarely. According to the clergy, one of the 
advantages is peace in Europe. During the discussion about the conflicts in 
modern Europe it was said that “on this land should start a process which 
would carry reconciliation and agreement, so that human rights and democracy 
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would gain a significance, and the new structures of the world and justice were 
created similarly to the United Nations and the European Union ” (Vlk, 1995a). 
The next perceived benefit is rationalisation of the economy and social 
sphere in the Czech Republic. Example “our Republic will proceed towards 
thwarting of hope of the integration with the European structures. (...) We 
demand from politics to listen to the Union marks” (Halík, 1999). During the 
visit to Brussels in 1998, the Czech Episcopacy enumerated the following 
benefits connected with the membership in the European Union; they were: 
tolerance growth, country stability, abiding by law, solidarity, and social 
fairness (Bartak, 1998). 
The EU has been perceived as an opportunity for restitution of the Church’s 
property. I would like to say a few words more about this. After 1989 the Church 
in the Czech Republic has taken a stand towards the problem of restitution of 
property which it lost under the communist rule. This issue has triggered 
controversy, on the level of Church – State relations, and also in Czech society. In 
1996 the Roman Catholic Church – represented by Cardinal M. Vlk – declared, 
that restitution of the Church property “is not the privilege of government, but it 
is one of the conditions of joining the community of the Western world” (from: 
Sierszula, 1996). He stated that the indisposition of the Czech government 
towards the solution of this problematic issue, could be a barrier in getting 
membership in the European Union. I would like to emphasize that in 1995, the 
European Parliament recommended to Union members and candidates to 
facilitate the restitution of the Jewish and the Church property. It was not only on 
paper – the Church took steps in practice. The clergymen appealed to the 
Tribunal in Strasbourg, the European Parliament or the Council of Europe. 
During the visit of the Czech Episcopacy in Brussels Cardinal Vlk stated that the 
restitution issue is “as important as the problem of observing human rights” 
(Hekrdla, 1998a). The bishops stated that from the entry to EU they expect better 
observance of law and solutions to the issues problematic for the Church . 
4. Conclusion 
At the end of 2002 the Roman Catholic Churches in Poland and the Czech 
Republic officially declared that they favourably assessed the process of the 
integration and supported the future membership of Poland and the Czech 
Republic in the European Union. 
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The standpoint of the Church in Poland has evolved; the bishops said 
“Yes” to the integration, Europe and the Union, but this declaration was 
preceded by a period which may be called Eurosceptic. 
From the beginning of the 1990s the clergymen in the Czech Republic 
assessed the European Union very favourably, and they opted to include the 
Czech Republic in European structures. We can ask in that case if a 
transformation inside the Church in Poland has led to the change of standpoint? 
After 1997 the clergy took a stand corresponding to the standpoint maintained 
by the Church in the Czech Republic from the beginning of 90s. Despite many 
common features, I propose that the stances of Polish clergy and the Czech 
Church towards Europe do not share many characteristics. In order to remind 
on the rendering of the most relevant issues and to facilitate the comparison of 
the standpoints I have created the following table: 
 
Table 1: Europe7 
 What is the present situation – pagan Europe 
 
W
hat w
as the 
situation in the past 
– C
hristian Europe 
Europe needs 
The illness of 
Euro pe
D
ivided Europe 
Postm
odernism
 
Secularisation 
Liberalism
 
Individualism
 
D
echristianisation 
C
onsum
erism
 
Pluralism
 
N
ationalism
 and 
racism
 
The Church in Czech Republic Rarely8 + - + + +/-9 - + - - +/- + 
The Church in Poland  + + + - + + + - + + - ?10 
 
                                                          
7 Plus means that the clergy took the phenomenon into consideration in their statements, minus 
means that this aspect was absent from the content of the documents. 
8 I have found in 3 texts statements about Christian Europe (the expressions about the past, 
Christian Europe). 
9 Plus and minus together mean that this phenomenon hasn’t been only criticized, but its positive 
sides were also remarked. 
10 Nationalism or racism weren’t mentioned, but the conflict was. The main author was the 
Archbishop Życinski. 
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Table 2: European Union 
 Profits Threats 
 
R
estitution of 
the property 
Peace 
C
onsum
er 
protection 
Econom
y 
Tolerance 
M
orality 
Independence 
Identity 
Econom
y 
Sale of land 
A
griculture 
The Church in Czech Republic + + - + + - - - - - - 
The Church in Poland - + + + - + + + + + + 
 
In the standpoints of both Churches we can notice very relevant differences 
in the assessment of the Union and Europe. 
First problematic issues connected with the European integration appeared in 
the documents. The views connected with the integration process seem to be 
superficially the same: both Churches emphasize that Europe (if it wants to 
integrate) should be based on Christian values. However the given arguments 
differ in the case of the both Churches. The Church in the Czech Republic 
appeals to the memory of Christian Europe only incidentally. Nevertheless, an 
analysis of this category (Christian Europe) in the statements of the clergy in the 
Czech Republic has been complicated by the difficulties in finding expressions 
which indicate the existence of this Europe in the “consciousness” of the Church. 
In this place a difference appears: it seems that the Church in Poland has 
postulated the building of Europe on the basis of Christian values, and it argues 
“because it was like that in the past” – because the Europe was Christian and 
should return to this condition (the verbs connected with Europe are: “return” 
and “find”). By contrast the Church in the Czech Republic puts special 
emphasis on the power which is brought by Christianity and its values, helpful 
in integration (love, forgiving, conquering of egoism). There was no talk about 
a return, but about the new spirit of Europe. The Church in Poland would like 
modern Europe to become Christian Europe once more. The Church in the 
Czech Republic talks about a third Europe, a new one. 
Irena Borowik (1999) describing the conservative option of “managing” by 
the Churches in the modern world said that “the conservative option and 
“pitting” are connected with the trial of constituting traditional understanding 
of transcendence and the holistic vision of the human person in the perspective 
of the global differentiation of the modern world”. Taking into consideration 
the understanding of Christianity as the foundation of the European unity, I can 
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say that the Church in Poland is more conservative than the Roman Catholic 
Church in the Czech Republic. 
The main difference is in the perception of Pagan Europe by the both 
Churches. In both cases postmodernism and the expression “Europe needs” are 
common . Secularisation (similar to pluralism) in the Czech Republic is not 
universally presented as the “evil” in European society. These phenomena have 
been considered as “signs of the time”, which the Church in the Czech 
Republic wants to “read”. The most important difference is in describing 
liberalism and individualism by the both Churches. 
In the statements of the clergy in Poland, liberalism has been condemned 
unequivocally. Similar to the individualism condemned by the priests of the 
Church in the Czech Republic. None the less a radical difference exists in the 
definition of the results of these phenomena, which are (according to the 
clergy) negative for European societies. The Church in Poland criticizes 
liberalism, because it is “evil” in general – the analysed texts give this overall 
impression. Liberalism is perceived as merciless and radical. However the 
clergy in the Czech Republic assess it differently from the Church in Poland. 
Using these metaphors we should put individualism before nationalism or 
racism and consider it as the source of division of Europe. Individualism has 
been considered an “evil” of Europe, because it was the cause of individual and 
national egoism. Nationalism and racism are the results, and they have 
contributed to the divisions in Europe. It is important to note that the clergy 
stressed that the sin of individualism in the Church and Christianity have 
contributed to religious conflicts and wars. European integration has been 
considered a process which is a denial of the individualistic tendencies in 
modern European countries. 
The Church in the Czech Republic has stressed the threats of Europe, 
which are the results of nationalism, racism, and xenophobia. It has gone 
beyond the local reality, and has not limited itself to the statements about “evil” 
of postmodernism or liberalism. 
I would argue that the stance to the European Union is the best indicator of 
the standpoint of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland and the Czech Republic 
towards the European reality. The Roman Catholic clergy in the Czech 
Republic did not point at any threats connected with the membership in the 
European Union and emphasized the opportunities for Europe, the Czechs, and 
the Church. I have recognized, that the standpoint of the Roman Catholic 
Church in the Czech Republic can be called euroenthusiastic. 
Katarzyna Leszczyńska 
270 
The analysis has showed that the estimation of the European reality is 
multidimensional, and it also includes the stance towards Europe and the 
European integration. However, taking into account the Polish Church’s postulate 
to build the European integration on the Christian foundation only, I suppose that 
this proposition was not realistic. It seems to be impossible to realize such an idea 
in European societies which are culturally and religiously pluralistic. Obviously it 
is not probable to verify this postulate today. Anyway, the Roman Catholic clergy 
of the both countries had the similar views on these issues. 
Taking into consideration a group of attitudes towards Europe, the 
European Union and the integration that appeared during the analysis, I have 
considered the Roman Catholic Church in the Czech Republic as more open 
and liberal, but also as aware of the civilisation problems in contemporary 
Europe. The Roman Catholic Church in Poland is more conservative, closed 
and “looking” at European cultural and the structural changes in a “local” way. 
However, I suppose that inside the Roman Catholic Church in Poland 
(institutional Church) appear the pluralism and the diversity of standpoints, 
which are not necessarily merely conservative. I have tried to create a 
typology11 of attitudes, but not so much in the whole institutional Church as 
among the Church’s hierarchy, the Catholic bishops and the archbishops in 
Poland. The starting point for creating the typology will be the stance of the 
clergymen towards the EU. I have distinguished: 
1. Eurosceptics – they point only at the threats connected with membership 
in EU; they fear integration process, and, in a sense, they are afraid of the 
changes that will take place in Poland after accession to the EU’s 
structures. You may say that they are conservatives. 
2. Eurorealists – they point at the chances and the costs connected with the 
integration and the EU. 
3. Euroneutrals (but euro-non-aligned) – they are not indifferent towards 
European integration; they speak about Europe, but do not express their 
opinions about the economy, agriculture etc. that is to say, the issues 
directly concerning the Union. 
4. Euroenthusiasts – they do not mention the costs and the threats, and they 
concentrate on the chances and the possibilities connected with the 
membership in the EU structures; as the signs of “benevolence”/kindness. 
                                                          
11 As the indicators I took the categories which were created during the analysis. 
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I acknowledged omitting the costs and emphasizing the favourable sides – 
the chances and the benefits. I call them the liberals. 
Among 21 bishops were: 6 Eurosceptics, 9 Euroneutrals, 4 Eurorealists, 2 
Euroenthusiasts. We can notice, despite this, that the Church in Poland 
officially declares support to the European integration, but it is not so clear-cut 
when we look at the diversity of standpoints among the Church’s hierarchy. 
Among the types of the stands distinguished, Euroneutrals predominate (but 
they are not indifferent to the entire integration and the Europe). Eurosceptics 
are placed on the second place. We can ask: in that case – does the Roman 
Catholic Church in Poland support the European Union? Even if the answer is 
affirmative, we can suppose that the Church in Poland fears the European 
Union. And it does not matter if it focuses this attention on threats connected 
with morality, agriculture or economy. 
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Lucian N. Leustean 
RELIGIOUS ELEMENTS IN DEFINING EUROPEAN 
IDENTITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND 
SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE 
1. Introduction 
This paper presents a short survey of identity as it is perceived in the 
literature regarding the creation of European identity and current understanding 
of religious factors and symbols. I shall analyse the present policy efforts and 
perceptions used in elaborating a common identity within the European Union 
and Southeastern European countries from a comparative perspective. My main 
argument is that due to the historical process of secularisation, which has 
resulted in a diverse religious spectrum in the present members of the EU, the 
religious elements used in defining current EU identity are different from those 
in Southeastern Europe, having different implications at the level of national 
identity. I shall not analyse the functions of religion in underpinning the eco-
nomic or social motivations of joining the EU or supporting EU enlargement, 
nor shall I advocate that religious factors contribute decisively in supporting 
national policies towards EU accession or membership. My intention is to pro-
vide a comparative prospectus of the concept of identity and its religious ele-
ments for the EU as a whole and Southeastern European countries, focusing on 
Orthodoxy’s role and influence as the ‘prevailing religion’ in these countries. 
I shall argue that the current EU policies which try to create a European 
identity have centred mainly on promoting common European symbols, which 
tend to play a ‘hidden’ religious role. Southeastern European countries, do-
minated by a concentrated religious power and influence in their political 
structures and decisions, have a different religious approach in defining their 
national identity. From this perspective, the current and future EU enlargement 
will have to take into account the necessities of comprehending the religious 
complexities of this region. 
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2. European Identity 
The issue of identity has become a major theoretical subject of different 
disciplines that attempt to define it according to their own perceptions. Even if 
the senior disciplines in identity studies are anthropology and psychology, the 
particular interest in this matter dates from the 1960s when identity began to 
mean more than just ‘sameness’ and to signify a ‘positively valued socio-
psychological construct’ consisting of ‘allegiance to people, group and often 
place and past’ (Macdonald, 1993:6-7). Collective identities can generate a 
degree of continuity between individuals and their social environment being 
able, thus, to confer social recognition and approval (Benda-Beckmann and 
Verkuyten, 1995:24). 
Identity derives from the Latin word ‘idéntitas’ which means ‘the same’ or 
‘sameness of essential character’. Identities are diversified in nature being 
affected by allegiance to things such as own gender, family, class, region, 
religion, age group, kin group and nation. From all these aspects, some are 
more important than others, and there is a competition between them for 
domination or exclusion. Groups’ identities are best represented as matrices 
that change over space and time but consequently the different elements in an 
identity matrix may be contradictory (Benda-Beckmann, 1993:12). In this way, 
people maintain devotion to different institutions that may at times clash, or at 
least in theory be partially exclusive to each other (Wintle, 2000:13-14). An 
example of such mixed attachments within a single collective identity would be 
the feelings of allegiance to both nation and region, furthermore being possible 
to share loyalties for one’s own country and for Europe at the same time. 
Identity is a complex term. European identity has primarily focused on the 
major features of the European continent and attempted to analyse the closer 
features of different European aspects: nations, ethnicity, culture, society, etc., 
speaking thus about a European ethnic identity, European political identity, 
European cultural identity, etc. according to different spatial and temporal per-
spectives. Religion as a mobilising/demobilising factor in creating a common 
identity has been researched especially from the state-church relations’ point of 
view and sociological dimension of religion. Moreover, in the last decade, 
outlining the cultural and religious attributes of political structure, there is a 
growing literature, which describes political culture with a religious dimension 
and the role of cross-national variations in political systems (Almond and 
Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1990; Putnam et al., 1993). 
The present attempt to define European identity has focused on two major 
sources: firstly, the search for an identity of the European Union itself in the 
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context of international relations, and secondly in the individual subject dispo-
sition as reflected by the Eurobarometer surveys (Soysal, 2002:273). Both 
analytical searches agree that European political culture is not homogeneous, 
even if there are some factors contributing to the spread of common values 
across the continent. From a historical point of view, Europe has had an identity 
or different identities in the past to which Europeans have felt a higher or lesser 
degree of allegiance. 
The attempt to draw a definition of European identity is a complex issue, 
which includes the European specificity and historical background (Smith, 
1992). The easiest approach in this analysis is to understand European 
uniqueness, which has changed Europeans’ lives throughout centuries and 
made them a specific group with a particular identity. Schneider (1999:16) 
created a list of historical facts, which mainly contribute to the development of 
European identity, from which I mention some of the most representative: pre-
classical and classical Antique, classical Hellas, Rome as a Republic and 
Empire, Christendom in Latin and Byzantine Empire, the Schism, the 
controversy between ‘regnum’ and ‘sacerdotium’ in the Middle Ages, the 
Renaissance and the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the political ideas and 
movements of the XIXth century, world wars and totalitarianism. Describing 
Europe as a construct entity, a particular form of ‘Europeanness’ may be noted 
throughout centuries as a kind of overarching identity (Smith, 1991). 
The societies of the European Union are primarily divided along national 
lines. As Hix (1999:133-66; 358) asserts ‘each individual has a set of beliefs, 
opinions, values and interests relating to the political process. These <political 
preferences> often derive from deep historical or cultural identities, religion or 
language […] Citizens form their attitudes towards the EU on the basis of 
personal economic interests and political values and as a result individuals from 
the same social group in different member states share similar views on EU 
integration’. 
The relationship between religion and identity in the European context of 
the nation-state has recently been summarised by Smith (1999) and Hutchinson 
(2001; 2003:7) as follows: ‘nations are not explicable only by state necessities. 
The nation is a moral community that binds individuals into a <timeless> socie-
ty evoked by <unique> myths, memories and culture so that they overcome 
contingency and death. Religious institutions can be of great importance in 
clarifying the definition of national identity because of their deep social reach, 
often endowing a community with the sense of being chosen that informs the 
modern nation-state. The nation is a surrogate religion, which arises with 
secularisation and often builds on older religious identity.’ 
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National identity monopolises the central place in the analysis of border-
demarcations (Foucher, 1991; Anderson and Bort, 2001) and human terri-
torialities.1 Though the ‘single national identity – single nation-state’ equation 
dominates the literature, individuals still define themselves to an important 
extent by multiple identities. The concept of ‘matrioshka’ nationalism (Taras, 
1993:513-538) (named after the Russian dolls that are hidden inside each other) 
still has a great applicability in defining the domestic politics of European 
countries. As national, ethnic, regional and local identities overlap but remain 
‘hidden’, various political actors compete with each other for adherents, 
attempting to wake up and activate ‘sleeping’ identities. Sometimes these iden-
tities coexist peacefully even within a territorial community and also in the 
consciousness of an individual, but sometimes, as in the former Yugoslavia, 
they erupt into intense ethnic conflict (Kolossov and O’Loughlin, 1998). 
European identity is founded not only on the geographical approach of 
perceiving nationality versus territoriality but also takes into account very histori-
cal and social differences. Moreover, specific national identities evolved and 
shaped in particular manners due to particular links to mainstream European 
developments, influenced or not by other European or non-European powers.2 
3. The last EU’s Enlargement Events and European Identity 
Studies of public support for European integration have focused on the 
notions of postmaterialism and cognitive mobilisation (Inglehart, 1970; 1977) 
and have explained the individual’s support for the integration process as the 
result of mainly economic (Anderson, 1995:111-134), cultural (Rougemont, 
1962; Habermas, 1992:1-19; Bastian and Collange, 1996) and social changes 
(Engelbrekt, 2002:37-52). 
                                                          
1 For a detailed analysis of national identity in the EU accession candidates see, Survey of National 
Identity and Deep-Seated Attitudes towards European Integration in the Ten Applicants Countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe. By the Forward Studies Unit in collaboration with the delegations 
of European Commission in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria and DG1A. 1998. Brussels: European Commission. 
2 Transformations of identities affect the functions of national borders. The open, peaceful, well-
delimited and internationally recognised borders in Western Europe and North America make up 
only 8% of the total length of world land frontiers. In Europe, only 2% of political boundaries 
established in the twentieth-century up to 1989 resulted from plebiscites and about 42% of the total 
length of land boundaries in Africa represents geometrical lines imposed by colonial powers. About 
20% of current world boundaries were drawn up by the British and about 17% by the French. 
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The conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council stated the 
completion of accession negotiation with 10 state candidates3 welcoming them 
as new members of the European Union from 1 May 2004. At the same time 
the Union welcomes the progress achieved by Bulgaria and Romania asserting 
the particular intention of these states to join the EU in 2007. As the Presidency 
Conclusions (2002:4) presents ‘the accession negotiations with these countries 
will continue on the basis of the same principles that have guided the accession 
negotiations so far, and that each candidate country will be judged on its own 
merits’. In addition, in Turkey’s case the European Council in December 2004 
will decide if this country fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria in order to 
open immediate accession negotiations. 
The broad spectrum of this summit, and particularly its conclusions, reveals 
a very broad political consensus and agenda. The current EU member states 
agreed that the future European Union would be larger from 2004 with a new 
economic and political engine. At the same time it is obvious that the other 
candidates, which do not meet all the political or economic criteria, will have to 
wait a few years until a new European Council, on the basis of a report and a 
recommendation from the Commission, will invite them to join. The particular 
character of societies in these countries that still have to fulfil other criteria 
raised the question of the ability of their governments to implement EU policy 
and acquis communitaire into their legislation at the lower social level. 
During the post-cold war period, the European Union has encountered 
vivid debates regarding the nature of its future borders in the context of differ-
ent European cultural, social and religious patterns throughout the continent. 
Different definitions of ‘civilisations’, and possible conflicts between these 
civilisations (Huntington, 1993a.b.), were raised immediately after the collapse 
of communism, indicating a possible struggle between Western Protestant and 
Catholic cultures and, on the other hand, Eastern Orthodox and Islamic. The 
main questions regarding the nature of future European borders included or 
excluded, in the name of European values, the Easterners (Russians, Belarus-
sians, Ukrainians, Moldavians) and Southeasterners (the Balkans, Turks) from 
a reorganised European Union. These questions appear rational, taking into 
account the diversity of appropriate factors within the European continent – 
geographic, historic, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, and developmental. 
                                                          
3 Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. 
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The conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council, inviting 10 
accession states to be future EU members, extend the border of the European 
Union and eliminate the former assumptions of incompatibility between ex-
communist territories with Western countries’ values. The main debate moved 
from the future limit of European borders to the real capacity of the invited 
countries to fully adopt into practice the acquis communitaire and European 
values as a whole. 
At present there are still a few countries, which have as their national 
objective the completion of accession negotiations and possible EU 
membership from 2007. The last European Council noted their aspirations, 
encouraging and supporting them with a strict calendar and dispatching a 
favourable financial packet. Bulgaria and Romania are in this situation. In 
addition, Turkey and Croatia consider themselves in the same position aiming 
at EU membership in the near future. The same position was also recently 
shown by the other countries from the Western Balkans. It is possible that the 
structure of the future European Union will be limited to only a few of these 
countries according to their particular economic achievements but also due to 
future political leaders’ opinions of where the ‘true’ Europe should end. 
Notable is the opinion of the president of the European Parliament, Pat Cox, 
indicating that the enlargement of the European Union will stop in 2007 with 
Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania.4 
The main reasons for delaying official invitations for Bulgaria and Romania 
are their slow progress towards establishing a functioning market economy and 
their limited capacities to cope with competitive pressure and market forces 
within the Union.5 Expressing its support for Bulgaria and Romania in their 
efforts to achieve the objectives of membership in 2007, the Commission of 
European Communities detailed roadmaps, including timetables, and increased 
pre-accession assistance.6 
                                                          
4 ‘With the entry of ten countries in 2004 and possible accession of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia 
in 2007, the EU will probably need to stop the enlargement process for several years to consolidate 
(enlargement by that time)’ EP President Cox sees Croatia in EU in 2007, European Liberal Youth, 
http://www.lymec.org/article.php?sid=176. 
5 2002 Regular Report on Bulgaria’s Progress towards Accession. 09 September 2002. Brussels: 
Commission of European Communities. p. 35; 2002 Regular Report on Romania’s Progress 
towards Accession. 09 September 2002. Brussels: Commission of European Communities. p. 49. 
6 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Roadmaps 
for Bulgaria and Romania. 13 November 2002. Brussels: Commission of the European 
Communities pp. 1-43. 
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Clearly the final decision to invite these countries will be a political one, 
due to the immense economic discrepancy between them and the present 
members of the European Union. Looking at some actual socio-economic data 
from the World Bank resources, the GNI per capita of Bulgaria, Romania and 
Macedonia is less that $2,000 per person per year, at about the same level as 
Guatemala, while the invited countries such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia have a GNI per capita of $3,000 – 5,000, the 
same level as in Brazil, Chile and Mexico. Slovenia is at the upper end of the 
scale having a per capita income of around $10,000, being thus closer to the 
level of the poorest present EU member, Portugal.7 The explanation of these 
figures subsides in variable economic and socio-historical explanations; 
however, this is not the purpose of my paper. Nevertheless, there seems to be a 
widespread trend within the European political leadership to maintain the 
accession efforts with the remaining candidates despite these economic 
difficulties. If this trend does continue, the future European Union will have, in 
the next years, according to the Conclusions of the Copenhagen European 
Council, 25 members plus Bulgaria, Romania and possibly Croatia and Turkey. 
Even with the European political leaders’ and national governments’ 
support for further EU enlargement, it is still possible that this process may be 
delayed or postponed due to various reasons. The terms stated by the European 
Council in December 2002 could be affected by factors such as the new crisis 
over Iraq; the Union’s attempt to reiterate a new European foreign policy 
motivated by certain US military action which is nevertheless supported by 
some future EU candidates; or a major decrease in supporting EU enlargement 
due to unpredicted events in international politics. However, the main task 
would be an economic one, requesting that the present candidates achieve the 
promised reforms in creating a functional market economy. 
4. Religion, Symbols and European Identity 
A brief overview of European state-church relations shows deep 
connection between the 25 future EU members. Thus, in the constitution of five 
countries, the Christian cultural heritage is mentioned in the preambles (Ireland, 
Greece, Poland, Germany, and Slovakia). In six other countries there is a more 
                                                          
7 World Development Indicators 2002, The World Bank Group, www.worldbank.org. In 2002 GNI 
per capita in USD: Bulgaria 1,560, Macedonia 1,690, Romania 1,710, Guatemala 1,670, Croatia 
4,550, Estonia 3,810, Hungary 4,800, Poland 4,240, Slovak Republic 3,700, Brazil 3,060, Chile 
4,350, Mexico 5,540. 
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or less formal relation between state and church by giving one particular church 
a special position (Denmark, Finland, Spain, Austria, Portugal and the United 
Kingdom). In France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Sweden, church and 
state are formally separated. In the constitutions of Hungary and Slovenia a 
distinct separation is mentioned between church and state. Malta is the only 
European country in whose constitution a state religion is established as Roman 
Catholic. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have religious freedom written into 
their constitutions, but they favour certain churches and religious communities 
(Robbers, 1996; Pihl, 2003). 
The religiosity in the EU’s countries is divided between ‘believing without 
belonging’ as in the United Kingdom to ‘belonging without believing’ as in 
Denmark (Willaime, 1996:311). According to different surveys after 1990, 
approximately 59 per cent of the EU’s population declare themselves as 
believers, 29 per cent as non-believers, 5 per cent as atheists and 7 per cent as 
uncertain about their religious belief. Public trust in different churches and 
religions varies throughout the EU, while in most countries a strong decline in 
religious identification and spiritual belonging can be observed. The official 
dialogue between EU leaders and religious leaders of different churches and 
religious groups has been active especially during Gaston’s presidency in 1980s 
(Jansen, 2000:111). It is not the purpose of my paper to present the official 
dialogue framework, the common achievements or the public attitude of the EU 
leaders toward religion. Nevertheless, there is a stronger trend in the last years 
at the EU institutions’ level, towards analysing and implementing public 
policies regarding the role of religion in Europe. In this sense, financial support 
has been allocated for reflection on ‘ethical and spiritual implication of 
European integration’ (Hulbert, 1998:25). 
This empty European religious space has been the perfect territory for the 
gradual use of symbols, which had the main task of supporting a common 
European identity. There is a lack of research in this area, the only present 
analyses demonstrating the relationship between symbols and nation-state. 
However, regarding the European Union space, ‘the introduction of symbols such 
as an EU flag and anthem and a preoccupation with a European demos suggests 
the desire to create a European national identity’ (Hutchinson, 2003:10). 
To have a better image of the progress of using symbols in relation to 
European identity, I present in the next paragraphs, a short outline as reflected 
by EU documents and public policy implementation. 
In 1973, for the first time, the nine member countries of the European 
Community decided to draw up a document on European identity. According to 
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the declaration from the Heads of State and Government during the Copenhagen 
meeting on the 14th of December 1973 this would 
enable them to achieve a better definition of their relations with other 
countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy 
in world affairs. 
They also tried to ‘define the European Identity’ having 
the intention of carrying the work further in the future in the light of 
the progress made in the construction of a United Europe. Defining the 
European Identity involves reviewing the common heritage, interests 
and special obligations of the Nine, as well as the degree of the unity 
so far achieved within the Community.8 
In 1983 the Heads of Government signed in Stuttgart the ‘Solemn 
Declaration on European Union’ inviting the member states to promote 
European awareness and to undertake joint action in various cultural 
areas. 
This message was interpreted as an official recommendation to pursue 
cultural initiatives 
in order to affirm the awareness of a common cultural heritage as an 
element in European identity.9 
Consequently, new main areas developed a stronger cultural dimension 
such as education, training programmes and audio-visual policy. 
The 1984 ‘Television without Frontiers Directive’ established a connection 
between integration and European cultural identity: 
Information is a decisive, perhaps the most decisive, factor in 
European unification […] European unification will only be achieved 
if Europeans want it. Europeans will only want it if there is such thing 
as European identity. A European identity will only develop if 
Europeans are adequately informed.10 
                                                          
8 CEC 1973, Bulletin of the EC, No 12-1973. 
9 CEC 1983, Bulletin of the EC 6, 24. 
10 CEC 1984, Bulletin of the EC, 7/85. 
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The European Council meeting from the same year in Fontainbleu 
concluded that the European Community should 
respond to the expectations of the people of Europe by adopting 
measures to strengthen and promote its identity and its image both for 
citizens and for the rest of the world.11 
Regarding this matter, a special committee was established to organise and 
coordinate the best actions. The Committee examined the symbols present in 
the construction of European identity such as a flag and an anthem, marking the 
beginning of the campaign ‘A People’s Europe’. The Committee, under the 
chairmanship of Member of the European Parliament, Pietro Adonnino, 
presented two reports in 1985, which focused on the promotion of the ‘Idea of 
Europe’. The Committee proposed concrete EU policies in order to establish a 
Europe-wide audio-visual area, a European Academy of Science, Euro-lottery, 
formation of European sports teams, school exchange programmes and a 
stronger European dimension in education (Höjelid, 2001). The reports also 
implied that there is a need for a new set of symbols in order to communicate 
the EU’s principles and values. Thus the Commission stated: 
Symbols play a key role in consciousness-raising, but there is also a need 
to make the European citizen aware of the different elements that go to 
make up his European identity, of our cultural unity with all its diversity 
of expression, and of the historic ties which link the nations of Europe.12 
In a formal ceremony in May 1986, a new emblem and flag were created as 
among the most important symbolic actions. The flag was taken from the logo 
of the Council of Europe being composed from a circle of twelve yellow stars 
set against an azure background. As Shore (2000:47) asserts, ‘twelve was a 
symbol of perfection and plenitude, associated with the apostles, the sons of 
Jacob, the tables of the Roman legislator, the labours of Hercules, the hours of 
the day, the months of the year, or the signs of the Zodiac. Lastly, the circular 
layout denoted union’. There are also voices claiming that the circle with 
twelve gold stars should be perceived as a Christian symbol representing the 
Virgin Mary’s diadem and symbolic reference to the Virgin Mary’s sign in the 
New Testament (Apocalypse 12.1).13 Among other symbols, the Committee 
                                                          
11 Ibid. 
12 CEC 1988, Bulletin of the EC, Supplement 2/88. 
13 Elisabeta Constantin and Aurel Nae. 23 February 2000. Ortodoxia şi integrarea europeană. 
[Orthodox Church and European Integration] Interview with Joseph Homeyer, Bishop of 
Hildesheim, president of COMECE. Vestitorul Ortodoxiei [Orthodox Church News] p. 14. 
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proposed the creation of a European passport, driving licence and car number 
plates as well as a European anthem and European postage stamps. The most 
representative initiatives were the creation of EC Youth Orchestra, Opera 
Centre, the European Literature Prize, the European Woman of the Year Award 
and over one thousand Jean Monnet Awards (Höjelid, 2001). 
The Commission created new celebratory calendar markers such as 
European Weeks, European Culture Months and a series of European Years 
dedicated to specific representative themes. The most important moments in the 
history of European integration have started to be celebrated and the 9th of May 
– the anniversary of the Schuman Plan of the early fifties – was officially 
designated Europe Day. 
In the Maastricht Treaty, 1991, in order to promote an even stronger sense 
of belonging to the EU, a new legal category titled European Citizenship was 
developed. The Heads of Member State and Governments tried to achieve 
[…] a new stage in the process of European integration undertaken 
with the establishment of the European Communities […] desiring to 
deepen the solidarity between their peoples while respecting their 
history, their culture and their traditions […] resolved to establish a 
citizenship common to nationals of their countries […] to lay the 
foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.14 
In addition, the Maastricht Treaty emphasised new policy areas within the 
jurisdiction of the EU including education, youth, culture, consumer protection 
and public health, and, for the first time, a new ‘Cultural article’ (Article 128) 
was clearly stated: 
The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the 
Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity 
and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore. 
It is also noted the fact that the Maastricht Treaty does not make any 
reference to religion or churches. The Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, has issued a 
‘Declaration on the Status of Churches and Non-Confessional Organisations’ 
stating: 
The European Union respects and does not prejudice the status under 
national law of churches and religious associations and communities in 
                                                          
14 The Maastricht Treaty: Preamble. 
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the Member States. The European Union equally respects the status of 
philosophical and non-confessional organisations.15 
As the last released ‘Eurobarometer. Public Opinion in the European 
Union’ presents, 53 per cent of EU citizens feel to some extent European, 
compared with 44 per cent who only identify with their own nationality, while 
in 9 of the 15 Member States, European sentiment outweighs exclusive identifi-
cation with one’s own nationality. The proportion of people who do not identify 
with their own nationality and who feel European is the highest in Luxembourg 
(16 per cent). In the other Member States, the proportion of people who feel 
European ranges from 28 per cent in the UK to 66 per cent in Italy.16 
Despite the widespread sense of being European, in many member states 
there are now more people who identify only with their own nationality than in 
autumn 2000. In Spain, an 18 percentage point increase has been recorded in 
this respect, followed by a 9 percentage point increase in the UK and Ireland, 
an 8 percentage point rise in Greece and Italy and a 7 percentage point increase 
in Luxembourg. The demographic analyses show that people who left full-time 
education at the age of 20 or older, those who are still studying and managers 
are most likely to feel to some extent European. Retired people are most likely 
to identify with their own nationality. The attitudinal analyses show that 70 per 
cent of people, who regard their country’s membership to the European Union 
as a good thing, feel to some extent European. At the other extreme we find that 
73 per cent of people, who regard their country’s membership as a bad thing, 
identify with their own nationality.17 
5. Religion and Identity in Southeastern Europe in the Process of 
the EU’s Enlargement 
In Southeastern Europe church-state relations differ from those in Western 
Europe through the mainly nationalist discourse of religious leaders and the 
strong use of political and historical myths. 
The Byzantine concept of ‘symphonia’ supports state-church relations in the 
Orthodox region. This concept emphasises the fact that between church and state 
there is a continuous and common cooperation maintaining their status quo, 
                                                          
15 Official Journal C 340 10.11.1997. 
16 Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Union. April 2002. p. 14 Brussels: European 
Commission, www.europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion. 
17 Ibid. 
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fulfilling their particular goals, each supporting the other and neither being 
supported by the other. The rapid secularisation of the last century did not 
strongly affect religious support for Orthodoxy. This was especially possible due 
to the profound symbolism of liturgical acts and the concept that nationality is 
formed on a very strong religious basis (Kokosalakis, 1996:133; Janković, 2001). 
I shall not insist here on the theological concepts, which make Orthodoxy a 
specific religious approach in church-state relations. The use of religious symbols 
related to the political field in Orthodox countries is stronger and more significant 
than the use of secular symbols, such as the country’s flag or national anthem. At 
the same time, there is a significant and contradictory phenomenon within Ortho-
doxy, which sees the European Union’s values as incompatible and dangerous to 
its own values (Kazantzakis, 1993:114-115) but also a new and revised 
conception of Orthodoxy’s role within the European space (Prodromou, 1996). 
Analysing the religious roots of the modern international relations’ 
equation, Philpott (2000:214) tries to find the major elements which could 
explain the particular role of religion in the international political arena. He 
argues that ‘had the Reformation not occurred, a system of sovereign states 
would not have developed, at least not in the same form or in the same era as it 
did. More precisely, were it not for the Reformation, persistently medieval 
features of Europe […] would not have disappeared when they did, to make 
way for the system of sovereign states.’18 The relevance of the beginning of the 
system of modern international states, as we know them nowadays, subsides in 
understanding the major historical events where churches were involved 
specifically due to their influence in political and social life. The Westphalia 
Peace of 1648, that established the sovereign state system, shaped the present 
European political architectural model and the specific ways in which the 
political leaders know and understand politics. 
Concerning the Balkan region and its particular religious and political 
equation, it is important to remember that only 195 years before the ‘birth’ of 
the nation state, in 1453, Constantinople, the religious capital of Orthodoxy, 
was conquered by the Ottoman Empire. This event has changed completely the 
political and religious evolution of the whole of Eastern Europe for the next 
centuries. This situation affected not only the creation of future nation states in 
                                                          
18 ‘More precisely, were it not for the Reformation, persistently medieval features of Europe – the 
substantive powers of the Holy Roman Empire and its emperor, the formidable temporal powers of 
the church, religious uniformity, truncations of the sovereign powers of secular rulers, Spain’s 
control of the Netherlands – would not have disappeared when they did, to make ways for the 
system of sovereign states.’ 
Lucian N. Leustean 
290 
the Balkans, but also subsequent specific religious elements. All churches from 
this region, and mainly the Orthodox Church, had to develop throughout the 
centuries an active presence and nationalistic discourse in order to survive. In 
Balkan countries, even if politics nowadays is theoretically completely secular, 
in reality religious influence is rather strong. For example, in Greece, an EU 
member, religious elements are present in the political arena. The Orthodox 
Church is perceived as the ‘prevailing religion’ (Kyriazopoulos, 2001) and this 
fact created animated disputes in recent years regarding the real place of Greece 
in the European Union. Consequently, other governments did not escape this 
mesmerising balance between religion and politics in creating and elaborating 
their national strategies and main policies interests. As Ramet (1991:259) 
argues ‘religious identity is bound up with national identity, and religious 
tolerance is often inseparable from national intolerance’, this being the main 
feature of religious presence and revival throughout all Eastern European 
countries after the fall of communism. 
Romania and Bulgaria are both major Eastern Orthodox Christian 
countries. In order to have a detailed image on how symbolism affects the 
political arena, I shall focus further on Romania’s attitude towards the religious 
role in the vision of the future of Europe as perceived through public attitudes 
and official documents of political leaders. 
In Romania, the debate on the future of Europe was launched by Adrian 
Nastase, Prime Minister of Romania, on May 9, 2001, Europe Day. On this 
occasion, Nastase urged Romanian citizens to express their opinion about 
Romania's place in the future Europe, by participating in the debates organised 
especially under the direction of the Ministry of European Integration. 
A recent survey (Curelau et al., 2002) analyses the Romanians’ attitude 
towards European integration, according to religious confessional appurtenance 
and their inner motivations in conceiving the process of European integration. 
The study has as its main targets the specific groups of Orthodox and Catholic 
clerics and laymen. The group of Orthodox clerics has proved to be in greater 
favour of particular Romanian and religious identity and less of a European 
one, while the Catholic clerics have favoured Catholic and European identities 
to the same extent. The results do not show an explicit anti-European clerical 
identity but favour more their particular religious identity in contrast with the 
European one. Orthodox laymen favour to the same extent the Romanian and 
European identity and to a lesser extent their religious identity. Catholic laymen 
favour both Romanian and European identity but they are to a lesser extent in 
favour of any religious compromise. This aspect may be explained due to the 
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Catholic Church’s active presence in European politics. On the other hand, 
Orthodox clerics are in an even smaller percentage in favour of religious 
compromises and for some citizens European integration is even perceived as a 
threat to their national and religious identity. Thus, in their opinion, the church 
has the role of the protector of national and religious identity in maintaining 
Romanian traditions and values. During this experimental survey a provocative 
question was formulated. The interviewed subjects were told that because the 
majority of the European Union is Catholic, the process of European integrati-
on would consequently accelerate the process of the churches’ unification, and 
local religious autonomy will be diminished. The reactions of both clerics and 
laymen were mainly the same. Romanians are the greatest supporters of 
European integration from all accession candidates19 but their national identity 
is to a great extent bound to religious identity. Thus, the survey’s results indica-
te that even if in experimental conditions the majority favoured Romania’s 
accession to the EU, they are to an overwhelming extent against accession that 
may modify or threaten their religious identity. 
Romania’s position in the framework of the Convention on the Future of 
Europe debate has a strong religious attitude regarding the public religious 
discussions in the EU forums. The conception of political leaders on the future 
European architecture stands, from this point of view, in accordance with the 
major churches’ leaders. On 30 January 2003, the Minister of European 
Integration, Hildegard Puwak, declared that the proposals made by Romania 
concerning religious values in the context of the future European Constitution 
could only be in full agreement with the denominational majority position in 
Romania. Romania has presented a document to the members of the convention 
referring to the Christian heritage of Europe-building, which has been drawn 
jointly by the representatives of the Romanian Orthodox Church, the Roman 
Catholic Church, experts from the Ministry of European Integration and the 
Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs.20 
The former Romanian Foreign Minister and ex-President of the OSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly, Adrian Severin (2003), adopted an interesting 
position regarding this debate. In his opinion, political Europe would not 
become Christian but Christianity instead will acquire a European dimension 
                                                          
19 Romania has the greatest support for EU membership with 78% of population from all accession 
candidates, followed by Bulgaria with 68%, Hungary 67% and Turkey 65%. Candidate Countries 
Eurobarometer, Public Opinion in the Countries Applying for European Union Membership. 2002. 
Brussels: European Commission p. 62. 
20 ROMPRES,  www.rompres.ro, 30 January 2003. 
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‘by setting at the basis of Europe-building human rights, solidarity, the fight 
against poverty and the effort to promote peace, love and tolerance. […] 
Europe is and will be Christian. This does not mean exclusivity and intolerance, 
but a Christianity of love for Man, created after the image of God.’ His 
discourse is close to Romanian public perceptions, furthermore promoting a 
religious language in asserting his personal political ideas. 
In addition, Romania’s concrete proposals in the framework of the 
Convention on the Future of Europe consists of (1) the creation of a second 
chamber of the European Parliament, (2) the promotion of the principle of 
subsidiarity and (3) an economic and social government (Severin, 2002). The 
second proposal is the well-known political principle of subsidiarity, promoting 
the best distribution of tasks between the national and European levels. It is 
enticing to note that the controversy regarding the applicability of this principle 
has a religious inference, especially to Catholic social doctrine, emphasising the 
role of the regional and local level in contrast with the European centralised one 
(Montclos, 1994). Even if Romania’s official position does not have any 
implicit religious assertions, it is evident that by promoting this principle the 
major Orthodox denominational countries tend to favour the same Christian 
values as promoted also by the Roman Catholic Church21 in the process of 
European construction. 
6. Conclusions 
Religious and political surveys in Europe point out that ‘Eastern Europe is 
quite close to the norms of the original EEC members with regard to beliefs and 
values concerning the role of religion in public life.’ In addition ‘there is an 
emerging secular religious culture throughout Europe, one that sees religion as 
inconsequential for political life’ (Laitin, 2002:50-88). 
The European Union’s leaders use the secular symbols in the same way as 
major Orthodox Southeastern European’s countries use religious symbols in 
creating better social cohesion and support of their national identities. The 
overwhelming public support towards national Orthodox churches in 
Southeastern Europe would make any other European institution envious in the 
attempt to promote the best public policy towards a common European identity. 
                                                          
21 ‘Certes, les responsables politiques européens ont emprunté à l’Eglise la notion de subsidiarité. 
Son inscription dans les textes laisserait à penser que les autorités européennes n’interviennent que 
si elles permettent une action plus efficace qu’au niveaux national.’ (Montclos, 1994: 100-101). 
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The EU’s political leaders used in the gradual construction of the European 
Union, political symbols in the same way as religious symbols have been used in 
Southeastern European countries. If in the next years, Bulgaria and Romania will 
be members of the EU, there should be a great attention to the utilisation of 
secular and religious symbols in the EU and particularly in these countries in 
order to maintain the same strong popular support towards EU policy. Otherwise, 
we might be witness to the rejection of ‘foreignness’ which does not share the 
same religious values and an increase in nationalist discourse and propaganda 
through perhaps the creation of a distinct religious block including the other 
Orthodox countries. The desired economic prosperity in these countries is not the 
absolute engine that leads them to the European Union community, but also the 
feeling of cultural and religious belonging to the same European family. 
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CHURCHES, SECTS, AND INVISIBLE RELIGION IN 
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AFTER THE 
TRANSFORMATION 
Since the end of the eighties and the fall of the communist regime with its 
official atheistic ideology in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe signifi-
cant changes in religious scenery have taken place. They constitute an interesting 
field for testing many theories to religious change, which are usually formulated 
and tested mainly on the empirical material from western and third world coun-
tries without almost any references to this part of the world. One of the possible 
reasons for this neglect may by a relatively poor condition of the sociology in 
these countries, partly caused by the ideological control of this discipline in the 
previous years, resulting in the lack of data necessary for comparative analysis. 
This situation is, however, gradually changing and much more data are now 
collected and accessible for the analysis. Comparative research programs, both 
more generally oriented (but including many variables related to religion) as 
EVS, WVS, ISSP and more specifically oriented towards religion as Aufbruch or 
RAMP, as well as some censuses and other research programs, offer a rich vari-
ety of data for testing different theories of religious change. 
1. Theoretical interpretations of religious change 
Among theoretical approaches to the problem of religious change we may 
find different predictions concerning the future of religion. The most 
widespread theory or rather a group of theories will expect a gradual decline of 
religion (differently conceptualized) with the advancement of modernisation. In 
the formulation of Thomas Luckman (1999) it is the decline of institutional 
religion due to the two of the basic components of the overall process of 
modernisation: functional differentiation and pluralism. The functional differ-
entiation is to subject the public life of the individual members of modern 
societies to norms without religious significance and restrict the influence of 
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religious norms to the private sphere of life, resulting in the privatisation of 
religion. Pluralism makes different worldviews widely accessible and forces to 
making choices between different options including also religious options. 
As the result, the new social form of religion is de-monopolized and the 
religious collective representation constitutes a relatively open ‘market’. 
Among the old suppliers of this market are: 
the survivors from the previous, monopolistic social form of religion 
remain important as purveyors of what is clearly labeled as a religious 
notion. This is something of a handicap when it comes to competition 
with suppliers closer to what is taken to be modern consciousness, but 
it is also an advantage with regard to the continuing demand for the 
traditional product on the part of a shrunken clientele. In any case, the 
churches and sects are doing their best to continue to play a role in 
those contemporary articulations of a sacred cosmos which are still 
directly connected to the subjective experiences of the “great” 
transcendences of life and death as well as to other-worldly salvation. 
(Luckman, 1999:254). 
Among the new suppliers New Age is one of the most successful as being 
closer to modern consciousness and representing individual ‘holistic’ responses 
to the specialisation of institutional domains, the pluralism of mass-culture, the 
development of a market of world views as general conditions which charac-
terize modern societies: 
The new, privatized, and, in a manner of speaking, invisible social form 
of religion can be best illustrated by certain diffuse recent developments 
usually collected under the same label: the “New Age” movement – 
which of course is anything but a movement in the accepted sense of a 
social movement including the “new occultism”, and various programs 
favoring the “spiritual” development of the individual. They are highly 
syncretistic. They gather diverse psychological, therapeutic, magic, and 
marginally scientific as well as older “esoteric” materials, repackage 
them and offer them for individual consumption. Further private syncre-
tism typically makes selective use of these packages. There is no canon-
ized dogma, no personal recruitment system, no disciplining apparatus. 
In other words, these movements and (cultic) milieus are marked by 
varied, generally weak forms of institutionalisation. No attempt to trans-
form these enterprises into a big institutional apparatus is made. Instead, 
“networks” are formed or, at least, a “network” mystique is cultivated, 
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and commercially exploitable “cultic milieus” are formed. In fact, this 
may be a precondition for the successful maintenance of a vague holistic 
approach, an approach expressly designed to overcome the “alienating” 
specialisations of science, religion, art, etc. into institutional spheres and 
segregated cultural domains (Luckmann, 1999:255-6). 
On the basis of theory of religious change proposed by Thomas Luckmann 
we could expect the decline of traditional churches and the growth of invisible 
religion of the New Age type especially with the advancement of the modernisa-
tion. The growth of the cultic milieu should be correlated with the decline of 
church religiosity. 
Different expectations concerning religious change could be formulated on 
the basis of the theory proposed by Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge 
(1987), often quoted as an example of emerging economic paradigm in the 
study of religion. According to this theory and other formulations of the market 
model of religion the most successful competitors of traditional churches are 
high-tension groups of the sectarian type. 
Sects demand high levels of commitment and high rates of participation, 
require strict and distinctive codes of conduct, emphasize “particularristic” 
beliefs and practices (which distinguish their members from those of 
other religions and, presumably, make them superior to all others), and 
view secular society as corrupt, dangerous, and threatening. Sects 
emphasize “volitional membership” (personal conversion as opposed to 
membership through birth), and they attract a disproportionate share of 
their converts from among the less advantaged segments of society – 
ethnic minorities, the poor, and the less educated. Most sects eschew reli-
gious professionalism, favoring lay leadership and simple organisation 
structures in which members can participate as equals (Iannaccone, 
1997:104). 
Their growth may limit the scope of secularisation in a most efficient way 
especially in those countries where the conventional churches are weak and the 
level of state regulation of religion is not too high to make their activity 
possible (Stark and Bainbridge, 1985; 1987). Eastern Europe, which is now 
undergoing a radical socio-cultural transformation (one of the factors contrib-
uting to the growth of NRMs, according to Stark and Bainbridge), while 
generally representing low level of religious activity and showing a significant 
decrease of state regulation of religious market in comparison to the earlier 
period. The secularisation of Eastern Europe was not a “natural” process due to 
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the structural differentiation of the socio-cultural system but at least in part, was 
enforced by the deliberate attempts of the communist state to restrict religious 
activities of all kinds. After resignation of atheism as an official ideology (in all 
EE countries) and withdrawing from state regulation of religious market (to a 
different degree in different countries), possibilities of growth are opened for 
all kinds of religious organisations including also traditional churches. 
On the ground of the Stark-Bainbridge theory we can expect that religious 
change is related to the existing level of church religiosity and the degree of 
state control of religious market. From their thesis that sects and cults are 
reactions to a different degree of erosion of traditional churches, we can con-
clude: in the countries with a low level of religious participation we may expect 
further decline of church religiosity accompanied by the growth of cults or cult-
like phenomena (‘New Age’ type beliefs and practices). In the countries with a 
high level of church religiosity it is to be expected either stabilisation or a slight 
decline of church religiosity and the growth of sects and sect-like movements 
within the dominant religious tradition. 
Another factor, which may be relevant here is the level of economic 
development. 
Although an economic model of sacrifice and stigma serves to 
“rationalize” sectarian behavior, it also yields testable implications 
about the social and economic correlates of sectarianism. For example, 
it correctly predicts that sectarian groups will attract a disproportionate 
share of their members from among the poor, less educated, and 
minority members of a society. (The prediction derives from the fact 
that the opportunity cost of sect membership is substantially lower for 
people with limited secular opportunities.) Similarly, the model 
predicts that a general decline in secular opportunities, such as those 
occasioned by economic recessions, will encourage the growth of sects 
relative to more lenient, mainstream groups. (Iannaccone, 1997:106). 
In a less economically developed region of Eastern Europe, according to 
the market model, the most dynamic development will take place in the sector 
of high tension groups (sects and cults). A typology of religious organisations 
proposed by Stark and Bainbridge (1987) based on the level of tension and 
innovation in relation to their environment includes only churches, sects and 
cults but it may be extended to a fourth element of cultic milieu (with a high 
level of innovation and a low level of tension). 
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Figure 1: A typology of religious organisations 
 Tension  + Sects Cults 
  – Churches Cultic milieu 
   – + 
    Innovation 
 
On the ground of both theoretical approaches we could therefore expect a 
differentiated rate of growth in different sectors of this typology – churches, 
sects and cultic milieu (in the case of cults, where almost any statistics is 
lacking, we will not test any predictions). The main area of growth according to 
the market approach will be the sector of high tension with the sociocultural 
environment and low innovation related to the activity of sects. According to 
Thomas Luckmann’s theory of religious change, the most significant develop-
ment will take place in the region of low tension and high innovation related to 
New Age. In the case of traditional churches both theories will predict their de-
cline. They will lose their position in favor of New Age in Thomas Luckmann’s 
model and higher tension groups in the market model. 
2. Data and Methods 
To test the predictions based on these two theoretical models I will use the 
data on church attendance and church participation as the indicators of church 
religiosity. The main source of these data is International Social Survey Pro-
gramme gathered in 1991 and in 1998. But because this survey has been 
conducted only in a few countries of Central and Eastern Europe in 1991 I will 
use as additional source of data another comparative research programmes as 
European Value Study and World Value Study, which will make possible the 
comparisons between the beginning and the end of the nineties to indicate the 
growth or decline of church religiosity. The main source for data related to 
sectarian religiosity are statistics published annually by Jehovah’s Witnesses in 
the first number of the year in their periodical “The Watchtower”. The data 
related to New Age come from International Social Survey Programme. The 
survey data will be aggregated on the level on countries and in such a way 
(country as the principal unit of analysis) will be used in descriptive, correlati-
onal and regression analyses to test the predictions related to the market theory 
of religion and Theory of Thomas Luckmann. 
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3. Results 
Churches 
On the average, church membership in the Western world is higher than in 
Eastern Europe (with the exception of Poland). In the countries participating in 
EVS in 1990 – the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary and 
Slovakia, the proportion of unchurched is 24,1% in comparison to 32,8% in the 
Western countries participating in the same study). Eastern Europe was, 
however, significantly differentiated in this matter. The percentage of the 
unchurched population varies from 3,7% in Poland to over sixty percent in East 
Germany, Czech Republic and Bulgaria (Ester et al., 1994). 
 
Table 1: Percent of unchurched in Western and Eastern Europe  
Country ISSP 1991 ISSP 1998
Germany 11 15 
E.Germany 64 69 
UK 33 46 
Austria 10 12 
Hungary 5 27 
Italy 6 7 
Ireland 2 5 
Netherlands 55 58 
Norway 6 10 
Sweden  28 
CzechRep.  44 
Slovenia 11 24 
Poland 3 6 
Bulgaria  13 
Russia 63 33 
Spain  14 
Latvia  34 
Slovakia  16 
France  46 
Portugal  8 
Denmark  11 
Switzerland  9 
Sources: ISSP 1991 and ISSP1998 (Dataset from: Zentralarchive für Empirische 
Sozialforschung an der Universität zu Köln) 
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According to the ISSP data the percentage of the unchurched has remained 
almost at the same level in EE countries between the years 1991 (mean 29,2%) 
and 1998 (28,9%) as well as in the Western Europe (17,5% and 20,7%). The 
differences between both regions are not statistically significant. 
Comparisons in time in 5 EE countries and in 7 WE countries indicate 
greater increase in the percentage of the unchurched in the Western than in the 
Eastern part of the continent (4,5% and 2,6%) but the differences are not 
statistically significant. The decline of the percentage of the religious ‘nones’ is 
observed only in Russia, whereas in more modernized countries of the region 
we may witness its growth. 
It may be also observed in census data (in those countries where question 
of religious participation was included in recent censuses). For example in the 
Czech Republic according to the census of 1991 there were 40% of those who 
do not belong to any church. Ten years later the proportion of unchurched has 
grown to 58,3% (45,3% in small communities up to 199 inhabitants and 63,1% 
in the cities over 100 000). According to the preliminary result of this census 
published at the website of the Czech Statistical Office, traditional churches 
have suffered heavy losses, whereas some denominations classified as ‘others’ 
have increased 161,4%.Significant differences between countries could be also 
observed on another indicator of church religiosity – church attendance rates. 
The results of these surveys (Table 2), conducted in similar time periods, in 
some countries are diversified (probably due to the different format of the scale 
measuring attendance, for example frequency of practices is usually higher in 
EVS data than in ISSP). At the beginning of the nineties Poland, Ireland, East 
Germany and Slovenia have had quite different attendance rates according to 
different surveys. These differences appear at the end of the decade in Poland and 
Slovenia. (I have no access to the latest editions of WVS and EVS at present 
moment). They might be the result of different research methodologies, so in 
comparing these results in time, the best solution is perhaps to use results from 
the same survey program (ISSP). In this case, however, the number of countries, 
which could be taken into consideration radically diminishes (especially in 
Eastern Europe), so if the data for a particular country are lacking we may take 
the data from other sources. Rose and Haerpfer, (1993) for the beginning, and 
Aufbruch 1998 for the end of the decade, will be especially useful in supplying 
data for Eastern Europe, as well as EVS 1990 for the rest of lacking cases. 
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Table 2: Church attendance rates (at least weekly) in Western and Eastern 
Europe  
Country EVS 1990 
ISSP 
1991 
WVS 
1991-1993 
Rose & Haerpfer 
1993 
ISSP 
1998 
Aufbruch 
1998 
Croatia    15  25 
Belarus   3 3   
E. Germany 13 4   2 3 
Latvia   2  5  
Romania   19 16  25 
Lithuania      10 
Ukraine    5  8 
Hungary 14 12 14 11 15 14 
Czech Rep 8  15 12 7 9 
Slovenia   23 13 13 20 
Poland 66 38 65 54 39 53 
Bulgaria 5   5   
Russia  2 2  3  
Slovakia 32   35 30 33 
Belgium 27  27    
W. Germany 18 15 18  7  
UK 14 10 14  13  
Austria  17 25  19  
Italy 38 32 37  29  
Ireland 81 65 81  61  
Netherlands 20 17 20  14  
Norway 5 5 5  6  
Sweden 4  4  5  
Spain 30  29  22  
France 10  10  12  
Portugal 39  39  27  
Denmark 3  3  2  
Switzerland   22  44  
Sources: Rose & Haerpfer (1993) and datasets: EVS 1990, WVS 1991-3, ISSP 1991, ISSP 1998, 
Aufbruch 1998. 
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The comparison of attendance rates at the beginning and at the end of the 
decade in Western Europe (11 countries) indicates a small decline (from 20,5% 
to 19,7%), whereas in Eastern Europe a small growth of attendance rates (from 
13,3% to 15,6%) can be noticed. The frequency of church attendance is here 
still lower than in Western Europe, but growing instead of declining as in the 
West, so the difference between both regions is diminishing. 
Both indicators of church religiosity (church participation and church 
attendance) are growing in EE countries, although not always to the same 
degree. A significant growth of church participation in Russia is not reflected in 
the growth of attendance rates. 
Sects 
The quantitative data on sects (groups within the dominant religious 
tradition) are available only in some cases and usually they are provided by the 
movements themselves. The most detailed statistical information is published 
annually by Jehovah's Witnesses, in the first numbers of their journal ‘The 
Watchtower’ Their reports on membership are rather conservative and include 
only the most devoted members. Therefore they are usually lower than the data 
from censuses (Stark and Iannaccone, 1997). Jehovah’s Witnesses are present 
in EE for several decades but it is the last decade, when they record a 
significant growth in this region. Although the statistical data show high rates 
of growth in percentages (greater than in Western Europe, where they never 
exceed 5 per year) but in absolute numbers of committed followers or in rela-
tion to the population, the figures are usually smaller than in Western Europe. 
In the case of almost all EE countries we may observe (Table 3) the growth 
of the rate of publishers to the total population in the years 1995-1999 (22% on 
the average), whereas in almost all WE countries (with the exception of Italy 
and Portugal) we may note a decline at the same time period (-4%). The 
difference in the rate of growth between the two regions is statistically signifi-
cant (p>,000). Eastern Europe is, however, differentiated in the rate of growth 
of this religious group between former Soviet Union and Central-Eastern 
Europe. After the initial high rates of growth at the beginning of the nineties in 
both regions of Eastern Europe, we observe a slowing down of their dynamics 
in the second half of the decade, especially in the countries of Central-Eastern 
Europe. The patterns of growth here are more similar to the countries of 
Western Europe than those for the countries of the former Soviet Union. 
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Table 3: Number of citizens per each active member of Jehovah's Witnesses 
(‘publisher’) in each country in the years 1990-1999.  
Country  1990 1992 1995 1999 
Croatia , 1326 1043 893 
Yugoslavia 3388 5001 3321 2620 
Belarus , , 5180* 4038 
Estonia , , 551 386 
E. Germany 784 , , , 
Latvia , , 2579 1238 
Romania 1217 938 678 593 
Lithuania , , 2256 1578 
Ukraine , , 868 468 
Hungary 994 820 605 488 
Czech Rep  , 612 616 
Slovenia , 1335 1149 1061 
Poland 400 355 311 312 
Bulgaria , 34004 12977 8230 
Russia , , 2217** 1379 
Slovakia , 612 437 435 
Belgium 393 375 363 392 
Germany 468 496 479 490 
UK 463 444 432 467 
Austria 402 391 384 394 
Italy 318 297 271 252 
Ireland 1474 1266 1144 1174 
Netherlands 475 478 470 502 
Norway 439 440 428 455 
Sweden 377 367 358 376 
Spain 465 427 388 387 
France 495 475 459 495 
Portugal 268 231 211 201 
Denmark 319 315 324 353 
Switzerland 403 387 381 394 
Sources: “The Watchtower” * – 1997. ** – 1996.  
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New Age 
Researches conducted in some countries of Eastern Europe usually show a 
high level of acceptance of New Age beliefs. Polish university students, sur-
veyed at the end of the eighties, outdistanced their western colleagues in their 
acceptance of the occult beliefs and this tendency seems to be continued in the 
nineties (Doktór, 1996). Among 17-18 years old Hungarians, 35,5% believe in 
reincarnation, 49,6% in telepathy, 43,8 % in UFO’s and 45% in God (Tomka, 
1996). In the International Social Survey Program in 1991 and in 1998 some 
questions concerning the parallel beliefs have been asked. Three items may be 
used to measure New Age beliefs: ‘Some fortune tellers really can foresee the 
future’; ‘Some faith healers really do have God-given healing powers ’; ‘A 
person’s star signs at birth, or horoscope, can affect the course of their future’. 
They were coded on a four point Likert scale ranging from ‘definitely false’ (1) 
to ‘definitely true’( 4) and form a scale with Cronbach Alpha =,77). This scale, 
however, do not include items related to oriental beliefs, which constitute 
another important dimension of New Age beliefs (Doktór, 1999). 
 
Table 4: Acceptance of New Age beliefs (means) 
Country 1991 1998 
Latvia  2,86 
E. Germany 1,85 1,87 
Hungary  2,10 
Czech Rep  2,61 
Slovenia 2,44  
Bulgaria  2,66 
Russia  2,58 
Slovakia  2,68 
W. Germany 2,00 2,20 
UK   
Austria 2,14 2,10 
Ireland 1,99 2,17 
Netherlands  1,82 
France  2,10 
Portugal  1,91 
Switzerland  2,28 
Source: ISSP 1991 and 1998 (Dataset from: Zentralarchive für Empirische Sozialforschung an der 
Universität zu Köln) 
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Comparative data from ISSP91 include only a few countries, where the 
questions concerning parallel beliefs have been asked (in the case of EE 
countries it was only East Germany and Slovenia). In the 1998 edition of this 
program, there were a few more countries, where these questions have been 
asked but only Eastern and Western Germany, Austria, and Ireland may be 
compared with the first edition of this program. In comparison to the results of 
the survey from the 1991 we may observe a decline of acceptance of New Age 
beliefs in one country and growth in three countries, in which the same 
questions were asked. These results tend to confirm the expectations based on 
Thomas Luckmann interpretations of New Age predicting the growth of this 
phenomenon. In all three countries the growth of New Age is also accompanied 
by decline in church attendance (see Table 2). The confirmation is, however, 
related only to the comparisons in time, because results based only on ISSP 
data from 1998 – tend to falsify this interpretation. The acceptance of parallel 
beliefs in a less modernized Eastern Europe is higher than in the Western part 
of the continent (mean 2,48 and 2,08 respectively) and the differences are 
statistically significant even on the aggregated level. Similar results may be 
obtained from correlational analysis using the data for the countries as cases. 
Table 5: Pearson’s correlations between analyzed variables 
   GDP 1998 Attendance rate 1998 
Publisher’s growth 
rate 1995-99 
Attendance rate 1998 R ,001   
  Sign. ,998   
  N 25   
Publisher’s growth rate 1995-99 R -,714 -,250  
  Sign. ,000 ,227  
  N 28 25  
New Age beliefs acceptance rate 1998 R -,602 -,146 ,650 
  Sign. ,029 ,634 ,016 
  N 13 13 13 
 
New Age beliefs are more widespread in the countries with a lower level of 
economic development as measured by GDP, which falsifies the Thomas 
Luckmann’s model of religious change. New age is stronger in less modernized 
countries, contrary to his expectations. Even stronger is the negative correlation 
between GDP and percent of growth of Jehovah’s Witnesses, which supports 
both theoretical models. Sectarian religiosity flourishes in less affluent and less 
modernized countries. Church religiosity is not related to GDP but tend to be 
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inversely related to both forms of alternative religiosity as predicted by both 
models. The correlation is, however, rather small and not statistically significant. 
To take into account the possible effects of the interrelationship between 
independent variables we will also conduct the multiple regression analysis. 
 
Table 6: Regression analysis with a rate of ‘publishers’ in relation to the 
population and with acceptance of New Age beliefs as dependent variables 
 Publisher’s growth rate 1995-1999  
New Age beliefs 
acceptance rate 1998  
  Beta Sign. Beta Sign. 
(Constant)  ,000  ,000 
Attendance rate 1998 -,250 ,105 -,040 ,895 
GDP1998 -,676 ,000 -,543 ,101 
Adj. Rsq. ,48  ,16  
 
GDP is the only significant predictor of the growth rate of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses (which supports the market model), although the attendance rate is 
approaching the level of statistical significance. In the case of acceptance of 
New Age beliefs there are no significant predictors but GDP is approaching the 
level of statistical significance in the predicted direction. 
4. Conclusions 
Among the three forms of religious life, church and sectarian religiosity, 
although still weaker in Eastern than Western Europe, manifest a tendency to 
grow, whereas in Western Europe are on the decline. The differences between 
both regions are more pronounced in the case of sectarian religiosity. The main 
factor influencing these differences is the level of economic development. Eastern 
Europe and especially countries of former Soviet Union are significantly lower 
on GDP and in some countries this indicator was even declining during the 
decade. As the market model predicts, ‘a general decline in secular opportunities, 
such as those occasioned by economic recessions, will encourage the growth of 
sects relative to more lenient, mainstream groups’ (Iannaccone, 1997:106). 
Therefore we may interpret these results as confirming the predictions of this 
model. They could be also interpreted as confirming Thomas Luckmann’s model, 
but in this case the confirmation is not so obvious. Although for this author, 
transformations in the economy are one of factors underlying the modernisation 
process, it is not the principal factor and the relationship between the economic 
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growth and the religious change is not emphasized in his model to the same 
extent as pluralism and structural differentiation. The EE countries, although 
sometimes declining in economy, are advancing in modernisation understood as 
growing pluralism and structural differentiation. Nevertheless, they are still less 
advanced in this process than the countries of Western Europe. 
In the case of New Age beliefs, they are growing, where church religiosity 
is declining (in a few countries of Western Europe and in former East 
Germany, one of the most modernized country of Eastern Europe). This is 
confirming the prediction based on the Thomas Luckmann model. However, 
the data from the 1998 edition of ISSP abate its predictions. The main correlate 
here is also economic development. It is significant as bivariate correlate of 
New Age but in regression analysis it is only approaching the level of statistical 
significance. In both cases, the results are contrary to the expectations of 
Thomas Luckmann model. New Age beliefs are more widespread in the 
countries with a lower level of GDP, whereas this model predicts their growth 
with the advances of modernisation. The market model has no specific predic-
tions concerning New Age. But it may be assumed that because New Age 
includes specific compensators, it may also involve, to some extent, the similar 
compensatory mechanism as in the case of sects and some New Age beliefs, 
especially more traditional (occult) ones as in our data, may have higher 
acceptance among the socially deprived. More innovatory New Age beliefs 
include elements of the oriental traditions both in their form (religious inclu-
siveness and universalism) and content (reincarnation or impersonal concept of 
divinity). The number of the analyzed countries is also in this case over twice 
as much smaller than in the case of sect religiosity and the operationalisation of 
New Age beliefs rather narrow, which may imply some reservations in the 
interpretation of these results. 
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Stipe Tadić and Vine Mihaljević 
ECCLESIASTICAL MOVEMENTS IN CROATIA: SOME 
INDICATORS OF MUTUAL ACQUAINTANCE AND 
TOLERANCE 
1. Introduction 
The presence and more engaged activity of the new ecclesiastical 
movements in the Catholic Church in Croatia emerged at the end of the 60s and 
in the 70s. It seems that the two almost coinciding factors had a decisive role in 
these events. The first one is a loosening up of the rigorous and repressive 
restraints of the Communists regime with respect to religion and the Catholic 
Church and its relative opening to the Western democratic societies where 
some ecclesiastical movements have already got deep-rooted, which enabled at 
that time the ‘import’ of some of those movements to Croatia. The second 
factor is the Second Vatican Council and the opening of the Catholic Church to 
the world (Aggiornamento). Establishing the dialogue of the Catholic Church 
with modern society and its opening to the world have considerably inspired 
the gathering of the laypersons in the new ecclesiastical movements. In a 
broader sense the new ecclesiastical movements belong to new religious 
movements which appeared after the World War II and share their common 
features (Barker, 1989), but contrary to other movements they are at least 
implicitly recognized by the Church authorities and the local bishop, as acting 
under the umbrella of the local church, parish and/or diocese (Christifideles 
laici, 1990:30; Favale, 1991:531; J. Baloban, 1993:49). 
Besides these fundamental factors, a global change of religious situation by 
the end of the 60s and onwards should also be mentioned. Namely, at that time, 
in addition to all the complexity and an increasing phenomenon of 
secularisation, ‘theology of the dead God’ and contesting, religion is back to 
the scene. Moreover, it became a real ‘hit’ among the students and the young in 
general. So, with good reason, sociology of religion does not speak any more of 
“the descent of the holy” (S. Acquaviva, 1966), “the secularized city” (H. Cox, 
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1967), but of “the return of the holy” and the revitalisation of religion instead. 
After an unsuccessful attempt to reinterpret the ‘new religious revival’, new 
religious and ecclesiastical movements in a thematic set of secularisation, these 
issues have become in different aspects ‘privileged’ topics of the sociology of 
religion (Tadić, 2002). 
On a global religious plan it was manifested especially in ‘the religions of 
the young’, ‘the New Religious Movements, while at that time, a new 
charismatic movement emerges within the Catholic Church and some earlier 
ecclesiastical movements regain new enthusiasm and motivation inspired by the 
Second Vatican Council. So, it seems that such a spiritual situation in the 
Catholic Church strongly echoed through the changed social and ecclesiastical 
setting in Croatia as well. 
The new ecclesiastical movements, as well as the New Religious 
Movements, are a believers’ response to the new religious and social situation 
in society and to the challenges of time (Greely, 1979, Harvieu-Léger, 1987, 
Jukić, 1991). Proliferation of different ecclesiastical and religious movements 
and groups are, by all means, the signs of modern religious revival. A strong 
religious personal experience, new religious practice and more engaged activity 
of the members of the ecclesiastical movements in the Catholic Church and in 
society, generate changes and the resurgence of the socio-cultural and religious 
situation. All this leads to the new pluralisation of already plural religious offer 
in Croatian society, but at the same time, to a certain, even though, latent 
fideism and (sectarian) inaccessibility. 
This study examines how much the members of a particular ecclesiastical 
movement who participated in this research, are acquainted with charisma1, 
respectively, with the fundamental mission, activity and spirituality of another 
movement (the movement the respondent belonged to, was not assessed), then 
to what extent the members of an ecclesiastical movement cooperate with other 
ecclesiastical movements. The focus of our interest was also a response to the 
question what the members of such movement think about the attitude of their 
movement towards the Christian sects and the New Religious Movements that 
are not of the Christian provenance2. In this way we wanted to assess the level 
                                                          
1 The term ‘charisma’ in this text means the fundamental mission, specific activity and spirituality 
of a particular ecclesiastical movement. Namely, the interviewed members of the ecclesiastical lay 
movements do not understand this term in the sociological (scientific) Weber’s sense of an 
exquisite personal gift of an individual, but as a specific basic mission, communitarian activity and 
spirituality of a certain ecclesiastical lay movement. 
2 Sects are the forms of a religious community within Christianity and which break contacts with 
the Churches from which they derive. The New Religious Movements have appeared mostly after 
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of acquaintance with the activity and spirituality of another ecclesiastical 
movement and the readiness to cooperate with other movements. 
2. The main characteristics of the ecclesiastical movements 
The new ecclesiastical movements stem from the church ‘basis’ of the 
believers (Tadić, 2002). They do not establish themselves, but emerge, happen, 
start, live. Their initiators are laypersons, namely, the believers who do not 
belong to the clerical hierarchy of the Catholic Church. They represent a 
response to various socio-cultural and religious challenges of time. These 
movements are mostly marked by ecclesiasticism, strongly shown dimension of 
community, by personal religious experience incited by sensation of the Holy 
Spirit, manifested in human reality, by the ecumenical openness, the openness 
to the young people, the spiritual and evangelical resurgence, the uniqueness 
and specificity of the holiness of the Christian life. The Second Vatican Council 
contributed to the emerging of the new ecclesiastical movements while (besides 
the ministerial) emphasizing the general priesthood of all the baptized, what has 
become a theological presumption for the laypersons to engage more and have 
a more influential role in the Catholic Church and in the world. 
Therefore we might say that the Catholic Church itself was the very source 
and origin of the lay turmoil and development and the motivation for emerging 
of the new lay movements, respectively, in the changing circumstances in the 
world, the Catholic Church did not prevent but encouraged their rising. For that 
reason it is understandable why the sociologists (J. Séguy, 1973, D. Hervieu-
Léger, 1990) tried to interpret the new ecclesiastical movements, as well as the 
charismatic revival as the “shock” of modernity and the turbulent post-Council 
times in the Catholic Church. There was also an attempt to explain these 
movements as a protest of laypersons against the ecclesiastical control or as a 
protest against the monopoly of clergy in the area of the sacral, and finally, as 
an attitude of an individual or of a group, respectively, a community. 
After the Second Vatican Council, the Catholic Church in Croatia also 
experienced various spiritual lines of force among the laymen, lay turmoil and 
ecclesiastical movements. They act and are engaged in the Church and in the 
                                                                                                                                
the World War II. They are offering the means and services aimed at acquiring transcendental 
knowledge and spiritual enlightenment of an individual. These movements include the 
fundamentalist-oriented Christian groups, groups that assume the religious concepts of the East, 
especially Hinduism and Buddhism, and psychological-therapeutic groups (comp. H. Knoblauch, 
2004:183-238). 
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world primarily through the group, communitarian functions. They exist and 
function on the principles and laws of other bigger or smaller groups. The 
majority of them emerged, as mentioned earlier, from the ‘basis’ of the 
believers, but still with the presence of the priest and within the clerical, 
hierarchic part of the Church. They have no firm organisation, they are not 
established by any legislative stipulation and are not found in a form of an 
organisation, nor have they been established by a decree or the wish of the 
Church hierarchy. The bishops of the former Yugoslavia emphasize the criteria 
of the ecclesiastical of the various groups and movements – small Christian 
communities – that represent important places and bearers of the Evangelic, 
more true upbringing in faith and a valuable contribution to the revival of the 
Church, “unless they separate from the universal or local Church and their 
leadership” (Bishops of Yugoslavia, 1983:72). 
From the beginning of their activity until today, the Catholic ecclesiastical 
movements did not have a prominent social engagement. As a matter of fact, 
they remained on the edge of the ecclesiastical events, partly because of the 
“harsh attitude of the Church authorities”, partly because “priests find it hard to 
give up the established forms of pastoral activity and do not accept or barely 
accept new forms and offers”, or perhaps because members of ecclesiastical 
movements “abandon their own parish” (Ivančić, 1981:252). All this 
emphasizes a latent tension between the hierarchic Church and the 
ecclesiastical lay movements. After democratic changes in Croatian society, in 
the transitional period of the last years, both, the leaders of certain movements 
and the members of the hierarchic top of the Catholic Church in Croatia, feel 
the need for stronger cooperation of the movements and for a coordination 
body, or an umbrella organisation covering all the movements (Vijeće za laike 
Hrvatske biskupske konferencije – Council for Laypersons of the Croatian 
Bishop Conference 2002:707-759). 
3. Methodology 
This research examines the selective groups in the Catholic Church in 
Croatia with a purpose to collect as more socio-religious data about the 
Catholic lay movements and their members3 as possible. The research included 
                                                          
3 The authors did the research of the ecclesiastical lay movements in Croatia (belief, practice, 
perception /insight/, religious experience-experience of religion and belonging) within the religious 
context “Globalisation and (post)modern ecclesiastical and religious movements” in the Institute of 
Social Sciences “Ivo Pilar”, Zagreb. 
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the following movements: “The Prayer and Word Community” (Zajednica 
Molitva i Riječ – MiR), “Focolare Movement” (Djelo Marijino – Pokret 
fokolara), “Marriage Encounters Community” (Zajednica bračnih susreta), 
“Cursillo” (Mali tečaj – Kursiljo), “Franciscan Youth” (FRAMA), “Franciscan 
Secular Order” (Franjevački svjetovni red), Charismatic Renewal Movement 
(Pokret karizmatičke obnove) and “Neocatechumenal Way” (Neokatekumenski 
Put). Besides the listed movements, the questionnaire offered an open 
possibility of belonging to some other not listed movement. In such a case, the 
respondents wrote the name of the movement themselves.4 
The expected size of the sample was 700 respondents, but 549 were 
realized. (Note: in this sample of 700, we expected to question 100 respondents 
of the Neocathechumenal Way, but after having agreed to participate in the 
research and accepted the questionnaires, they refused to hand the filled 
questionnaires in. The program of this movement regarding the formation of its 
members, emphasizes the inappropriateness of the psychological and 
sociological techniques. Therefore, their restraint with respect to this research is 
understandable to a degree.) In agreement with them, we distributed the 
questionnaires to the leaders of some ecclesiastical lay movements, who, by 
random selection, distributed them further to the members of their movement in 
the period from the 25th of June to the 10th of August. After that the 
questionnaires were returned to the leaders, which they handed in to the 
researchers or sent by mail. 
The analysis of the mutual acquaintance of the spirituality and the activities 
of the members of the ecclesiastical movements, the cooperation of the 
members and the attitude of a certain movement towards the sects and other 
religious movements was carried out by introducing the values starting with ‘I 
am not familiar at all’ to ‘I am familiar to a large extent’, respectively from 
exclusive to inclusive attitudes of a certain movement. 
In presenting the results, we used frequencies, percentages and arithmetic 
means from the descriptive statistics. 
                                                          
4 This possibility was mainly chosen by the members of the ‘charismatic movements’. Namely, the 
respondents interviewed in the House for renewal “Tabor” – Samobor expressed their belonging to 
other movements and wrote charismatic movement after conferring with the leader of the 
charismatic community. 
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4. The research results 
4. 1. Familiarity with the fundamental mission, spirituality and the 
activities of other movements 
One of the questions in the questionnaire was: “How familiar are you with 
the charisma, respectively, with the fundamental mission, the activities and 
spirituality of other ecclesiastical lay movements?” Familiarity with the 
spirituality and the activities of other ecclesiastical movements, without 
assessing their own movement, was measured acording: totally unfamiliar with, 
mostly unfamiliar with, more or less familiar with, mostly familiar with, and 
familiar with to a large extent. The members of the movements are reproached 
of “elitism”, “sectarianism”, self-sufficiency and inaccessibility, mostly by a 
hierarchic part of the Catholic Church (Ivančić, 1990). 
Graph 1 shows us how familiar respondents from certain ecclesiastical 
movements are with the charisma, respectively, the basic mission, spirituality, 
and the activities of other ecclesiastical movements. 
 
Graph 1: The extent of familiarity that members of certain ecclesiastical 
movements have with spiritual values and activities of other ecclesiastical 
movements (%) 
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The results show a generally high level of unfamiliarity with the activities 
and spirituality of other ecclesiastical movements, especially the activities and 
spirituality of the Schönstadt family (62.6 per cent), Mary’s Congregation (47.7 
per cent) and the movement “MI” (40.6 per cent). There is a slightly higher 
level of the acquaintance with the charisma, respectively, the fundamental 
mission, spirituality and the activities of the Prayer and Word Community (19.3 
per cent), Franciscan Secular Order (19.4 per cent) and the movement of 
Franciscan Youth (21.9 per cent). 
The results shown on Graph 2 reveal an average acquaintance of the 
respondents with spirituality, the charisma, respectively, the basic mission and 
the activities of other ecclesiastical movements. 
On the average, the respondents are familiar the most with the lay 
movement of the Franciscan Youth (FRAMA), the Franciscan Secular Order 
and the Prayer and Word Community, while they are the least familiar with the 
charisma, respectively, the basic mission, the activities and spirituality of the 
Schönstadt Family, Mary's Congregation and the movement “MI”. 
 
Graph 2: Average level of familiarity of respondents with the charisma and 
spirituality of certain ecclesiastical laymen movements 
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The average familiarity of the respondents with the charisma, the activities 
and spirituality of other lay movements, while not declaring themselves about 
their own movement, was measured by values from 1 to 5. Value 1 corresponds 
to the statement totally unfamiliar with, 2 corresponds to mostly not familiar 
with, 3 to more or less familiar with, 4 mostly familiar with and 5 familiar with 
to a large extent. 
The results confirm the hypothesis that the members of the ecclesiastical 
movements are mostly limited to the activities within their own movement and 
that there is no sufficient familiarity with the charisma, respectively with the 
basic mission, the activities and spirituality of other ecclesiastical lay 
movements, was justified. Consequently, we can say with reason that the 
interviewed ecclesiastical movements, with their inaccessibility and focus only 
on their own sphere of action, their lack of communication with other 
movements, have certain features of the sects in the Catholic Church. 
4. 2. Cooperation of the members of certain movements with other 
movements 
One of the questions referred to the cooperation of the respondents with 
other ecclesiastical movements: “To what extent do you cooperate with other 
ecclesiastical movements?” We measured the cooperation of the respondents 
with other ecclesiastical movements (without their declaring about cooperation 
within their own movement) using the values: I cooperate to a great extent, 
mostly cooperate, more or less cooperate, mostly do not cooperate and do not 
cooperate at all. 
The following graph clearly indicates a prevailing lack of cooperation 
between the movements. After a very poor acquaintance with the activities and 
spirituality of other ecclesiastical lay movements, it is hardly surprising to find 
such a high level of non-cooperation of the respondents with other movements. 
Ignoti nulla cupido! So 77.6 per cent of the respondents do not cooperate with 
the Schönstadt family at all and 74.2 per cent do not cooperate with Mary’s 
Deed (Focolare Movement). 
It is notably a low percentage (below 10 per cent) of the respondents that 
cooperate with the movements the Prayer and Word Community (8,5 per cent), 
the Franciscan Youth (9,0 per cent) and the Franciscan Secular Order (9,5 per 
cent), as shown on Graph 3. 
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Graph 3: To what extent do respondents cooperate with other ecclesiastical 
movements (%) 
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The results show a high level of non-cooperation of the members of the 
interviewed ecclesiastical lay movements with other ecclesiastical lay 
movements. This is a logical consequence considering the fact that a high 
percentage of the members of ecclesiastical lay movements is not familiar with 
the charisma, respectively, the basic mission, spirituality and the activities of 
other ecclesiastical movements.  
On the other hand, the members of some ecclesiastical lay movements are 
familiar the most with the lay church movements of the Franciscan provenance 
with whom they cooperate to the largest extent. We should emphasize too that 
the results show a higher level of the acquaintance and cooperation with an also 
original lay church movement in Croatia: The Prayer and the Word (MiR). This 
is shown on Graph 4. 
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Graph 4: A display of the average level of cooperation between members of 
ecclesiastical movements and certain other ecclesiastical movements (their own 
movement excluded) 
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4. 3. The attitude of some movements towards the sects 
The next question is related to the attitude of the members of the 
interviewed ecclesiastical lay movements towards the Christian sects. To the 
question: “What is the attitude of your movement towards the sects?”, the 
following answers were offered: “acknowledging”, “indifferent”, “not 
acknowledging” and “disqualifying”. After the results showing a high level of 
unfamiliarity with the charisma, respectfully, the basic mission, spirituality and 
the activities of other ecclesiastical movements and the lack of cooperation with 
them, the results of their attitude towards the sects are hardly surprising. 
Namely, the attitude towards the sects is, to a great extent, determined by 
previously declared attitudes of the members of the interviewed ecclesiastical 
movements. 
The results presented in Graph 5 show that one third of the respondents 
(32.2 per cent) considers their movement has a disqualifying attitude towards 
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the sects. Slightly more than one third (34.3 per cent) claims their movement 
does not recognize them, while 22.1 per cent claims the attitude of their 
movement is indifferent. Only 11.4 per cent of the respondents have an 
acknowledging attitude towards the sects. So, the two thirds of the respondents 
(66.5 per cent) consider their movements have a negative attitude towards the 
sects. 
 
Graph 5: Attitude of members of ecclesiastical movements towards sects (%) 
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Graph 5 illustrates the mentioned attitudes. The results question the 
openness of the members of the interviewed ecclesiastical lay movements to the 
ecumenical activities in our region. Investigating the reasons of such an attitude 
of the ecclesiastical lay movements towards the sects exceeds the context of 
this study. 
However, it should only be mentioned that during the war and the post-war 
period, there was a general mistrust in other people and different views. In this 
period there was very little sympathy even for some Christian sects that 
associated their proselytizing activities with their humanitarian work in order to 
persuade new members to join their Christian denomination. Besides this, we 
would also like to mention that for the members of the ecclesiastical lay 
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movements the term ‘sect’ does not have a neutral meaning, but rather more 
pejorative one. 
4. 4. The attitude of certain movements towards the new religious 
movements (NRM) 
The following question was: “What is the attitude of your movement 
towards the NRM?” and the offered answers: acknowledging, indifferent, not 
acknowledging and disqualifying. 
 
Graph 6: Acknowledgement of new religious movements by the respondent's 
movement (%) 
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Over one third of the respondents declared their movement has an 
acknowledging attitude towards the NRM (36,6 per cent), 18,4 per cent 
indifferent, 26,0 per cent not acknowledging, and 19,0 percent disqualifying, as 
shown in Graph 6. 
Members of the interviewed church lay movements have shown far more 
positive attitude of their movement towards the NRM of the non-Christian 
provenance than towards the sects of the Christian provenance. This shows a 
relatively high readiness and openness of certain interviewed church 
movements to the inter-religious dialogue. 
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5. Conclusion 
A modern religious revival, resulted in the new religious and new 
ecclesiastical lay movements, as well, is focused on the concern of the meaning 
of the human existence. Religion (only) gives the (valid) answers to the 
questions of the global meaning. Therefore, it is understandable why the 
authentic religious dimensions of life got rehabilitated in the new religious and 
church lay movements: the questions of the absolute meaning of the human 
existence, searching for the full meaning of one’s own life, unappeasable 
searching for a personal sensation of the holy. Especially promising is a 
possibility of the personal, direct sensation of the holy. 
All these are the questions that modern secularisation has completely 
marginalized. This is the reason why the anti-secularisation dimensions of life 
are strongly emphasized in the modern religious revival. The very thing that 
had preceded the anti-secularisation processes on a global social scale, and 
what has been clearly manifested in the NRM and the ecclesiastical lay 
movements, was a total undermining of the foundations and destroying the 
religious contents of the world of modernism. Foremost, it is the belief in 
sciences, linear progress, fake promises of the social utopia, spectacular 
terminating of great ideologies, respectively, worldly religions and their 
transcending into the mentalities. The modern religious revival represents a 
strong anti-secularisation process. NRM, the new ecclesiastical lay movements 
and the ‘religions of the young’ at the end of the 60s are a quite obvious 
evidence of this phenomenon. 
The new ecclesiastical lay movements, as we already mentioned, emerge in 
the Catholic Church in Croatia by the end of the 60s and in the 70s. At these 
post-Council times a very intense religious life awakens and grows in the 
Catholic Church – and a charismatic movement emerges. 
For the purpose of this research, we were interested, firstly, in the topic of 
the intra-church dialogue ‘ad intra’, respectively, in the mutual acquaintance 
and cooperation of the members of different ecclesiastical lay movements. 
After that, our intention was to assess the willingness, or unwillingness of the 
members of the ecclesiastical lay movement for a dialogue ‘ad extra’: readiness 
for ecumenical activities (the attitude towards the sects of the Christian 
provenance) and for an inter-religions dialogue (the attitude towards the New 
Religious Movements). 
The results of the research show that the members of the interviewed 
ecclesiastical lay movements are poorly acquainted with the charisma, 
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respectively the fundamental mission, the activities and spirituality of other 
ecclesiastical lay movements they don’t belong to. Obviously, this caused the 
unwillingness of the members for cooperation with the members of other 
movements. So, the lack of communication among the members of different 
movements is not surprising. Establishing of one umbrella organisation, 
respectively a coordination body of the ecclesiastical movements in Croatia, 
would probably help better communication, openness, knowledge and 
cooperation of the members of the ecclesiastical movements. It is ‘ad intra’ 
dialogue within the Catholic Church, we are speaking of. 
Further, the obtained results demonstrate that the attitude of a specific 
movement towards the sects of the Christian provenance is to a great extent 
negative and disqualifying, while considering the new non-Christian religious 
movements, it is rather positive. First of all, the very fact that the attitude 
towards the NRM is considerably more affirmative than to the sects, is quite 
surprising. 
A relatively closed atmosphere within the interviewed ecclesiastical 
movements contributes to the (sectarian) inaccessibility as well, as to a quite 
negative attitude towards a further pluralisation of the already plural religious 
scene in the Croatian society. This in turn generates new tensions and 
intolerance, and sometimes exclusivism. Such results were indisputably 
influenced by recent war events, problems and tensions of the transitional 
period of the Croatian society. 
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Péter Török 
COLLECTION OF DESCRIPTIVE DATA ON NEW 
RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS: OBSTACLES AND A 
PROPOSAL∗ 
1. Introduction 
The scientific study of new religious movements began in the early 
seventies, about thirty years ago1. As a result, a significant amount of 
publications appeared focusing not only on specific NRMs or issues related to 
them2 but also on the methodological considerations of their exploration. The 
prospect for convergence of research in social movements and in NRMs was 
also investigated (Mauss 1993). In the course of time, however, several 
problems surfaced, one of which has seemed to be rather lasting. This problem 
is the collection of systematic and reliable basic descriptive data of NRMs. 
My study, eventually offering at least a partial solution to this problem, 
consists of two main parts. In the first one, I discuss briefly the obstacles of 
systematic research. It is followed by a short description of suggested solutions 
and the attempted realisations. The second part contains my suggestion, with 
some evaluative remarks resulting from its application to the investigation of 
Hungarian NRMs in 2002. 
                                                          
∗ The financial support of NATO Advanced Scholarship (2001) contributed to the realisation of this 
project. 
1 Some researches date the rising of their interest back to the sixties. C.f. Melton (1995:265). 
Melton’s article appeared in a thematic edition of Social Compass entitled “20 Years On: Changes 
in New Religious Movements”. 
2 It would grow beyond the boundaries of this study to list all of the movements and the topics 
discussed in the literature. I mention only a time-tested classic, Barker’s The Making of a Moonie 
(1984), which not only describes a movement but also investigates one of the topics most 
frequently connected with NRMs, brainwashing. 
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2. The Obstacles of Systematic Research, Some Suggestions and 
their Realisations 
Sociologists noted as early as 1985 that one of the difficulties in the 
scientific study of NRMs is the lack of basic descriptive data3. According to 
Robbins, “comparative and theoretical inferences from the available data are 
impeded by the non-standardisation of data collection techniques and foci” 
(1988:16). Despite the early warnings, scientists were more involved in the 
methodological problems of particular interests in researching NRMs, which 
might be explained by the controversial issues surrounding at least some of 
these movements. The titles of the chapters in Barker’s practical introduction 
(1995) or in Wilson and Cresswell’s edited work (1999) investigating the areas 
where NRMs have affected contemporary societies reveal these issues4. 
The systematic research of these movements with the aim of gaining basic 
descriptive data has concerned only a few scholars. Robbins’ “Note on 
Methods” (1988) lists several general problems afflicting most scientific works 
on NRMs, including the inadequate methods of collecting data. He also 
observes that “sociological journals do not like to publish ‘mere’ descriptive 
accounts, and thus sociologists’ descriptions become abbreviated and distorted 
in order to be accommodated to the ‘theoretical’ embellishment necessary for 
publications” (1988:16). Richardson, Balch and Melton (1993) identify six 
major problems of contemporary research. These are the (1) abundance of one-
shot research designs, the (2) compounded accounts, the lack of (3) longitudinal 
research, (4) replication and standardized instrumentation, the (5) difficulties 
surfacing from data collected at therapy settings, and (6) the limitations of 
research conducted among “happy members”. In their words, “considerable 
data have been amassed, but often the data have been gathered in ways not 
allowing easy comparisons. Many studies therefore are idiosyncratic and diffi-
cult to relate to other research. Different concepts and theoretical perspectives 
are used, and limited ad hoc methodologies discourage comparisons” 
(1993:214). What is even more alarming, as Richardson et al. note, very little 
                                                          
3 Balch (1985). 
4 These issues in Barker’s book (1995) include conversion vs mind control (Chapter 2); deception, 
physical violence and criminal activities (Chapter 5); suicide, drugs, finances, confessions (Chapter 
6); sexual practices, attitude towards women, children (Chapter 7); detachment, isolation and 
dependancy, totalitarian authoritarianism (Chapter 8); the breaking up of families, strains between 
non-NRM members of the family, ‘mixed marriages’ (Chapter 9); and parents’ reactions (Chapter 
10). 
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has improved in this regard since the mid-eighties, because “suggestions for 
systematic data gathering … have rarely been followed” (1993:215). 
For a possible solution, Balch, Robbins, Richardson, and Melton5 
suggested that sociologists should construct something akin to anthropologists’ 
Human Relations Area Files (HRAF), in which seventeen categories of 
classifiable data are identified. These basic categories of such data are the 
(1) demographic characteristics of membership; (2) historical 
development; (3) structure and content of belief system; (4) leadership; 
social organisation; (5) relationship of members to outsiders; (6) 
economic practices; (7) material culture; (8) patterns of everyday life; 
(9) talk patterns; (10) sexual patterns; (11) child rearing; (12) deviance 
and social control; (13) recruitment strategies; (14) commitments and 
sacrifices required of members; (15) socialisation techniques; (16) 
conversion patterns; and (17) defection patterns (Robbins 1988:16). 
However, it has been noted that the volatile nature and effervescence of 
NRMs “which sift their patterns in response to the inspirations of gurus as well 
as environmental pressures will undercut any program of cataloguing groups on 
the model of the anthropological files”6. 
Some scholars tried to solve this problem by mailing questionnaires to the 
movements. As far as I know, two such attempts7 have been made with differ-
ent results. The London-based INFORM ended up with a 30 percent response 
rate8, however, the undertaking of the Japanese RIRC resulted a 70 percent re-
turn rate9. Apart from the uncertainty of the response rate, the reliability of the 
answers is also questionable in this way. The obvious question to be raised is 
                                                          
5 Robbins (1988), Balch (1985), Richardson et. al. (1993:215). 
6 Robbins (1988:16). With regard to the environmental pressures, Török (2000) notes, that in the 
area of the former Communist bloc, even the disappearance of the anti-religious system did not 
create confidence and trust to conduct appropriate research among NRMs. 
7 Here I am counting only those attempts where questionnaires containing something similar to 
HRAF were mailed. 
8 Personal communication with Eileen Barker, the founder and leader of INFORM, in November 
2001. A short description of INFORM can be seen in Barker (1995:141-144). The colleagues of 
INFORM also provided me with the questionnaire, which was used, although in a much more 
detailed form in my research. 
9 Personal communication with Dr. Keishin Inaba, then research associate of Centre de Recherches 
sur le Japon, in 2003. Dr. Inaba also mentioned that the homepage of RIRC would provide further 
information, but the homepage is only in Japanese. I also conducted the leader of RIRC, but as of 
19 July, 2003, I received no further information, therefore, I cannot confirm their return rate. 
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whether it would be possible to improve this method without encountering the 
time constraints of researchers facing the volatile NRMs. 
3. A Possible Solution of Collecting Reliable Descriptive Data 
3. 1. Semi-Structured Interviews with the Leaders of NRMs 
My suggestion is that a semi-structured interview wit the leaders of NRMs 
supplemented later with observations and other techniques, e.g. surveys, might 
be – at least a partial – solution to the problem. The development and conduct 
of semi-structured interviews was the first phase of a three-staged systematic 
research of Hungarian NRMs10. This stage is followed by a questionnaire 
survey conducted among the members of several movements. In the third 
phase, the creeds of NRMs, collected during the semi-structured interviews, 
would be analyzed. Obviously, interviewing the leaders of all NRMs is not 
everywhere possible; in North America it would probably be unfeasible. But in 
our region of Central and Eastern Europe, it is more attainable, because of the 
relatively low number of NRMs11. Furthermore, some sort of registration of 
religious organisations in most of the former Communist countries is required 
enabling researchers to contact the leaders relatively easily. After reaching a 
certain level of development or institutional organisation, it is in the interest of 
most of the NRMs to be heard and, so to speak, ‘socially recognized’12. We can 
always explain to the hesitant leaders that it is better for them to speak for 
themselves than to gain information from their real or perceived enemies. In 
1996 and 1997, the present author was able to conduct interviews with 48 of the 
then 55 Hungarian registered NRMs13. Finally, a repeated interview in a few 
years would provide a relatively simple means to see and document the changes 
                                                          
10 The research has been envisaged and undertaken by the Department for the Study of Religions, 
University of Szeged (Hungary). 
11 Compared to the estimated 10,000 African, the 800 to a few thousand Japanese, or the 2,000 
European NRMs (Barker 1999:16), the Hungarians named about 250 religious organisations to 
which they belonged at the 2001 Census (Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 2002). However, this 
number must be further reduced because people used several different names for the same religious 
group. The final number would be between 150 and 180. Personal communications with colleagues 
in Romania and Ukraine revealed similar proportions. 
12 I am not denying the fact that some groups have and maintain an anti-social attitude. However, 
the experience I gained from the Hungarian research is that their proportion is rather small. Some of 
these groups in the second round of asking for interviews agreed without hesitation. 
13 C.f. Török (2000). Obviously, unregistered NRMs must be contacted as well. However, my 
experience is that most of them are as cooperative as the registered NRMs, partly because they also 
want to be ‘socially recognized’. 
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in the life of a NRM. In other words, the conduct of longitudinal studies would 
be made easier. 
The semi-structured interview,14 as it is presented in the Appendix of this 
study, is a rather structured interview. However, it is evident from the letter15, 
which is to be sent to the leaders prior to the interview, I encourage them to 
express themselves openly and fully on particular topics. Furthermore, certain 
questions naturally invite the comments of the leaders. 
Before discussing the main parts of the questionnaire, a problem of 
terminology must be clarified. Some of these movements expressed their 
antagonism with and dislike for the expression of new religious movements16. 
However, the Hungarian legal nomenclature solved this problem, because it 
simply calls any religious organisation a ‘church’ (Schanda 2001). This is the 
reason why in the interview, and occasionally in this paper17, I referred to all of 
these movements as churches. 
3. 2. The Structure of the Interview 
There are seven main parts of the interview, which begins with the 
protocol. My intention of taping the interviews is mentioned both in the letter 
and the protocol. It is conceivable that the leaders would not approve of it, 
therefore I also mention that I take notes simultaneously. I do not offer it as an 
alternative, rather it is a safety-measure or device to ensure data-recording. 
The following part inquires after the name and addresses of the NRM. It is 
important to know the so-called front organisations as well. That is why I ask 
about organisations, such as publishing houses, theological academies, etc. that 
are associated with them. 
Another part of the interview seeks information on the belief system of the 
NRM. The institutionally accepted formulation of the belief system18 and its 
availability to others, along with other indicators, are the signs from which we 
can infer the NRMs’ level of institutionalisation. Similarly, the existence of 
                                                          
14 I would like to thank Prof. Eileen Barker and her colleagues in INFORM for helping me develop 
this structure. 
15 It can also be seen in the Appendix of this study. 
16 C.f. Goswami Mukunda’s article (1995), entitled “NRM is Four-Letter Word”. 
17 Especially when I quote a question from the interview. 
18 The lack of such a system is as valuable an information as the existence and the content of the 
formulation. 
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special and strict dietary and dress rules can expose significant aspects of their 
life, which will be discussed later. 
A section on the history19 of organisation precedes the inquiry on 
membership. Membership is usually a sensitive issue for the leaders of NRMs; 
they can easily refuse to answer. However, from the history of the NRM, we 
might be able to have a fair guess about the criteria and different levels of the 
membership, the sanctions for violating the practices and beliefs.. It is also 
important to know whether mixed membership, i.e. simultaneous membership 
in other denominations is possible. To find out more about the different levels 
of membership, the following question can be helpful. “Let us suppose, I 
convert now to your church. How could I become the leader of this church? 
What stages must I go through? What would be my possibilities if I were a 
woman?” 
The next part seeks information on the structure of the organisation. 
Special attention is given to the education of children and also to the teaching 
of the NRM on different moral questions. Here the leaders, as leaders of their 
organisations, will reply to these questions, but our intention is to ask the same 
questions later in a survey from the individual members of at least a few 
movements as well. 
The final section inquires after the relationship of the NRM and the wider 
society. Apart from asking the leaders about the general attitude of the host 
society toward their organisation, it is worth seeking information on their view 
of the neighboring countries’ attitude. The evaluation of the different post-
communist governments can reveal also a lot. Needless to say, that these 
questions, along with inquiries on legislative measures regulating the country’s 
religious life – such as the question on Mr. Semjén’s unsuccessful proposal 
defining what is NOT a religion20 – forcefully invite the leaders to express their 
views. Each country can easily replace this question with its own legislative 
proceedings on the issue. It is also important to know the NRMs’ relationship 
toward other religious organisations. I ask them to list three churches with 
which they have good and bad relationship, respectively. 
The final section also contains attitudinal questions. Before I discuss these 
questions, I have to deal with a sensitive problem, namely the so-called church-
                                                          
19 Prompting words help the leaders summarize the most important aspects of the international and 
local history of their movements. 
20 For a discussion of Mr. Semjén’s proposal see Schanda (2001), especially pp. 280-1, and Török 
(2003), especially p. 138. 
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sect typology. I am aware of the difficulties in defining these categories and 
establishing whether a particular group is a cult, denomination or sect21; and I 
do not want to categorize the Hungarian NRMs accordingly. However, certain 
aspects of a movement’s relationship with the hosting society are related to the 
church-sect typology. Based on Robbins’ (1988) and McGuire’s (1997) works, 
these aspects are the movement’s teaching on the exclusive or inclusive nature 
of salvation22, the group’s general attitude to the society – friendly or hostile. 
Furthermore, these aspects also include the role of religiosity in everyday life – 
segmented or diffuse23 –, and finally, whether the movement accepts mass-
religiosity or it requires their members to be religious virtuosos24. 
If we use the nature of salvation and the group’s attitude towards the 
hosting society as the determining factors of our categorisation, we can decide 
whether a particular religious group’s stance is churchly, cultic, sectarian or 
denominational, as it is depicted in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Stances of Religious Communities. 
Nature of Salvation Relationship of Group and Society 
Exclusive Inclusive 
Positive Church Denomination 
Negative Sect Cult 
 
However, it is useful to “distinguish sectarian, cultic, denominational, and 
churchly individual orientations from the parallel patterns of collectivity stance, 
because several different orientations can occur within the same collectivity”25. 
                                                          
21 These difficulties begin with the definition of religion itself. A good discussion of these problems 
is O’Toole’s work (1984, Chapter 2). For a good summary of different typologies see Robbins 
(1988, Chapter 5) and McGuire (1997, Chapter 5). 
22 It is exclusive if a group claims that salvation can be achieved only in and with the group. 
Inclusive salvation, on the other hand, implies that salvation can be gained not only in the given 
group but also in others. 
23 Diffuse role of religiosity means that a person’s every conscious moment is, or should be, guided 
by religious norms. On the other hand, segmented religiosity implies that religion plays a guiding 
role in a person’s life only at certain times, mainly at religious services. This is the area where the 
existence of special dietary and dress rules is revealing. 
24 Weber’s notion of religious virtuoso (1991, especially Chapter X, and pp. 187-188), i.e. a person 
striving for perfection and is not satisfied by the normal levels of religiosity, is contrasted here with 
a minimalist approach. 
25 McGuire (1997:153). This categorisation, however, is applicable not only to individuals but also 
to collectivities. 
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In this case, our axes of categorisation are the role and emphasis of religiosity, 
as it is illustrated in Table 2. The questions in the remaining part of the inter-
view intend to probe the above mentioned aspects. 
 
Table 2: Religious Orientations 
Religious Emphasis Religious Role 
Mass Religiosity Virtuoso Religiosity 
Diffused Churchly Sectarian 
Segmented Denominational Cultic 
 
Any question on money is always sensitive, therefore, I left the inquiry 
after their budget to the end of the interview. Even if the leaders refused to 
reply this question, it would not create a hostile or suspicious atmosphere for 
the rest of the interview. A preliminary discussion and evaluation of whether 
and to what extent my expectations were realized follows in the next part. 
3. 3. A Preliminary Apprehension of the Hungarian Results 
Nine aspects of the semi-structured interviews can be briefly assessed here, 
of which the first is the response or ‘return rate’. As we recall, the mailed 
questionnaires resulted a return rate of 30 and 70 percent of response rates in 
London and Japan, respectively. The 68 interviews conducted in Hungary in 
2002, covered about two thirds (63 percent) of the registered churches26 in 
Hungary. This calculation of the ‘response rate’ is very conservative, because if 
we accepted the claim of the Prime Minister’s Office27 that at least 25 percent 
of the 135 registered churches were not functioning, the response rate would be 
77 percent. However, based on the lack of any means to communicate with 
them28 and the fact that they did not receive from anybody the 1 percent of the 
income tax, which can be channeled to the churches, I considered only 14 
churches (10 percent) inoperative. Apart from the inoperative churches, 13 
                                                          
26 The requirements of registration are rather formal. According to Act IV/1990, sections 8-9, a 
“church has to be founded by 100 private individuals, has to have a charter … and elected organs of 
administration and representation. The founders have to submit a declaration whereby the 
organisation they have set up has a religious character and its activities comply with the 
Constitution and the Law” (Schanda 2002:19). 
27 This office is responsible for the distribution of state budget assigned to the churches. 
28 A second letter was sent to those groups, which did not respond to the first letter asking for an 
interview. Finally, we tried to reach them by phone and/or email if these communication devices 
were available. 
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other organisations were, for all practical purposes29, nonexistent. In addition to 
the 68 registered churches, I interviewed the leaders of 4 non-registered 
churches as well30. It can be concluded that with this method we can achieve a 
fairly good result31. Comparing the Hungarian interview to the questionnaire of 
INFORM, we can state that the covered areas are basically the same. However, 
the Hungarian research examined them more deeply, not only through the more 
detailed questions, but also through the added information provided by the 
leaders during the interview. Several more aspects of the semi-structured 
interviews would further demonstrate the usefulness of this method. 
As it was noted, both in the letter asking the leaders to participate in the 
research and the protocol of the interview emphasized the researchers’ intent to 
listen to the leaders. Such an openness of the interviewer resulted in a much 
deeper understanding of the particular topic than what the answers to either a 
closed or an open ended question would have allowed in a mailed 
questionnaire. Nevertheless, the closed questions in the semi-structured 
interviews provided a good base around which the leaders’ additional 
information could be arranged. 
The purpose of taping the interviews was twofold. First of all, it guaranteed 
the preservation of all the information said by the leaders. It would also serve 
the researcher as evidence in disputed issues, provided the leaders approve of 
the recording. Only in four cases was our request for recording denied. In these 
instances the signing of the sheets of the semi-structured interview served as 
proof of the leaders’ testimony. The procedure of one of the NRMs should also 
be mentioned here. The leader of this particular group invited their lawyer to 
the interview. At first, the presence of the legal expert created some tension on 
the part of both the researcher and the interviewee, but the end of the interview 
witnessed mutual respect and cooperation. 
The inquiry after organisations related to a particular NRM brought up a 
certain difficulty (Q832). As it is known to scholars, some of the NRMs 
                                                          
29 These churches were duplicates or part of other churches. 
30 The non-registered churches were the Family, Sri Chimnoy, Ananda Marga, and Menora, a 
Messianic Jewish group. Several other groups, listed by a cult-watching organisation – Apológia – 
indicated that they do not consider themselves religious organisations. 
31 It is at least as good as what the Japanese RIRC reportedly achieved through its mailed 
questionnaires. However, as it was noted earlier, no information was available on the research of 
RIRC. 
32 For easier reference, I numbered the questions of the interview, which can be seen in the 
Appendix. 
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establish so-called front organisations, which might serve as a cover for the real 
nature of the group. From the point of view of presenting these organisations, 
problems surface when a publishing house, rehabilitation center, foundation, 
association, etc. are registered and/or function independently from the NRM. 
Although the researcher might be aware of the existence of these organisations, 
the leader of the NRM does not mention them, because officially or formally 
they are not associated with the movement. The semi-structured interview, 
especially when it is conducted at the headquarters of the NRM33, has definitely 
an advantage over mailed surveys, because the interviewer can raise the issue 
and clarify it. 
Questions with regard to the belief system of a NRM (Qs16-18) also 
brought up a phenomenon, to which not much attention has been paid so far. In 
Hungary, about one third of the interviewed churches do not have any officially 
recognized belief system. This can certainly contribute to the relatively short 
existence of many of the NRMs34. 
As I noticed during the presentation of the semi-structured interview, the 
membership of a particular movement can be so sensitive that leaders might 
avoid reporting it. However, after discussing the history of the NRM, the 
criteria and different levels of the membership, the sanctions for violating the 
practices and beliefs, most of the leaders considered it inconsistent35 and 
contradictory to refuse to answer this question. However, it must be noted, 
again in favor of the semi-structured interview over a mailed questionnaire, that 
the presence of the interviewer facilitated the provision of information on 
membership. In two cases, where for technical reasons36 the leaders filled out 
the sheets of the interview, they did not report the number of their members. At 
the same time, it seemed prudent to include a question on the possibility of 
simultaneous membership (Q37) as almost two thirds of the interviewed leaders 
reported such a possibility. Similarly to the question of membership, the 
                                                          
33 In several cases the offices of the front organisations are located on the premises of the 
headquarters. It happened several times, that the leaders provided me with a guided tour, during 
which I noticed these other offices. 
34 In Barker and Mayer’s words, we can “hope only to understand more about religions that do 
survive to change if we have a greater understanding about those that do not survive to change” 
(1995:162). See also Stark (1996). 
35 Especially during the discussion of the history of the church, many of the leaders already 
mentioned the magnitude of the membership. 
36 My car was stolen, so I could not visit all of the NRMs. In twelve cases, therefore, I had to 
conduct the interview through email. 
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magnitude of the yearly budget of the NRMs did not turn out to be as sensitive 
as I had anticipated. Some of the NRMs even provided me with a copy of their 
bookkeeping records. 
However, the questions of two other areas need further improvement. 
Unlike expressing their general opinion on the society and its particular 
institutions, the Hungarian leaders found it somewhat difficult to select 
churches with which they have good or bad relationship (Qs 89-90). Auxiliary 
questions must be formulated in order to probe the movements’ relationships 
toward other religious organisations37. Similarly, the attitudinal questions (Q91-
98) exploring whether a particular group demonstrates church, sect, cult, or 
denominational stance or orientation, must be further developed. The question, 
for instance, whether for the sake of salvation or achieving Nirvana, etc. it 
would be better for the community to live apart from the rest of the society 
(Q94), did not have any spread or standard deviation, because all of the leaders 
dismissed such an idea38. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper highlighted a rather lasting methodological deficiency in the 
research of NRMs, the lack of reliable, basic descriptive data. Scientists 
suggested a long time ago the use of the anthropologists’ human relations area 
files (HRAF) to obtain descriptive data, but because mostly of the researchers’ 
time constraint and the volatility of NRMs, the creation of these files on NRMs 
seemed rather unlikely. Some scholars tried to resolve this problem by mailing 
questionnaires to the movements. My proposal, however, is to conduct semi-
structured interviews with the leaders of NRMs, where the findings can be later 
relatively easily supplemented with and controlled by participant observations 
and other techniques. In fact, the semi-structured interview can cover, although 
to varying extent, most of the areas of a HRAF, only the talk patterns, material 
                                                          
37 Leaders were more cooperative when I presented the simple request of naming churches with 
which they have good or bad relationship in a somewhat more humorous way. Unfortunately, the 
Hungarian expression of prüszkölni valakire cannot be properly translated into English. For all 
practical purpose, I asked them to name churches which show annoyance toward them, or at which 
they show annoyance or take offence. 
38 Let us not forget that most of my interviewees were the leaders of registered churches, which, so 
to speak by definition felt the need to work for and in the society. The encounter with the leader of 
a more secretive movement might have resulted in an approval of this proposal. 
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culture, conversion and defection patterns of a NRM must be explored later by 
other means. 
The application of these interviews in the systematic research of Hungarian 
NRMs in 2002 demonstrated that this method can provide at least as good a 
response rate as the reportedly best mailed questionnaire survey did. While 
examining several aspects of the semi-structured interviews, certain deficits of 
the questions were highlighted, it was also noted that in many of the areas the 
semi-structured interview can produce better results than mailed questionnaires 
would. 
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Appendix 
The letter sent to the leaders of Hungarian NRMs prior to the 
interview 
Dear Leaders, 
The Department for the Studies of Religion at the University of Szeged is starting to carry out a 
systematic research on new religious communities (NRMs). This department, the first and so far the 
only one in Hungary, is independent of both ecclesiastical organisations and political parties, which 
is a prerequisite of an objective approach to the study of NRMs. The research was planned during 
my 2-month stay in INFORM, based at the University of London, which holds what is probably the 
largest collection of files on NRMs in Europe. 
The first stage of our research is a semi-structured interview with the leaders of the NRMs. A semi-
structured interview means that while there are preestablished answer-choices – e.g. (a) mostly 
men, (b) mostly women, (c) equal proportions – it is also possible for the leaders to express their 
opinion on the topic discussed in more detail. In order to make sure that every word is taken into 
account, I would like to tape the interview; and a copy will be sent to the interviewee. 
The topics to be discussed include the belief system of the organisation, its history, geographic and 
demographic data, and its relationship to the wider society. The systematic research implies that we 
do not rely exclusively on these interviews; rather, we intend to triangulate, i.e. to collect and check 
the information in some NRMs through observation and questionnaire in the second stage of the 
research. 
This research is probably known to most of the NRMs in Hungary. In 1996/7, I conducted similar 
interviews with the leaders of 48 out of the then 55 registered NRMs. Two publications resulted 
from that research: 
 
1.“A magyaországi bejegyzett kisegyházak tagságának alakulása 1990 és 1997 között.” 
(Changes in the Membership of the Hungarian Smaller Churches between 1990 and 1997) 
Távlatok 48 (July 2000): 290 – 300. 
2.“Egyházszámadás” (“Church – Inventory” – The Churches of Hungarian Youth) 
Egyházfórum 12 (1997/2): 60 – 66. 
 
A longer version of the first publication, with a more detailed view of my approach towards NRMs, 
is also available on the Internet at www.vallastudomany.hu. 
Participating in the interview provides the religious organisations with an opportunity to talk for 
themselves; and they can check what is written about them in the “Directory of NRMs in Hungary”, 
which is to be published as a result of our research. We do not wish to have to rely solely on other 
sources – sometimes hostile to NRMs – for information. 
In the hope of your cooperation we request an appointment of about 1.5 hours in January or 
February, preferably between 2 p.m. and 8 p.m. on Monday, Tuesday or Wednesday. A self-
addressed and prepaid postcard is provided in this letter to facilitate your reply. I also ask you to 
give a phone number through which I can confirm – or modify if necessary – the date, time and 
location of the interview. 
With best wishes, Yours sincerely, 
Péter Török 
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The interview 
Semi-structured interview with the leader(s) of the  
................................…………………………………………. 
 
italics: instructions to the interviewer 
underlined text: read out to the leader(s) 
 
Protocol: 
(note the following details) 
1. Date of interview: 
2. Location of interview: 
3. Time of interview: 
 
Thank the leader(s) for having made possible the interview, then ask: 
Would you allow me to tape the interview – just for the sake of being able to check for accuracy – 
but at the same time I would also take notes. I would send you a copy of the tape. 
 
4. May I ask who is/are present? 
Person(s) present: 
........................................................................... (position) 
........................................................................... (position) 
........................................................................... (position) 
........................................................................... (position) 
 
I. Let us begin with a few simple questions about the name of the church/org.: 
 
5. Hungarian name of the church: ..................................................................................... 
 
6.English name of the church, if there is one: ................................................................... 
 
(Note by circling this sentence if they try to make the English name up on the spot.) 
 
7. By what other names is the church/org. known?: 
None – the following names: 
(circle “none” or list the names) 
 
8. What organisations – e.g. theological academy, publishing house, voluntary organisations, etc.) – 
are associated with the church/org.? 
 
9. International headquarters of the church 
Address: 
 
Tel: 
Email: 
Web-site: 
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10. Address in Hungary: 
 
Tel: 
Email: 
Web-site: 
(If the department does not have a contact person from the church/org., ask for one.) 
Contact person: 
 
11. In which countries is your church/organisation operating? 
(Circle the appropriate one, and/or list the countries.) 
No other country – worldwide – following countries: 
 
12. Appearance in Hungary (year): ................... (Specify the “form” of appearance: e.g. 
missionaries, converted students/workers returning from abroad, registration, etc.) 
 
13. Where does the Hungarian church/branch send missionaries? 
Nowhere – the following countries: 
(circle “nowhere” or list the countries) 
 
II. Now, I would like to turn to the belief system of the church/org. 
 
14. What religious tradition(s) are you associated with? 
(Hand over Card I. containing the names of different religious traditions. Circle the appropriate 
one or write in the space provided.) 
None 
Animism, Buddhism, Christian, Confucianism, Hindu, Islam, Jainism, Judaism, Naturalism, Shinto, 
Sikhism, Tao, Zoroastrianism, 
Other: 
 
15. Does your church/org. refer to sacred texts/written materials, such the Bible or Qu’ran, or your 
own documents? 
No – Yes 
If yes, to which one(s)?: 
 
16. Does your church/org. have its own – institutionally accepted – formulation of belief system (its 
own creed)? 
No – Yes 
 
17. If yes, what are its main tenets/distinctive features? 
(Use a separate sheet of paper if necessary.) 
 
 
18. Does the formulation of your belief system exist in printed format or in any other form 
accessible by or available to others? 
No – Yes 
 
19. If yes, would it be possible to get a copy of it? 
Received one – not received one. 
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20. What are the special feast days and dates of celebrations of the church/org.? 
(List them.) 
 
21. What type of services and meetings do you hold? 
(List them, with their location and time.) 
 
What are the special religious practices of your church/org.? 
 
22. Special rites: 
 
23. Dietary rules: 
 
24. Dress rules: 
 
25. Symbols: 
 
III. Let us turn to the history of your church/org. 
 
26. Is the church/org. an exclusively Hungarian establishment? (This church/org. originates in 
Hungary.) 
Yes – No 
 
27. If “no”, where was the original church/org. established? 
 
28. If it was established “somewhere else”, where and when did the first missionaries come from 
[to Hungary]? 
 
29. Is there any publication on the history of the church/org.? 
Yes – No, if “yes”, name the most important one(s): 
 
30. Is it possible to receive/buy a published work? 
Received – Not received. 
 
Even if received, ask about 
 
31. The international and Hungarian “story” of the church/org.: 
Hand over Card II.; and mention the following keywords: founder(s), persecutions, allies, missions, 
organisational work, internal tensions, dates, members, converts, turnovers, children. 
 
IV. I would now ask several general questions about the membership. 
 
32. Does membership in the church have precise criteria? 
No – Yes 
 
33. If so, what are these? 
(Prompt the leader(s) to tell the official and”unofficial” reasons.) 
 
34. What are the sanctions, if any, when certain beliefs/practices are violated? 
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Do you have sympathizers, who are not members, but support your church organisation, e.g. 
 
35. Financially 
Yes – No – I do not know 
 
36. Morally, e. g. by attending centers, writing to news papers/MPs., etc. (Specify:) 
Yes – No – I do not know 
 
37. Is membership in other denominations possible at the same time? 
Not – Yes 
 
38. Are there different levels of membership? 
As a help, list the following possibilities (lay member, student/novice, monk/nun, teacher, guru, 
priest, minister, etc.) 
No – Yes 
 
39. If yes, what are these, and what are their characteristic duties? 
It may help if you ask the following question: 
Let us suppose, I convert now to your church/org. How could I become the leader of this 
church/org.? What stages must I go through? What would be my possibilities if I were a woman? 
Membership categories/levels (their main features) 
 
 
40. What was the total membership of your church/org. in Hungary on January 1, 2002? 
Clarify level of membership talking about. 
 
If you have the membership data of the church from 1996/97, note the direction of change; and ask 
why it was growing/declining? 
41. Reasons of growth/decline: 
NB difference between birth/death, conversion, leaving 
 
42. What is the age distribution of the membership like? 
3. approximately corresponds to that of the Hungarian Society 
4. younger 
5. older 
 
43. What is the gender distribution of the membership like? 
a. women and men are equally represented 
b. more women 
c. more men 
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44. Would it be possible to tabulate the members by age-groups, levels and gender? 
Hand over Card III. containing the tables. 
Age Male Female 
< 18   
18-30   
31-45   
46-60   
> 60   
 
Level Male Female 
   
   
   
   
   
 
45. Where do you have congregations/communities in Hungary?: 
Name them with the approximate number of members 
Budapest: number of members: ……. 
………….: number of members: ……. 
………….: number of members: ……. 
………….: number of members: ……. 
 
46. What is the proportion of mixed-membership? …………… member 
 
V. A few questions about the organisational structure of the church/org. 
 
47. How is the church/org. built up? 
(Let them explain it; try to draw a chart in the “Notes” section, then ask by choosing the closest 
one:) 
 
48. So the structure of the church is rather 
a. Episcopalian (explain), 
b. Presbyterian (explain), 
c. Congregationalist (explain) 
 
49. What charity work does the church do? 
(Hand over Card IV. listing the different charity works.) 
a. orphanage 
b. old age home 
c. feed homeless 
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d. shelter homeless 
e. care for disabled people 
f. alcohol rehabilitation 
g. drug rehabilitation 
h. other, specify: 
 
50. What charity work does the church intend to do in the future? 
i. orphanage 
j. old age home 
k. feed homeless 
l. shelter homeless 
m. care for disabled people 
n. alcohol rehabilitation 
o. drug rehabilitation 
p. other, specify: 
 
Still some questions related to the organisation 
 
51. Are the members’ children educated within the organisation? 
No – Kindergarten – Elementary school – High school (circle the appropriate one(s)) 
 
52. Sunday school or other religious education 
Yes – No 
Other specify: 
 
 
53. Do you consider the public education – supplemented by your organisation with the religious 
education – satisfactory for your children? 
Yes – No 
 
54. Does the church intend to establish its own child-care/school system? 
Yes – No 
 
(Hand over Card V. containing the following questions.) 
 
What is the teaching of the church/org. on the following issues? 
 
55. How many children should a couple have? 
a. as many as God wants them to have (not even natural method is allowed) 
b. it is completely up to the family, the church/org only condemns abortion and artificial birth 
control, 
c. it’s completely up to the family, the church/org condemns only abortion, 
d. it’s completely up to the family, the church/org does not have anything to say about it 
e. other: 
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56. Based on the teaching of the church, to what extent would you agree with the following 
statement: The father should be the family’s breadwinner, and the mother should stay at home with 
the children. 
1 2 3 4 5
completely disagree neutral completely agree
 
 
Based on the teaching of the church 
 Yes No No teaching 
57. Is pre-marital sexual relationship permitted?    
58. Is sexual relationship outside marriage permitted?    
59. Is partnership/common-law relationship permitted?    
60. Is divorce permitted?    
61. Is homosexuality permitted?    
62. The theory of evolution, developed by Darwin, 
describes properly the creation of the world.    
 
VI. And finally, I would like to ask some questions about the relationship of your church/org. 
and the wider society. I will proceed from the general to the particular. 
 
63. In your opinion, how does the Hungarian society relate to your church? As I said, first I would 
ask about your general opinion; there will be questions on specific institutions later. 
1 2 3 4 5
Hostile neutral friendly
 
In your opinion, how do the following societies relate to your church? 
1 2 3 4 5
Hostile neutral friendly (9, not applicable; 0: dk)
 
Society 1 2 3 4 5 9 0 
64. Rumanian        
65. Ukrainian        
66. Slovakian        
67. Czech        
68. Austrian        
69. Croatian        
70. Slovenian        
71. Yugoslavian        
72. American (US)        
73. French        
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74. How would you evaluate the Antall government’s church-policy? 
1 2 3 4 5
bad neutral good
 
75. What was good – if any – about it? 
 
76. What was bad – if any – about it? 
 
77. How would you evaluate the Horn government’s church-policy? 
1 2 3 4 5
bad neutral good
 
78. What was good – if any – about it? 
 
79. What was bad – if any – about it? 
 
80. How would you evaluate the Orban government’s church-policy? 
1 2 3 4 5
bad neutral good
 
81. What was good – if any – about it? 
 
82. What was bad – if any – about it? 
 
83. In your opinion, would it have been better if Semjen’s proposal defining what is NOT a religion 
had passed? 
1 2 3 4 5
much worse neutral much better
 
84. Do you agree with the statement that a government should somehow regulate the requirements 
of establishing a church? 
1 2 3 4 5
completely disagree neutral completely agree
 
85. Has the church/org. ever asked for financial support from the government? 
Yes – No 
 
86. Has it ever received any? 
Yes – No 
 
87. In your opinion, how does the Hungarian press relate to your church? 
1 2 3 4 5
Hostile neutral/objective friendly
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88. To what extent do you agree with the statement that the press associated with the socialist – 
liberal parties presents new religious organisations in a more favorable way? 
1 2 3 4 5
completely disagree neutral completely agree
 
89. What other churches does your church have good relationships with? 
Best ………………….. 
Second best …………………. 
Third best ………………… 
None 
 
90. What other churches does your church have bad relationships with? 
Worst …………………. 
Second worst …………………. 
Third worst …………………. 
None 
 
As the leader(s) of the church/org./community, to what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
1 2 3 4 5
completely disagree neutral completely agree 9: NA; 0: dk
 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 9 0 
91. We, as a church/religious organisation must play down 
the things that divide us and emphasize those things which 
make for unity. 
       
92. There are many roads that lead to 
Salvation/God/Nirvana/Clear/etc.        
93. Our church/org./community is one of many equally 
good/valid ways.        
94. For the sake of salvation/becoming clear/achieving 
Nirvana/etc. it would be better for our community to live 
apart from the rest of the world, say, on an isolated island. 
       
95. A church/org. should define the minimum requirements 
of salvation for those who are less sensitive to spirituality.        
96. Members of our church should restrict their friendships 
to fellow members.        
 
97. To what extent do you think that members of your church do in fact restrict their friendships to 
fellow members. 
1 2 3 4 5
not at all neutral completely agree 9: NA; 0: dk
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98. Is the members’ religious character externally recognizable at their workplaces? 
1 2 3 4 5
not at all e neutral completely agree 9: NA; 0: dk
 
99. I do not want to know the exact amount of your annual budget, but what are its sources? (Not 
only for the charity work, but in general. As a guideline, mention some possible sources.) 
 
Membership fees  ………… percentage 
Donations, collections  ………… percentage 
Publications  ………… percentage 
Services (specify)  ………… percentage 
Government subvention  ………… percentage 
Other  ………… percentage 
Other  ………… percentage 
 
Notes 
 
(– Note here those questions, which will be answered later. Note also the name and phone 
number/email address of the person who takes responsibility for the answers. 
– Draw here the structure of the church.) 
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